Aseres Yemei Teshuva and Parshas Vayelech. Sometimes, the Ribono shel Olam taps you on the shoulder.

Around a year ago, my wife and I began learning Tanach together. We have gone through Yehoshua, Shoftim, and Melachim, all with Rashi. My wife was not looking forward to beginning Yeshaya, because the Hebrew is idiomatic, and because it is so depressing. Nonetheless, we began. We found Rashi to be much lengthier than elsewhere, and that added to the challenge, so we cut down our usual twenty or so pesukim a night to five. We discussed changing our way of learning, because the length of Rashi made it so much harder, so maybe we would find another peirush for our seder, maybe the Radak.

Come Friday night, she says that it probably is not appropriate for her to learn Yeshaya on Shabbos, because it makes her teary eyed, as do all the stories of tragedies and missed opportunities. I say that we should try anyway. So we sit down to learn, including Rashi.  

Here are the Pesukim we learn Friday night.

לָמָּה־לִּ֤י רֹב־זִבְחֵיכֶם֙ יֹאמַ֣ר יְהוָ֔ה שָׂבַ֛עְתִּי עֹל֥וֹת אֵילִ֖ים וְחֵ֣לֶב מְרִיאִ֑ים וְדַ֨ם פָּרִ֧ים וּכְבָשִׂ֛ים וְעַתּוּדִ֖ים לֹ֥א חָפָֽצְתִּי׃

כִּ֣י תָבֹ֔אוּ לֵרָא֖וֹת פָּנָ֑י מִי־בִקֵּ֥שׁ זֹ֛את מִיֶּדְכֶ֖ם רְמֹ֥ס חֲצֵרָֽי׃

לֹ֣א תוֹסִ֗יפוּ הָבִיא֙ מִנְחַת־שָׁ֔וְא קְטֹ֧רֶת תּוֹעֵבָ֛ה הִ֖יא לִ֑י חֹ֤דֶשׁ וְשַׁבָּת֙ קְרֹ֣א מִקְרָ֔א לֹא־אוּכַ֥ל אָ֖וֶן וַעֲצָרָֽה׃

חָדְשֵׁיכֶ֤ם וּמוֹעֲדֵיכֶם֙ שָׂנְאָ֣ה נַפְשִׁ֔י הָי֥וּ עָלַ֖י לָטֹ֑רַח נִלְאֵ֖יתִי נְשֹֽׂא׃

וּבְפָרִשְׂכֶ֣ם כַּפֵּיכֶ֗ם אַעְלִ֤ים עֵינַי֙ מִכֶּ֔ם גַּ֛ם כִּֽי־תַרְבּ֥וּ תְפִלָּ֖ה אֵינֶ֣נִּי שֹׁמֵ֑עַ יְדֵיכֶ֖ם דָּמִ֥ים מָלֵֽאוּ׃

רַחֲצוּ֙ הִזַּכּ֔וּ הָסִ֛ירוּ רֹ֥עַ מַעַלְלֵיכֶ֖ם מִנֶּ֣גֶד עֵינָ֑י חִדְל֖וּ הָרֵֽעַ׃

לִמְד֥וּ הֵיטֵ֛ב דִּרְשׁ֥וּ מִשְׁפָּ֖ט אַשְּׁר֣וּ חָמ֑וֹץ שִׁפְט֣וּ יָת֔וֹם רִ֖יבוּ אַלְמָנָֽה׃

לְכוּ־נָ֛א וְנִוָּֽכְחָ֖ה יֹאמַ֣ר יְהוָ֑ה אִם־יִֽהְי֨וּ חֲטָאֵיכֶ֤ם כַּשָּׁנִים֙ כַּשֶּׁ֣לֶג יַלְבִּ֔ינוּ אִם־יַאְדִּ֥ימוּ כַתּוֹלָ֖ע כַּצֶּ֥מֶר יִהְיֽוּ׃

אִם־תֹּאב֖וּ וּשְׁמַעְתֶּ֑ם ט֥וּב הָאָ֖רֶץ תֹּאכֵֽלוּ׃

וְאִם־תְּמָאֲנ֖וּ וּמְרִיתֶ֑ם חֶ֣רֶב תְּאֻכְּל֔וּ כִּ֛י פִּ֥י יְהוָ֖ה דִּבֵּֽר׃ 

Rashi on passuk 16:

רחצו הזכו. (פתח הוא) ל' צווי לפי שהוא מגזרת רחץ, אבל רחצו קמץ לשון עבר שהוא מגזרת רחץ

 רחצו. הזכו. הסירו. חדלו. למדו. דרשו. אשרו. שפטו. ריבו. לכו.

י' אזהרות של ל' תשובה יש כאן כנגד עשרת ימי תשובה וכנגד עשרה מלכיות זכרונות ושופרות:

".... Wash, purify, remove, cease, learn, seek, uphold, judge, fight, come: ten mandates of repentance here, corresponding to the Ten Days of Repentance [between Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur] and corresponding to the ten verses of Kingship, Remembrance, and Shofar."


The ten imperatives in Pesukim 16, 17, and 18, correspond to the עשרת ימי תשובה. I never would have known this. How often are the עשרת ימי תשובה referred to in Tanach? So far, only one other place, where Naval died ten days after he insulted Dovid HaMelech, those were the עשרת ימי תשובה (RH 18a.) To have learned Tanach a whole year, to get to Yeshaya, to wonder whether yes Rashi or no Rashi, to decide to do it anyway, and to do it now, and to learn davka the pesukim that are meramez to the עשרת ימי תשובה, that is not just general information. 


Even more: This week is Parshas Vayelech. In 31:18, the Torah warns us that Klal Yisrael will face Hester Panim.

ואנכי הסתר אסתיר פני ביום ההוא על כל הרעה אשר עשה כי פנה אל אלהים אחרים

Rashi in Yeshaya 8:17 brings a Yerushalmi (San 10:32) that discusses the "Hester Panim" mentioned in our Parsha. The Yerushalmi says that there was no worse moment of Nevu'ah than that moment when the Ribono shel Olam said through Moshe Rabbeinu that there would be הסתר פנים.

וחכיתי לה' המסתיר פניו וגו'. אין לך נבואה קשה כאותה שעה שאמר משה (דברים ל״א:י״ח) ואנכי הסתר אסתיר פני ביום ההוא

We are used to thinking of הסתר פנים like the story of Megillas Esther, that Hashem hides from us, that His Hashgacha Pratis is hidden behind Teva. But the Navi Yeshayahu tells us that there is an aspect of Hester Panim that is much, much, worse than that. This is the aspect kind of Hester Panim that the Gemara in Chagiga (4b) uses our pesukim in Yeshaya 1:12 to explain.

רב הונא כי מטי להאי קרא יראה יראה בכי אמר עבד שרבו מצפה לו לראותו יתרחק ממנו דכתיב כי תבואו לראות פני מי בקש זאת מידכם רמוס חצרי.

This is an aspect of Hester Panim where Hashem doesn't want your mitzvos. 

The Navi Yeshaya applies this to the Avoda of the Beis HaMikdash - I have no interest in your korbanos. Who asked you to make Aliyah LeRegel? Your Yomtov gatherings make me tired. But the Rambam and Rabbeinu Yonah explain that this הסתר פנים is not limited to the things the Navi Yeshaya described, it is total. All the mitzvos you do are rejected by the Ribono shel Olam. This is not an issue of עבירה מכבה. This is an iron curtain created by failure to do Teshuva.

The Rambam (Teshuva 7:7) says that when a person has not done Teshuva, the RBSO does not want a person's mitzvos. Not just Aliya l'regel - all mitzvos.

כַּמָּה מְעֻלָּה מַעֲלַת הַתְּשׁוּבָה. אֶמֶשׁ הָיָה זֶה מֻבְדָּל מֵה' אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה נט ב) "עֲוֹנוֹתֵיכֶם הָיוּ מַבְדִּלִים בֵּינֵכֶם לְבֵין אֱלֹהֵיכֶם". צוֹעֵק וְאֵינוֹ נַעֲנֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה א טו) "כִּי תַרְבּוּ תְפִלָּה" וְגוֹ'. וְעוֹשֶׂה מִצְוֹת וְטוֹרְפִין אוֹתָן בְּפָנָיו שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה א יב) "מִי בִקֵּשׁ זֹאת מִיֶּדְכֶם רְמֹס חֲצֵרָי", (מלאכי א י) "מִי גַם בָּכֶם וְיִסְגֹּר דְּלָתַיִם" וְגוֹ'. וְהַיּוֹם הוּא מֻדְבָּק בַּשְּׁכִינָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים ד ד) "וְאַתֶּם הַדְּבֵקִים בַּה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם". צוֹעֵק וְנַעֲנֶה מִיָּד שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה סה כד) "וְהָיָה טֶרֶם יִקְרָאוּ וַאֲנִי אֶעֱנֶה". וְעוֹשֶׂה מִצְוֹת וּמְקַבְּלִין אוֹתָן בְּנַחַת וְשִׂמְחָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (קהלת ט ז) "כִּי כְבָר רָצָה הָאֱלֹהִים אֶת מַעֲשֶׂיךָ". וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא שֶׁמִּתְאַוִּים לָהֶם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (מלאכי ג ד) "וְעָרְבָה לַה' מִנְחַת יְהוּדָה וִירוּשָׁלםִ כִּימֵי עוֹלָם וּכְשָׁנִים קַדְמֹנִיּוֹת":

Rabbeinu Yona says this in Shaarei Teshuva (א' מ"א) as well. 

העיקר הט"ז התפלה. יתפלל אל השם ויבקש רחמים לכפר את כל עונותיו. שנאמר (הושע יד) קחו עמכם דברים ושובו אל ה' אמרו אליו כל תשא עון וקח טוב ונשלמה פרים שפתינו. זה ענין הוידוי. אמרו אליו כל תשא עון וקח טוב. זה ענין התפלה. ופירושו - וקח טוב מעשה הטוב שעשינו. כי אמרו ז"ל עבירה מכבה מצוה. ובעת התשובה יתכפרו העונות ותתעורר זכות המצוה ויאיר נרה. אחרי אשר לא הגיה אורו לפני התשובה. וכן כתיב (איוב ח) אם זך וישר אתה כי עתה יעיר עליך ושלם נות צדקך. אמרו רבותינו זכרונם לברכה אם זך וישר היית לא נאמר. אלא אם זך וישר אתה. שעשית תשובה. כי עתה יעיר עליך. עתה אחרי התשובה שעשית. יעיר עליך כל הצדקות שעשית מלפנים ואשר היה ביתך פתוח לרוחה. ונטעת אשל אכסניא. כמ"ש (שם לא) דלתי לאורח אפתח וקודם התשובה לא היו צדקותיך מגינות עליך. ואחרי שובך וסר עונך. יעיר זכותך ושלם נות צדקך.

All the mitzvos, and maasim tovim, and Torah, that you did, Hashem tears them up in front of you; Only after Teshuva they are changed into zechusim. 

Reb Ahron (Mishnas Rebbi Ahron/Torah/Vayeilech, p 368)

ובאמת זהו עיקר גדר קלקול העוון, ההבדלה והריחוק בין האדם לבוראו, וכדכתיב (ישעיהו נ"ט ב') "כי אם עוונותיכם היו מבדילים ביניכם ובין אלקיכם" ומגיע הריחוק עד כדי כך שאין רוצים במצוותיו, וכמש"כ הרמב"ם בהל' תשובה פרק ז' ה"ז שעושה מצוות וטורפין אותן בפניו שנאמר מי בקש זאת מידכם רמוס חצרי וגם תורתו אינה רצויה וכדכתיב תהלים ג' ט"ז ולרשע אמר אלוקים מה לך לספר חקי ותשא בריתי עלי פיך והגדר הוא שאין למצוותיו ותורתו מבוא וכניסה לפנים ובגדר מה דתנו יזנה כ"ח ב' משל לעבד שבא למזוג כוס לרבו ושפך לו קיתון על פניו וזהו מה שאמרו סוטה כ"א א' עבירה מכבה מצוה ואפילו בעסק התורה שבה אמרו שם אין עבירה מכבה תורה אבל מ"מ יש שהאדם מגיע לדרגה כזו שגם תורתו אינה רצויה עד שאומרים לו מה לך לספר חקי ואף שברור ופשוט הוא שגם אז מחוייב הוא בתורה ומצוות אך מ"מ אינם לרצון וכמו שנאמר בקרבנות שמות יח יח לרצרן להם וכן הוא בכל מעשי המצוות שכולם נקראים ריצוי ובזה שעוונותיו מבדילין בינו לבין קונו ומרחיקין אותו ממנו ית' אינו במצב של רצוי 

ובאמת שחשיבות תורתו ומצוותיו של האדם הוא כפי התקרבותו אל ה' וכמש"כ בממ"י פ' ט"ו כשם שאינו עולה על המזבח אלא סולת מנופה וכו' כן אינו עולה על רצון מזבחו העליון וכו' אלא המובחר שבמעשים הטהור וכות ונמצא דמשקל התורה והמצוות הוא לפי מדרגתו בכלל אף שהמצוה עצמה נעשית בתכסיס שוה 

That means that when a person does not do Teshuva, then his heartfelt davening is not a davening, his mehuderdikkeh tefillin is not tefillin, his hasmada in Torah is not Torah. Only with Teshuva do these things turn to your eternal benefit.

Learning this Friday night of Shabbos Shuva felt like a Navi knocked at my door with a message from the Ribono shel Olam. "The Ribono shel Olam wants you to know this: It is the עשרת ימי תשובה, and you had better take this very, very, seriously."

We don't have neviim, we don't even have a bas kol. But we apparently do have something. That "something" arranged that after almost a year of learning Tanach, during Aseres Yemei Teshuva, the night before we read in Parshas Vayeilech about Hester Panim, we read a Rashi that told me that until a person does Teshuva, all his Mitzvos and Maasim Tovim just make the Ribono shel Olam tired. They bring no Ritzui. The person is in a self imposed condition of Hester Panim, a Hester Panim that means not only that Hashem is hidden from him, but far worse, that Hashem does not want to see him or his pathetic mitzvos and Torah.  In order to escape from that miserable condition, the Navi told us we have Aseres Yemei Teshuva. These Aseres Yemei Teshuva are not just a matter of time passing. They represent the ten steps a person must take to climb out of his pit of Hester Panim. They are  

 רחצו. הזכו. הסירו. חדלו. למדו. דרשו. אשרו. שפטו. ריבו. לכו.

The Gaon in his Peirush on Nach (MHK) says
טז רחצו וגו' חשב כאן תשעה דברים ואחר כך אמר לכו נא ונוכחה והמה כנגד עשרת ימי תשובה והעשירי יום הכפורים ואמר בפסוק הראשון ד' דברים רחצו הזכו הסירו חדלו שהם ד' דרכי התשובה היינו חרטה וידוי עזיבת החטא ולחדול מכל הדברים שהביאו לחטוא והם כנגד ארבעה פעולות שבאדם במחשבה בדיבור במעשה והמעשה נחלק לשתים עשה ולא תעשה יז למדו היטב הרגילו את עצמכם להיטיב דרשו לדרוש יפה אשרו לשון הדרכה כמ"ש רש"י ורצה לומר הגזול תמיד שלא היה יכול לילך בדרך מפני העושקים ורצחנים וז"ש בחולם לשון מקור שהיה תמיד עשוק וגזול תדריכוהו שפטו בשביל היתום כמו שפטני אלהים וריבו הוא יותר כי שפיטה מדת השופט וריב הוא מדת בעל דין ואצל אלמנה שהיא מעונה יותר מהיתום וגם כל כבודה פנימה אמר ריבו שתהיה בעל דין בשבילה 

The notes from R Meir Yehoshua Katzenellenbogen there:

 ביאור פסוק זה בכת"י וז"ל 

"רחצו הזכו הסירו כו' חדלו אמר כאן כב' פסוקים יו"ד דברים נגד יו"ד ימי תשובה. ובפסוק הראשון הוא דברים נגד ד' דרכי תשובה והם חרטה וידוי ועזיבת החטא. דהיינו אם גזל ישיב את הגזילה' וכן כל דבר יקבל על עצמו שלא לעשות עוד' והם נגד מחשבה דיבור ומעשה. ומעשה הוא ב' דברים עשה ולא תעשה, והיינו חרטה בלב נגד מחשבה, וידוי הוא בפה נגד דיבור, עזיבת החטא נגד מעשה שהוא משיב הגזילה וכדומה, ומה שקיבל על עצמו שלא לעשות עוד נגד לא תעשה, וז"ש (דברים ל יד) בפיך ובלבבך לעשותו. וז"ש: רחצו היינו חרטה, הזכו הוא וידוי, הסירו כו' כמשמעו עזיבת החטא. 

[בליקוטים: להסיר כל העבירות מה שגזל יחזיר לבעליו וכן בכל העבירות יראה לתקנם] חדלו הרע שיקבל על עצמו שלא לעשות עוד." [בליקוטים: נמצא יש בארבעה אלו שתיים לעבר ושתים להבא, רחצו הזכו לעבר, הסירו חדלו להבא. וע"ש עוד] 

Reb Tzadok Pri Tzadik Devarim 11:

והנה אמר בתוכחה זו עשרה לשונות של תשובה, רחצו, הזכו וגו' עד לכו נא ונוכחה וגו' כפירוש רש"י ז"ל, והיינו הטהרה והזדככות מצד האדם כסדר להיות מקודם סור מרע במחשבה ובמעשה, ואחר כך להיות ועשה טוב גם כן במחשבה ובמעשה, כי הד' ראשונים המה בסור מרע, רחצו הזכו הוא במחשבה בלב, הסירו חדלו הוא במעשה, ואחר זה ד' בחינות כנ"ל בועשה טוב, ולמדו היטב הוא הכנה לזה ללמד את עצמו אופן העשה טוב, ודרשו ואשרו חמוץ הוא במחשבה, ושפטו יתום ריבו אלמנה הוא עשה טוב בפועל. ואחר כל אלה לכו נא ונוכחה שיהיה מעתה בכח להיות נקרא מהלך, כמו שנאמר "אשרי תמימי דרך ההולכים בתורת ה'", כי כל עוד שלא נטהר מחלאת הנפש הוא נסבך בסבכי חטאים עד שאין בו כח לזוז את עצמו ולהלוך. ומעתה אם יהיו חטאיכם כשנים היינו דבר הנפעל ונצבע לעצמו, כשלג ילבינו, שיוכל להתהפך לתכלית הלבנונית להיות עזה כשלג, כי כבר בא על ידי מעשיו לתשובה עלאה שזדונות נעשים כזכיות. וגם תיבת רחצו הוא בחינת תשובה תתאה בהרהור במחשבה בלבד, שאמרו על זה שזדונות נעשים כשגגות... וגם אם יאדימו כתולע, שהוא לשון מפעיל כתולעת שצובע את אחרים, היינו גם מי שהחטיא את אחרים יש בכח להתהפך כצמר על כל פנים שהוא במדרגה למטה משלג, כידוע משאת כצמר לבן, כי גם אלישע אחר ששמע מאחורי הפרגוד שובו בנים שובבים חוץ מאחר (חגיגה ט"ו), והיה זה מפני שאין מספיקין בידו, ועם כל זה היה בזה התעוררות לדחוק את עצמו והיה מועיל תשובתו גם כן כדאיתא בשל"ה הקדש, וגם לירבעם שחטא והחטיא תפסו הקב"ה בבגדו שישוב... (שם דברים יא)

Rabbi Krasner speaks about this at length in his amazing Nachalas Shimon on Yeshaya 1, numbers 31 and 41, and brings from the Noda Biyehuda a long discussion of how the Rambam could say what he says and his makor. Among other things, the idea is that וְעוֹשֶׂה מִצְוֹת וְטוֹרְפִין אוֹתָן בְּפָנָיו  doesn't mean that he doesn't get schar. It means that his schar goes to where his ikker roots/yenika are/is, so if he is a ben olam hazeh, all the schar goes to olam hazeh. If he does teshuva, and becomes a ben olam haba, then his schar goes to the olam haruchni, to olam haba.

Helping Your Friends Do Teshuva. כפייה דתית

Two parts:  Part two is is Divrei Torah. 

PART I

There's a tendency to favor simplicity, the easy-to-understand half-truths that free us from trying to comprehend a complex whole.  Still, sometimes these bromides can yield some insight.  For example: the distinction between Humans and other creatures, that "only a Human is capable of intentionally killing himself" is true, but it's not the only difference.  Still, it does focus our attention on one aspect of what being human means.


Almost all religions are exclusivist.  They teach that their truth is the only truth, and that other religions are false and, by omission or commission, passively or actively, evil.  But to what extent do they require that their adherents impose their beliefs on others?  That great intellectual achievement of Western society, that religion is a matter of personal conscience and outside the ambit of the state or of other individuals, is a purely political concept, and tells us nothing about theoretical religious doctrine.   Of course there is a wide gulf between theoretical religion and practical religion, and the practicalities of living among others in a heterogeneous civil society mandates some degree of tolerance.  But there are definitely differences between religions in this matter; what does a religion's theological doctrine on tolerance of or respect for other religions tell us about that religion?  I'm not claiming that this discussion will tell us everything about a religion.  But it does focus our attention on one aspect of what it means to be faithful to that religion.


There are really several aspects to this question.  We find differences in applying this concept to members of the same religion who have sinned, to minority non-co-religionists who live in a state that defines itself as being "of religion X," and to non-co-religionists who live outside the borders of the religious state.


Another question: among those religions that hold that their beliefs should be imposed on others, what is the motive for that imposition?  There are four distinct possibilities: 

• 1. As charity, for the spiritual benefit of the other (to save him from burning in Hell, to save a lost soul, etc.).  
• 2. As service to god.  Just as sins are offensive to god, so too are sinners; unbelievers are by definition sinners and should therefore be eliminated.  (You could also call this punishment, or Ubi'arta Hara Mikirbecha, but I think the way I put it is sharper.)  
• 3. Shared liability.  Any sin that we could prevent, but don't prevent, has been committed because of our inaction.  It is our fault that it occurred, and to some extent it is as if we did the sin.
• 4. To protect the true religion, because the existence of non-believers can engender doubt in the minds of the servants of the true god.  (Before we got married, my wife met a very sincere woman who told her she should light candles for Shabbos even before she gets married.  My wife said that in her family, they don't light until they get married.  The other person said "But the Rebbe says you should."  My wife answered, "My rebbe, Reb Moshe Feinstein, said I shouldn't."  The other, with a perplexed look of utter confusion, said, "There's another Rebbe?????")

I don't mean the items in this list to be mutually exclusive.  One, or two, or all of the reasons might apply.


David Rohde, in an article he wrote for the New York Times (October 19 of 2009), described his seven month`s as a captive of the Taliban.  He wrote

Citing the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam, he said it was every Muslim’s duty to try to stop others from sinning. If one person in a village commits a sin, those who witness it and do not stop him will also be punished by God.

Pressing me to convert, one commander ordered me to read a passage of the Koran each day and discuss it with him at night. He dismissed my arguments that a forced conversion was not legitimate. He and the guards politely said they felt sorry for me. If I failed to convert, they said, I would suffer excruciating pain in the fires of hell.

At one point, a visiting fighter demanded to know why I would not obey. He said that if it were up to him, he would take me outside and offer me a final chance to convert. If I refused, he would shoot me. 

That is pretty forthright, but you can't really prove anything from an ignorant man-child with a gun who is emulating a morally stunted illiterate.


The Christians have changed their overt behavior over time, generally from proselytization by force to earnest evangelism.  Even in the earliest years, there were some moments of tolerance: In the year 633, The fourth council of Toledo declared that

“men ought not be compelled to believe (or rather pretend to believe) because God will have mercy on those on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth.  Man fell by his own free will in listening to the tempter, and suffering himself to be misled by the wiles of the serpent, and so he could only be converted by his free acceptance of the Christian faith.”

And there is a very poignant record of the Jewish community's attempts to convince the Visigothic King Sisebut of Hispania (565-612) to leave them alone and not force them to convert to Christianity here.

Hindus and Buddhists really don't care a fig for what others do or don't believe; The pluralism they espouse, I think, bespeaks a theological blurriness, and they're kind of embarrassed about the whole thing.  Islam has gone through various stages, from the formative stage of violent forced conversion, to a long and wonderful period of tolerance, and back to nuts again.


What do we Jews believe?  Can we do the Torquemada thing, too?  Certainly, we have a mitzva of rebuking and educating people who are not being mekayeim mitzvos.  But intimidation is much more effective.  As a certain mobster once said, "You can get a lot more done with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone."  More seriously, it's obvious that if we did go along this path, we could never replicate what the Spanish did during the Inquisition.  We don't have that kind of bloodiness in our national makeup.  But I want to talk about both theory and practice.


This has a lot to do with the Aseres Yemei Teshuva.  It's so very hard to modify our behavior!  Breaking habits to the extent that we can be confident we will never revert is practically quixotic.  Judging from those poor people who have their stomachs banded, and who manage to regain all their weight, succeeding at permanent behavioral change is vanishingly rare.  On the other hand, it's easy to force other people to do the right thing.  We've all seen the morbidly obese person hectoring a diabetic to undertake a spartan lifestyle, and we've all seen smokers curling their lip in disdain at the sight of a person like them lighting up in public.  If we've despaired of doing teshuva ourselves, can we at least make our friends and neighbors do teshuva?   Not only is it easy to make other people do the right thing, it is also very enjoyable.  It provides a sense of superiority and rectitude at no personal cost.

And this is not such an abhorrent notion.  Would you not agree that a father or mother could impose their beliefs on their children?  What about a grandfather, or an uncle, or a cousin?  Where does the familial right of enforced indoctrination end?  And what about the regulation of psychoactive drugs and alcohol and tobacco? Are we not interfering in personal matters of choice?  And what about traffic safety laws that require the use of seat belts and penalize failure to use them?  Or do we have a right to protect society from the costs of irresponsibility, and even protect individuals against their own bad choices?  Is כפייה דתית, religious coercion, different? 

PART II

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 16 brings the first passuk in Shoftim, Devarim 16:18, to show that we are required to establish a system of justice that is empowered to enforce all religious law, including matters of public morality, transgressions of prohibitions, and refusal to fulfill religious obligations.  This empowerment is absolute, and the means of enforcement is left to the judges' discretion.  This rule primarily pertains only to the official court system operating within Israel or other areas of Jewish autonomy.  Can individuals take the law into their own hand?  What obligation do we have regarding non-Jews?  What obligations do we have regarding Jews outside Israel,, or outside areas of self-government?

The Rosh in Bava Kamma 27-28, brought by the Rema CM 421:13, says that one is permitted to strike another Jew in order to prevent him from transgressing an Isur. Therefore, if one sees a Jew chasing another Jew to hit him, he may use physical force in order to stop the perpetrator.  This, however, involves the defense of a victim, not simple religious enforcement.

The Rema in EH 154:3 also brings, as a Yeish Omrim, the Trumas Hadeshen  (#414) permits a person to hit his or her spouse in order to prevent the spouse from cursing his or her parents.  This case, too, can be seen as a legitimate response to verbal assault, and not at all a matter of enforcing religious law.

However: The Sheiltos (#27)  indicates that not only may one use physical force to prevent another from doing any aveira now, but he can also do so to prevent him from doing aveiros in the future.  But the Trumas Hadeshen limits his halacha to cases where the one is responsible for the other, such as a parent or a master, or a spouse, depending on how society views a spouse.

The Maharshal (YSS Bava Kamma 3:9) limits this to a Muchzak b’kashrus.  (By the way, I'm not convinced that he's making this distinction on the basis of the Mishna in Sanhedrin about Kana'im, which would limit it's relevance to muchzakim b'kashrus, like Pinchas.  I think he says this because if we allowed the shabavnikim to do it, Judaism would descend to utter anarchy and chaos.  Like in Mei'ach She'arim.)  He explains that the Rosh we quoted in the beginning, who seems to grant a blanket hetter for everyone to do so, is only talking about a sin that hurts other people, and the Rosh that allows intervention only allows it in order to save the victim, just as we find by a rodeif achar arayos or retzicha, but not by a rodef after avoda zara.

On the other hand, the Gemara in Ksuvos 86a that states that if a person refuses to build a sukka or take a lulav, “they beat him….” until he changes his mind.  This obviously is not talking about a sin that affects anyone else.  Even so, the Nesivos in CM 3:1 says that the din of Makin oso is not limited to Beis Din.  You and I can take the law into our own hands as well, even using physical coercion to force a person do his personal mitzva, like lulav or sukka, and certainly to stop him from doing aveiros now or in the future.  (The Nesivos in his Chavos Da’as in YD 161:6 seems to contradict this.)  The Ketzos in his Meshoveiv Nesivos there says, like the Maharshal, that the hetter for an individual to use physical force only applies where he is preventing an imminent aveira, not to prevent a future aveira, and he limits the Gemara in Ksuvos to Beis Din.


(By the way, although the Nesivos would allow you to hit someone who was talking during davenning, you are not allowed to embarrass him in public, to be malbin panav.  So take him outside and then smack him.)

The Netziv in Haamek She’lah 27:6 and the Shaar Hatziyun in OC 608:8 say that the Rambam, and therefore the halacha, only frees the vigilante from civil liability, but not that it is muttar to do so.  This is clear in both the Rambam in 3 Avadim 5 and 6 Dei’os 5, as cited by the Shaar Hatziyun.

In any case, everyone agrees that if a person has the ability to rebuke a sinner, that person is obligated to do so under the din of Arvus, under the din of “Hochei’ach Tochi’ach” and (Ramban there) because of “Arur asher lo yakim as divrei hatorah hazos.”

 So, as it turns out, it's only the She'iltos and the Nesivos in CM (self-contradicted by the Nesivos in his Chavos Daas in YD) that give a blanket hetter for individual vigilantism for aveiros.  The Maharshal limits it to individuals who are Muchzak B'kashrus.  Everyone agrees that Beis Din can impose and enforce religious requirements.

Going back to the beginning of this post, the question remains:  Does this concept, that we, either as individuals or as a society, impose our beliefs upon others by force, apply only to fellow Jews, or even to non-Jews??  I say that this would depend on whether you learn this halacha from, on the one hand, hochei'ach, which is specific to Amisecha, or Areivus, which is only lanu ulvaneinu- for Jews, or, on the other hand, from Arur.  I also pointed out that there were three possible motives for proselytization: charity, destruction of evil, and elimination of bad examples from the public forum.  These three possibilities are also implied respectively by the dinim of hochei'ach, arvus, and arur.




In practical terms, Judaism never ever was interested in imposing its beliefs outside of its home grounds.   While we certainly believe that it would be in the gentiles' best interest to adopt our theology, we never, ever, took a step to force this doctrine on others, even when we were a dominant power.  Maybe that says something about the calm confidence of Judaism.  We have nothing to prove to ourselves or to others.  If you want to join us in our Avodas Hashem, you're welcome.  If not, have a good life.


Eli, in the comments, quotes Avishag Hashunamis, who said (Sanhedrin 22a) חסריה לגנבא נפשיה לשלמא נקיט, that a certain person's profession of piety was merely a way of hiding his impotence.


Still and all, I maintain that there are real and true and fundamental distinctions between the behavior of the Jews and that of other nations, such as our excess of mercy, despite historical figures like Leizer Kaganovich.  Our behavior towards people of other religions, I believe, is another example of our unique character, even if it was not always strictly observed.

And here's an interesting yedi'ah.  The Rambam in 8 Melachim 10 says that Moshe Rabbeinu received a commandment from Hashem to impose the Seven Noachide Mitzvos on all mankind.  However,there's a fascinating discussion from R Dovid Pardo in his pirush on the Sifrei, in Ki Seitzei, on passuk 21:14, where he states that the Ramban there holds that the requirement of imposing the seven mitzvos on gentiles only applies to those gentiles that choose to live among us in Eretz Yisrael.  We have no obligation or interest in going outside of our borders and imposing our beliefs on the gentiles.  He brings that the Ra'avad also holds like that, and that despite the literal meaning of the Rambam, it could be that the Rambam agrees with this.

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On another note:  I recently came across something from the Breslevers, and since they are just now coming back from Uman, I found it to be an interesting window into what they're all about.  I'm just putting the link here, and you'll have to translate it yourself.

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The Chumros of the Aseres Yemei Teshuva

Chazal say (sotah 2a) that it is as 'difficult', so to speak, for the Ribono shel Olam, to successfully match a chasan and a kallah as it was to split the Red Sea at the time of Yetzias Mitzrayim. Similarly, there is a Gemara (Pesachim 118) that says that it is as 'hard' for Hashem to provide a parnassa for a man as it was to split the Red Sea. How are we to understand these puzzling Gemaros?

It's hard to know what constitutes "difficulty" for the Ribono shel Olam. But Chazal do tell us that a conflict arose as Klal Yisrael left Mitzrayim. When Hashem told the sea to split, the sea, or the malach that represented the sea, refused, because Halalu ovdei avoda zara, vehalalu ovdei avoda zara-- this group worships idols and that group worships idols. In other words, the sea protested and said "Yes, when I was created, I was created on the condition that when this time will come, I will suspend natural law and allow the fleeing Jews to cross me, and then inundate the pursuing Egyptians. But where are the Jews? I see no difference between the two groups. Both look like idolaters. Why should I save the lives of one group and drown the other, when they are basically indistinguishable? They all look like Mitzrim to me." But Hashem said that while the difference might be only incipient and vestigial, nonetheless, there was a difference, and Hashem insisted that the Red Sea split.

When a young couple goes out, they are on their best behavior; they dress, eat, and talk with a constant awareness that they have to make a good impression, that they cannot disappoint the person who has committed their lives to them. A few years later, the perspective has entirely shifted. The spouse is taken for granted, children and profession are the foremost if not the only concerns, and so forth. This is not the Chasan and Kallah of a few years ago. That the relationship built on entirely different personnae survives is a miracle- a miracle akin to the splitting of the sea.

When we daven on Yom Kippur, we stand there in our kittels, we don't eat, we don't engage in unnecessary talk, we spend twenty four hours like pure angels, and we ask Hashem to please, please, give us a tranquil life and financial success so we can do chesed, and so we can learn and support those who learn. So Hashem looks down and sees us behaving in the holy manner that we were born to achieve, and Hashem brings the malach of bracha and parnasa and hatzlacha and says "Look, see this beautiful, holy man? I want you to bring him all the blessings he is asking for." A few weeks later, the malach is summoned to do his work, and he comes down to the world, and he looks at the man, and the malach says to himself, "Who is this guy? This isn't the person Hashem showed me on Yom Kippur, the tzadik with an angelic countenance whose pure tefillos and desire to serve Hashem brought tears to my eyes! This guy I see in front of me blew off his chavrusa because he got araingetohn into fantasy football on his stupid computer. There is no way this is the same person." And the malach goes home.

The Mechaber in OC 603 says that during the Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva, everyone should try to avoid Pas Palter, and should be machmir on things that he normally would not be. This is certainly a meritorious thing, and any builder will tell you that when you lay the foundation, you have to be hyper-meticulous, because the most trivial, initially invisible deviation will set in place a trajectory that, after you build ten stories, will cause a disasterous collapse. The Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva are the year's foundation, and nothing is 'inconsequential": we need to set the foundation of the year into place without even the most minor flaw.

But let's try to remember that after Yom Kippur, when the real world reasserts itself, when petty concerns seem momentous, when Sukkos duties demand our attention, that we need to retain enough of the Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva so that when the malach comes down with the bracha, at least he'll find some resemblance to the person Hashem pointed out to him on Yom Kippur.