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Showing posts with label Massei. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Massei. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 03, 2013

Massei, A Guest Post on the Forty Two Journeys of Bnei Yisrael

Two weeks ago, when we read Parshas Balak, I mentioned the Gemara (Sanhedrin 105b) that one should seek to do mitzvos even if he is lacking the requisite intentions, as we see from Balak.  Because Balak offered up forty two sacrifices, he merited that Rus, the mother of the monarchy of Klal Yisrael, descended from him.

לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ובמצווה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה שבשכר ארבעים ושתים קרבנות שהקריב בלק זכה ויצאה ממנו רות

I brought this up in order to lead into a conversation about the Gemara that says that a mitzva done with imperfect intentions, שלא לשמה, is also a great thing and will lead to perfected mitzvos.   What sort of imperfection is included in the term שלא לשמה?  (This is widely discussed, e.g., Brachos 17a and Tosfos there, Pesachim 50b, etc.)  Reb Chaim Volozhiner in the Ruach Chaim says that it only means that he does it for some other reason but in his heart he wishes to some day do it with a purity of intent.  This seems to contradict the Gemara that includes Balak's sacrifices under the rubric of שלא לשמה, Shelo Lishma.  One answer might be that the expression שלא לשמה as applied to Balak and Bilaam means something different than that expression as applied to anyone else, because of the unique quality of Bilaam's extraordinary but equally deviant spirituality.  But the answer we said was that Balak sincerely wanted to serve God, but he wanted to do so by supplanting the Jews.  He said that he could serve God better than the Jews could, considering their failure at the sin of the Egel.

After that discussion, Harry F asked about the significance of the number forty two, and I didn't know the answer.  He said that he seems to remember that there is a name of God that has forty two letters, and perhaps Balak's sacrifices were intended to propitiate that name of God.  Of course he is right, and it just highlights my unfortunate weakness of learning and immediately forgetting anything of that sort.  One would think that I would at least remember something so important that it explains life, the universe, and everything.  As penance, I am posting a translation of Rabbi Pinchas Friedman's dvar torah on this week's parsha (Shvilei Pinchas.)  The translation is done, as always, by my dear friend, Dr. Barry Fox.




The Holy Baal Shem Tov’s Amazing Revelation

From the Day of One’s Birth to the Day of One’s Passing Every Person
Makes All Forty-Two Journeys Made by Yisrael in the Midbar

On the upcoming Shabbat kodesh, we will read from the Torah the double portion of Matot-Masei.  This week, we would like to focus, b’ezrat Hashem, on parshat Masei.  Every year, without exception, we read parshat Masei on the middle Shabbat of the three weeks of “bein hametzarim.”  

The Gemara (Megillah 31b) teaches us that Ezra HaSofer methodically arranged the Torah readings for the entire year.  It stands to reason, therefore, that the institution to read parshat Masei on the second Shabbat of “bein hametzarim” serves a distinct purpose.  In this parsha, the Torah enumerates the forty-two journeys that Yisrael travelled in the midbar.  This teaches us that there is an intimate connection between the journeys travelled by Yisrael in the midbar and the difficult journeys we travel during all of the various exiles.  

Twenty-one Days and Twenty-one Nights Corresponding to Forty-two Journeys

Amazingly, the Maggid of Kozhnitz, zy”a, in Avodat Yisrael, states that the twenty-one days and twenty-one nights of the three weeks of “bein hametzarim” correspond to the forty-two journeys.  Here is what he writes: 
"והנה פרשה הזאת נקראת תמיד בין המצרים, שהם נחשבים כ"א יום כמו שפירש רש"י, וכ"א יום וכ"א לילות הם מ"ב, כנגד מ"ב מסעות שצריך לעבור בין המצרים בכמה מסעות לתקן הכל ולעבוד את ה', הגם שהזמן גרמא להיות עצב ונאנח על חורבן בית ה', עם כל זאת יש לחזק את עצמו ולטהר לבבו ולעבוד ה' בתורה ותפלה בשמחה, בפרט בשעת אמירת שירות ותשבחות".
This parsha is always read “bein hametzarim”—which are considered to be twenty-one days, as Rashi explains.  Twenty-one days and twenty-one nights adds up to forty-two—corresponding to the forty-two journeys that one must make “bein hametzarim,” to rectify everything and serve Hashem.  Although it is a time of sadness, during which we bemoan the churban of Hashem’s house, nevertheless one must encourage oneself and purify one’s heart to serve Hashem through Torah and tefilah with happiness—especially while reciting songs and praises.  

The Rashi he refers to concerns the words of the prophet Yirmiyahu (1, 11):  "ויהי דבר ה' אלי לאמר, מה אתה רואה ירמיהו, ואומר מקל שקד אני רואה"—the word of Hashem then came to me, saying, “What do you see Yirmiyahu?”  And I said, “I see a staff made of almond wood.”  Rashi comments in the name of a Midrash Aggadah that an almond grows and completes its development during a twenty-one day period—corresponding to the number of days between the seventeenth of Tamuz, on which the city was breached and divided, and the ninth of Av, on which the House was burnt down.  In Sha’ar HaKavanot, the Arizal also states that the period of “bein hametzarim” consists of twenty-one days.  

It seems that Tishah B’Av is not included in this count of twenty-one days, because it is referred to as a “moed”—a festival.  It states in the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 552, 12) that tachanun is not recited on erev Tishah B’Av, because it is called a “moed.” Additionally, it states (ibid. 559, 4) that tachanun is not recited on Tishah B’Av itself, because it is referred to as a “moed.”  We find this to be so in the following passuk (Eichah 1, 15):  "קרא עלי מועד"—related to Tishah B’Av.  

In Imrei Pinchas (Tishah B’Av 388), the great Rabbi Pinchas of Koritz, zy”a, explains why Tishah B’Av is referred to as a “moed” based on the statement in the Yerushalmi (Berachot 2, 4) that Tishah B’Av is the birthday of Mashiach ben David.  Additionally, our holy sources explain, based on the Midrash (Eichah 4, 14), that in the process of the churban of the Beit HaMikdash, HKB”H took out His wrath on the wood and stones of the physical structure, sparing Yisrael from extermination.  

Therefore, the period of “bein hametzarim” is considered to be only twenty-one days, since the “moed” of Tishah B’Av is not included in the calculation.  So, now, it is incumbent upon us to explore the association between the forty-two journeys Yisrael travelled in the Midbar and the twenty-one days and twenty-one nights of “bein hametzarim”—which also constitute an entity of forty-two.  As we learned above from the Avodat Yisrael:  "כנגד מ"ב מסעות שצריך לעבור בין המצרים בכמה מסעות לתקן הכל ולעבוד את ה'"--corresponding to the forty-two journeys that one must make “bein hametzarim,” to rectify everything and serve Hashem.  

Forty-two Journeys Corresponding to the Name of Forty-two in  
 "אנא בכח"

Let us begin our path to enlightenment by examining the passuk at the beginning of the parsha (Bamidbar 33, 1):  "אלה מסעי בני ישראל אשר יצאו מארץ מצרים לצבאותם ביד משה ואהרן, ויכתוב משה את מוצאיהם למסעיהם על פי ה' ואלה מסעיהם למוצאיהם"—these are the journeys of Bnei Yisrael, who departed the land of Mitzrayim according to their legions, under the hand of Moshe and Aharon.  Moshe wrote their goings forth according to their journeys at the bidding of Hashem, and these were their journeys according to their goings forth.  The Ohr HaChaim hakadosh notes that at first the passuk states:  "מוצאיהם למסעיהם"--their goings forth according to their journeys—whereas it concludes:  "מסעיהם למוצאיהם"--their journeys according to their goings forth—reversing the order.  

At this point, it is worthwhile introducing the following from the Magen Avraham (O.C. 428, 8):  The Tzror HaMor writes that we should not stop in the middle of the reading of the forty-two journeys listed in parshat Masei; for they correspond to the “name of forty-two”—“shem mem-beit.”  The source for this association is found in the Arizal’s Likutei Torah:  "הנה נזכר בכאן מ"ב מסעות, והוא שישראל יצאו ממצרים בכח שם מ"ב"—forty-two journeys are mentioned here, indicating that Yisrael left Mitzrayim by means of the “shem mem-beit.”  

They are referring to the holy name of forty-two letters, which we mention on a daily basis in the Shacharit service, during the korbanot, in the tefilah of "אנא בכח".  This entire prayer is founded on forty-two letters, divided into seven separate names—each containing six letters.  These names are:  אבגית"ץ, קר"ע-שט"ן, נג"ד-יכ"ש, בט"ר-צת"ג, חק"ב-טנ"ע, יג"ל-פז"ק, שק"ו-צי"ת.  The Tanna Rabbi Nechuniah ben HaKanah formulated a tefilah based on these names.  Each word in the tefilah corresponds to one letter of one of these names, as follows: 
א'נא ב'כח ג'דולת י'מינך ת'תיר צ'רורה: [אב"ג-ית"ץ]
ק'בל ר'ינת ע'מך ש'גבנו ט'הרנו נ'ורא: [קר"ע-שט"ן]
נ'א ג'בור ד'ורשי י'חודך כ'בבת ש'מרם: [נג"ד-יכ"ש]
ב'רכם, ט'הרם, ר'חמם, צ'דקתך ת'מיד ג'מלם: [בט"ר-צת"ג]
ח'סין ק'דוש ב'רוב ט'ובך נ'הל ע'דתך: [חק"ב-טנ"ע]
י'חיד ג'אה ל'עמך פ'נה ז'וכרי ק'דשתך: [יג"ל-פז"ק]
ש'ועתנו ק'בל ו'שמע צ'עקתנו י'ודע ת'עלומות: [שק"ו-צי"ת]
ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד:

We can now understand the rationale for the Magen Avraham’s statement in the name of the Tzror HaMor—that it is improper to stop in the middle of the reading of the forty-two journeys.  For, we do not want to disrupt the “shem mem-beit” corresponding to these journeys.  Hence, we should ask:  What is the connection between the “shem mem-beit” and the forty-two journeys travelled in the midbar?  Furthermore, what is the significance of these names that we recite every day in "אנא בכח"?  

Every Jew in the Course of His Life Completes These Forty-two Journeys

Let us proceed by introducing an illuminating principle presented by the Degel Machaneh Efraim in the name of his elder, the esteemed Baal Shem Tov, zy”a.  He teaches us that every Jew in the course of his lifetime, from the day of his birth until the day of his death, passes through the desolate wilderness of “olam hazeh”—this world.  He completes the very same forty-two journeys that Yisrael travelled in the midbar.  Ultimately, he merits entering the land of the living in the world of the neshamot.  

He writes that the day a person is born and exits his mother’s womb is analogous to the exodus from Mitzrayim.  Then a person travels one journey after another until he reaches the upper “eretz hachaim.”  Certainly, these journeys were recorded in the Torah to guide a Jew along the proper path—so that he will know which path to choose as he moves from journey to journey throughout his life.  

Each and every journey is sacred and exalted; nevertheless, the nature of a journey and location can change due to people’s actions.  Unfortunately, a place of kedushah can be transformed into the exact opposite.  Yet, if people journey and arrive at these destinations without altering them with their actions, each destination will surely illuminate their lives with its concealed light.  

This is the significance of the opening pesukim of our parsha.  Moshe recorded these journeys in the Torah as they were intended from above.  They are designed to guide a person along the path that Hashem would have him choose.  

Now, let us combine these two essential principles.  Firstly, we learned from the Baal Shem Tov hakadosh that every person experiences all forty-two journeys during his lifetime.  Secondly, we learned from the Arizal and other kabbalists that the forty-two journeys correspond to the name containing forty-two letters.  Combining these two ideas, we can conclude that every one of us—from the day of our birth until the day of our passing, when a person returns his neshamah to the Creator—lives and breathes the forty-two letters of "אנא בכח"—which represent the forty-two journeys comprising a person’s entire life.  

The Forces of Kedushah Refined the Nitzotzot in the Midbar

It appears that we can expand on this notion based on the commentary of the Ohr HaChaim hakadosh.  He focuses on the words:  "אלה מסעי בני ישראל"—these are the journeys of Bnei Yisrael.  Why does the passuk emphasize their journeys--"מסעי"—without mentioning their encampments?  He answers that the purpose of the journeys in the Midbar was to elevate the “nitzotzei kedushah.”  This purpose was fulfilled primarily as they journeyed from place to place together with the nitzotzei kedushah in hand that they clarified in each location.  

He emphasizes that Yisrael journeyed through the midbar, because that is the domain of the “samech-mem.”  It established its residence in the desolate wilderness inhabited by (Devarim 8, 15):  נחש שרף ועקרב—snake, fiery serpent and scorpion.  Hashem’s holy people traversed that wilderness to extract the nitzotzei kedushah the forces of tumah had captured and to refine them.  As a consequence, Yisrael camped in one location for an entire year, while they only remained in another location for a mere twelve hours.  Their sojourn in each location was determined by the time required to clarify the nitzotzot present in that location. 
The Ohr HaChaim adds an essential detail to this explanation.  This refinement process required the participation of the total complement of kedushah—the holy Shechinah, the congregation of Yisrael and the Torah, coordinated by Moshe Rabeinu.  Such an incredible coalition of the elements of kedushah never existed before—since the time of creation until Yisrael left Mitzrayim and received the Torah.  By means of this joining together of the forces of kedushah, they successfully extracted the nitzotzei kedushah from the forces of tumah in the desolate wilderness.  

The Generation of the Midbar Prepared the Way for Future Generations

Now, let us add an important principle from the Sefat Emet (Bamidbar 5655).  He states that it was the generation of the midbar’s task to prepare the way for all future generations.  Here is what he writes:
"והנה דור המדבר הוציאו מכח אל הפועל, והיו הכנה לכל דורות בני ישראל, ויצאו ללמד על הכלל כולו, וזהו שכתוב שאו את ראש כל עדת בני ישראל, שהם היו ראש לכל עדת בני ישראל וכל הדורות נמשכו אחריהם, ועל זה נאמר (קהלת ז-ח) טוב אחרית דבר מראשיתו". וכן כתב עוד (פרשת פנחס שנת תרנ"ב): "והנה דור המדבר היו הכנה לתקן כל הקומה לכל הדורות, וניתן להם ברית הלשון בקבלת התורה בהר סיני במדבר".
The generation of the midbar represented the epitome of Bnei Yisrael throughout the generations.  It was their job to pave the way for all future generations and provide the means for tikun.  At Har Sinai, in the midbar, they received the Torah and were given “brit halashon.”  

This sheds some light for us on the teaching of the holy Baal Shem Tov, zy”a.  The generation of the midbar experienced forty-two journeys in the midbar in order to subjugate all the forces of tumah and clarify all the nitzotzei kedushah by means of the “shem mem-beit.”  This name elevates all of the nitzotzei kedushah back to their heavenly origins.  In similar fashion, every Jew must make these forty-two journeys during his lifetime—in order to subdue all of the forces opposing his service of Hashem.  In the process, he effectively refines the nitzotzei kedushah by means of the “shem mem-beit.”  The generation of the midbar, however, established the precedent; their actions paved the way for all future generations to follow.  

This illuminates for us the meaning of the passuk:  "אלה מסעי בני ישראל אשר יצאו מארץ מצרים לצבאותם ביד משה ואהרן, ויכתוב משה את מוצאיהם למסעיהם על פי ה'"—these are the journeys of Bnei Yisrael, who departed the land of Mitzrayim according to their legions, under the hand of Moshe and Aharon.  Moshe wrote their goings forth according to their journeys at the bidding of Hashem.  In other words, they departed Mitzrayim in order to complete the forty-two journeys, which were:  “their goings forth according to their journeys”—they were guided by Hashem, according to the name of forty-two letters, to clarify the nitzotzei kedushah lost in the terrible wilderness.  

Then the passuk concludes with a  reference to the generations to come:  "ואלה מסעיהם למוצאיהם"-- and these were their journeys according to their goings forth.  This conveys the message that these same forty-two journeys travelled by Yisrael in the midbar, must be travelled by all of their future generations.  Thus, the passuk emphasizes:  "ואלה מסעיהם"—in other words, these forty-two journeys travelled by the generation of the midbar, were, in effect, a preparation:  "למוצאיהם"—for all of the future generations that would come forth from them.  This preparation would enable every future Jew to successfully pass through the midbar that is “olam hazeh”—with all of its hardships and obstacles.  The generation of the midbar already paved the way for all of us.  [Note that the numerical value of the word ואל"ה equals forty-two.]

Accordingly, we can appreciate the sacred words of the Avodat Yisrael.  The twenty-one days and twenty-one nights of the period of “bein hametzarim” correspond to the forty-two journeys travelled by Yisrael in the midbar.  Their main purpose was to encourage us and strengthen our resolve.  For, we now know that every journey we take during this bitter galut is in some form a repetition of one of the forty-two journeys travelled by Yisrael in the midbar.  The knowledge that they already paved the way for us allows us to endure and successfully withstand all of the trials and tribulations of galut.  Upon completing all forty-two journeys in galut, we will achieve the complete tikun and will thus merit the complete geulah shortly.  

The Name of “Mem-beit” of "אנא בכח" Elevates All of the Mitzvot

So, we now know that HKB”H sent each and every one of us down from the world of the neshamot to the desolate wilderness of this world to endure all forty-two journeys corresponding to the “shem mem-beit.”  Surely, every one of us desires, according to the best of our limited abilities, to comprehend the significance of this name of forty-two letters, upon which the tefilah of "אנא בכח" is founded--a tefilah our blessed sages instituted to be recited daily in the morning service.  

Hence, with the help of Hashem, Who teaches His people Yisrael Torah, we will endeavor to explain the matter in a manner that is beneficial to all.  We will examine the immaculate teachings of our holy Rabbis, with the Arizal first and foremost.  The Midrash explains that HKB”H is named according to His actions.  For example, here is how HKB”H responds to Moshe in the beginning of sefer Shemot (3, 13):  "ויאמר משה אל האלקים הנה אנכי בא אל בני ישראל ואמרתי להם אלקי אבותיכם שלחני אליכם ואמרו לי מה שמו מה אומר אליהם, ויאמר אלקים אל משה אהיה אשר אהיה"—Moshe said to G-d, “Behold, when I come to Bnei Yisrael and say to them, ‘The G-d of your forefathers has sent me to you,’ and they say to me, ‘What is His name?’ what shall I say to them?”  Hashem answered Moshe, “I Shall Be What I Shall Be.”  The Midrash addresses HKB”H’s response: 
"ויאמר אלקים אל משה. אמר רבי אבא בר ממל, אמר ליה הקב"ה למשה, שמי אתה מבקש לידע, לפי מעשי אני נקרא, פעמים שאני נקרא באל שדי, בצבאות, באלקים, בה'. כשאני דן את הבריות אני נקרא אלקים, וכשאני עושה מלחמה ברשעים אני נקרא צבאות, וכשאני תולה על חטאיו של אדם אני נקרא אל שדי, וכשאני מרחם על עולמי אני נקרא ה', שאין ה' אלא מדת רחמים שנאמר (שמות לד-ו) ה' ה' אל רחום וחנון, הוי אהיה אשר אהיה, אני נקרא לפי מעשי".
HKB”H tells Moshe that each particular name of G-d relates to a specific function.  When He judges creation, He is referred to as “Elokim”; when He battles the wicked, He is referred to as “Tzevakot”; when He suspends judgment regarding a person’s transgressions, He is referred to as “Kel Shakai”; and when He shows His world mercy, He is known as Hashem.  So, the answer “I Shall Be What I Shall Be” indicates that the name He is called depends on the particular divine action being displayed.  

Based on this notion, the kabbalists teach us that the name containing forty-two letters is designed to elevate all matters of kedushah a person performs in this world to its heavenly source—until it reaches HKB”H.  This applies to a person’s Torah study, tefilot, fulfillment of mitzvot, and a Jew’s clarification of nitzotzei kedushah.  This name is even at play when a person’s neshamah goes up to heaven every night when he goes to sleep.  All of them ascend to present themselves before HKB”H by means of the “shem mem-beit”; its forty-two letters act like wings carrying our mitzvot and good deeds up to HKB”H.  

As we saw, this name divides into seven shorter names—each containing six letters.  It is important to realize that these shorter names correspond to the seven days of the week.  אב"ג-ית"ץ corresponds to Sunday; קר"ע-שט"ן corresponds to Monday; נג"ד-יכ"ש corresponds to Tuesday; בט"ר-צת"ג corresponds to Wednesday; חק"ב-טנ"ע corresponds to Thursday; יג"ל-פז"ק corresponds to Friday; שק"ו-צי"ת corresponds to Shabbat kodesh.  

In essence, each name is designed to elevate the Torah and mitzvot of its corresponding day.  For example, the name אב"ג-ית"ץ elevates the Torah learned and the mitzvot performed on the first day of the week, Sunday—while the other six names assist in the process.  Each name performs this same function on its corresponding day of the week.  Finally, when Shabbat arrives, one should focus on the name שק"ו-צי"ת; for this is the main name acting to elevate our tefilot and mitzvot, with the assistance of the other names.  

Six Letters Corresponding to the Six Wings of a Malach

Continuing on along this exalted path, let us proceed to explain why each of these seven names is composed of precisely six letters.  We shall refer to the words of the prophet (Yeshayah 6, 1): 
"בשנת מות המלך עוזיהו ואראה את אדני יושב על כסא רם ונשא ושוליו מלאים את ההיכל, שרפים עומדים ממעל לו שש כנפים שש כנפים לאחד, בשתים יכסה פניו, ובשתים יכסה רגליו, ובשתים יעופף"—in the year of King Uzziyahu’s death, I saw the Lord sitting upon a high and lofty throne, and its legs filled the Heichal.  Seraphim were standing above, at His service.  Each one had six wings:  with two it would cover its face, with two it would cover its legs, and with two it would fly.”  Rashi comments:  the Seraph uses two wings to cover its face so as not to gaze upon the Shechinah; it covers its legs with two wings for the sake of “tzniut”—modesty—so as not to expose its body in the presence of its Creator; with its remaining two wings it carries out Hashem’s will.  

With this scheme and structure in mind, the divine Tanna Rashb”y discusses the “shem mem-beit” in the Tikunei Zohar (Tikun 69 103b).  He explains that the six letters which compose each of the seven names are divided up functionally just like the six wings of the Seraphim.  For instance, let us examine the first name, אב"ג-ית"ץ:  the first two letters, א"ב, act to cover up the face of a person’s neshamah, which ascends nightly along with all of the mitzvot performed on that corresponding day; the function of the middle two letters, ג"י, is to cover up its feet—protecting them from the harmful effects and influence of the angels of destruction; finally, the last two letters, ת"ץ, serve as the wings—transporting the neshamah up to HKB”H.  

Here is what Rabbi Chaim Vital writes in Sha’ar HaKavanot according to the Arizal concerning this subject: 
"אנא בכח גדולת ימינך כו', ויאמר כל שני תיבות ביחד, אנא בכח ויפסיק, גדולת ימינך ויפסיק, תתיר צרורה ויפסיק. ונראה לפי עניות דעתי שהטעם הוא לכוין אל מה שנתבאר אצלינו, כי כל שם מאלו הז' שמות של מ"ב יש בו ששה אותיות, ומתחלקים לג' בחינות, בשתים אותיות יכסה פניו, ובשתים יכסה רגליו, ובשתים יעופף, ולכן צריך לחבר כל שני אותיות ביחד".  Each two words should be uttered together as separate units.  One should say אנא בכח and pause; then גדולת ימינך and pause; then תתיר צרורה and pause.  In my humble opinion, this is done so that we have in mind that each of these seven names comprising the “shem mem-beit” is composed of six letters; they are divided up into three functional units; two cover its face; two cover its legs; with two it flies.  Therefore, each set of two should be uttered together.  

In summary, every Jew should find strength as he completes the journeys that comprise his life.  He should realize and believe wholeheartedly that every step he takes is guided by Hashem—aimed at accomplishing a particular tikun.  As the passuk states (Tehillim 37, 23):  "מה' מצעדי גבר כוננו ודרכו יחפץ"—Guided by Hashem, the footsteps of a righteous man are firm; his way shall He approve.  Let us always remember the valuable lesson learned from the holy Baal Shem Tov, zy”a.  Each and every one of us—from the day of one’s birth to the day of one’s passing—experiences the forty-two journeys corresponding to the forty-two letters of "אנא בכח".  This will insure that we utter this magnificent tefilah with greater focus and intent—allowing us to complete our sacred task with ease and understanding.  Amen. 

Thursday, July 19, 2012

Massei, Bamidbar 35:19. The Goel HaDam: Vigilantism and the Court

Bamidbar 35:19  גואל הדם, הוא ימית את-הרוצח

Under the rule of Goel HaDam, if a man kills as a result of insufficient caution (akin to involuntary manslaughter), relatives of the victim are not prevented from killing their relative's killer.

The question is, to what degree and in what sense is this act extra-judicial.  By extra-judicial I mean that this act is not sanctioned by the Beis Din, but only not interfered with, or not punished.  


There is a machlokes between the Ketzos (2:1) and the Tumim whether the rule of Goel HaDam applies today, namely, without a determination of law by a court that is empowered to judge capital cases.

First the Xos brings the Tumim's opinion that the legal entitlement of the Goel HaDam occurs only upon a decision of the Beis Din to so empower him.  The Tumim bases his opinion on the words of the Rambam in 1 Rotzei'ach 5:  
רוצח שהרג בזדון--אין ממיתין אותו העדים ולא הרואים אותו, עד שיבואו לבית דין וידינוהו למיתה:  שנאמר "ולא ימות הרוצח, עד עומדו לפני העדה למשפט" (במדבר לה,יב).  והוא הדין לכל מחוייבי מיתת בית דין שעברו ועשו, שאין ממיתין אותן עד שייגמר דינם בבית דין.
where the Rambam says that a man who killed with intent is not killed until he the Beis Din finds him liable for capital punishment.

The Ktzos argues and says no such empowerment is necessary; being a Goel HaDam is an extra-judicial status.  The Rambam the Tumim brought is not talking about the Go'el Hadam, it is talking about court administered punishment.  (He also notes that the Rambam and Rashi argue about the extent of the law of Goel HaDam:  Rashi applies it even to inadvertant but negligent manslaughter, while the Rambam requires some degree of criminal negligence.)  The Ktzos does, however, agree that it is possible that a court's involvement is necessary simply to establish the facts of the case- על כל פנים בעינן קבלת עדים להודיע אמיתת הדבר שהרגו הרוצח.

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky, in his shiurim on Makkos, disagrees with the Xos' interpretation of the Tumim.  It is possible that the Tumim is saying that Goel HaDam is a MITZVA only when the court determines that the killing was intentional but a procedural barrier to capital punishment prevents justice from being done.  The Tumim might agree with the Ketzos that even in other cases, and even without a finding by the court, the Goel HaDam would not be guilty of a capital crime if he killed the Rotzei'ach.  Pattur- yes, maybe even a Reshus, but Mitzva- no.

This reminds us of the Mishna L'Melech (1 Rotzei'ach 15):
הרואה רודף אחר חבירו להורגו כו' ויכול להציל ולא הציל ה"ז ביטל מצות עשה כו'. נסתפקתי ברוצח בשגגה שיש רשות לגואל הדם להורגו אם נתאמץ הרוצח והרג לגואל הדם אם נהרג עליו. ומסתברא דאינו נהרג עליו וסמך לדברי זמרי דאמרינן [סנהדרין פ"ב.] נהפך זמרי והרג לפנחס אין נהרג עליו ועדיין אין בידי ראיה מכרחת לזה. וכן נסתפקתי ברודף אחר חבירו להורגו וכן רודף אחר הערוה שניתן להצילו בנפשו אם נתאמץ הרודף והרג את המציל אם נהרג עליו. ונראה דבאלו נהרג עליו דדוקא גבי זמרי דליכא מצוה גבי פנחס אלא רשות אמרינן נהפך זמרי והרגו לפנחס אינו נהרג אבל רודף אחר חבירו או אחר הערוה דאיכא מצוה להצילו וכמ"ש רבינו אם הרג רודף למציל נהרג עליו. וכן יש לדקדק מדברי רי"ו ז"ל במישרים נל"א ח"ב שכתב ואם הבועל נהפך והרגו לקנאי אפילו בשעת מעשה אינו נהרג כי רודף היה הקנאי כי אינו מצוה להרגו אלא רשות בעלמא ע"כ. הרי שתלה הדבר לפי שאינו מצוה להורגו ודוק. ורוצח בשגגה דינו כדין בועל ארמית שהרי רשות היא ביד גואל הדם ולא מצוה ודוק:

that discusses the killer's right of self defense against the Go'el HaDam.  There is another category of sins that trigger the right of a Kanna'i to kill the malefactor (Sanhedrin 81b).  These include the example in last week's parsha of Pinchas killing Zimri during his act of publicly consorting with Kozbi, a pagan woman. (הגונב את הקסוה והמקלל בקוסם והבועל ארמית קנאין פוגעין)  In this latter category, the malefactor is entitled to defend his life from the Kana'i (such that if he would know that he is threatened by the kana'i, and he raised a gun and said he was going to kill him if he didn't desist from his kana'us, and witnesses told him that to defend himself would be a capital sin, and he killed the threatening kana'i, he would be held legally blameless.)  Obviously, no such right of self defense exists where a court-appointed executioner is punishing a sinner.


Clearly, then, the rule of Kana'im is totally extra-judicial.  What about Goel Hadam?  Does the Rotzei'ach have the right of self defense?  Will the court interfere if he hires mercenaries, or enlists his friends, and creates a militia to defend him from the Goel Hadam?  And does the rule of Goel Hadam pertain in out times, when our Batei Din are no longer empowered to judge capital cases?  


The Mishna L'Melech says that Goel HaDam is like the Kanai ONLY where the Goel HaDam is merely PERMITTED to kill, where it is a reshus- namely, where he is allowed to kill someone who is guilty only of involuntary manslaughter.  But where the Goel HaDam's act is a mitzva- where the man killed intentionally but with only one witness or without legal warning- his target has no legal right of self defense.  If he protected himself by killing the Goel HaDam, he has committed a capital offense.

So it seems that the Xos makes a general rule of Reshus for every Goel HaDam.  According to Reb Shmuel Rozovsky, the Tumim agrees with the Ketzos but holds that the additional status of Mitzva vests only after a finding by the Beis Din.

In light of all of this, I find Reb Meir Simcha's words interesting.  Reb Meir Simcha (8 Chovel U'Mazik 12) says:
אולם התבוננתי כי כ״ז טעות, דכל זמן שלא העידו עליו עדים אסור להורגו אף לגואל הדם, ודוקא מזיד דיתחייב בב״ד ע״י מעשה זו פטור, אבל שוגג דאינו חייב בב״ד, רק שרשות ביד גואל הדם א״כ כ״ז דלא העידו עליו עדים אסור לגואל הדם להורגו..... ועיין בקצות ס'ק ב׳ ודוק :

It appears that Reb Meir Simcha learns that where the Goel has a mitzva, namely, where the killing was in some way criminal, then the Goel can proceed without any involvement of the Beis Din.  Only where the killing was inadvertent (although negligent) must the Goel wait for permission from Beis Din.  The logic is that in the former case, where it's a mitzva, that mitzva exists irrespective of Beis Din.  Where it is only a reshus, the weak status of reshus requires creation by a Beis Din.  Mitzva is between man and Hashem.  Reshus is a matter of the relationships within society, and it is a creation of the Beis Din.

So I want to point out something interesting about the characterization of the act of the Goel as respectively a Reshus or a Mitzva.

  • In Makkos 10b, Rav Huna says that if the Goel finds the Rotzeiach outside the Ir Miklat and kills him, he is Pattur.  אמר רב הונא רוצח שגלה לעיר מקלט ומצאו גואל הדם והרגו פטור.  The implication is that he is merely pattur, but he has no mitzva.  
  • The Mishna on 11b brings a Machlokes Reb Akiva and Reb Yosi HaGlili as to whether the Goel that finds the Rotzeiach outside the Ir Miklat has a mitzva or a reshus to kill him. רוצח שיצא חוץ לתחום ומצאו גואל הדם רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר מצוה ביד גואל הדם ורשות ביד כל אדם רבי עקיבא אומר רשות ביד גואל הדם וכל אדם חייבין עליו .  
  • It appears that Rav Huna is consistent only with Reb Akiva's opinion, which is impossible, because the Gemara would have noted that.  

The Divrei Yechezkel (which I am reprinting pursuant to my father zatzal's will if the twit who thinks he owns the rights doesn't create too many problems) in 23:8 and slightly differently in the Chazon Ish in Likutim 23 to Makkos 10b both say that Rav Huna's expression Pattur only applies where the Rotzei'ach fled to the Ir Miklat before any decision by the Beis Din.  The Machlokes Reb Akiva and Reb Yosi HaGlili is where Beis Din already paskened Galus on the Rotzei'ach, and then he left the Ir Miklat.



Here is the Divrei Yechezkel, albeit messed up by the OCR. Good luck figuring it out.

איברא יקישיא זי מעיקרא ליחא לפמ״ש הרמכ״ס (פ״ה ממצח  הל״מ) וז״ל רוצח כשגגה שהרגו גואל הים חין לחחום  מיד מקלטו פמור שנאמר. ולו אין משפע מוח אחי ההורגו כדרך  קייס שיכנס לעיר מקלמ או שהרגו כחזירחו מם השנים ששוממן
 איחי, נכנס לעיר מקלמי ייצא חון לחחימה כזמן הר״ז החיר עצמי  למיחה ורשוח לגואל הדס להרגו יאם הרגי כל אדם אק חייבין עליי  שנאמר אין לו דם עכ״ל והמחכאר מזה דחרי דיני איכא כגואל הדם  א) קידם שקלטו עיר מקלעו אסור לגואל הדס להורגו אלא ראם  הרגו פטור מקרא דולו אק משפט מומ ט ימס לבכו וכו יאס הרגי  כל אדם מייבק עליו דהך פטורא דכי ימס לככו בגואל הדס לבד קאי  ב) לאמר שיצא מגבול עיר מקלטו בזדון הר״ז המיר עצמו למיהה  ורשוה כיד גואל הדם להורגו וגס כל אדם אין מייגק מליו מקרא  דאין לו דם והוא מדברי הסוספמא (פ״כ דמכוה) יעו״ש וככר  נחכאר אצלנו כמק״א לבאר יהם שני מנים נפרדים יקודם שהגיס  לערי מקלט לא הוחר דמו של הרוצח כלל אלא יהגואל הרס פטור  מעונש לכד וכעין אנוס הוא מקרא דכי יחס לבכי אכל עוכר כלא  תרצח ומשו״ה כל אדם ההורגו חייכ וזהו נלמד מהסוגיא  דמטח  ודף י׳ ע״כ) דשקיל וטרי שם אם גואל הדם נהרג מליו אמנם  לאחר שהגיע לעיר מקלעי ייצא הוחר דמו מצד היציאה כמזיד ושוכ  אק כאן איסור רציחה כלל ופליגי כזה ריה״ג יר״ע אם מציה כגואל  הים אי רשיח ועכ״פ לט״ע הוחר דמו שאין כאן איסור רציחה כלל  ואפילו לכל אדם דאסורק להורגו אינו כלל מחורח רציחה יעיק  ריסב״א כמכוח (דף י״כ) ומשמה כל אדם אק נהרגין מליו ומה״ס  פריד אהך דינא דרב הונא (שם מ< י׳) ממחניחיז דגואל הדם נהרג  סליו קודם שהגיע לעיר מקלעו ולא קשי׳ ליה מפלוגח׳ דריה״ג ורכנן  ועיי״ש כפי׳ ר״ח וכריםכ״א כשם הרמ״ה והרא״ה וכ״ז מוכרח  מםיגיית הש״ס (שם) מכמה ראייח ואכמ׳׳ל, ולפ״ז ל״ש לומר  דמצח בשוגג יפער מחורח קלב״מ כתה דיש עליו דין מיחה מ״י  גואל הדם טון דגואל הדס אסור להרגו קודם שנכנס לעיר מקלעו  אלא דאם הרגי פסיר מתורח אנוס נמצא דאין זה קלכ״מ דדוקא  רשיח להרגו פוטר מדין קלכ״מ ומה דהוחר דמו אח״כ כשיוצא מעיר  מקלעו הוא חיוב חדש שנעשה ע״י היציאה שאח״כ למ״ד מצוה מצוה  ולמ״ו רשוח רשוח ואס ישכר כלים בשמח יציאחו מערי מקלט אז  שייך שפיר קלכ״מ.




Here is the Chazon Ish, which I mostly fixed up. The Chazon Ish distinguishes between a Hora'a of Beis Din and a Psak of Beis Din.

וחלוקה הב׳ שפגעו גוה״ד קדם פסק דין, ובזה אפשר דמודה  ר״ה דנהרג עליו, שהרי עדיין לא נתברר שהוא בר  גלות, והרבה תנאים בעינן לחיוב גלות כגון דקדוק אופן ההריגה דלמא היה קרוב לאונס ודלמא יסרו לדבר מצוה, ודלמא פרכס,  ודלמא אין עדים בדבר ועוד כיו״ב  שצריך פסק ב״ד, ואף אם יתברר אח״כ שהיה בר גלות לא מפטר גוה״ד דבשעה שהרגו  עדיין לאו בר גלות הוא ולאו בר קטלא הוא כדאמר לעיל ה׳ אי,  אכל בר״מ פ״ה ה״י כתב דאחד ההורגו בדרך קדם שיכנס לעיר מקלט, משמע אפי׳ קדם גמר דין, והדבר מוכח בגמ׳ סנהדרין  מ׳׳ע א׳ [כמש״כ חזו״א חו״מ סי׳ י״ז] והיינו דמזיד דלא סגי  לי׳ בגלות ג״נ לא עדיף משוגג דאין גוה״ד נהרג עליו כמש״כ  הר״מ פ״ו מה׳ רוצח ה״ה, והגה יואב הרגו קודם שהעמיד את אבנר לפני  ב״ד לדונו דביד גוה״ד להרגו ולמפטר, ואם איתא  דבשוגג כה״ג נהרג עליו אין כאן ילפותא למפטר גוה״ד ברוצח במזיד,  אלא ע״כ ר״ה דרריש לקרא ולו אין משפט מות [דברים י״ט ף]  קאי אפי׳ קדם גמר דין דלענין למפטר גוה״ד סגי בהוראה  וכשיתברר אחר כן שהיה בר גלות גוה״ד פטור ומזה ילפינן גם  מזיד, ונראה לפ״ז דר״ה סבר ורוצח שיצא במזיו ומצאו גוה״ד והרגו פטור דלא כר״א דאמר לק׳ י״ב א׳ דגם מצא במזיד צריך פסק בית דין להתיר את גואל הדס להרגו שהרי צריך  בירור שמא הוא תוך התחוס ושמא היה בשוגג, וכיון לצריך פסק דין לא סגי במה שיתברר אחר כך אלא קדם גמר דין  עדיין לאו בר קטלא הוא, והכי פסק רב שם בגמ׳, אבל ר״ה  נראה דלא ס״ל הכי, דלא מסתבר שיהא בתחילתו קל הריגתו יותר מיצא במזיד.



Masei: Living Donation of Organs and Ir Miklat

(With some changes, this is a re-post of last year's post on this subject.  I also incorporated the comments that came in last time.)


What is the extent of the moral and halachic obligation to save another's life?  The question is far too broad and nuanced to even discuss in this forum.  I only want to point out a not well known paragraph from Reb Meir Simcha in his Ohr Samei'ach on this topic.  Every word in Reb Meir Simcha is a gem, and this one is particularly interesting and deserves wider dissemination.


The issue at hand is whether one is allowed to endanger his life to save someone else.  Assuming he is allowed to do so, is he obligated to do so?  Does the relative degree of danger to himself and the other person matter?  There has to be some leeway here; an absolute prohibition would mean there were no soldiers, no policemen,  no doctors in infectious disease clinics, and no firefighters.  As you can see, the numerous permutations require careful attention.   One current question is whether a person may donate a kidney or part of a liver to someone who would otherwise die.  There is definitely a danger involved in living donation.  It is allowed?  Is it justified?  Is it a mitzvah?  Is it an obligation?  For helpful overviews and a survey of the various opinions, both modern and ancient, see here and here.  There is a wonderful group, called HODS- the Halachic Organ Donor Society- that has a very interesting and informative web site dedicated to this and many other issues.  I should really have linked to HODS' home page, but the video on the home page is so hard to watch, and so beautiful and poignant at the same time, that I wanted to warn you before linking to it.

As always, halachic questions of this nature should be directed to an Orthodox Rabbi of stature.  Basic rabbinic training certainly does not guarantee the expertise to deal with such questions.


Back to Reb Meir Simcha.  The Gemara says that a person who must run to the Ir Miklat, that is, a person who had killed someone inadvertently, may never leave until the Kohen Gadol dies.  There is absolutely no circumstance that would allow him to leave.  As the Mishna in Makkos 11b says, 
אינו יוצא לא לעדות מצוה ולא לעדות ממון ולא לעדות נפשות ואפי' ישראל צריכים לו ואפי' שר צבא ישראל כיואב בן צרויה אינו יוצא משם לעולם

He does not leave to testify about the new Moon, and not for civil testimony, and not to testify in capital cases, and even if the Jewish People need him, even if he is a General like Yoav ben Tzruyah, he never leaves.


Reb Meir Simcha addresses the question, how can it be that Pikuach Nefesh wouldn't allow temporary abatement of the punishment of Galus?  If he is needed to lead the army in war, if he is needed to testify in a capital case, if he is a doctor, nothing at all allows him out, despite the deaths that will likely result from this refusal.  What happened to the primacy of human life?  In fact, I would say that the best possible thing for this man to do that would rectify his negligent taking of a life is to go and save lives!  Why doesn't the Torah allow this?  


Reb Meir Simcha (in 7 Rotzei'ach 8) answers that all these reasons would not affect the vengeful relative's right to kill him.  The Goel Hadam will still have the right to kill this man as soon as he walks out of the Ir Miklat.  Since leaving endangers him, he is not allowed to leave his safe refuge; A man may not endanger his life in order to save others.  (I would not be too quick to assume that this is based on Reb Akiva in Bava Metzia 62a, חייך קודמין, because Reb Meir Simcha makes no reference to that Gemara at all.)  This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the ability and the motivation of the Goel Hadam to do what he is allowed to do will vary with the time and place and circumstances.  But Reb Meir Simcha says that the mere fact that the Goel Hadam has the right to kill this man with impunity prohibits this man from leaving the Ir Miklat, even if leaving would enable him to save another man's life.


Without in any way deprecating Reb Meirs Simcha's teretz, the fact remains that, as he himself cites extensively, many poskim say that one may, perhaps even must, endanger himself to save another's life, and his teretz is of no use in explaining how the others would learn the Mishna in Makkos.  (Rav Shternbuch, in Taam VaDaas, argues that the whole concept of war means that you endanger yourself for the benefit of the people, and it doesn't make any sense to say that it is the danger of the Goel HaDam that precludes a general from leaving the Ir Miklat in order to lead his army in war.  I'm not impressed with his raya, but there it is.)  A certain Isha Chashuva immediately answered that the experience of Galus has to be a simulacrum of death, of leaving everything behind and not being able to return.  If the person can come back for any reason at all, then it's not at all like being dead.   (I once said that the reason women tend to get headaches is because vestigial organs are more prone to derangement.  While I still think this is true, my rebbitzen has made it clear that it does not apply to her.)

Here is our teretz.


Galus is a form of chiyuv missah.  Chiyuv missah obviously trumps V'chai bahem.  Proof- first of all, the fact that you kill the guy is proof enough.  More- pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos, but a mechallel Shabbos is chayav missah.  One might say that this is because Rachmana afkerei l'damei.  Or one might say that the chiyuv missa is doche pikuach nefesh.  If you say the latter, then you have a pshat in the Mishna in Makkos.  In any case, one thing is certain: you don't say אז מען דארף דעם גנב - נעמט מען אים פון די תליה אראפ

Comments:

Efrayim said...


Your answer is creative, but some might find it hard to believe that one person's chiyuv misah can set aside another person's pikuach nefesh. Is someone who is chayav misah now exempt from saving othes' lives? Perhaps the explanation is that since there is a real chiyuv misah - if he leaves intentionallly, anyone is permitted to kill him - leaving is not viewed as doubtful misah, but as actual misah. This is comparable to the principle of "kim leih b'd'rabbah mineih" where there is theoretical chiyuv missah even when there is no chiyuv missah applied.

b said...

I didn't say that a chayav missa is not obligated in pikuach nefesh. I said that when the chiyuv missa is at odds with the pikuach nefesh, chiyuv missa is stonger. Here, galus in the Ir Miklat is the equivalent of Missa, leaving is like avoiding a chiyuv missa, and pikuach nefesh is not docheh chiyuv missa. 

I hear how you are using Reish Lakish from Ksuvos 34b. Very nice. Creative- and ironic, too. It's diametrically opposed to my teretz. I am saying that galus is missa, and missa is docheh pikuach nefesh. You are saying that galus is galus, and leaving galus is the din of missa, and the mitzva of pikuach nefesh cannot possibly generate a din missa on someone.
Daniel said...

I'm asking because I don't know. Is there in fact a chiyuv on the rotzeach to go to an ir miklat? or just an option? what would be the chiyuv? ושמרתם לנפשותיכם or ונס אל אחת הערכים האל וחי? what if he genuinely feels that he wants pure justice of death by go'el hadam?

2- Doesn't ואם אין מחני נא מספרך and אשר הערה למות נפשו (ישעיה נג show that you can give up your life for someone else? ואת"ל Moshe saving the entire nation is different, what about avraham going to save Lot. Or the din of קנאים פוגעים בו? it seems to me, where the danger is a function of the person's expressing that which is proper is in his eyes it's always permissibale to give your life for that which you feel is Truth. Even in instances of certain death, let alone only risk.
b said...

He is required to go to the Ir Miklat, he doesn't have the option of staying home and taking the risk. First Rambam in 5 Rotzei'ach- כל ההורג בשגגה גולה ממדינה שהרג בה לערי מקלט ומצות עשה להגלותו שנאמר וישב בה עד מות הכהן הגדול. והוזהרו בית דין שלא יקחו כופר מן הרוצח בשגגה כדי לישב בעירו שנאמר ולא תקחו כופר לנוס אל עיר מקלטו

I don't know how to explain your examples. But here's what I'm thinking:

Perhaps self endangerment is a form of charity, of giving away what is yours on behalf of another, and there are limits to tzedaka. There's a rule of chomesh, that you only give up to 20% of your money to tzedaka. If so, as soon as we remove the parties from a tzedaka relationship, all these discussions will not apply. Perhaps certain relationships create responsibility, and when you are responsible for someone, you are allowed and maybe obligated to take a risk on his behalf.
Daniel said...

The Rambam only shows that beis din is obligated להגלותו, not that he has a chiyuv to be גולה.

I'm a little puzzled how כופר לנוס אל עיר מקלטו means "to allow him to stay home" but regardless, again my point the same, the issur is on beis din, not the rotzeach.
Efrayim said...

Re your 1027 response - I agree with you that you must say that a chiyuv missah is stronger than the mitzvah of v'chai bahem of the person who chayav misah; if I recall correctly there is a story of a person who actually carried out the 4 types of misas beis din on himself. The nafkah minah would be that one who is chayav misah and has the opportunity to escape is not required to, and perhaps is not even allowed to (assuming he knows he is guilty). However, a strong, perhaps compelling case can be made that even if you are correct in your assertion that golus is a form of chiyuv misa, that does not now exempt the rotzeiach b'shogeg from the obligations he has because he is physically alive. Why is he less subject to the mitzvah of v'chai bahem as applied to others than he is in the mitzvos of wearing tefillin, learning Torah, et al.? Is someone who is on his way to being executed now patur from saving others' lives (assuming he can escape beis din's hands long enough to do so)?

Re Daniel's point - if anything the chomesh halachah is a question on this whole discussion You are not allowed to give up more than 20%/25% of your assets to perform a one-time mitzvas aseh. Acharonim understand that as also applying to your emotional strength - e.g., you are not required to push yourself to your breaking point in order to fulfill the chiyuv achilas matzah. (Obviously this is a principle which requires in-depth elaboration.) How then can you be allowed to risk your life? I don't believe the answer can be as broad as the one Daniel suggests since the meforshim give all sorts of technical parameters under which the rule of "kanaim pogim bo" can apply. It's not carte blanche for risking your life for whatever you consider worthwhile.
b said...

OK, Efrayim, I agree that my teretz is far from impregnable. But I thought that it was, as you said, creative enough to count as a nice lomdus. I'm not arguing, but I do want to emphasize that I anticipated the problem when I said that if his chiyuv missa is רחמנא אפקריה לדמיה, the teretz doesn't begin.

As for your kashe on chomesh- please note that I was making the tzutshtell to chomesh in Reb Meir Simcha, who holds that it is assur to endanger yourself, which would comport with the idea of Chomesh and Tzedaka.
great unknown said...

Daniel at 3:30
la'nus is not a verb but a noun: the one required to escape.
Daniel said...
TGU- saw the rashi now. thank you very much.
b said...

By the way, Chomesh is a takana derabanan, and there are many exceptions to its application. Still, the concept, the idea that underlies the Chachamim in Usha, may apply.
great unknown said...

How can you say that chomesh is a takana d'rabanan? Everyone knows that it is a halacha l'Moshe miSinai. Not to drag this out too far, see the Shnos Eliyahu on the first mishna in Peah, d"h gemilus chassadim, in the Pirush Ha'Aruch.
Intriguingly, the Pirush Ha'Kotzor says the opposite.
Daniel said...

Re Efraim: the maamar chazal of אל יבזבז יותר מחומש , regardless of it's source, is not a strict ISSUR in the way you (or yes, probably 99% of the world) are thinking but rather a general guidleine for going through life and mode of conduct (as the original meaning of הלכה/הליכה means).

How can it be "ASSUR" to give more than a chomesh when i have the right to be מפקיר כל נכסיי if I want and live a life of an עני?...

Anonymous said...

. אגרות משה, יו"ד, א סימן קמג 

ובדבר אם תקנת אושא שאל יבזבז יותר מחומש הוא איסור או רק עצה טובה... והנה לא כתב הרמב"ם הדין דאל יבזבז יותר מחומש אלא בסוף הלכות ערכין ולא בצדקה בהלכות מתנות עניים ובש"ע מפורש שהמחבר סובר דבידו משגת מחוייב ליתן כפי צורך העניים אף שהוא יותר מחומש משמע שסובר בדעת הרמב"ם שכיון שדין התורה הוא שיתן כפי צורך העניים לא תקנו רבנן לאסור וגם לא לעצה טובה בצדקה רק להקדיש אסרו... עכ"פ הרמ"א שכתב ואל יבזבז יותר מחומש בצדקה פליג וסובר שאסור וכדמוכח מהא דמר עוקבא ודעת הרמב"ם והמחבר צ"ע. עכ"פ למעשה אין לבזבז יותר מחומש אם לא לחשש פקוח נפש. 

.מנחת יצחק, ה סימן לד 

והנה בתשובת אגרות משה שם, בנה יסודו על דברי הרמ"א שם (יו"ד סי' רמ"ט סעי' א'), שכתב ואל יבזבז יותר מחומש עיי"ש. ולענ"ד אין ראיה דבא לחלוק על המחבר, דאם רצונו לחלוק, היה כותב, וי"א, כנודע דרכו, וביותר ממה שמצוין שם המקור, (ב"י בשם הגמ' פרק נערה שנתפתתה), ואף שאין הציון מהרמ"א עצמו, אבל כן ראיתי בדרכי משה השלם, שעל דברי המחבר בש"ע, עד חומש מצוה מן המובחר כו', כתב למקור הדברים, בפ' נערה שנתפתתה א"ר אילעי באושא התקינו המבזבז אל יבזבז יותר מחומש, שמא יצטרך לבריות עיין שם, ש"מ דלא בא לחלוק על דברי המחבר, אלא למלאות דבריו, דבאין ידו משגת אסור לבזבז, אבל בידו משגת, י"ל דמודה לדברי המחבר. 
וא"כ להלכה למעשה, כמו בזמן הזה, שבכל עת יש עניים נצרכים לפנינו, וביותר עניי א"י, שפיר יכול מי שידו משגת לבזבז יותר מחומש, ומצוה קעביד

b said...

I saw the שנות אליהו and the פירוש הארוך, and I see that the former implies derabanan, while the latter says clearly, based on a Yerushalmi, that what we call תקנת אושא is really a Halacha L'Moshe Mi'Sinai that Chazal publicized at Usha.

Are you sure the שנות אליהו and the פירוש הארוך are both from the Gaon?

Efrayim said...
This has nothing to do with the discussion here, but the Mishnah Brurah brings this down in the sugya of chomesh, and it's inyanah d'yoma, so maybe the distinguished blog editor or someone else can answer this question. Based on the story of Bar Kamtza the Magen Avraham suggests that when there is "eimas hamalchus" one is permitted to violate even a lo saseh (i.e., offering a korban with a mum). The Mishnah Brurah says that other acharonim question this ruling since the rabanan's concern was actually about pikuach nefesh, which is certainly docheh any ordinary lo saseh. However, if you look at the Maharatz Chiyus on Gittin where the story of Bar Kamtzah is, he not only approvingly cites this Magen Avraham, but says that the reason the rabanan suggested Bar Kamtzah be killed was because he was a rodef! If he was a rodef, how can we infer anything to a case of ordinary "eimas hamalchus"?

great unknown said...

I was just thinking about a similar issue this morning: in America, so far, we don't have a clue as to what aimas malchus is, other than from history. Unless you live in Chicago, where the police routinely beat up and torture people; murders have yet to be revealed.

The din of rodef is defense against personal [or communal] sakanas nefashos; so is aimas malchus.

re: the Shnos Eliyahu
Other than the pirushim on kabbalah and trigonometry, we have very little actually written by the GR"A; most of it was transcribed by his talmidim [rather chasuv in their own right], but some was actually reviewed by the GR"A. See the haskama of R' Chaim Volozhiner to the Shnos Eliyahu.

As to the stira in the two versions, we find the same in the gemora by amora'im who just came out of shiur.

l'Inyanainu, see also the Gevuros Ari on Ta'anis 24a. However, see the Ahavas Chesed, 19:4 and the footnote there. Also, perek 20. Note that the Chofetz Chayim is not misyaches at all to the GR"A in the pirush ha'aruch.

A very relevant issue concerns how much of support for descendants who are learning can be counted against ma'aser and chomesh. I seem to recall from the Chasam Sofer that for a time period originally contracted at the time of the chasuna, none of it counts; after that, fifty percent.

I suspect the age of the child counts also; the minhag seems to be not to follow the strict d'Oraysa or even the more generous takanas Usha on that. However, I suspect that it would be very good from a chinuch standpoint to kick out sons as soon as they become bar mitzvah.
From a certain perspective, that is done by many in Eretz Yisroel, where they are shipped out the yeshiva dorms at the earliest possible moment.

b said...

Efrayim:

Have you ever wondered about policy in Halacha? For example: Rahm Emanuel is associated with an Orthodox synagogue. When the recession began, he asked his rabbi whether it was allowed to participate in a conference call on Rosh Hashanna to make decisions about what to do to prevent a depression. The Rabbi said that he may, because telephone usage is most likely derabanan, but more importantly, a depression would destabilize nations, bring hunger and famine, and result in many deaths and wars.

Certainly true. But one might argue that these results are not proximate, and halacha deals with direct, not gramma of gramma of gramma.

Or you could say that it is delusional to say there's a difference between pikuach nefesh of a choleh in front of you, or pikuach nefesh of cholim de'alma when you know for a fact that cholim will eventually appear.

You realize that this hetter would be a blanket hetter for kohanim to go to medical school, and chillul shabbos for medical students, and even working on shabbos when you're afraid that if you don't make a parnassa, you might get poor and not be able to afford medical help. And so on ad absurdum. So only Gedolim mamash can pasken on such questions.

In this case, Chazal are telling us that Eimas Malchus is Pikuach Nefesh. It may not look like it, it may not be immediate, but antagonizing the government is extremely dangerous, and so you are docheh shabbos as if it were pikuach nefesh mamosh, and if a guy is massering to the government, even on a matter that seems relatively minor, he is a rodef and chayav missah.

b said...

and Efrayim- I certainly don't need children and fools visiting this site. You are obviously neither. If you have any friends that you think might add something to our discussions, they would be welcome. I don't guarantee a gem every week, but occasionally something interesting does come up, either in the posts or in the comments.

Efrayim said...

Good, well-explained answer. Iy"h I'll come at least as long as I have bein hazmanim.

great unknown said...

There's a shu"t Chasam Sofer which deals with and thoroughly disposes of any possible heter for a Kohain to attend medical school based on future pikuach nefesh. Please enlighten me as to any gedolai poskim who do promulgate such a heter.

BTW, didn't Rahm's Rabbi also sign a letter in support of SSM? Obviously a godol with breite plaitzes.

great unknown said...

Which puts me in mind of,
Hog butcher for the world...
City of the breite plaitzes

b said...

I know the Chasam Sofer and of course Reb Moshe as well, that there's no chiyuv to learn medicine so that some day you will be able to save lives. By the way, the same thing would be mattir student autopsies, because only with that kind of hands on training will surgeons and physicians be able to save lives. We all know how that argument fared in Eretz Yisrael. 

The only posek I know that is mattir is the apocryphal posek at YU that so many MO doctors are someich on. Unbelievable what I've heard in the "name" of this alleged posek- wholesale chillul shabbos during rounds as a student and so forth.

But I still say that the concept of dichui on the basis of policy and planning is valid if applied by poskim of a certain stature. I realize that many of the reasons advanced for prohibiting chillul for getting a rebbe to daven or to get a kamei'a would apply here, too. That's a subject I'm working on, and will post on if I can find a parsha it's relevant to.

b said...

From a letter I received from Dr. Nachum J:

true , that is what rav moshe said
but he also told me, now that you will be a doctor , you HAVE to do that,
you don’t have the right to say that ” I’m better off in learning”
[ he also knew me well enough to know that I am NOT better off in learning]
so I work 30 hrs a week, that’s enough
a 60/40 split works fine for me