When a person orally obligates himself to donate to Hekdesh or to any charity his own or another person's "value", the court has to determine the subject's monetary value. If, however, the person uses the term "Eirech," as opposed to the word "D'mei," or "value,"then his obligation is not dependent on the particular person he named. The Torah lists standard monetary amounts for people according to their age and gender, and actual market values are irrelevant. This year, my Eirech is going to drop like a rock. From fifty Shekel to fifteen. Overnight. (See pesukim 27:3 and 27:7.) Time to buy karka.
Well, in ten years I'll qualify for מפני שיבה תקום, if not והדרת פני זקן, for whatever that's worth. See Aruch Hashulchan YD 245:1-3. It's not worth much. When I was at Ner Israel in the seventies, there was a bachur, a bright young man, who liked to walk into the Beis Medrash behind Rav Ruderman, so that when the entire Beis Medrash stood up, he could imagine that they were standing up for him. Like many noisome young baalei ga'ava I knew, he turned out quite successful. In any case, my personal collection of Yetzer Haras does not happen to include this one, so it's not much of a consolation.
Showing posts with label Bechukosai. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bechukosai. Show all posts
Sunday, May 20, 2012
Monday, May 23, 2011
#3 Bechukosai, Vayikra 26:31. Reiach Nichoach
No, this is NOT about Rav Yechiel of Paris or the Aruch Laner and Rav Kalisher and the Chasam Sofer and Reb Akiva Eiger or the Netziv about Korban Pesach.
וַהֲשִׁמּוֹתִי אֶת מִקְדְּשֵׁיכֶם וְלֹא אָרִיחַ בְּרֵיחַ נִיחֹחֲכֶם
In the Tochecha, the passuk says that there will be/was destruction of the Mikdash, and I will not smell the fragrance of your korbanos.
Reb Meir Simcha in the Meshech Chochma here says that this passuk is well understood according to the Shitta of the Baal Tosfos Rabbeinu Chaim (who was famously a talmid of Rabbeinu Tam) in Megilla 10b. There is a machlokes whether the Kedusha of the Beis Hamikdash remained after its destruction. Most people read the Gemara to mean that if the kedusha remains, then private altars, Bamos, are prohibited. If the kedusha disappears, then Bamos are muttar. Rav Chaim holds that this is incorrect. He says that everyone agrees that once the Beis Hamikdash was built, never again are Bamos muttar. The machlokes is only whether the kedusha of the mikdash remains so that one could bring korbanos on the place of the Mizbei'ach.
Reb Meir Simcha explains that the first half of the pasuk, וַהֲשִׁמּוֹתִי אֶת מִקְדְּשֵׁיכֶם, means there will be no mikdash, that the kedusha of the mizbeiach will be gone so you won't be able to bring korbanos on the place of the mizbei'ach as mizbei'ach korbanos. And if you think that this will release you to bring korbanos on Bamos, the passuk says no: וְלֹא אָרִיחַ בְּרֵיחַ נִיחֹחֲכֶם . You won't even be allowed to bring korbanos on a Bama.
The great problem with this vort is that one of the prominent characteristics of a Bama is that there is no din of Rieach Nichoach on korbanos that are brought on a Bama. So how could Reb Meir Simcha say that the end of the passuk that says וְלֹא אָרִיחַ בְּרֵיחַ נִיחֹחֲכֶם is referring to Bamos? You can't possibly exclude Bamos with the words "I will not smell your Reiach Nichoach"!
The answer is that Reb Meir Simcha in several places brings a medrash that says that although there is no Reiach Nichoach on a bama, but if you build a bama on the place of the mizbeiach, then there IS Reiach Nichoach. It depends on the PLACE of the mizbei'ach, irrespective of Bama/Mizbei'ach, and irrespective of whether the place has Kedushas Mizbeiach. So the passuk means that not only won't you be able to be makriv on the place of the Mizbei'ach because lo kidsha le'asid lavo, but if you think you will be able to be makriv wherever you want with a Bama or ON THE PLACE OF THE MIZBEIACH WITH A BAMA, you're wrong, because there won't be a hetter bamos: no kedusha of the Mizbeiach to allow Mizbeiach-korbanos, and no hetter bamos which would allow a Bama on the place of the Mizbei'ach.
Derech Agav, using Reb Chaim Hakohen to deny the option of being makriv on the mekom hamizbei'ach with a mema nafshach of either mizbei'ach or bama can also be found in the Tzitz Eliezer here and here (volume 10 end of siman 13 and beginning of siman 5.)
Bechukosai. Meta-Mitzvos.
Synopsis:
Although generally we are told what we must and what we must not do, there are some concepts and attitudes that the Torah expects us to know without being told. These are so fundamental that that in their absence, the mitzvos we do are essentially crippled.
In Greek, the word Meta means after or beyond. In English, it can be used to mean a fundamental truth beyond the self-evident, an abstraction that transcends and informs the reality with which it is associated. It is both transcendent and fundamental.
Our 613 Mitzvos are defined clearly enough for us to know exactly whether we have or have not fulfilled them. But there are meta-Mitzvos. By this I mean an underlying attitude or a manner beyond the legal definition of any particular Mitzva. Even if one fulfills a mitzva, he may have failed in the Meta-Mitzva. Sometimes, failing the Meta is worse than not doing the Mitzva at all.
Here's an illustration: Reb Chaim's pshat in Kavanas Hatefilla. Reb Chaim says that more fundamental than the Kavana of "what the words mean" is the Kavana of "standing before the King." Even if you could get away with mouthing words and not thinking about what they mean, you cannot be said to be davening at all unless you are aware that you are standing before Hashem. That, to me, is Meta-Kavana.
Three examples of Meta-Mitzvos come to mind.
1. The Yerushalmi (Brachos 2:5) says that a laborer who eats during his work day cannot say the usual long form of Bentching, but instead says the first bracha and a shortened version of the rest. The Yerushalmi says that even though we all are able to work while we bentch, this is prohibited. Because it is assur to work while you Bentch, the only option is to truncate Bentching,
The Taz (OC 191:1) says that this is true by all tefillos and by all mitzvos:
2. What is worse, occasionally being Mechallel Shabbos, or scrupulously keeping Shabbos but not believing that Shvisa is a mitzva from the Ribono shel Olam?
In Devarim (27:26) it says אָרוּר אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָקִים אֶת דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתָם
Cursed is he who does not uphold the words of this Torah to do them. The Ramban explains this to pertain to a Jew who does all the mitzvos, but does not believe in his heart that the mitzvos are divine obligations, that Hashem rewards their observance, that Hashem punishes their desecration. The Ramban says that if a person does the mitzvos but doesn't believe they are min hashamayim, then he is subject to the curse. If, on the other hand, a person simply violates commandments, that is, a person who eats chazir or does not keep the mitzva of Sukkah or lulav, but still believes they are true and that ultimately there is reward and punishment, that person is not subject to the curse in the parsha. In other words, it is worse to do mitzvos but not believe they are from Sinai than to not do them but know that you are being a sheigitz. (See the words of the Ramban below.)
This, by the way, should give pause to those that believe that Judaism is a religion of actions, Orthopraxy, and that belief, Orthodoxy, is not so important. Unless, of course, they disagree ("He's a Rabbi, and I'm a Rabbi") with the Ramban.
3. Devarim 28:47, תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר לֹא עָבַדְתָּ אֶת יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּשִׂמְחָה וּבְטוּב לֵבָב. A person does all that is expected from him; but he does it grudgingly and resentfully, feeling that Mitzvos are an imposition he would prefer to be without. This is a sin that can chas ve'shalom tip the balance to the tochecha. Imagine that! The attitude makes such an enormous difference! I remember hearing Reb Shalom Shvadron speak about this on the psukim in Malachi 3:13-14. חָזְקוּ עָלַי דִּבְרֵיכֶם אָמַר יְהוָה. וַאֲמַרְתֶּם מַה נִּדְבַּרְנוּ עָלֶיךָ. אֲמַרְתֶּם .שָׁוְא עֲבֹד אֱלֹקְים וּמַה בֶּצַע כִּי שָׁמַרְנוּ מִשְׁמַרְתּוֹ וְכִי הָלַכְנוּ קְדֹרַנִּית - The people said "It is futile to serve God, and what profit do we get for keeping His charge and for going about in anxious worry ( because of Hashem's commandments)." Rav Shvadron asked, how can the people say "what did we say that was wrong?" And the Gemara says that not only the people were clueless, even the Malachim didn't understand why Hashem was upset. If they said shav avod Elokim, if they said ma betza, if they said halachnu kedoranis, it should have been obvious that there was a problem. The answer is that they did every mitzvah, they did everything with hiddur, but they did it with sour faces and an attitude that the mitzvos were a burden. They didn't chas veshalom say a negative word about the mitzvos, but their faces and slumped shoulders screamed out their dislike of the mitzvos.
Summing up, I say that there are three Meta-Mitzvos: Reverence, Awareness, and Joy.
1. Respect and reverence that focuses your attention exclusively on the Mitzva while you do it.
2. Awareness that this Mitzva is Hashem's will as He taught us in His torah min hashamayim, and that we do the mitzvos because we are obligated to do as Hashem commands us.
3. Joy that we have the opportunity to serve Hashem in a way that makes us into great and holy people.
Slightly off topic: We find a similar idea in the context of Kibbud av. Devarim 27:16, אָרוּר, מַקְלֶה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ. Cursed is he who belittles his parents. Reb Meir Simcha in his Meshech Chochma- explains that this is a person who belittles his parents because he knows they will be mochel. Mechila might help; this person has not transgressed the mitzva of Kibbud. He's not even like the Ma'achil petumos veyoreish Gehinom, because here, the parent is mochel. But that doesn't help him. His disparaging attitude is as great a sin as actual bitul asei.
Comments about the Ramban made it clear that I ought to quote it verbatim.
Also, please note that we're not quoting a Gemara or a Medrash. This is a Taz, a Ramban in his pirush al hatorah, and a diyuk in a passuk.
Although generally we are told what we must and what we must not do, there are some concepts and attitudes that the Torah expects us to know without being told. These are so fundamental that that in their absence, the mitzvos we do are essentially crippled.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In Greek, the word Meta means after or beyond. In English, it can be used to mean a fundamental truth beyond the self-evident, an abstraction that transcends and informs the reality with which it is associated. It is both transcendent and fundamental.
Our 613 Mitzvos are defined clearly enough for us to know exactly whether we have or have not fulfilled them. But there are meta-Mitzvos. By this I mean an underlying attitude or a manner beyond the legal definition of any particular Mitzva. Even if one fulfills a mitzva, he may have failed in the Meta-Mitzva. Sometimes, failing the Meta is worse than not doing the Mitzva at all.
Here's an illustration: Reb Chaim's pshat in Kavanas Hatefilla. Reb Chaim says that more fundamental than the Kavana of "what the words mean" is the Kavana of "standing before the King." Even if you could get away with mouthing words and not thinking about what they mean, you cannot be said to be davening at all unless you are aware that you are standing before Hashem. That, to me, is Meta-Kavana.
Three examples of Meta-Mitzvos come to mind.
1. The Yerushalmi (Brachos 2:5) says that a laborer who eats during his work day cannot say the usual long form of Bentching, but instead says the first bracha and a shortened version of the rest. The Yerushalmi says that even though we all are able to work while we bentch, this is prohibited. Because it is assur to work while you Bentch, the only option is to truncate Bentching,
The Taz (OC 191:1) says that this is true by all tefillos and by all mitzvos:
ודאי בכל המצוות לא יעשה אותם ועוסק בד"א כי הוא מורה על עשייתו המצוה בלי כוונה אלא דרך עראי ומקרא וזה נכלל במאמר תורתינו ואם תלכו עמי בקרי שפירושו אף שתלכו עמי דהיינו עשיית המצוה מ"מ הוא בדרך מקרה ועראי
He says that this behavior falls under the heading of walking with Hashem with indifference, the passuk in Bechukosai (Bamidbar 26:21), וְאִם תֵּלְכוּ עִמִּי קֶרִי וְלֹא תֹאבוּ לִשְׁמֹעַ לִי, if you walk with Me with indifference and do not desire to listen to Me. Even if a person does all the mitzvos, if he does them with a casual attitude, an attitude of indifference, he has failed the Meta-Mitzva. We should keep this in mind when, during bentching, we distractedly begin brushing off the crumbs and stacking the plates. Or patchkeh'ing with your phone when it buzzes during Shmoneh Esrei. (The Magen Avraham there says it applies even to easy melachos.)2. What is worse, occasionally being Mechallel Shabbos, or scrupulously keeping Shabbos but not believing that Shvisa is a mitzva from the Ribono shel Olam?
In Devarim (27:26) it says אָרוּר אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָקִים אֶת דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת לַעֲשׂוֹת אוֹתָם
Cursed is he who does not uphold the words of this Torah to do them. The Ramban explains this to pertain to a Jew who does all the mitzvos, but does not believe in his heart that the mitzvos are divine obligations, that Hashem rewards their observance, that Hashem punishes their desecration. The Ramban says that if a person does the mitzvos but doesn't believe they are min hashamayim, then he is subject to the curse. If, on the other hand, a person simply violates commandments, that is, a person who eats chazir or does not keep the mitzva of Sukkah or lulav, but still believes they are true and that ultimately there is reward and punishment, that person is not subject to the curse in the parsha. In other words, it is worse to do mitzvos but not believe they are from Sinai than to not do them but know that you are being a sheigitz. (See the words of the Ramban below.)
This, by the way, should give pause to those that believe that Judaism is a religion of actions, Orthopraxy, and that belief, Orthodoxy, is not so important. Unless, of course, they disagree ("He's a Rabbi, and I'm a Rabbi") with the Ramban.
3. Devarim 28:47, תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר לֹא עָבַדְתָּ אֶת יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּשִׂמְחָה וּבְטוּב לֵבָב. A person does all that is expected from him; but he does it grudgingly and resentfully, feeling that Mitzvos are an imposition he would prefer to be without. This is a sin that can chas ve'shalom tip the balance to the tochecha. Imagine that! The attitude makes such an enormous difference! I remember hearing Reb Shalom Shvadron speak about this on the psukim in Malachi 3:13-14. חָזְקוּ עָלַי דִּבְרֵיכֶם אָמַר יְהוָה. וַאֲמַרְתֶּם מַה נִּדְבַּרְנוּ עָלֶיךָ. אֲמַרְתֶּם .שָׁוְא עֲבֹד אֱלֹקְים וּמַה בֶּצַע כִּי שָׁמַרְנוּ מִשְׁמַרְתּוֹ וְכִי הָלַכְנוּ קְדֹרַנִּית - The people said "It is futile to serve God, and what profit do we get for keeping His charge and for going about in anxious worry ( because of Hashem's commandments)." Rav Shvadron asked, how can the people say "what did we say that was wrong?" And the Gemara says that not only the people were clueless, even the Malachim didn't understand why Hashem was upset. If they said shav avod Elokim, if they said ma betza, if they said halachnu kedoranis, it should have been obvious that there was a problem. The answer is that they did every mitzvah, they did everything with hiddur, but they did it with sour faces and an attitude that the mitzvos were a burden. They didn't chas veshalom say a negative word about the mitzvos, but their faces and slumped shoulders screamed out their dislike of the mitzvos.
Summing up, I say that there are three Meta-Mitzvos: Reverence, Awareness, and Joy.
1. Respect and reverence that focuses your attention exclusively on the Mitzva while you do it.
2. Awareness that this Mitzva is Hashem's will as He taught us in His torah min hashamayim, and that we do the mitzvos because we are obligated to do as Hashem commands us.
3. Joy that we have the opportunity to serve Hashem in a way that makes us into great and holy people.
Slightly off topic: We find a similar idea in the context of Kibbud av. Devarim 27:16, אָרוּר, מַקְלֶה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ. Cursed is he who belittles his parents. Reb Meir Simcha in his Meshech Chochma- explains that this is a person who belittles his parents because he knows they will be mochel. Mechila might help; this person has not transgressed the mitzva of Kibbud. He's not even like the Ma'achil petumos veyoreish Gehinom, because here, the parent is mochel. But that doesn't help him. His disparaging attitude is as great a sin as actual bitul asei.
Comments about the Ramban made it clear that I ought to quote it verbatim.
"אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָקִים אֶת דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת". 'כאן כלל את כל התורה כולה וקבלוה עליהם באלה ובשבועה' - זה לשון רש"י. "ולפי דעתי, כי הקבלה הזאת, שיודה במצות בלבו ויהיו בעיניו אמת ויאמין שהעושה אותן יהיה לו שכר וטובה והעובר עליהן ייענש ואם יכפור באחת מהן או תהיה בעיניו בטלה לעולם, הנה הוא ארור! אבל אם עבר על אחת מהן, כגון שאכל החזיר והשקץ לתאוותו, או שלא עשה סוכה ולולב לעצלה, איננו בחרם הזה, כי לא אמר הכתוב 'אשר לא יעשה את דברי התורה הזאת', אלא אמר: "אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָקִים אֶת דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת..", כטעם: "קִיְּמוּ וְקִבְּלוּ הַיְּהוּדִים" (אסתר ט, כ"ז) והנה הוא חרם המורדים והכופרים'.
Also, please note that we're not quoting a Gemara or a Medrash. This is a Taz, a Ramban in his pirush al hatorah, and a diyuk in a passuk.
Sunday, May 15, 2011
#1 Bechukosai. The Tochecha and the Value of Human Life
A dear friend, Harav Shmuel Yeshaya Keller of Chicago Telshe, shared a nice thought from his father, Harav Chaim Dov Keller, on this week's parsha, and I'd like to share it with you. The vort is his, the presentation mine.
We Jews understand intellectually and emotionally how very precious human life is. I recently read a memoir written by a man with whom I am privileged to be very close, Avraham (Romi) Cohen, "The Youngest Partisan." He describes his experience before, during and after WW II, during which he joined and fought with a group of non-Jewish partisans. To this day, his courage and strength of character are preeminent. He is a lion of a man, and it is wise to not stand in his way. In his book, he describes the tortures he experienced and saw inflicted on others by the Nazis. Once, his group caught a Nazi, and after questioning him, tied him to a tree facing forwards, with his arms behind him. Romi was handed a knife and granted the honor of executing the prisoner; he was told not to kill the prisoner quickly. Standing there, visions of what this man and his friends had done ran through his mind. But he couldn't do it. Or, more correctly, he certainly could have done it, but he refused to do it. He handed the knife to his superior and said that he wanted to be 'mechabeid' him. As he walked away, he heard as his officer began his work.
But not everyone is like that. For many, even for Jews, there are brutalizing experiences that diminish our respect for human life. Three times in the Torah, we are forewarned about this problem and cautioned to balance what we have seen with kvod habriyos.
After the great mabul, in Parshas Noach, when so many lives were lost, what would murder mean? Nothing. Is there any difference at all between 5,555,555 and 5,555,556? Specifically there (Breishis 9:10), the Torah teaches us , שופך דם האדם באדם דמו יישפך כי בצלם אלוקים עשה את האדם , one who spills the blood of a man deserves the ultimate punishment, for man was created in Hashem's image. The great flood was Hashem's will, and even if we were told the reasons it happened, we can never understand why it was necessary and just. Our job is to remind ourselves, even under the worst circumstances, that human life is precious.
In Parshas Shoftim, the Torah teaches us what must be done when we go to war (Devarim 20:10) and when we lay siege upon our enemies (20:19). Immediately afterwards, we are taught the dinim of Egla Arufa, the calf that must be brought for atonement for the residents of a city when some unknown criminal murdered someone near their city- perhaps if they had been more welcoming and supportive, the victim would not have felt so impelled to go elsewhere that he chose this dangerous route that resulted in his death. Yes, there are times of war and of siege, there are times when the shedding of blood is necessary. But the touchstone, the baseline, is that we need to atone even for not anticipating the feelings of an itinerant beggar.
In our parsha, we see the same thing. The Tochecha speaks of the unspeakable, and horrifies all that hear it. After the Tochecha, one might feel that life is just a great and dark abyss of futility, that tranquility and happiness are only a delusion, that human life is brutish and worthless and just long enough to destroy hope. So the Torah tells us the rules of Arachin. Every human being is equally precious, no matter who, no matter when. Never forget that your friend is worth exactly the same as you and as the Kohen Gadol and as the Melech Yisrael. We are all created be'tzelem Elokim.
I particularly like this vort because it is an anodyne for how I felt yesterday as I was being ma'avir sedra. I noticed that the Eirech of a man between twenty and sixty is fifty (50) shekalim. The eirech for a man past his sixtieth birthday is fifteen (15) shekalim. It's not nogei'a to me for another year, but still....put that in your pipe and smoke it. Which actually sounds like a very good idea.
We Jews understand intellectually and emotionally how very precious human life is. I recently read a memoir written by a man with whom I am privileged to be very close, Avraham (Romi) Cohen, "The Youngest Partisan." He describes his experience before, during and after WW II, during which he joined and fought with a group of non-Jewish partisans. To this day, his courage and strength of character are preeminent. He is a lion of a man, and it is wise to not stand in his way. In his book, he describes the tortures he experienced and saw inflicted on others by the Nazis. Once, his group caught a Nazi, and after questioning him, tied him to a tree facing forwards, with his arms behind him. Romi was handed a knife and granted the honor of executing the prisoner; he was told not to kill the prisoner quickly. Standing there, visions of what this man and his friends had done ran through his mind. But he couldn't do it. Or, more correctly, he certainly could have done it, but he refused to do it. He handed the knife to his superior and said that he wanted to be 'mechabeid' him. As he walked away, he heard as his officer began his work.
But not everyone is like that. For many, even for Jews, there are brutalizing experiences that diminish our respect for human life. Three times in the Torah, we are forewarned about this problem and cautioned to balance what we have seen with kvod habriyos.
After the great mabul, in Parshas Noach, when so many lives were lost, what would murder mean? Nothing. Is there any difference at all between 5,555,555 and 5,555,556? Specifically there (Breishis 9:10), the Torah teaches us , שופך דם האדם באדם דמו יישפך כי בצלם אלוקים עשה את האדם , one who spills the blood of a man deserves the ultimate punishment, for man was created in Hashem's image. The great flood was Hashem's will, and even if we were told the reasons it happened, we can never understand why it was necessary and just. Our job is to remind ourselves, even under the worst circumstances, that human life is precious.
In Parshas Shoftim, the Torah teaches us what must be done when we go to war (Devarim 20:10) and when we lay siege upon our enemies (20:19). Immediately afterwards, we are taught the dinim of Egla Arufa, the calf that must be brought for atonement for the residents of a city when some unknown criminal murdered someone near their city- perhaps if they had been more welcoming and supportive, the victim would not have felt so impelled to go elsewhere that he chose this dangerous route that resulted in his death. Yes, there are times of war and of siege, there are times when the shedding of blood is necessary. But the touchstone, the baseline, is that we need to atone even for not anticipating the feelings of an itinerant beggar.
In our parsha, we see the same thing. The Tochecha speaks of the unspeakable, and horrifies all that hear it. After the Tochecha, one might feel that life is just a great and dark abyss of futility, that tranquility and happiness are only a delusion, that human life is brutish and worthless and just long enough to destroy hope. So the Torah tells us the rules of Arachin. Every human being is equally precious, no matter who, no matter when. Never forget that your friend is worth exactly the same as you and as the Kohen Gadol and as the Melech Yisrael. We are all created be'tzelem Elokim.
Reb Chaim B directs our attention to the Mei Hashiloach, from Rav Mordechai Leiner, the Ishbitzer Rov. He suggests that Arachin focuses our attention on the redemption of pledges, and says the idea of redemption should be understood more generally. The Parsha of Arachin following the Tochecha reminds us that there is always an opportunity to redeem onself. Indeed, other than the introductory passuk of "Vayidaber Hashem el Moshe…" and the ending review passuk, there is an exact match between the thirty-three pesukim of Parshas Arachin and the thirty-three pesukim of the Tochecha. Sometimes, Tochecha is the trauma that forces a person to realize that he must redeem himself through sincere Teshuva and Ma'asim Tovim. Sometimes, the punishment itself is the means of attaining redemption.
I particularly like this vort because it is an anodyne for how I felt yesterday as I was being ma'avir sedra. I noticed that the Eirech of a man between twenty and sixty is fifty (50) shekalim. The eirech for a man past his sixtieth birthday is fifteen (15) shekalim. It's not nogei'a to me for another year, but still....put that in your pipe and smoke it. Which actually sounds like a very good idea.
Friday, May 07, 2010
Bechukosai, Vayikra 26:3. Bechukosai Teileichu; Ameilus in Torah: Hard Work and Perseverence
First of all: the dvar Torah is late this week because beside the usual crises and
It's strange, how life works. Just as I had written that line, wondering whether the various issues that arose this week could be called crises or just the usual ups and downs, my mother shetichyeh slipped and fell a few feet away from me. Baruch Hashem there was no damage, but it did remind me of the difference between crisis and minor disturbance.
So the real reason I'm writing late is that my wife and I took a few days off and drove to southern Kentucky, where we enjoyed the ice cream at Graeter's in Louisville, toured Mammoth Cave, visited an Australia-oriented petting farm where you mingle with kangaroos, emus, parakeets and lorikeets, and, following "The Bourbon Trail," toured the Jim Beam Distillery.
Now, when I say the first two birchos hashachar, I have a lot more kavana.
And now, lehavdil bein yom uvein lailah, to the parsha.
Literally translated, אִם בְּחֻקֹּתַי תֵּלֵכוּ is a directive to walk in the path of Torah. Rashi (from Toras Kohanim,) however, says it means shetih’yu ameilim batorah, that you will work hard and expend all your energy in learning Torah.
I want to know where in this passuk do we see that "teileichu" means "ameilus". Rashi does demonstrate that the passuk is talking about learning Torah and not only doing the mitzvos. But that's all that Rashi proves; from Rashi’s proofs you only see that teileichu means limud hatorah, but you don’t see ameilus. Unless this is why the word “chukosai’ is used— that you should see the dinim as chukim, which are almost beyond human understanding, and diligently work to understand them.
Rabbi Dovid Zupnick zatzal told me that the Chofetz Chaim says that the proof is the fact that we are talking about chukim: the definition of ameilus is work that does not produce tangible results, and since chukim are incomprehensible, all the work you do to understand it will produce no real change in your understanding, so it is called ameilus. I do agree that when I learn Taharos, it feels like ameilus.
In any case, the concept that we are obligated to learn Torah with hard work is found in several places. There is the Rashi in Shabbos 63a. The Gemora brings the passuk in Mishlei “Orech Yamim biminah, bismola osher vekavod,” and says that for the "mayminim" in Torah, they have arichas yamim plus osher vekavod; "masmilim" only have osher vekavod. Rashi says two pshatim in masmilim; either that they weren’t “yegei’im bo kol tzarkan,” or they learned shelo lishma. So you see that Rashi learns that ikkar limud hatorah has to be with yegiah. And, in Shabbos 88b, the Gemora says that for maiminim Torah is a sam chaim, a life elixir, but for masmilim it is a sam hama'ves, poison, and Rashi says that ma’aminim means “asukim bechol kocham utrudim lada’as soda ke’adom hamishtameish be’yad yemino she’hi ikkar," working with all their strength and obssessed with knowing its secrets, like one who uses his right hand because it is dominant. But I still don’t see it in the words of this passuk.
Some learn that ‘chukosai’ refers to the shlosh esrei middos shehatorah nidreshes bohem, so teileichu means that you will use the rules of drasha to understand and expand on the Torah Shebichsav. This certainly requires yegiah, because you are developing meaning where it is not obvious, and it needs consistency with kol hatorah kullah.
This is what I once said:
When Hashem told Avraham the mitzva of mila, He said “Ani Keil Shakai, Hishaleich lefanai ve’heyei samim.” Why was this sheim Hashem used here? The mefarshim (Arvei Nachal, Maharal) say that Hashem created the world incrementally, with the briah stepping from lower to higher quality as the briah progressed, but Hashem stopped the briah short of perfection, so that mankind would have the opportunity and duty to bring it to perfection, thus emulating Hashem’s work. The mitzvah of milah is the archetype of this concept, the concept that we are commanded to emulate the Ribbono Shel Olom in his brias ha’olam, which progressed from lower to higher quality.
We see that when Hashem commands us to bring ourselves and the briah to perfection, the Torah uses the term ‘his’haleich lefanai.” This shows that "halicha" does not mean a stroll to mediocrity, but instead it means ameilus to reach perfection. Only concerted and diligent effort can bring perfection. This is the raya that “bechukosai teileichu” means ameilus. It means that we must strive to bring ourselves to perfection through limud haTorah.
I recently heard a teretz from the Alter of Kelm's son (see similar in Nesivos Shalom). He says that anyone can learn Torah like any other scholarly pursuit, but such learning is superficial, it is like a scarf he puts on and can easily take off. Only a person who dedicates himself to learning, who sacrifices his desires because he wants to focus on Torah, only such a person is permeated with Torah, it becomes a part of what he is. The way you can tell the difference is how they act when they're outside of the Beis Medrash. The ameil batorah will still look and act like a Ben Torah, while the other one will quickly lose the tzurah and become indistinguishable from every bum in the street. How a person acts when he walks around is a proof of whether he is dipping his toes in Torah or pickling himself in it. So when the Torah says bechukosai teileichu, that means that your halicha should illustrate the fact that your learn Torah; people should be able to see from the way you walk around that you are a ben Torah. Learn Torah in a way that your teileichu is the teileichu of a Ben Torah. That only comes with Ameilus.
This reminded me of something my father zatzal said. My father learned in Slabodka. He told me that the Alter said that he couldn't predict what would come of the talmidim in the yeshiva, whether they would be ye'rei'ei shamayim or not. But one thing he knew for a fact: nobody that touched the door-knob of the beis medrash of Slabodka would ever have hana'a from olam hazeh. (Kein hano'eh fuhn oilem hazeh veht ehr shein nit hobben.)
His point was that for a person who has immersed himself in Torah, which every talmid of Slabodka did, worldly pleasures would be crass and low and unworthy of attention. You might enjoy things, but you would never become a hedonist. You might not be frum, you might abandon the Torah, but your limud hatorah would make an indelible mark; you could never sink to vulgar obsession with physical pleasure.
And another answer, that I just heard from a very nice man who was here collecting money. He is Rabbi Yisrael David Stern from Bnei Brak. He is a talmid chacham and has a yeshiva, and while he was in town, he was asked to speak at several yeshivos and kollelim. This is what he said:
The Rambam in the last Halacha in Hilchos Sechirus, 13 Sechirus 7, says the following:
(Just for shleimus, please note that the Maharsha also asks this question- How the parsha can promise earthly reward for tzidkus according to Reb Yaakov? The Maharsha answers that Reb Yaakov's rule is only for a yachid. A tzibur gets schar in this world too. If you think about it, you'll realize that the Mahrsha is not just right, he's absolutely and inescapably right.)
It's strange, how life works. Just as I had written that line, wondering whether the various issues that arose this week could be called crises or just the usual ups and downs, my mother shetichyeh slipped and fell a few feet away from me. Baruch Hashem there was no damage, but it did remind me of the difference between crisis and minor disturbance.
So the real reason I'm writing late is that my wife and I took a few days off and drove to southern Kentucky, where we enjoyed the ice cream at Graeter's in Louisville, toured Mammoth Cave, visited an Australia-oriented petting farm where you mingle with kangaroos, emus, parakeets and lorikeets, and, following "The Bourbon Trail," toured the Jim Beam Distillery.
And now, lehavdil bein yom uvein lailah, to the parsha.
Literally translated, אִם בְּחֻקֹּתַי תֵּלֵכוּ is a directive to walk in the path of Torah. Rashi (from Toras Kohanim,) however, says it means shetih’yu ameilim batorah, that you will work hard and expend all your energy in learning Torah.
I want to know where in this passuk do we see that "teileichu" means "ameilus". Rashi does demonstrate that the passuk is talking about learning Torah and not only doing the mitzvos. But that's all that Rashi proves; from Rashi’s proofs you only see that teileichu means limud hatorah, but you don’t see ameilus. Unless this is why the word “chukosai’ is used— that you should see the dinim as chukim, which are almost beyond human understanding, and diligently work to understand them.
Rabbi Dovid Zupnick zatzal told me that the Chofetz Chaim says that the proof is the fact that we are talking about chukim: the definition of ameilus is work that does not produce tangible results, and since chukim are incomprehensible, all the work you do to understand it will produce no real change in your understanding, so it is called ameilus. I do agree that when I learn Taharos, it feels like ameilus.
In any case, the concept that we are obligated to learn Torah with hard work is found in several places. There is the Rashi in Shabbos 63a. The Gemora brings the passuk in Mishlei “Orech Yamim biminah, bismola osher vekavod,” and says that for the "mayminim" in Torah, they have arichas yamim plus osher vekavod; "masmilim" only have osher vekavod. Rashi says two pshatim in masmilim; either that they weren’t “yegei’im bo kol tzarkan,” or they learned shelo lishma. So you see that Rashi learns that ikkar limud hatorah has to be with yegiah. And, in Shabbos 88b, the Gemora says that for maiminim Torah is a sam chaim, a life elixir, but for masmilim it is a sam hama'ves, poison, and Rashi says that ma’aminim means “asukim bechol kocham utrudim lada’as soda ke’adom hamishtameish be’yad yemino she’hi ikkar," working with all their strength and obssessed with knowing its secrets, like one who uses his right hand because it is dominant. But I still don’t see it in the words of this passuk.
Some learn that ‘chukosai’ refers to the shlosh esrei middos shehatorah nidreshes bohem, so teileichu means that you will use the rules of drasha to understand and expand on the Torah Shebichsav. This certainly requires yegiah, because you are developing meaning where it is not obvious, and it needs consistency with kol hatorah kullah.
This is what I once said:
When Hashem told Avraham the mitzva of mila, He said “Ani Keil Shakai, Hishaleich lefanai ve’heyei samim.” Why was this sheim Hashem used here? The mefarshim (Arvei Nachal, Maharal) say that Hashem created the world incrementally, with the briah stepping from lower to higher quality as the briah progressed, but Hashem stopped the briah short of perfection, so that mankind would have the opportunity and duty to bring it to perfection, thus emulating Hashem’s work. The mitzvah of milah is the archetype of this concept, the concept that we are commanded to emulate the Ribbono Shel Olom in his brias ha’olam, which progressed from lower to higher quality.
We see that when Hashem commands us to bring ourselves and the briah to perfection, the Torah uses the term ‘his’haleich lefanai.” This shows that "halicha" does not mean a stroll to mediocrity, but instead it means ameilus to reach perfection. Only concerted and diligent effort can bring perfection. This is the raya that “bechukosai teileichu” means ameilus. It means that we must strive to bring ourselves to perfection through limud haTorah.
I recently heard a teretz from the Alter of Kelm's son (see similar in Nesivos Shalom). He says that anyone can learn Torah like any other scholarly pursuit, but such learning is superficial, it is like a scarf he puts on and can easily take off. Only a person who dedicates himself to learning, who sacrifices his desires because he wants to focus on Torah, only such a person is permeated with Torah, it becomes a part of what he is. The way you can tell the difference is how they act when they're outside of the Beis Medrash. The ameil batorah will still look and act like a Ben Torah, while the other one will quickly lose the tzurah and become indistinguishable from every bum in the street. How a person acts when he walks around is a proof of whether he is dipping his toes in Torah or pickling himself in it. So when the Torah says bechukosai teileichu, that means that your halicha should illustrate the fact that your learn Torah; people should be able to see from the way you walk around that you are a ben Torah. Learn Torah in a way that your teileichu is the teileichu of a Ben Torah. That only comes with Ameilus.
This reminded me of something my father zatzal said. My father learned in Slabodka. He told me that the Alter said that he couldn't predict what would come of the talmidim in the yeshiva, whether they would be ye'rei'ei shamayim or not. But one thing he knew for a fact: nobody that touched the door-knob of the beis medrash of Slabodka would ever have hana'a from olam hazeh. (Kein hano'eh fuhn oilem hazeh veht ehr shein nit hobben.)
His point was that for a person who has immersed himself in Torah, which every talmid of Slabodka did, worldly pleasures would be crass and low and unworthy of attention. You might enjoy things, but you would never become a hedonist. You might not be frum, you might abandon the Torah, but your limud hatorah would make an indelible mark; you could never sink to vulgar obsession with physical pleasure.
And another answer, that I just heard from a very nice man who was here collecting money. He is Rabbi Yisrael David Stern from Bnei Brak. He is a talmid chacham and has a yeshiva, and while he was in town, he was asked to speak at several yeshivos and kollelim. This is what he said:
The Rambam in the last Halacha in Hilchos Sechirus, 13 Sechirus 7, says the following:
כדרך שמוזהר בעה"ב שלא יגזול שכר עני ולא יעכבנו כך העני מוזהר שלא יגזול מלאכת בעה"ב ויבטל מעט בכאן ומעט בכאן ומוציא כל היום במרמה אלא חייב לדקדק על עצמו בזמן שהרי הקפידו על ברכה רביעית של ברכת המזון שלא יברך אותה. וכן חייב לעבוד בכל כחו שהרי יעקב הצדיק אמר כי בכל כחי עבדתי את אביכן. לפיכך נטל שכר זאת אף בעולם הזה שנאמר ויפרץ האיש מאד מאד:
Just as the employer is warned to not cheat his employee or withhold his salary, so too the employee is warned to not cheat his employer by wasting a little time here or there....instead, he is obligated to be meticulous with every moment. Chazal tell us that the laborer cannot say the fourth blessing of Birkas Hamazon because his time belongs to his employer. And he must work with all his strength, as we find that the Tzadik Yaakov said that he worked for Lavan with all his strength. This is why Yaakov received reward even in this world, as it says, and the man was mightily successful.
From this Rambam we see that although there is no guarantee that one's efforts will be successful, if a laborer works with all his strength, he will be rewarded in this world. If so, we can say that Rashi is using the same idea. Although Reb Yaakovs rule (Kiddushin 39b) is thatשכר מצות בהאי עלמא ליכא, the reward for good deeds is not given in this world but only in the world to come, this does not apply when a person is an ameil, when he does his work with all his strength. This is why Rashi says that the rewards of Bechukosai are for ameilus: mere fulfillment of the mitzvos does not bring the blessings enumerated in Parshas Bechukosai. Only ameilus overcomes the general rule of שכר מצות בהאי עלמא ליכא
(Just for shleimus, please note that the Maharsha also asks this question- How the parsha can promise earthly reward for tzidkus according to Reb Yaakov? The Maharsha answers that Reb Yaakov's rule is only for a yachid. A tzibur gets schar in this world too. If you think about it, you'll realize that the Mahrsha is not just right, he's absolutely and inescapably right.)
~~~~~~~~~
Monday, May 11, 2009
Hebrew Names, Jewish Names, & Secular Names. A Guest Post, Annotated
This was originally posted here in May 2009. In June 2013 we posted on three closely related topics: When one should name a daughter; The profound significance of the naming of a child; and Why some Gedolim insist that we only give our children traditional names.
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This is an article that appeared in the "Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society" (Fall 1997.) I referred to it in a post that discussed Jewish names that are abbreviations, and the author kindly sent me a copy. The article is thorough and engaging; Some format static was introduced by my inexpert conversion of the document from pdf to html. I have neither the skill nor the inclination to fiddle around with it, and the errors are inconsequential.
I have added my own remarks in and after the footnotes, and my interpolations, annotations, and addenda are clearly marked as such by being in bold italics.
Secular Names
Steven Oppenheimer, D.D.S.
And G-d formed from the earth every beast of the field and every bird of the sky and brought them to Adam to see what he would call each one; and whatever Adam called each living creature, that remained its name (Hu Sh'mo).1
Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch2 says the word Shem (name) comes from the word Sham (place). A person's name (Shem) indicates his place in the world. When someone is given a name, that name has a profound effect on that person's essence. The Besht, the Ba'al Shem Tov, commenting on this verse in Genesis,3 wrote HaShem Hu Ha'Neshama Shel Ha'Adam, one's name is one's very soul. In fact, the middle letters of the word neSHaMa (soul), spell the word Shem (name).
The Midrash states:
The Jews were redeemed from Egypt through the merit of four things: they didn't change their names, they didn't change their language, they didn't engage in gossip (Lashon HaRa), and they didn't engage in licentious behavior; they didn't change their names, they went down [to Egypt] as Reuven and Shimon and they left [Egypt] as Reuven and Shimon; and they didn't call Reuven, Rufus, and they didn't call Shimon, Luliani, nor Yosef, Listim nor Binyamin, Alexander.4
If a person's name is so important, and if the Midrash states that the Jews were redeemed from Egypt because they didn't change their names, how is it that today, secular names are so widespread among Jews? If one can learn from Galut Mitzrayim, the exile in Egypt, and extrapolate from Geulat Mitzrayim, the redemption from Egypt, then it would seem that we should not have secular names, but good Hebrew names! How is it that so many Jews in America today have Hebrew and English names? Could it be that we are holding up the Geulah by having secular names?
Maharam Shick5 quotes the Midrash, (that they didn't change their names) and writes that it is a Torah prohibition to have a non-Jewish name. We see this from the verse Hivdalti etchem min Ha'Amim, (and I have separated you from the nations)?6 Maharam Shick quotes Rambam7, that we see from this verse that one is not permitted to dress like the Gentiles. So, too, says Maharam Shick, we are not allowed to call ourselves by a non-Jewish name. "And don't say", says Maharam Shick, "that I also have a Hebrew name to be called up to the Torah, that is foolish and stupid, and it is still prohibited to have a non-Jewish name."
The Talmud8 quotes the verse in Mishle9, "and the name of the wicked shall rot," and brings a grim story referred to in a passage from Lamentations.10 A child was given the name Do'eg (in spite of Do'eg's bad reputation).11 His mother would measure his weight every day and would give the increase in his weight in gold to the Beit HaMikdash. In spite of this, the child died a horrible death. The Talmud states that none should name their children after wicked people and because of the unfortunate choice of name and the deviation from custom, "see what happened to him." The Migdal Oz, Rabbi Ya'akov Emden, writes12 that just as we are not allowed to name someone after a wicked person as it says in Mishle, "and the name of the wicked shall rot," so too, it is also not permitted to have a non-Jewish name.
Rabbi Yosef Rosen, zt"l, writes13 that one is permitted to have a secular name that is a translation of one's Hebrew name.
It interesting that the Chatam Sofer, writes14 that someone who has two names, shem kodesh and shem chol, a Hebrew name and a secular name, should not be called to the Torah by both names. He was not referring to the Hebrew name and the English name but to the Hebrew name and the Yiddish name. The Yiddish name is the shem chol, the secular name. If your name is Tzvi Hersh you should only be called up by the name Tzvi.
How is it that so many of us have Hebrew and secular names? Not only that, but throughout the ages we see Jews have taken secular names. We find many non-Hebrew names among the zugot mentioned in Pirkei Avot. Antigonos and Avtalyon are some examples. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, zt"l, points out that many Amoraim had non-Hebrew names, such as Mar Kashisha, Rav Z'vid, Mar Zutra, and Rav Papa. Most of the names of the Geonim were Aramaic and not Hebrew. The author of the Maggid Mishnah was Rabbeinu Vidal. The name Maimon, the father of Rambam, appears to be a secular name.15 Rav Yitzchak Zev Soloveitchik of Brisk was also called Rav Velvele; his grandfather, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, the Bait HaLevi, was called Rav Yoshe Ber, and Rav Yitzchok Dov Bamberger of Wurtzburg was called Rav Seligman Ber.16 The great thirteenth-century leader of French Jewry was known by the Hebrew name, Rav Yechiel of Paris and by the French, Vivant of Meaux.17
Doesn't all this seem to be against the Midrash that we spoke of earlier? Rav Moshe Feinstein states18 that many non-Hebrew names that have gained acceptance in the Jewish community today as Jewish names started out as secular names taken from the countries in which Jews lived. At the time, says Rav Moshe, the rabbis complained about Jews taking these names, but they eventually gained acceptance. Today's secular names are not any worse than the old secular names. The new names just haven't been around as long. Eventually, they, too, will probably be accepted. And, therefore, when one writes a get, a bill of divorce, all secular names are equal, one isn't any holier than another.
Let us address, then, the last two remaining questions: (1) What about the Midrash, (they did not change their names) and, therefore, the Jews merited redemption? And if this is so, (2) Why do so many of us have a secular name? Rabbi Yehuda Loew, zt"l, the Maharal MiPrague, explains our Midrash as a special requirement only for the Jews of Egypt.19 They had not yet become a nation and needed the strict adherence to retaining their names and their language to serve as a distinction between them and the Egyptians. Rabbi Loew explains that one's name serves as one's personal connection to one's nation. A people's language serves as its connection to its nationhood. Rav Moshe also makes this point, that the requirement not to have a secular name was only for that period in time and is not a law today. While it may not be desirable to give your child a secular name, there is no issur (prohibition) involved.
As for the second question, "Why do so many of us have secular names?", I would like to share a fascinating historical insight. There are, apparently, three categories of names that Jews have had. 1) Shem kodesh – names taken from Tanach (Bible) or Gemara (Talmud). These were given at the Brit and were used for Aliyahs to the Torah, Jewish legal documents, and in prayers for the sick. 2) Shem chol – these were usually Yiddish-German nicknames that were given on the Shabbat that the mother came to Shul during the Cholkreisch (hollekreisch) ceremony. In Eastern Europe, in recent generations, this ceremony has been lost. 3) Shem lo yehudi – during the period of emancipation, these names were adopted by the Jews of Central and Western Europe for the purpose of governmental registration. These names were unrelated to the Cholkreisch ceremony.
The purpose of the Cholkreisch ceremony was to establish the child's nickname, the shem chol, to be used in his everyday life. The Cholkreisch ceremony is about 1,000 years old. Rav Simcha of Vitry20 and Rabbi Yehuda HaChasid both write about this ceremony. The first one to mention it by name and explain the name, however, was the fifteenth-century Rabbi Moshe HaLevi MiMagentza, the Maharam Mintz. He explained that Hol or Chol referred to the secular name and Kreisch referred to the calling out (Tze'a'ka) of that name. ["In German, in the southern region, they call Tze'a'ka, kreisch."]
Rabbi Avraham Moshe Tendlau (1801-1877) wrote that the word "kreisch" used in the sense of "Tze'aka" comes from the old German "kreien", or "kreischen". This is similar to the English word in use today, 'cry']. On the first Shabbat that the mother came to Shul, the children of the community would be invited to the home of the new baby. They would lift up the cradle and call out the nickname, the shem chol, of the new baby. The adults would throw fruit to the children. The sixteenth-century rabbi, Rabbi Yosef Hahn Neuerlingen, author of Yosef Ohmetz, warned about the custom of throwing fruit to the children. The fruit got squashed and this was Bizui Ochlin, a desecration of food. The custom arose to throw candy to the children. This is probably the origin of today's custom to throw candy to the children at joyous occasions in shul. There are those who say that the lifting of the cradle during the naming is the origin of the name Hollekreisch. In French, lifting the cradle is called, "haut la creche" which is similar to the term "hollekreisch".21
Rabbeinu Tam22 indicates that Jews would give themselves Hebrew names but the Gentiles would call them other names. When his Aunt Rachel got divorced, she had a secular name given to her by the Gentiles, Belle-Assez which means very pretty. This is the origin of the Yiddish name Bayla. The Rosh also speaks of Gentiles giving Jews names during his time. Zanvil was a nickname for Shmuel, Rechlin for Rachel, Mirush for Miryam, Bunam for Simcha, Seligman for Pinchas, Wolf for Shimon, and Zalman for Shlomo.23
Historically, there was a distinction between the Shem Kodesh, the Hebrew name, and the Shem Chol, the secular name. The Shem Kodesh served for d'varim she'b'kedusha, holy matters, such as being called to the Torah, prayers, and the writing of Jewish legal documents. The Shem Chol served for secular matters, as a nickname used by the person's family and friends. The Shem Kodesh was given in Shul at the time of the Brit; the Shem Chol was given at the baby's home while he lay in his cradle. We see this from Maharam Mintz who wrote over 500 years ago about a man called Meshulam Zalman. "He is called Meshulam to the Sefer Torah and this is the Shem Kodesh that his father gave him at the Brit, and the secular nickname for Meshulam is Zalman, the name given to him by his father and mother in his cradle on the Shabbat that she went with him to Shul, and this (ceremony) is called 'Hol Kreisch'."24
The student of the Trumat Ha'Deshen (1389-1459) wrote a sefer called Leket Yosher. In the introduction, he introduces himself as follows: "My name is Yuzlan and I am called to the Sefer Torah as Yosef B'Reb Moshe." Concerning his Rebbi he wrote: The Gaon is called to the Sefer Torah as Yisrael B'Reb Petachya, z"l, but the world calls him Rabbi Isserlin ."25 Rabbi Moshe ben Yisrael, zt"l, is known as the Ramo. Ramo is an acronym for Rav Moshe Isserlis. Isserlis means "son of Yisrael."
In Germany, a clear separation was kept between the Shem Kodesh and the Shem Chol. In Eastern Europe, however, over the course of time, this distinction was blurred, most probably as a result of the abandonment of the Cholkreisch ritual. There were some rabbis, such as the student of the Shevet Sofer , (Rabbi Yitzchak Meir Tzoval MiFakash) who attempted to stop the mixing of the two names. He allowed use only of the Shem Kodesh when calling someone to the Torah. In time it became common for people in Eastern Europe to use both the secular name and the Hebrew name for all matters. This created halachic problems in writing Gittin (divorce papers). In the past only the Shem Kodesh had been used. Now, it was uncertain exactly what should be written.26
During the period of Emancipation, there were Jews who wanted to be accepted by the Gentile population and took non-Jewish first names. In Prussia, the government prohibited Jews to change their Jewish names to Christian names. In 1787, an Austrian edict limited the Jews to biblical first names. Nevertheless, the assimilationists managed to take Christian names. In 1836, Leopold Zunz published a book entitled Namen der Juden in which he attempted to prove that throughout the ages Jews had names given to them by the Gentiles. In this way, he hoped to persuade the government to allow Jews to choose any name they wanted.
In the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the government allowed the Jews to adopt Christian names. The overwhelming response on the part of the Jews to take such names surprised even the Gentiles. When Maharam Shick27 turned over the official list of names of his congregants to the local government official, the official berated him over the fact that so many Jews had non-Jewish names. The official was astounded that they were not proud enough of their Jewish heritage. It was then that Maharam Schick wrote his responsum decrying taking non-Jewish names.28 He explained that following the law making it obligatory for Jews to have surnames, his father took the last name, SHiK, which was the abbreviation for Shem Yisrael Kadosh – a Jew's name is holy. This was done to remind his progeny of the importance of retaining a Jewish name. It is interesting to note that when a controversy arose over a rabbi who preached in the vernacular rather than in a "Jewish language", Maharam Schick came to his defense and justified the rabbi's practice.29
Non-Jewish names were to be found among Jews even during the time of the Tanaim. There is a Braita30 that teaches:
Divorce papers brought from abroad (to Israel) signed by witneses, even if the names are like the names of idolators, [the divorce papers] are valid. [This is] because most of the Jews [who live] outside of Israel have names that resemble the names of idolators.
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein writes31 that it is impossible to determine when non-Jewish names came to be considered as Jewish names since all these names were originally taken from the Gentiles. In the beginning, the rabbis complained about these names, but they took hold. So, too, the rabbis could complain about the English names that Jews have taken in this country and similar names in other countries, but how much should they complain and how successful would they be? Rav Moshe is telling us that these non-Jewish names have been around for a long time in one form or another.
A number of countries in Central and Western Europe required Jews to register their children's birth in the official registry. Only German names were recognized, and so almost every Jew had a German first name, just as it is common today for Jews in Anglo-Saxon countries to have English names.32
Rabbi Shlomo Carlebach (1844-1918) wrote that since many Jews had left the ghetto and lived among the Gentiles, they were uncomfortable about calling themselves overtly Jewish names, fearing ridicule by the Gentiles, and so chose German names. Rabbi Carlebach recommended that they adopt a translation of their Hebrew names, i.e. Abraham for Avraham and Moses for Moshe. Social pressure, however, eventually led more and more Jews to take German names.33
A name determines one's destiny34
Had the generations so merited, G-d would have given each and every person a name, and from that name we would have known that person's nature and deeds.35
One should ever examine names, to give his son a name worthy of him to becoxme a righteous person, for sometimes the name may be a contributory factor for for evil or for good.36
The Talmud37 brings the story of Rabbi Meir who stopped at an inn with his two travelling companions. Rabbi Meir didn't want to leave his money with the innkeeper named Kidor, because Rabbi Meir doubted his honesty. He based his suspicions upon the verse, "they are a generation ( Ki Dor ) given to perverseness."38 In the end, Rabbi Meir turned out to be right and Kidor, the innkeeper, stole his (Rabbi Meir's) companions' money. They complained to Rabbi Meir that he should have warned them. Rabbi Meir answered, " I considered this name a suspicion, not a definite presumption." In other words, a name can only arouse suspicion that a person may have an intrinsic dishonest nature. A name cannot, however, determine this definitively, since a person may overcome this character flaw and control the negative influences of his name.
We see that one should be very careful to select a name for a child that will have a positive effect upon his growth and development. A Hebrew name carefully selected does just that. This is what the Ba'al Shem Tov meant when he wrote that a name can manifest one's very essence. While the practice of using non-Hebrew names has been around for a long time, it is clear that Chazal saw major benefits in having and using a Shem Kodesh – a Hebrew name.
Every time a person engages in the performance of mitzvahs, he acquires a good name (Shem Tov) for himself. A person is called by three names – that which he is called by his father and mother, that which he is called by others, and that which he acquires for himself. The best of all is the name he acquires for himself [by the performance of mitzvahs].39
Let us strive for the ideal approach. Let us choose a Shem Kodesh and pursue a Shem Tov. Let us pursue mitzvot and be proud to be Jews. And may our names and our deeds hasten the final redemption.
1.Genesis 2:19
2. In his commentary to Genesis 2:19
3 P'ninei Ha'Chasidut. (Blog note: this idea is also found in the Ohr Hachaim Devarim 29:19. By the way, the "Likutei He'aros" on the Ohr Hachaim there credits a sefer called "Ohr Habahir" for the oft searched for statement that the father is given divine inspiration, Ru'ach Hakodesh, when he chooses a name for his son. But I'll tell you that in my opinion, and in my personal experience, headstrong and/or stupid always trumps Ruach Hakodesh; when a Brass Band is playing, it's hard to hear the Kol Demama Dakah.)
4 Shir HaShirim Rabah, Chapter 4 (Blog note: Also in Vayikra Rabba in Parshas Emor #32)
5 Responsa Maharam Shick, Y.D., Chap. 169.
6 Based on Leviticus 20:24 (Blog note: The Maharam Shik's opinion on this matter is by no means normative. He tends toward the extremes when dealing with issues that touch upon haskala.)
7 Hilchot Akum 11:1 (Blog note: The Rambam he brings is a weak raya, especially since the Rambam doesn't mention the issue of Jewish names.)8 T.B. Yoma, 38b
9 Mishle, 10:7
10 Lamentations, 2:20
11 Do'eg Ha'Adomi, who lived during the time of Sha'ul HaMelech, was originally a great scholar and head of the Sanhedrin. He engaged in lashon ha'ra (slander) against David HaMelech and helped poison the relationship between Sha'ul and David. Do'eg died at age 34. The Talmud says that he had no share in olam haba (the world to come).
12 Nachal Tet, 14.
13 Tzafnat Pa'ne'ach, No. 275.
14 E.H., No. 21.
15 Iggerot Moshe, Vol. IV, No. 66.
16 Shorshei Minhag Ashkenaz, by R. Binyamin Shlomo Hamburger, B'nei Brak, 5755.
17 Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. 12, page 810.
18 Iggerot Moshe, E.H., Vol. 3, No. 35. (Blog note: As the author mentions, Reb Moshe says the same svara as the Maharal, although he says it noncommittally-- he says it is a reasonable pshat, but he is not comfortable stating it as a matter of halachic fact. Also, while the author quotes Reb Moshe as saying "While it may not be desirable to give your child a secular name, there is no issur (prohibition) involved", in fact Reb Moshe calls it "megunah," shameful--unless it is given to honor or memorialize a family member who had a non-Jewish name; see below, Additional notes, #3.)19 G'vurot HaShem, Chap. 43.
20 Rashi's noted student and author of Machzor Vitry.
21 Shorshei Minhag Ashkenaz, loc. cit.
22 Tshuvot Rabbeinu Tam, No. 25.
23 Shorshei Minhag Ashkenaz.
24 Ibid.
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
27 Hungary, 1807 - 1879.
28 Responsa Maharam Shick, Y.D., No. 169. (Blog note: Shick is an old gentile German name. For example, Conrad Shick was a German protestant missionary who lived in Jerusalem in the eighteen hundreds. And see http://www.houseofnames.com/xq/asp.fc/qx/schick-family-crest.htm where it is clear that Shick has a long history as a German gentile name. I don't think the Maharam's father thought he was inventing a name. I think the Maharam's father chose the well known name of Shick because he could invest it with a dual meaning. Among gentiles, it is a common German name. Within his own family, he let it be known that it means "Shem Yisrael Kodesh." It would be like naming a child Mickey and saying it stands for Mi K'amcha Yisrael.) 29 Ibid. O.C. No. 70.
30 T.B. Gittin 11b.
31 Iggerot Moshe, E.H. Vol. 3, No. 35.
32 Shorshei Minhag Ashkenaz.
33 Ibid.
34 T. B. Brachot 7b.
35 Midrash Tanchuma.
36 Ibid., Parshat Ha'azinu. (Blog note: R' Eliezer Papo in the Pele Yoeitz, Letter Shin, D'H Shem Tov, says that if one is interested in the benefit the child can derive from the influence of a name, one should give his child a name that commemorates some chesed Hashem did for the father, rather than taking a family name. For example, Rav Gifter's daughter's name is Rebbetzin Shlomis Eisenberg, and Reb Moshe's son's name is Rav Sholom Reuven Feinstein, because they were born either during or immediately after WWII. See also below in Additional Blog Notes #4.)37 T.B. Yoma 83b.
38 Deuteronomy 32:20.
39 Midrash Tanchuma, Parshat VaYak'hel.
Additional Blog notes:
1. See the Comment section, below, for an interesting discussion of the names of Mordechai and Esther, which, are certainly not Hebrew, and which some consider reminiscent of the names of certain pagan deities.
2. An Important Preliminary Analysis:
Three Aspects of the Concept of "Names."
What, exactly, does the word "name" mean? What constitutes a name?
It can be argued, however, that the comparison to Gittin is incorrect: what we call a 'name' for Gittin may be totally irrelevant to what is called a name for the purposes of our discussion. The determination of the name in a Get is based exclusively on clarity in identification. The din that Shemo uShemah are de'oraysa by a get doesn't really require names at all. If the people had unique and prominent physical characterisitics, we could write a get with no names at all, but instead just write "the man with three eyes and the woman with the horn in middle of her forehead." On the other hand, the idea discussed in this article, the preference of using Jewish names, involves two entirely different issues: Ethnic pride/Religious affiliation (in other words, that a Jew should use a Jewish name because it shows pride and affiliation with Judaism, while a non-Jewish name shows indifference, as Rashi says in Shemos when Moshe Rabbeinu did not correct the daughters of Yisro when they referred to him as an "Ish Mitzri,", or the Maharam Shik's "chukos ha'amim,") and the spiritual advantage of the inner essence of whatever the Hebrew name signifies, whether it is a trait or a reference to some bygone tzadik, (as we find by Adam, whose naming of the species in Hebrew was a portentous event that reflected and reinforced their essential reality and spirituality.)
Again: Defining 'name' in the context of Gittin, therefore, is a matter of eliminating, as far as possible, potential ambiguity in the mind of the reader, and clarity in publicizing exactly who was divorced. Defining 'name' in the context of the article, being a two-pronged analysis, might not be that simple. If it is a matter of ethnic pride/religious affiliation/chukos ha'amim, then perhaps we should define 'name' as that which one chooses to use in daily life. If it is a question of the connection with and influence of the spiritual elements of the name, the deeper meaning and history of the name, perhaps all that matters is the fact he uses it to be called up for aliyos.
And since when are Surnames names at all? Perhaps "name" in our culture only refers to the individual's given name, not the family name, which, in a sense, is no different than identifying the person by calling him Hirshel Varzhaner to indicate that he's from Varzhan.
Once you have decided which of the above aspects of a name you are examining, you have to determine what the person's real name is- because not everything people call you is your name, and what they called you at the bris might not be your name either.
As the Medrash Rabba Koheles 7:3 on Tov sheim mi'shemen tov says, every man has three names: the name his mother and father called him (she'karu lo aviv ve'imo), the name his friends called him (she'karu lo chaveirav), and the name he is given in the heavenly record of his deeds and behavior (she'karui lo be'sefer toldos briyaso).
3. Reb Moshe says that initially, parents who gave their children secular names were strongly decried by the Gedolei Hador, but over time certain names gained acceptance. But, and this is an important 'but', he also says that once a name is in a family, "kevod hamishpacha" is more important than the general preference for a Hebrew name, and therefore one should take the name of the family member even if it is not Jewish.
4. The question of whether to name a child for an event or for a relative is literally antedeluvian: it has been discussed since before Noach. The Medrash in Breishis Rabbah Parshas Noach 37:11 on the naming of Peleg, "Ki beyamav niflegah ha'aretz" says the following:
5. Reb Moshe, in his Igros YD 3:97 has a fascinating teshuva. The case was that the mother did not tell the father that she gave birth to his child. I assume they were separated for six or seven months, or divorced, or never married. When the boy was born, she arranged the bris without telling her ex about it, and the child was named without the father's input. This sounds weird, but you can see it happening in bitter divorces. where one party leaves town. And, if you know about the battles even happily married couples sometimes have about names, you can be sure that this mother was determined to eliminate her ex's input on this important decision. Obviously, the Millah is valid. But what about the name? Does the father lose the right to name his child?
6. Naming a child is a very important and auspicious event. There is an amazing Drisha in Yoreh Dei'ah at the end of 360 that states the following: When one has a choice of which of certain events involving mitzvos to attend, there are rules of priority. For example, if there is a choice of attending a levaya, or a wedding, or a bris, the Tur there discusses the order of relative importance. The Drisha states that in those cases where a bris has top priority, attending the naming of a girl has equal status. Although he does not cite his source, this comes from the Eliah Rabba. It is clear that this shittah holds that the importance of attending a bris is not the milah, it is the fact that the child is named at that time. Therefore, he holds, attending the naming of a girl has exactly the same significance and importance.
See Even Ha'ezer 129 regarding what names are used in Gittin, and see the Chazon Ish EH 93:15 on these halachos, where he extensively discusses the relative standing of the various names a person has, such as the name given at the bris, when one is ill, by one's friends, and various disparate circumstances. For example, in business, when I'm dealing with a non-Jew, I tell them my name is Gene. I chose Gene because non-Hebrew speakers mangle my name, and Eugene means "born of good parents." It is completely unrelated to the name I usually use, but if you ask my business contacts, they'll tell you it is my name. So, is my name Gene? If you say it isn't, then you have to think about whether Reb Moshe's expression that a non-Jewish name is "megunah," shameful, applies to a person named Yaakov Koppel at his bris who chooses to tell people to call him Kyle or Gene or Steven. On the other hand, one can argue that the name a person is known by is more "his name" than the name that's only used to call him up for an aliyah or to write on his kesuva and gravestone. (As it happens, the Chazon Ish holds that one's name is what people call him, unless they know that he has a 'real' name and the 'real' name is used at formal occassions, such as signing documents or getting an aliyah. Reb Moshe said the same thing-- at a wedding, he was writing the kesuva, and the chasan told him that his kallah's name was Sarah, but she has another name that nobody knows and nobody calls her by because she hates it and is embarrassed by it, and Reb Moshe said "Nishtakei'ah" and didn't write it in the Kesuva.) . After all, Tanach is full of names that were given later in life, and they are called names anyway. I know two young men named Josh whose Aliyah names are not Yehoshua, but completely different. (And, among Chasidim, it so happens that almost every person who is called "Zalmen Leib" in his daily interactions is called to the Torah by "Yekusiel Yehuda.") When they get aliyos, people who are paying attention are surprised, because they always knew them as Josh, and here they're getting aliyos by names like Shmuel or Baruch. According to the Chazon Ish, it is not at all simple whether their 'real' names are Josh or the Aliya names.
It can be argued, however, that the comparison to Gittin is incorrect: what we call a 'name' for Gittin may be totally irrelevant to what is called a name for the purposes of our discussion. The determination of the name in a Get is based exclusively on clarity in identification. The din that Shemo uShemah are de'oraysa by a get doesn't really require names at all. If the people had unique and prominent physical characterisitics, we could write a get with no names at all, but instead just write "the man with three eyes and the woman with the horn in middle of her forehead." On the other hand, the idea discussed in this article, the preference of using Jewish names, involves two entirely different issues: Ethnic pride/Religious affiliation (in other words, that a Jew should use a Jewish name because it shows pride and affiliation with Judaism, while a non-Jewish name shows indifference, as Rashi says in Shemos when Moshe Rabbeinu did not correct the daughters of Yisro when they referred to him as an "Ish Mitzri,", or the Maharam Shik's "chukos ha'amim,") and the spiritual advantage of the inner essence of whatever the Hebrew name signifies, whether it is a trait or a reference to some bygone tzadik, (as we find by Adam, whose naming of the species in Hebrew was a portentous event that reflected and reinforced their essential reality and spirituality.)
Again: Defining 'name' in the context of Gittin, therefore, is a matter of eliminating, as far as possible, potential ambiguity in the mind of the reader, and clarity in publicizing exactly who was divorced. Defining 'name' in the context of the article, being a two-pronged analysis, might not be that simple. If it is a matter of ethnic pride/religious affiliation/chukos ha'amim, then perhaps we should define 'name' as that which one chooses to use in daily life. If it is a question of the connection with and influence of the spiritual elements of the name, the deeper meaning and history of the name, perhaps all that matters is the fact he uses it to be called up for aliyos.
And since when are Surnames names at all? Perhaps "name" in our culture only refers to the individual's given name, not the family name, which, in a sense, is no different than identifying the person by calling him Hirshel Varzhaner to indicate that he's from Varzhan.
So: the following three dinim and purposes in a 'name" are conceptually and analytically discrete; and unless you are careful to focus on which attribute is relevant to your discussion, you will end up ploydering.
a. Identification
b. Ethnic/Religious affiliation
c. Spiritual influence of the name
Once you have decided which of the above aspects of a name you are examining, you have to determine what the person's real name is- because not everything people call you is your name, and what they called you at the bris might not be your name either.
As the Medrash Rabba Koheles 7:3 on Tov sheim mi'shemen tov says, every man has three names: the name his mother and father called him (she'karu lo aviv ve'imo), the name his friends called him (she'karu lo chaveirav), and the name he is given in the heavenly record of his deeds and behavior (she'karui lo be'sefer toldos briyaso).
3. Reb Moshe says that initially, parents who gave their children secular names were strongly decried by the Gedolei Hador, but over time certain names gained acceptance. But, and this is an important 'but', he also says that once a name is in a family, "kevod hamishpacha" is more important than the general preference for a Hebrew name, and therefore one should take the name of the family member even if it is not Jewish.
4. The question of whether to name a child for an event or for a relative is literally antedeluvian: it has been discussed since before Noach. The Medrash in Breishis Rabbah Parshas Noach 37:11 on the naming of Peleg, "Ki beyamav niflegah ha'aretz" says the following:
Reb Yosi: The ancients, who saw ten generations of their living ancestors, named their children "l'sheim ha'me'orah," in the name of an event. We, whose ancestors haven't survived to see us, name our children for them. (Eitz Yosef-- so they should not be forgotten.)
Reb Shimon ben Gamliel: The ancients, who had Ruach Hokodesh, divine inspiration, named their children "l'sheim ha'me'orah," in the name of an event. We, that do not have Ruach Hakodesh, name our children after our ancestors.
So, you see two interesting things in the Medrash; that it is a personal choice whether to name a child after a relative or to commemorate an event, which is slightly different than the Pele Yo'eitz that I brought in the main note section #36. Also, a careful reading shows that Reb Yosi's "ahl sheim ha'me'orah" does not mean the same thing as Reb Shimon ben Gamliel's "ahl sheim ha'me'orah." RSbG means "a future event," which is why he says you need ruach hakodesh to do this; while Reb Yosi does not necessarily mean that, and can mean that they gave the name for an event in the past or the present, or changed the name contemporaneous with some event in the person's lifetime. If he meant the same as RSbG, he would have agreed that naming ahl sheim ha'me'orah would have required ru'ach hakodesh. Since he doesn't say that, he must have not meant the same thing with "ahl sheim ha'me'orah." So: Reb Shimon ben Gamliel is is certainly different than the Pele Yo'eitz, since RSbG is not discussing at all the idea of naming for a past event. Maybe the Pele Yoeitz works with Reb Yosi, maybe not, because the Medrash says that the minhag is to name after relatives, not events.)
5. Reb Moshe, in his Igros YD 3:97 has a fascinating teshuva. The case was that the mother did not tell the father that she gave birth to his child. I assume they were separated for six or seven months, or divorced, or never married. When the boy was born, she arranged the bris without telling her ex about it, and the child was named without the father's input. This sounds weird, but you can see it happening in bitter divorces. where one party leaves town. And, if you know about the battles even happily married couples sometimes have about names, you can be sure that this mother was determined to eliminate her ex's input on this important decision. Obviously, the Millah is valid. But what about the name? Does the father lose the right to name his child?
Reb Moshe says that there are no hard and fast rules about who may name a child. In the case of Moshe Rabbeinu, the name that is used was given him by the daughter of Pharaoh, while his father and mother called him other names, as explained in the Yalkut Shemos Remez 166. Certainly a mother's right to name her child is at least as valid as the father's. The preference of the name given by Yaakov to Binyamin over that given by Rachel, Ben Oni, was pursuant to reasons specific to that particular event. So this child's name will be that which the mother gave him, but his father can call him by a different name. The teshuva clearly indicates that he is called to the Torah by the name given to him by his mother (here, his maternal grandfather as directed by the mother,) at the bris.
6. Naming a child is a very important and auspicious event. There is an amazing Drisha in Yoreh Dei'ah at the end of 360 that states the following: When one has a choice of which of certain events involving mitzvos to attend, there are rules of priority. For example, if there is a choice of attending a levaya, or a wedding, or a bris, the Tur there discusses the order of relative importance. The Drisha states that in those cases where a bris has top priority, attending the naming of a girl has equal status. Although he does not cite his source, this comes from the Eliah Rabba. It is clear that this shittah holds that the importance of attending a bris is not the milah, it is the fact that the child is named at that time. Therefore, he holds, attending the naming of a girl has exactly the same significance and importance.
Steven Oppenheimer is a practicing endodontist in Miami Beach, Florida. This article was dedicated to the memory of his beloved father, Chayim Gershon ben Meir, A"H.
Barzilai is a quasi-functional biped metabolising in Chicago. His notes and comments are the product of a hobby that is, currently, pretty much the only thing keeping him from demonstrating his disagreement with Camus.
Thank you Dr. Oppenheimer for your kind permission to republish the article.
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Lehavdil elef havdalos:
Purely out of bemusement, allow me to direct you to an article called "Holle's Cry: unearthing a birth goddess in a German Jewish naming ceremony.", by Jill Hammer, published in 2005 in a Journal which is dedicated to exploration of feminine spirituality in Judaism named "Nashim". The article's perspective is at odds with Rabbinic Judaism and disdainful towards Orthodox philosophy and traditions, and it helps to have a couple of beers in you before you start to read it. But it does cite many interesting minhagim associated with the Holkreisch ceremony. The fact is that individual feminists occasionally appeared in the Orthodox milieu long before its modern incarnation as a movement, and it is possible that some of the ideas in the article reflect the attitudes and intentions of some ur-feminists. We all have the odd relative or two we prefer to not talk about. Antiquity is not evidence of legitimacy. An old fool is still no more than a fool. You might have to sign up for a free membership to view the entire article.
Monday, May 07, 2007
Bechukosai, Vayikra 26:14. The Cause of the Tochecha.
Ve’im lo sishme’u li. Rashi— “lihiyos ameilim baTorah.” Many people mistakenly think that Rashi means that the Tochecha comes as punishment for lack of ameilus baTorah. This is not correct. What it means is that this is the threshold failure. It means that this is the first sin of the seven steps that lead to a person deserving the tochecha. As Baudelaire, a man who knew a great deal of moral decay, once wrote, "chaque jour vers l'enfer nous descendons d'un pas...." We don't fall into Hell, we descend, step by step.
This is spelled out clearly in Rashi here in 26:14 from the Toras Kohanim, and especially the last Rashi in 15, where he lists the seven deteriorating madreigos of a person who is falling, each of which leads to the other.
Rav Hirsch in his pirush on Chumash explains the Toras Kohanim in Rashi:
1. The first step down is a loss of interest in the theory and the understanding of the Torah. (Think about this-- we tend to view such an attitude as a relatively benign flaw, but Rav Hirsch, and Rashi, say that this attitude symptomizes an extremely dangerous philosophical flaw that ultimately leads to kefirah.)
2. Next comes a defection from practice.
3. The defector must then justify his defection as progress; the existence of the faithful is a reproach to the deserter, so he must learn to look on them with disdain and contempt.
4. Seeing the conviction and loyalty of the faithful, he cannot accept that it is free-willed and enthusiastic, and so he looks for causes, and blames the yeshivos and gedolei Torah as the sources for such unfortunate and primitive behavior.
5. Disdain becomes active intolerance— what he doesn’t honor and practice will nowhere be honored or practiced.
6. He persuades himself that he is not fighting Hashem, but that the Torah is a myth that enslaves the masses.
7. Finally, he is kopher be’ikar.
I said this at a drasha in May ‘04/Iyar ‘64. That was the year of the great sheitel scandal, when R’ Eliashiv paskened that all the sheitlach that were made entirely or partly from Indian hair were takroves avodah zorah, and had to be burned. I began the drosho by saying that there were a lot of great jokes about it; that we would soon have sheitlach with a special hechsher that said “shmura misha’as ktzira”, and that all three big aveiros were involved here– if you wear these sheitlach, you are over on avodah zorah; if you don’t, you are over on gilui arayos; if you throw the sheitel into the garbage, you are over on shfichas domim (domim=money)
But then I said that notwithstanding the abundance of good jokes, we have to remember that there are two ways of attacking the psak of a gadol. One is to attack the gadlus of the godol– you can say he is an amoretz, he is senile, he was bought off, etc. If his reputation is so good that you can’t attack his gadlus, you can attack the methodology, by saying that he was presented with bad or incomplete information, that the one who asked the question had and agenda, that he didn’t investigate adequately, etc. Both attacks are insults to the authority of the godol, whether attacks on the validity of the gadlus or the methodology, and they diminish respect for horo’a beyisroel. They are reminiscent of step four in R’ Hirsch’s Toras Kohanim. We can decline to follow a psak, but only if we have another gadol of equal stature, or an individual whose psak we always trust and follow, who paskens otherwise. I cited an article in the Haaretz online, which in English had a slight tone of deprecation and amusement, but which in Hebrew had the usual jeering and snide attitude, which implied that the gdolim made the tumul because their control was weakening with the broadening of their clientele (?), and that the people in Bnei Brak who love blondes will have to make do with artificial blond sheitlach from now on, and that this was an attack on the weakest and most unprotected element in the chareidi world, the women. The article was like a seminar on the application of R’ Hirsch’s Toras Kohanim to practical journalism
This is spelled out clearly in Rashi here in 26:14 from the Toras Kohanim, and especially the last Rashi in 15, where he lists the seven deteriorating madreigos of a person who is falling, each of which leads to the other.
Rav Hirsch in his pirush on Chumash explains the Toras Kohanim in Rashi:
1. The first step down is a loss of interest in the theory and the understanding of the Torah. (Think about this-- we tend to view such an attitude as a relatively benign flaw, but Rav Hirsch, and Rashi, say that this attitude symptomizes an extremely dangerous philosophical flaw that ultimately leads to kefirah.)
2. Next comes a defection from practice.
3. The defector must then justify his defection as progress; the existence of the faithful is a reproach to the deserter, so he must learn to look on them with disdain and contempt.
4. Seeing the conviction and loyalty of the faithful, he cannot accept that it is free-willed and enthusiastic, and so he looks for causes, and blames the yeshivos and gedolei Torah as the sources for such unfortunate and primitive behavior.
5. Disdain becomes active intolerance— what he doesn’t honor and practice will nowhere be honored or practiced.
6. He persuades himself that he is not fighting Hashem, but that the Torah is a myth that enslaves the masses.
7. Finally, he is kopher be’ikar.
I said this at a drasha in May ‘04/Iyar ‘64. That was the year of the great sheitel scandal, when R’ Eliashiv paskened that all the sheitlach that were made entirely or partly from Indian hair were takroves avodah zorah, and had to be burned. I began the drosho by saying that there were a lot of great jokes about it; that we would soon have sheitlach with a special hechsher that said “shmura misha’as ktzira”, and that all three big aveiros were involved here– if you wear these sheitlach, you are over on avodah zorah; if you don’t, you are over on gilui arayos; if you throw the sheitel into the garbage, you are over on shfichas domim (domim=money)
But then I said that notwithstanding the abundance of good jokes, we have to remember that there are two ways of attacking the psak of a gadol. One is to attack the gadlus of the godol– you can say he is an amoretz, he is senile, he was bought off, etc. If his reputation is so good that you can’t attack his gadlus, you can attack the methodology, by saying that he was presented with bad or incomplete information, that the one who asked the question had and agenda, that he didn’t investigate adequately, etc. Both attacks are insults to the authority of the godol, whether attacks on the validity of the gadlus or the methodology, and they diminish respect for horo’a beyisroel. They are reminiscent of step four in R’ Hirsch’s Toras Kohanim. We can decline to follow a psak, but only if we have another gadol of equal stature, or an individual whose psak we always trust and follow, who paskens otherwise. I cited an article in the Haaretz online, which in English had a slight tone of deprecation and amusement, but which in Hebrew had the usual jeering and snide attitude, which implied that the gdolim made the tumul because their control was weakening with the broadening of their clientele (?), and that the people in Bnei Brak who love blondes will have to make do with artificial blond sheitlach from now on, and that this was an attack on the weakest and most unprotected element in the chareidi world, the women. The article was like a seminar on the application of R’ Hirsch’s Toras Kohanim to practical journalism
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