The Holiday Between Shavuos and Rosh HaShanna

  Rab Schwab in Maayan Beis Hashoeiva in Emor (Vayikra 23:22) discusses the Medrash brought there by Rashi.

ובקצרכם. .......... אָמַר ר' אַבְדִּימֵי בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵף, מָה רָאָה הַכָּתוּב לִתְּנָהּ בְאֶמְצַע הָרְגָלִים — פֶּסַח וַעֲצֶרֶת מִכָּאן וְרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה וְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים וְחַג מִכָּאן — ? לְלַמֶּדְךָ שֶׁכָּל הַנּוֹתֵן לֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה לֶעָנִי כָּרָאוּי, מַעֲלִין עָלָיו כְּאִלּוּ בָּנָה בֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ וְהִקְרִיב קָרְבְּנוֹתָיו בְּתוֹכוֹ (ספרא):

Why does the Torah see fit to interpose the laws of Leket, Shikchah, and Pei'ah, here, in middle of the description of the holidays of the year? To teach you that one who gives matanos properly to aniyim, it is as if the Mikdash was built in his days and he brought his korbanos in the Beis Hamikdash.

Rav Schwab asks, what is the connection between matnos aniyim and binyan habayis? And whatever the connection is, why is it taught specifically here?

He answers the second question first. These seemingly incongruous pesukim actually fit here perfectly, because they refer to a holiday that occurs between Shavuos and Rosh HaShannah. That holiday is Tisha Ba'av. 

The passuk in Zechariah (8:19) says

כה אמר יהוה צבאות צום הרביעי וצום החמישי וצום השביעי וצום העשירי יהיה לבית יהודה לששון ולשמחה ולמעדים טובים והאמת והשלום אהבו

What we experience as a day of mourning for the destruction of the Mikdash will transform into a celebration, because the Mikdash will be rebuilt on that very day.

Who will rebuild it? Mashiach ben David. David Hamelech owes his existence to Rus and Boaz. We see in Megillas Rus that their relationship stemmed from the mitzva of Leket Shikcha and Pei'ah, the Matnos Aniyim that are mentioned in this no-longer-incongruous passuk. Thus, the Binyan Habayis directly relates to Matnos Aniyim.

(Liberties taken, not all from Rav Schwab.) The point is that there is a holiday between Shavuos and Rosh Hashannah, where the Torah inserts these pesukim. But it is a phantom holiday, amorphous and mutable. If Klal Yisrael lovingly cares for the poor and friendless, then it will be a joyful holiday of Binyan Beis Hamikdash. Unfortunately, in our current circumstances, it is a lugubrious commemoration of the consequences of selfishness and sinas chinam.

With this, he says, we understand the old minhag of the young women dancing in the vineyards on Yom Kippur and the fifteenth of Av. Bishlema Yom Kippur, we understand that the men will not have improper thoughts, and their interest in a good shidduch will be l'sheim shamayim. But the fifteenth of Av? Isn't this an invitation to improper thoughts and sin? 

The answer is that Tu Ba'av will be the seventh day of a holiday that begins on Tisha Ba'av, with intermediate days of Chol Hamoed, just like Pesach and Sukkos. At the finale of this wonderful holiday, young men and women will be inspired to seek a match that will enable a lifetime of Zikui Harabbim and Avodas Hashem. (Yes, I know that this minhag from the Mishna predates Mashiach by several millenia. So Tzorich Iyun.)

This is a wonderful pshat. I just saw something from the Ari zal that while slightly different, is essentially the same and also fits perfectly into Rashi's Sifra in Emor. The Ari zal in LIkutei Torah Ki Sisa, Shemos 32:5, says

ויאמר חג לה' מחר הנה תימא גדולה בדבר זה וכבר תרצו ז"ל מלת ויבן מזבח לה' שכונתו לש"ש הי' אך החג הזה מה יאמר בו ואיך כתבה תורה פלסתר ואיך יצאו דברים כאלה מפי אהרן אמנם סוד הנמרץ בזה כי העגל נעשה בי"ו בתמוז ובי"ז נשתברו הלוחות ועתיר הקב"ה להפכם ליו"ט נמצא כי חג לה' מחר כי יש מחר לאחר זמן וכ"מ בדרז"ל

So the Ari is saying that the yomtov will begin on Shiva Asar and end on Tisha Ba'av, while Rav Schwab is saying that it will begin on Shiva Asar and end on Tisha.  Many ask that it is odd that the ikkar yomtov, Tisha Ba'av, would end the holiday, because on the Yamim Tovim that we have, the ikkar simcha is at the beginning. In any case, Rav Schwab was unaware of the this Kisvei HaAri, but his view of the future yomtov is more understandable, that it begins on Tisha Ba'av and ends on Tes Vov Ba'av.

When I said this at the table, one of my grandchildren asked me, "If the Torah calls it a moed, then why don't we make havdalah?" Good point, and I imagine that when Zechariah's nevuah is fulfilled, we really will make both havdalah and kiddush. The answer is that unlike tachanun, havdalah is not talui in Moed alone, it also requires that you are going from issur melacha to hetter, or greater issur to lesser issur. Moed it may be, but there is no metziyus of issur melacha.

Reb Chaim said an interesting hearah. The Mecholos on Yom Kippur and the fifteenth of Av seem to have been davka in the environs of a Mikdash or Mishkan. The Mishna says בנות ירושלים, and the passuk in Shoftim 21:21 also mentions davka the young women of Shiloh, where the Mishkan was at that time.

וּרְאִיתֶ֗ם וְ֠הִנֵּ֠ה אִם־יֵ֨צְא֥וּ בְנוֹת־שִׁילוֹ֮ לָח֣וּל בַּמְּחֹלוֹת֒ וִֽיצָאתֶם֙ מִן־הַכְּרָמִ֔ים וַחֲטַפְתֶּ֥ם לָכֶ֛ם אִ֥ישׁ אִשְׁתּ֖וֹ מִבְּנ֣וֹת שִׁיל֑וֹ וַהֲלַכְתֶּ֖ם אֶ֥רֶץ בִּנְיָמִֽן׃

So it is very yitachen that it was only in those places, in the light of the Aron Hakodesh and the avodah, that these dances could take place in purity.  

He also pointed out what Reb Chaim Kanievsky says in his Taamah Dikra here on the relevance of Matnos aniyim in connection with Rus and Naami.

ובקצרכם וגו' לעני ולגר תעזב אותם. עי' בתו"כ למה כתובה פרשה זו כאן שכבר כתובה בפ' קדושים, ואפשר לומר עוד שרמזה כאן התורה למעשה רות שהיתה גיורת ולקטה הלקט לכן כתיב לעני ולגר והיא באה בתחלת קציר שעורים (ואמרו במדרש שזה קציר העומר) ולכן סמכו כאן לקציר העומר, ולגר עם האות שלפניה ושלאחרי' אותיות לגיורת, ויש כאן עוד רמזים לזה ולגר תעזב, תעזב אותיות בעז והת' עם ראש וסוף תיבת ולגר אותיות רות, לעני ולגר תעזב אתם בגימטריא זו נעמי ורות המואביה כלתה. 

Putting the Taama Dikra togther with the Mayan Beis Hashoeivah tremendously enhances both.  Kideamri inshi, 

אז מ'גייט אויפן ריכטיגן וועג, טרעפט מען זיך.  

Emor, Vayikra 21:14. The Holy Kohen Gadol.

The Tosfos Ri'd, רבינו ישעיה בן מאלי הזקן דטראני, has a sefer called Nimukei Chumash L'Rabbeinu Yeshaya.  I have Rav Chaim Chavel's Mosad Harav Kook edition.  On Parshas Emor, he brings the following from Reb Yehuda Hachasid:

אלמנה וגרושה לא יקח  הקשה רבינו יהודה החסיד מה טעם כהן גדול אסור באלמנה וכהן הדיוט מותר בה  ותירץ דאמרינן בפרק עשרה יוחסין (קידושין ע"א א) דאין מוסרין שם המפורש אלא לצנועין שבהם וכהן גדול אומר אותו ביום הכיפורים כדאמרינן ביומא (ס"ו א) ושמא ישא עיניו באשת איש שיראה אותה יפה ויזכיר השם על בעלה ויהרג אותו

This is found in several other likutim written by Rishonim on Chumash, namely, the Imrei No'am of Rav Yaakov D'Illescas (שמא היה מתפלל על בעלה שימות וזה לא היה טוב) and the Moshav Zkeinim (ושמא נתן עיניו באשת איש בשעת אזכרה שימות בעלה), both of which were written in the fourteenth century and both of which gathered Torah from the Ba'alei Tosfos and other Rishonim.  I quoted Rabbeinu Yeshaya's sefer because he is the only one who identifies the source of this idea as Reb Yehuda Hachasid, while the Moshav Zkeinim only says "Hachasid."  (I've seen several people who erred as to who "the Chasid" was.) 


Basically this is what he says:  A kohen gadol may not marry a widowed woman.  Our passuk, in 21:14, says אלמנה וגרושה וחללה זונה את אלה לא ייקח כי אם בתולה מעמיו ייקח אישה.  Why is a widow prohibited to him, when she is allowed to other kohanim?  Reb Yehuda Hachasid explained that the Kohen Gadol has great power when he enunciates the name of Hashem on Yom Kippur, and perhaps he has his eye on a married woman and he will use his power to cause her husband's death so that she would become available to him.


This is more than a little odd.  Yes, we know that something along those lines happened to one of our kings, a man beloved by the Ribono shel Olam, a holy and spiritual man.  But for Reb Yehuda Hachasid to say that the Kohen Gadol, the most holy of the holy Kohanim, on the holiest day of the year, while standing on the holiest spot on Earth, in front of the Aron Kodesh, enunciating the holiest secret Name of Hashem, (a Name that most humans could not survive saying and when others hear it they fall down on their knees and pray,) and considering that the Medrash in Acharei Mos (21:12) says that the Kohen Gadol was not considered to be a human being at that moment, he was, for all intents and purposes, an angel:   וכל אדם לא יהיה באוהל מועד בבואו לכפר בקודש (ויקרא טז,יז)  אמר ר' אבהו וכהן גדול לא אדם היה? אלא כההוא דאמר ר' פנחס בשעה שהיה רוח הקודש שרוי עליו היו פניו בוערות כלפידים עליו הדא היא דכתיב (מלאכי ב:ז) "כי שפתי כהן ישמרו דעת ותורה יבקשו מפיהו כי מלאך ה' צבאות הוא'" and he's got his neighbor's wife on his mind, and he might pray that his neighbor should go to his eternal reward so that the Kohen Gadol can take his widow????  Are we talking about a mee'isseh sheigetz or an Malach????
This is passing strange.


And even leaving aside how strange this is, what mussar haskeil do we derive from it?  Wouldn't we be better off not hearing this depressing dvar Torah?  Why would these rishonim write it in their sefarim for us to see?


The answer is, no, it's not strange and it's not depressing, and yes, it is important for us to know.  It is comforting.  We are subject to the power of the Yetzer Hara until the day we die.  There are moments of weakness and we might have a fleeting thought that is completely at odds with who we are and what we've made of ourselves.  Such moments are not a reason to despair and to think that we are fooling ourselves into thinking we're decent people.  We are good and we are holy people, and when we fail or lapse, the challenge is to overcome these moments.  We can't ever be sure they will never happen; we have to be on guard at all times, and when they break through, we can strive to overcome them.

As the Gemara in Shabbos (88b] says, the Ribono shel Olam wants people who were on the forty ninth level of Tumah, and who seven weeks later stood at Har Sinai ready to receive the Torah.  The Kotzker Rebbe said, the Ribono shel Olam says ואנשי קודש תהיו לי.  I have enough Malachim.  I want Men that are holy.  It is that willpower to overcome, the courage to never despair, the drive to change ourselves, the strength to fight the battle, that is what is precious to the Ribono shel Olam.

The anti-religious in Warsaw once put on a play, in which they re-enacted the procedure of ensuring that only those without sin would fight in our wars.  The conscripts were asked, did you do this?  And half left.  Did you do that?  And more left.  As they got down to more and more minor sins, more and more left, until there were only two soldiers left, two bent and bearded talmidei chachamim.  And then they were told that if they found a Yefas Toar, they were allowed to take her on the battlefield and bring her home as a captured wife, all because it was assumed they couldn't fight their yetzer hara.  This, of course, was the big joke of the evening, and all the enemies of Orthodoxy had a fine time.  But it's not a joke, and the Torah understands that there is regular daily behavior and then there is anomalous behavior and behavior under conditions of great stress.  We don't sweep it under the rug: we admit the possibility of sin and we prepare for it and we learn how to deal with it.

Emor, Vayikra 23:36. Atzeres and Shavuos

In the Torah, two holidays are called Atzeres.  They are Shmini Atzeres, after Sukkos, as said here (Vayikra 23:36) and in Bamidbar (29:35), and the seventh day of Pesach, which is also called Atzeres (Devarim 16:8),  שֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים תֹּאכַל מַצּוֹת וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי עֲצֶרֶת לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה מְלָאכָה.  The only one of the three Regalim that is never called Atzeres in the Torah is Shavuos.  In Shas, however, the word Atzeres refers to one and only one holiday- Shavuos.  For example, (Pesachim 68b),
ר' אליעזר אומר אין לו לאדם בי"ט אלא או אוכל ושותה או יושב ושונה ר' יהושע אומר חלקהו חציו לאכילה ושתיה וחציו לבית המדרש וא"ר יוחנן ושניהם מקרא אחד דרשו כתוב אחד אומר (דברים טז) עצרת לה' אלהיך וכתוב אחד אומר (במדבר כט) עצרת תהיה לכם ר' אליעזר סבר או כולו לה' או כולו לכם ור' יהושע סבר חלקהו חציו לה' וחציו לכם:  א"ר אלעזר הכל מודים בעצרת דבעינן נמי לכם מ"ט יום שניתנה בו תורה הוא

So after citing two places in the Torah that mention Atzeres as referring to the end of Pesach and the day after Sukkos, Rebbi Eliezer uses the unmodified word 'Atzeres' as referring to Shavuos, which clearly demonstrates that in their parlance, the unmodified word refers specifically and unequivocally to Shavuos.
Two questions:

• 1.  What did Chazal perceive in Shavuos that earned it the title 'Atzeres'?

• 2.  Isn't it strange that davka the one Yomtov that's not called Atzeres in the Torah is the one that acquired, in Chazal's language, the sole use of the title, to the extent that it supplanted the other uses?  

The Ramban in our parsha (where the Torah calls the day after Sukkos Atzeres) addresses the first question- in what sense is Shavuos an 'Atzeres':

ועל דרך האמת כי ששת ימים עשה ה' את השמים ואת הארץ (שמות כ יא) ויום השביעי הוא שבת ואין לו בן זוג וכנסת ישראל היא בת זוגו שנאמר ואת הארץ והנה היא שמינית "עצרת היא" כי שם נעצר הכל וצוה בחג המצות שבעה ימים בקדושה לפניהם ולאחריהם כי כולם קדושים ובתוכם ה' ומנה ממנו תשעה וארבעים יום שבעה שבועות כימי עולם וקדש יום שמיני כשמיני של חג והימים הספורים בינתים כחולו של מועד בין הראשון והשמיני בחג והוא יום מתן תורה שהראם בו את אשו הגדולה ודבריו שמעו מתוך האש ולכך יקראו רבותינו ז"ל בכל מקום חג השבועות עצרת כי הוא כיום שמיני של חג שקראו הכתוב כן וזהו מאמרם (חגיגה יז) שמיני רגל בפני עצמו הוא לענין פז"ר קש"ב ותשלומין דראשון הוא כי הוא אצילות הראשונים ואינו כאחדות שלהם ולכך יזכיר בפרשת כל הבכור (דברים טז טו) בשלש רגלים חג המצות וחג השבועות וחג הסוכות שבעת ימים ולא יזכיר השמיני כי שם אמר יראה כל זכורך וגו' והנה זה מבואר

The Ramban explains that the Torah tells us to count seven weeks after Shavuos, viewing each week as a day, and those weeks/days are a type of Chol Hamoed between the first week/day (Pesach) and the last and eighth day (Shavuos), the day the Torah was given.  This is why Chazal call Shavuos "Atzeres," because it is like the eighth day of the holiday (Pesach) and so it can be thought of as an Atzeres.  The Atzeres is the refinement and perfection of the holiday it follows.

This explains why Chazal thought of Shavuos as an Atzeres.  But the second question remains, and another question arises: 

• 2.  Even if you do use the term, why supplant the other uses?

• 3.  The Torah already gives Pesach its Atzeres- the seventh day of Pesach is called Atzeres.  Why give Pesach another Atzeres?

Psachim 116a

  מתחיל בגנות ומסיים בשבח:  מאי בגנות רב אמר מתחלה עובדי עבודת גלולים  היו אבותינו ושמואל אמר עבדים היינו

The Hagada is begins with a description of the degraded state of our ancestors, and leads up to their redemption.  What 'degradation' is meant?  Rav- that they worshiped idols.  Shmuel- that they were slaves.
To commemorate our redemption from Egypt, Rav and Shmuel emphasize different aspects of the Geula.  Rav says that the primary focus of the Hagada is the redemption from the spiritual debasement of paganism, and Shmuel says that the Hagada should emphasize the deliverance from the brutal horrors of slavery.

The Ramban has told us that Atzeres is the day that the promise of the holiday is fulfilled, that its potential is realized.  Certainly, the Torah talks of the physical degradation and existential danger we faced in Mitzrayim, and the redemption of leaving Mitzrayim saved us from those horrors.  The process thus begun culminated seven days later in the Splitting of the Sea  This is the Atzeres of Pesach, the day that the redemption that began with leaving Egypt, was made absolute by the destruction of the Egyptian pursuers and the unhindered movement towards Eretz Yisrael that began at that point.  This is consistent with Shmuel's idea of the focus of Pesach.  But Rav says that we should think of Yetzias Mitzrayim as a spiritual redemption, as being freed from paganism and spiritual blindness- (Avos 6:8) "והלוחות מעשה אלהים המה והמכתב מכתב אלהים הוא חרות על הלוחות אלתקרא חרות אלא חירות שאין לך בן חורין אלא מי שעוסק בתלמוד תורה"  Only he who learns Torah is truly free.  According to Shmuel, the culmination of Pesach is Krias Yam Suf.  According to Rav, the trajectory that was begun with Yetzias Mitzrayim reaches its target in Matan Torah; the culmination of Pesach, the apogee that is apparent only to those that make Torah the center of their lives, the Osek BaTorah, is Matan Torah.  For those people, the Atzeres of Pesach is Shavuos.

Not only is Shavuos an Atzeres, it is The Atzeres par excellence.  As Rebbi Eliezer says,  brought above, from Psachim 68b, א"ר אלעזר הכל מודים בעצרת דבעינן נמי לכם מ"ט יום שניתנה בו תורה הוא  :  Among all the yamim tovim, Shavuos deserves complete physical and spiritual rejoicing, because it is the ultimate of geulos and the apex of our national existence.

So why, as Micha asks, does the Torah wait for Chazal to introduce the novel appellation for Shavuos?  Because only from the perspective of a Torah completed by Torah SheBa'al Peh can we say that Matan Torah culminated our spiritual redemption.  We find that the Torah SheBichsav sometimes has a perspective, e.g., yad tachas yad, arba'im yakenu, which is clarified by our Chachamim through Torah SheBaal Peh.  Here, too.  The Torah SheBichsav focuses on the nationalist, on the physical aspect of the Geula.  Only through a Torah comprising Torah SheBichsav and Torah SheBa'al Peh can we say that our spiritual redemption is what made us into true Bnei Chorin.

In short: Shmuel holds that the ikkar sippur of the Geula was our escape from misery and death, and our transformation from a miserable horde into a proud and confident nation.  Rav holds that ikkar of the sippur is our transformation from pagans into malachim, from a people engrossed with their physical desires and superstitions into a truly free people enraptured by spiritual growth.  Shmuel's version of the redemption was finalized at Krias Yam Suf, so the seventh day of Pesach is the realization of the potential of Yetzias Mitzrayim.  Rav's version of the redemption was finalized at Har Sinai, so Shavuos is the realization of the potential of Yetzias Mitzrayim.  Torah SheBichsav expresses Shmuel's idea; Torah SheBaal Peh voices Rav's.


From Harav Moshe Jofen, Rosh Yeshivas Novardok/Beis Yosef in Flatbush.

Parshas Emor Vayikra 21:24 A Non-Kohen that Shechts a Korban

 When a Yisrael Shechts a Korban

21:24. V’el kol Bnei Yisroel. At the end of the Parsha that describes the mumim, the physical disfigurements, that disqualify a kohen from doing the sacrificial service in the Temple, the passuk says that Moshe told these dinim to Aharon and his sons and to all the Bnei Yisroel. The kashe is, what does this have to do with the Bnei Yisroel? This does not seem to have any relevance to non-kohanim, and, like the vast majority of Korban law, it should be addressed only to the Kohanim.

Rashi answers this by saying that this is a command to Beis Din to know and enforce these halachos for the Kohanim.

The Ibn Ezra here in 21:24 (as understood by Reb Meir Simcha here) says something much more interesting. As we know, the vast majority of the avodah, the sacrificial service, may be done only by a Kohen. However, the Shechita of Korbanos, even Kodshei Kodoshim, may be done by any Jewish person, male or female, tahor or tamei. Inasmuch as whoever can shecht chulin for consumption can shecht kodashim, one assumes that Shechita does not carry with it any particular restrictions. The Ibn Ezra is mechadesh that a Yisrael who shechts a korban cannot be a ba’al mum. (Can you imagine what Erev Pesach looked like in the Beis Hamikdash? I assume that the pesachim were shechted by the Yisraelim that brought them, or that all the shochtim in Israel were called up for duty. According to the Ibn Ezra, they would all have to strip and be examined by Beis Din to establish that they are not ba'alei mum! Unless perhaps the Beis Din trusted people to reveal and ask about any possible mum problem, since there is a chezkas kashrus and, I suppose, a rove that they are not ba'alei mum.)

Reb Meir Simcha asks from an open Mishna in the beginning of the third perek of Zvachim that says “kol hapsulim sheshachtu shchitasam ksheira,” and this includes ba’alei mum.

The sefer Kanfei Yona, by a Yona Voller, suggests that the Ibn Ezra means lechatchila. (He brings the Gemora there that asks that ‘sheshachtu” is mashma bedi’eved, but a passul can shecht lechatchila, and the Gemara answers that a tomei shouldn’t shecht lechatchila because he might be mitamei the korban, which is mashma that all the other psulim can shecht lechatchila, and he is madche that tomei is befeirush in the Mishneh, but ba’al mum is not, so the Gemara can’t use ba’al mum to be meyasheiv the loshon hamishneh.)

This Ibn Ezra reminds me of several things.
First, R’ Gifter in Parshas Shemini (Vayikra 10:9) says that the issur of shasui yayin (that one who has drunk wine cannot do avodah) applies equally to a Yisrael that shechts; this is similar to the idea of the Ibn Ezra here. So Erev Pesach, not only do you have to strip, you also have to breath into a breathalyzer.
Also, this issue relates to the machlokes (Rashi in Yevamos) about whether a Yisrael can shecht a korban tzibur on Shabbos.
Also, this relates to the machlokes Rabbeinu Efraim and Tosfos about whether a sakin has to be a kli shareis-- it seems to me that if the sakin does not have to be a kli shares, the shochet would have no particular requirements. Yes, of course it's easy to disagree with this.
It is universally accepted that the Yisrael, or the Kohen, who shechts, can be mefagel during shechita. If so, it obviously has aspects of avoda, so it’s logical that a Mum would be a problem.

But I still need to understand why mum and shasui are problems when tumah is not.

Emor, Vayikra 22:24. Ube'artzechem Lo Sa'asu. Spaying Pets. Part I

My Chavrusa told me a remarkable story. He knows a talmid chacham, a musmach who was a practicing Rav for several years, who then went to medical school and became a doctor. He told my chavrusa that he had a nice surgical practice that included the performance of vasectomies. One day, he said, he came across a halacha that he simply had never known-- that performing an elective vasectomy is a Mitzvah! Unfortunately, it is a Mitzvas Lo Sa'aseh, not a Mitzvas Asei. In all his years in Yeshiva, and despite his Semicha studies, he simply had never learned this halacha.

This law is derived from the passuk in Parshas Emor, Vayikra 22:24. The Torah lists various blemishes which disqualify animals from use as Korbanot. Among these blemishes is a list of disfigurements or removal of the genital organs. The passuk ends with the words "ube'artzechem lo sa'asu," which, Chazal teach us, means that it forbidden to remove or destroy or render non-functional the genital organs of any creature, from insect to human. I was surprised that the sugya of Chardal in Bava Basra 80, which refers to this halacha, escaped this person's notice, or at least I was surprised until a very close relative, who shall remain nameless, mentioned that he, at the age of thirty, has yet to learn Maseches Bava Basra. (But he knows dinei Taharas Hamishpacha ten times better than I do.) No doubt, our scholarly bretheren are familiar with this law, probably not from the Gemara, but rather from Josephus' The Antiquities of the Jews (Chapter 8, Section 40), where he discusses Jewish disgust with the practice, and describes it as an affront to God's will.  (See text of Josephus at end of this post.)

It goes without saying that the halacha has a vast body of qualifications and specifications which might have strict or lenient application. The point is that one must be aware of the halacha. Castrating (sirus) a calf is biblically prohibited. Sirus of dogs is prohibited; Sirus of goldfish is prohibited; sirus of bumblebees is prohibited; for all I know, sirus of the copepods in the tapwater you New Yorkers drink is prohibited; and telling a non-Jew to do it for you is assur as well, albeit miderabanan.

Recently, ordinances have been proposed or passed in Los Angeles and Chicago which require all owners of dogs and cats to spay or neuter their pets, or face fines up to $500. Certified Breeders are exempt; Orthodox Jews are not. A brief has been filed in support of a legal challange to the ordinance in LA, claiming that the ordinance impedes the practice of religion for Jews(here and here ) This is a Bubbeh maiseh, of course; Jews can avoid the conflict by not owning a dog or a cat, or they can buy them fixed.

Others have defended the practice by quoting Harav Amar, the Rishon Letzion, as having said that having a non-Jewish vet spay the animal is allowed because it helps to avoid tzaar ba'alei chaim. This is at best a half truth, possibly a total fabrication, but most likely just a misunderstanding. But at least the halacha is getting some press.

One of my favorite halachos is the rule that one is allowed to cut off the comb of a rooster, although this renders him impotent (Shabbos 110b). The reason this is allowed is because this has no physical effect on the generative organs, but, as Rashi there explains, only throws the rooster into mourning for his lost glory-- מתאבל על כבודו שאבד. It is like taking the car away from a teenager.

There is a related halacha involving men: the Torah states that a Jewish man who suffers certain genital disfigurements is prohibited from marrying certain women. This is known as the halacha of Petzu'ah Dakkah. In cases of prostate surgery, which often involves the severing of the vas deferens, which is a part of the shvilei hazerah, the issue arises as to whether the surgery will render the patient a Petzu'ah Dakkah. However, the normative halacha follows the Chazon Ish and Rabbi Feinstein, who held that although severing the vas deferens in the scrotum would render a man a Petzu'ah Dakkah, since prostate surgery is only within the abdomen, it does not render the man a Petzu'ah Dakkah. This is a purely halachic distinction: there is no biological difference where the vas is severed. Still, the halachic leniency has been generally accepted.

Many people (some of whom have published articles under this misapprehension) have mistakenly connected the Petzu'ah Dakkah leniency to elective vasectomy, and have assumed that since internal ligation or severing does not create Petzu'ah Dakkah, this act is also not prohibited mi'deoraysa under the Issur of Sirus, of Be'artzechem lo sa'asu kein. The Aruch Hashulchan EH 5:24 states explicitly that this is WRONG WRONG WRONG. They are different issurim with different rules. Methods that are allowed under the former may be prohibited under the latter. The reason "kos shel ikrin," hormonal castration, is only a rabbinic prohibition, is that it does not generate immediate gross physical change in the reproductive organs. But it is clear that internal severing or ligation of reproductive organs, while perhaps not covered by the rule of Petzu'ah Dakkah, is prohibited under the rule of Be'artzechem. Mi'deoraysa. And like all isurim de'oraysa, is only permitted in very limited circumstances.

Among the issues that must be considered:
1. Does the issur min hatorah of Sirus apply to females? This issue is relevant for women who wish to do a hysterectomy; if it is an issur derabanan, avoidance of pain would be a mattir. If it is de'oraysa, only piku'ach nefesh is mattir. The Gaon holds that it is de'oraysa. Most current poskim (e.g. Reb Moshe) hold it is an issur de'rabanan and is allowed in cases of great need. The Taz (EH 5:6), a minority opinion, allows neutering of females when done for their benefit.

2. Are non-jews prohibited from doing Sirus? (This is Rav Chidka's shittah in Bava Metzia 90b. Rav Chidka's shittos, by the way, are always fascinating. He is the Tanna that holds that you need to eat four meals on Shabbas, and he says that your own Neshama will testify against you at the final judgment.) If the issur applies to non-Jews, asking a non-Jew to do it would be Lifnei Iveir. The Beis Shmuel (EH 5:16) considers this a safek de'oraysa. The Aruch Hashulchan (EH 5:26) and the Chasam Sofer (Teshuvos CM 185) hold that Sirus is not a Noahide proscription.

3. Even assuming that non-Jews are not prohibited from doing Sirus, a Jew is not allowed to ask a non-Jew to do what he himself may not do. Most people are familiar with this issur derabanan in hilchos Shabbas. In fact, however, it applies to all issurim. If non-Jews have no personal issur (see #2), and the problem is only amira le'akum, there are those who allow a double amira le'akum: telling A to tell B to do it. (Sho'eil U'meishiv 3:1:229, Chasam Sofer CM 185.)
And since Amira Le'Akum is derabanan, it might be muttar where the animal is in pain.

4. Rav Unterman (Otzar Haposkim I Pps 164-165) suggests a procedure which cuts the blood supply to the reproductive organs. This would be a grama, and therefore assur mi'derabanan for Jews, but would be allowed for non-Jews. Rav Unterman, however, stated this as a personal opinion, and warned that he would not make a final decision until his method was sanctioned by other poskim.

5. There are some poskim (see #3) that say that even if we accept the Beis Shmuel, and rule that non-Jews are biblically prohibited from doing Sirus, one may sell his animal to a non-Jew, and instruct that non-Jew, A, to instruct another person, B, to do the sirus. If the idea that Lifnei Iver does not apply by Lifnei De'lifnei does not appeal to you, then this hetter won't help much.

So, the bottom line is that you have the Taz in #1, you have the Aruch Hashulchan and Chasam Sofer in #2, you have the Sho'eil U'meishiv 3:1:229 in #3, you have Rav Unterman's angiostasis in #4, and you have the lifnei de'lifnei people in #3 and 5.

So, what to do?

Well, if you decide your shailos like many people do,

,

or you consult and rely on Harav

,


then go ahead and rely on the mattirim. If, on the other hand, you take a safeik issur de'oraysa seriously, you'll have to find a competent Yarei Shamayim Poseik and ask him what to do, and let the burden fall on his shoulders.

NOTE:  Text of Josephus, Chapter 8 section 40, taken from Project Gutenberg:
40. Let those that have made themselves eunuchs be had in detestation; and do you avoid any conversation with them who have deprived themselves of their manhood, and of that fruit of generation which God has given to men for the increase of their kind: let such be driven away, as if they had killed their children, since they beforehand have lost what should procure them; for evident it is, that while their soul is become effeminate, they have withal transfused that effeminacy to their body also. In like manner do you treat all that is of a monstrous nature when it is looked on; nor is it lawful to geld men or any other animals.
The translator of this section comments:
[ This law against castration, even of brutes, is said to be so rigorous elsewhere, as to inflict death on him that does it which seems only a Pharisaical interpretation in the days of Josephus of that law, Leviticus 21:20, and 22:24: only we may hence observe, that the Jews could then have no oxen which are gelded, but only bulls and cows, in Judea.]

Emor, Vayikra 21:7. Isha Zonah V’chalalah Lo Yikachu. Jewish Names that are Abbreviations.

There's too much to talk about in this week's parsha, so I'm going to take advantage of my anonymity to post a fluff piece this week, at least for the time being.

I don't know about other languages or cultures, but it's fascinating that so many Jewish names are acronyms-- abbreviations that are pronounced as a word. Here is a list of the names I am aware of.
Azulai --- Isha Zonah V’challalah Lo Yikachu
Babad --- Ben Av Beis Din
Brill --- Ben R’ Yehuda Levoei or R’ Yomtov Lipmann
Charlap --- Kvod Harav Roshi L’Polen
Katz --- Kohen Tzedek
Mazah --- Mizera Aharon Hakohen
Segal --- S'gan Levi
Shalit --- Shivisi Hashem Le'negdi Tamid if it ends with a Tof, or Sheyichyeh L’orech Yamim Tovim if it ends with a Tes
Shatz --- Shliach Tzibbur
Shick --- Sheim Yisrael Kodesh
Shub --- Shochet U’bodeik
Tatz --- To’ein Tzedek
Zak --- Zera Kodesh

Let's go back to the first on the list, Azulai. This is a name found among Sefardi Kohanim, and a local Rav Azulai was the one that first mentioned the derivation of his name. I must say that the logic for choosing this particular phrase, (which prohibits kohanim from marrying women whose kedusha status has been diminished or sullied by certain events,) is passing strange. It would be the equivalent of calling a Yisroel "Limbi"-- Lo yavo mamzer bik'hal Hashem.

Note: There is a fascinating article by Dr. Steven Oppenheimer, DDS, in "Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society" Fall 1997 called "Secular Names"in which he discusses and analyzes the various opinions regarding having Jewish and non-Jewish names, both first and last. I have posted it elsewhere: check the labels for "names."

Miriam Bas Bilgoh and Parental Responsibility

Regarding the story of Miriam Bas Bilga in the end of Maseches Sukkah. In the case of an adulterous bas Kohen, the Torah says (in Parshas Emor, Vayikro 21:9) Es ovi’ho hi mechalleles. Rashi there brings from Sanhedrin 52a "Chilleloh ubizesoh es kvodo, she’omrim olov orur shezu yolad orur shezu gideil."

This has application in halocho lemaiseh— the Gemora in Sanhedrin 52a brings a braisa from R’ Meir and R’ Yishmoel that the community no longer should honor him, and that the community says about this rosho "orur shezeh yolad, orur shezeh gideil, orur shezeh yotzo meichalotzov, (and the Marsho says that these expressions refer to his/her mother, nursemaid, and father, respectively) and the Gemora there bring that R’ Ashi holds that this braisa justifies the fact that we call a rosho "reshi’a bar reshi’a" even if his father is a tzadik (which seems to show that the father really is a tzadik, but we call him a rosho when talking about his son). In Orach Chaim 128 in the Ramo he brings shittos that the community no longer has to give the father, a Kohen, the first aliah or precedence in bentching. The Mogein Avrohom in s’k 62 says two things: first, that the chillul of the father is only when the daughter was mezaneh, because the father should have seen to it that she was never alone with someone else, and then he brings the Mordechai that applies this din to a meshumedes, but the Mogein Avrohom explains that really meshumedes is also based on the assumption that she was mezaneh, and although she left his house when she was mishtamedes, the father could have instilled an aversion for promiscuity when the daughter was younger, as we find that Shmuel didn’t let his daughters sleep in the same bed so that they would not get used to contact with another body. The Mishneh Brurah, however, says that we are not noheig like those that penalize a Kohen with daughter-problems.

Note, too, that if the parents are blamed for bad children, they should take credit for good ones. See the Gemora in Yoma 86 where the tzidkus of a son reflects on the father, and vice versa, at least in the way people see him, and the Mahrsho there that says that people ascribe the son’s behavior to whether the father taught him lishmo or lo lishmo.

But the very serious issue here is, I don’t understand how you can blame the father. Was Avrohom responsible for Yishma’el? Yitzchok for Eisov? Dovid for Amnon, Avsholom, and Adoniahu? (Regarding Adoniahu, see Melochim I 1:6, "velo atzovo oviv miyomov leimor madu’a kocho osisoh." Krasner in his Nachlas Shimon brings the Abarbenel that says that unlike Eli, whose sons were called ro’im, and who was considered at fault for not rebuking them, see beginning of Shmuel I, Adoniahu was not a sinner, but only expected to inherit his father’s throne. But he also brings Rashi who quotes a Chazal that from here we learn that "kol hamonei’a tochocho mibonov meivi’o lemissoh.")

Research on the relationship between parenting and youthful offending has found an association between lax parenting and youth crime (Humm, 1991). Loeber and Stoutbamer-Loeber (1986, cited in Goetting, 1992, p. 4) found that "lack of parental supervision, parental rejection and lack of parent-child involvement, were among the most powerful predictors of juvenile conduct problems and delinquency."–

And what about bechira? Shouldn’t we take as given that everyone has a free range of bechira, so this girl, too, had bechira, and could have chosen to be good, but chose of her own free will and free choice to be bad, that choice having nothing to do with her father’s way of raising her? Does this prove that bechira is narrowly restricted to the area around habituation, and the father is responsible for raising a daughter whose range of bechira is at the bottom of the scale? What about the alleged Gaon that a person is ne’enash for bittul Torah during his baptism? Doesn’t a person also get schar for not going to get baptized while he is learning Torah?

See R’ Shternbuch’s Ta’am Voda’as here on 21:9, where he says, k’darko, that you shouldn’t think that Rashi’s "She’omrim orur shezeh yolad..." means that people say it but it is not necessarily true– he says that it is really true. That is, that if a son goes off the derech, "vadai no’utz hakilkul vehapgam b’oviv." And if a parent hasn’t implanted ahavas Torah and yiras shomayim to the level sufficient to protect from the yetzer hora, "beyodu’a shepogum hu atzmo bemiddas ha’arochoso lechayei kedusha vetaharo." I really would like to know what R’ Shternbuch would say about the gedolim of Torah and Mussor that had children that, rachmono litzlan, went off the derech.

But several things are clear: first, if a parent is told that he is absolutely responsible for the moral behavior of his child, that he is exclusively responsible for what his child does, that parent would be extremely serious about how he raises the child. And second, the fact that the parent is responsible does not diminish the child’s responsibility at all. The parent may have made it easier for the child to sin, but as long as the child is not an onnus, as in the case of a tinok shenishbeh, the child remains 100% responsible.

It is, however, very important to remember that the Gemora’s expression "shuto d’y’nuko b’shuko oh d’avuhei oh d’imei" limits itself in two very important aspects. First, it says "d’y’nuko," which means this is true only in the case of a young person. Second, it says "b’shuko," which means that this is true only when the child does so in a public fashion, and not merely among his friends. Similarly, the din of Bas Kohen is specific to a na’aroh of 12 years old who was mezaneh after hasro’o, which is basically in public, so it both in the age and in that it is "beshukoh."

However, note that at the end of the parsha of Bas Kohen, we have the story of Shlomis bas Divri’s son, the mekallel, and there is a definite association of his aveira with his mother’s attitude.

Speaking of the alleged Gaon, I saw that the Biur Halocho in 199:2 discusses this, and brings a Rambam that Yerovom Ben Nevot is ne’enash for cooking on Yomtov shelo letzorech, etc. See there. And I saw someone quote the Tollner Rebbe in Yerusholayim, a young and talented Rebbe, who said that he heard from the Gerrer re: the Gemora in Shabbos that saying Yehei shmei rabboh with all your koach is a mechaper even for chillul shabbos, and even for shemetz avodah zora, that you see from there that even a person with a shemetz AZ can say YShR with all his koach.
Anyway, this is all not like R’ Dessler’s "point of bechirah" concept.

Also, see the Sfas Emes in the beginning of Parshas R’ay who says that despite having done an aveira, a person has bechira every day to do teshuva, as it says "hayom brocho uklolo." I think that the truth is that the bechira exists, but the likelihood is that the person will continue doing what he has done before– anything is possible, but the smart money is on habit. For example: at the end of Achrei Mos, the Torah warns us to not do a list of disgusting things; and at the beginning of Kedoshim, the Torah tells us to be holy and refined. It seems that the Torah is talking to two people, and each has to be told different things.