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Showing posts with label Vayakhel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Vayakhel. Show all posts

Friday, February 25, 2022

Vayakhel, Shemos 35:30, 31. Betzalel ben Uri ben Chur l’matei Yehudah....Chochmoh, tvunoh, vodaas.

Originally published in 2007. It's very good, so I'm putting it in the front of the line.


Reb Meir Simchah here (Meshech Chochmoh) asks, why does the possuk list Betzalel’s yichus selectively, noting specifically his ancestors Chur and Yehudah.


He answers that one is faced with the possibility of the ultimate sacrifice, of martyrdom, close and meticulous rational analysis is untimely. When Nachshon and Shevet Yehudah were faced with the test of whether they would jump into the Red Sea, and when Chur was faced with a mob of hysterics demanding an Eigel, if Nachshon and Chur had indulged in careful critical analysis and deep consideration of the alternatives and ramifications, they never would have moved: they would have suffered from “the paralysis of analysis.” But they had the deeper wisdom and strength to do what needed to be done without hesitation, and what they did echoes throughout all time. He brings an epigram from the Chosid Yaavetz– "analysis saps the strength of the will." 
  דהחקירה תעכב [ברצון הפנימי] מלמסור נפשו על קדוש השם יתברך

So, middoh k’neged middoh, Hashem filled Betzalel with wisdom. When the time came, and there was a need for careful and prudent wisdom, Hashem granted that as a gift to the descendant of these two people who had shown they knew the limits of chochmoh.

Reb Meir Simcha 35:30
ראו קרא ד' כשם כצלאל כו' כן חור למטה יהודה כו' הענין דמסירת נפש צריך להיות שלא בחקירה והתחכמות יתירה ויהודה מסר עצמו בים במסירת נפש כמו דאיתא בתוספתא דסוטה וכן חור מסר עצמו בעגל דהחקירה תעכב [ברצון פנימי] מלמסור נפשו על קדוש השי"ת כעדות יעב"ץ החסיד לכן אמר שבעבור זה שלא חקרו ולא נתחכמו יותר מדאי לכן וימלא אותו בחכמה ובדעת כו' והבן 

Reb Meir Simcha ends his discussion with with “vehovein.” He clearly means to say that his pshat is not just his usual standard of a brilliant and deep vort, or a new iteration of a truism. And the reason is because at first glance, he seems to be advocating imprudence and foolhardiness! This, obviously, is not what he wants us to come away with. We are all too familiar with the delusional extremists whose acts of 'martyrdom' fill the newspapers. What, then, does he mean?

The answer is this: Reb Meir Simcha is not saying that there is an alternative to prudent wisdom. He is saying that along with chochmas hatorah, you have to develop another kind of chochmoh, and that is the chochmoh of mussor and hashkofoh. This is what the Torah means by "chochmo, tevuna, voda'as. Only when you combine Chochmas Hatorah with the Binoh of mussor and hashkofo do you come to Da'as, the knowledge of what needs to be done right now. If you only have the wisdom of havonas hatorah, you are lacking a crucial part of what a ben Torah must develop. People talk about ‘the fifth shulchon oruch.’ Everyone has their own opinion of what comprises this part of shulchon oruch, and it is usually cited in support of some unsupportable and foolish opinion that contradicts daas torah. In fact, however, this part of Shulchon Oruch is not an alternative to the first four parts. The fifth shulchon oruch is the mussor and hashkofoh that cannot be written on paper. Only if a person knows and understands kol hatorah kuloh, and he also is a godol in hashkofoh and mussor, only then can he trust that his kol demomoh dakoh comes from an inculcated sense of what the right thing to do is.

My father (Shlitah) Hareini Kapparas Mishkavo, liked to say that if someone would open a store that sold common sense, it would go bankrupt, because everyone thinks he has plenty of common sense. In fact, though, common sense is a rare and precious commodity. The same is true regarding the Tevunoh VoDa'as the Torah mentions here.

In Parshas Titzaveh, 30:7, it says B’heitivo es haneiros yaktirenu. The ketores is brought in middle of the hatovas haneiros. While this is a well known halachah which many of us say before pesukei de'zimra every day, did you ever wonder why this is so? Why must we interrupt the preparation of the menorah in order to burn the ketores? Where do we find a Gzeiras Hakasuv that requires that Oseik Bemitzvah should davka stop in middle to do a different mitzvah? Reb Moshe in the original Dorash Moshe says that a talmid chochom (the menorah) needs to have a sense of smell (the ketores) – to be able to discern that something is wrong even when nothing apparent is evident, to be able to sense when people are using the Torah to trick others into following false philosophies. He brings Sanhedrin 93b about the Melech Hamoshiach who is “morach v’do’in.” He explains that this is not a din of nevu’ah, it is simply a sense that every yorei shomayim develops to some degree.

This is what Reb Meir Simcha is talking about. A talmid chochom that does not develop this extra sense, and who relies on just his wisdom, is incomplete, and he should remember that the ketores is an essential part of the hatovas hamenorah.

Here is what bothers me. Why was this quality necessary, or relevant, to davka Betzalel? Of course you need kavana, and chachma, and daas, to fabricate the keilim and invest them with kedusha. As we have said elsewhere, the degree and quality of kavana is an essential part of the keilim and the begadim, no less than in writing a Sefer Torah. But why this particular techunas hanefesh? There was no mesiras nefesh involved here.

My nephew, Harav Yitzchak Buchalter, suggested the following. We know the story said about the Ramak, who said in a drasha that total bitachon will mean the Ribono shel Olam will take care of you 100%. A simple Jew listened, and sold his horse and wagon, we all know the story. The lesson is that the talmidim of Reb Moshe Cordevero were each and every one a gadol in Chochma and Mussar and Kabbala. But they were not simple Jews, they were great thinkers. As such, they had the problem the Chosid Yaavetz described. When Betzalel made the keilim, he had to have the deep wisdom of the heart, which entails dakusdikkeh kavanos that are entirely outside of a normal person's comprehension. To make the keilim with these kavanos required a faith in siyata dishmaya that the kavanos were exactly as they needed to be, with no sfeikos at all. 

  A young medical school student I met, Reb Jacobowitz from Baltimore, said the following, and I think it's superb. Chazal tell us again and again that Betzalel and Ahaliav and indeed all the craftsmen were איש אשר נשאו לבו וכל אשר נדבה רוחו אותו, which means they didn't apprentice, they didn't practice, they were inspired with divine wisdom and skill which expressed itself in their sublime work.  As the Ramban says in 35:21,
כי לא היה בהם שלמד את המלאכות האלה ממלמד, או מי שאימן בהן ידיו כלל, אבל מצא בטבעו שידע לעשות כן, ויגבה לבו בדרכי ה' (דה''ב יז ו) לבא לפני משה לאמר לו אני אעשה כל אשר אדני דובר 
 If so, the type of chochma needed here is beyond learned chochma. It is the tevunas haleiv that was exemplified by Nachshon and Chur, a direct connection to kedusha and truth. 

Friday, March 04, 2011

UPDATED A New Discussion about Computers and Shabbos

I found some interesting sources during the week of Parshas Beshalach in ayin gimmel, and I posted the information there, but I'm putting it here at the end of the post as well.


Last week, in Parshas Vayakhel, in passuk 35:33, the words מלאכת מחשבת, Me'leches Machashaves appeared.  These words are understood by Chazal as the fundamental definition of what sort of work is prohibited on Shabbos.  Mesorah's translation is "craft of design."  Most often, the way Chazal interpret this phrase is to limit the legal definition of 'work,' in Hilchos Shabbos, to cases of specific intent.

The next section is divided into two parts.  Option One is for people without experience in Hilchos Shabbos.  Option Two is for people who prefer straight yeshivishe talk.

Option One
In tort law, Specific Intent is defined as follows:
The mental purpose, aim, or design to accomplish a specific harm or result by acting in a manner prohibited by law.  Specific intent requires that the defendant intended to achieve some result additional to the criminal act in order to prove all the elements needed to be found guilty of the crime. It differs from general intent, which only requires proof that the defendant intended to do the prohibited act. For example, the crime of larceny requires not only the general intent to take property, but also the specific intent to permanently deprive another of the property.

Thus, in Hilchos Shabbos,  מלאכת מחשבת means that two elements must be present for a finding of  transgression of Shabbos: intention to do the specific prohibited act, and intention for a particular result.  If a person intended to do one prohibited melacha but did another, he didn't have intention to do that act, and it's not מלאכת מחשבת.  If a person intended to do a prohibited act, but was doing it for a purpose other than the usual purpose of the melacha, then he lacks the intent to achieve the prohibited result, and it's not מלאכת מחשבת. In both cases, מלאכת מחשבת teaches us that this person is not legally culpable for the what he did.

Option Two
In Yeshivish, we would say that Chillul Shabbos requires two things:
כוונה for a  מעשה  and   כוונה  for a תוצאה :  intent to do a specific act, and intent to generate a specific result.  The תוצאה has to be the purpose for which the Melacha was done in the building of the Mishkan.  Classic application: if a person digs a hole, he can be said to be creating a pit, or building a pit.  If he is digging because he wants sand, then even if he digs a perfect hole, it is not Meleches Machsheves.  He is lacking the specific intent required for a melacha of building.


Generally, מלאכת מחשבת narrows the cases that are called Melacha of chillul Shabbos.  But מלאכת מחשבת can also be used to include cases that would otherwise be excluded.  For example: If a person throws wheat and chaff up into the air, and the wind blows away the chaff and allows the wheat to fall to the ground, it is considered his act, because he is intentionally using existing forces to complete the act that he began and he intended (Aruch Hashulchan 242:24.  I don't know why the Aruch Hashulachan says it as if it were a chidush. It is an open Rashi in Bava Kamma 60a. and the Rosh there and the Rach in Shabbos 120b argue and say the svara is because that is the classic definition of the melacha, so the concept is limited to Zoreh.  Similarly, the Gemara says that nursing a child is technically a melacha, but of course it is muttar.  But why is it a melacha?  The woman is just putting the child to her breast, and the child nurses!  The child is doing the melacha, not the woman.  The answer is that because children naturally nurse, if you put a child to a breast with the intention that the child nurse, then the result is called your מלאכת מחשבת.  The same ought to be true by putting a leech on someone's skin, and just like Zoreh is a machlokes Rashi and the Rosh/Rach, this too is a machlokes between the Magen Avraham, who holds it's a grama even when you put grain into an active mill and certainly when you put a leech on skin, against the Even Ha'Ozer who holds it's a perfect melacha gmura, at the end of 328. Another example of this is in Tosfos Shabbos 73b.  For further discussion, see Totzos Chaim 8:3)

So now, here is a new question.

There is a nascent technology called BCI, Brain Computer Interface.  This enables a person to control a computer via his thoughts, or, more correctly, it trains a person to generate brain activity that controls a computer.  The computer doesn't read your mind.  As with Voice Recognition software, the computer and the person work together to create a lexicon of commands.  Brain activity A (visualize Netanyahu) means that the cursor moves the right, Brain activity B (visualize Shulamit Aloni) means left, and Brain activity C (think of smelling a bowl of hot cholent) means stop, and so forth.  See, for example, here.  (This is not what Stephen Hawking uses.  His devices respond to small muscle movements.)

At the moment, this infant technology is barely crawling.  It will soon become enormously efficient and popular.  One can easily imagine an earphone that functions as an inductive coil- or a yarmulkeh with a sensor- sensitive enough to distinguish between various brain activities, which could be used to control a computer.  One could do anything, from turning on a light to starting a war, by means of his brain activity.   All it will take is an Israeli with some spare time and a soldering gun.

Would this be called melacha on Shabbos?  You are not lifting a finger.  You are not moving or even talking.   You are not "doing" any act at all.

My opinion is that the centrality of kavana in the din of מלאכת מחשבת would make this a melacha de'oraysa.  Both the melacha and the result are intended.  The result is proximate and definite and immediate.  This is a melacha gemura.

It goes without saying that Reb Moshe, who prohibited the use of Shabbos clocks for anything but heat and light, would prohibit this at least on a Derabanan level.  But I'm not talking about Derabanans and Kavod Shabbos here, I'm talking about a De'oraysa.

Clarification:
This is not at all related to issues of voice controlled computers or microphones or hearing aids.  In all of those cases, the problem is the sound wave you generated impinging upon the receiver.  And please do not confuse this with infrared motion detectors, or computer controlled motion detectors.  In those cases, your action results in melacha being done, no less than if there were a string attached to you that pulled a switch when you moved.  You are basically pulling the switch.  In our case, you are doing absolutely no physical act.
This is not at all related to issues of whether the use of electrical mechanisms is assur or why it is assur.  I'm talking about a one hundred percent melacha de'oraysa- igniting a fire that cooks a pot of meat- that was done by sending a signal via my brain activity to a computer to do it.

UPDATE I
Over the last two days, I spoke about this to several Talmidei Chachamim.
  • One said that it is not a melacha at all and muttar mid'oraysa.  Melacha requires a physical act on my part.  This person is a highly respected posek.  He also holds that Rav Elyashiv's issur to walk where motion activated cameras will turn on is completely wrong, as does Rav Wosner.
  • One said that it is melacha gemura and assur mid'oraysa.  Interesting svara offered by the second person:  He said, a melacha was done.  The question is, to whom to be meyacheis the melacha.  So, if a person tells a goy to do a melacha, the melacha is mis'yacheis to the goy.  But if I make the computer do the melacha, it's mis'yacheis to me.  great unknown says that this svara is contradicted by Reb Akiva Eiger in the Teshuvos #8 where he argues on the Nesivos regarding mis'asek.
  • Another talmid chacham said that it is no different than the brain telling the hand to light a fire.  The hand's action is my action.  The computer here becomes my hand, and the melacha is a ma'aseh be'yadayim.
UPDATE II

An excellent and helpful comment posted by the antipodean bar nash pc directs us to the Gemara in Sanhedrin 101a.  The Gemara says that it is muttar to 'paralyze' an animal via a lechisha/incantation, even though it essentially traps the animal, and trapping is an Av Melacha.  He said that the reason for this hetter is the absence of an act of Tzeidah.  This is highly debatable, as will soon discuss.  But Reb Chaim Kanievsky assumes that is the pshat in Rashi in the following paragraph.  (And the tzushtell is notable for another reason, as well- he wants to be machria the issue of whether מלאכת מחשב is called מלאכת מחשבת from a case of מלאכת מכשף.)
(I do not have a copy of the sefer.  I copied this from an online citation, and made several minor changes. It  is not complete, as indicated by the ellipses, and I cannot vouch for its accuracy.)

בספר דרך אמונה על הלכות שמיטה ויובל להגאון ר"ח קנייבסקי שליט'א, הקשה: “ויל"ע דבסנהדרין ק"א א' אמרי
לוחשין לחישת נחשים ועקרבים בשבת ואין בכך משום צידה [...] אע"ג דע"י הלחש אינו יכול לזוז ממקומו
עד שנוכל לתופסו מ"מ...מותר דאין זה צידה טבעית ויל"ע מ"ש גבי שביעית דאסור גם פעולה שאינה
טבעית ומ"ש שבת דמותר" (דרך אמונה, שמיטה ויובל, פרק א, הלכה ז, ביאור הלכה ד"ה סוקרין). לאחר
מכן הוא מביא שני תירוצים, בתירוצו הראשון הוא עומד על ההבחנה המהותית שבין שביתת הארץ מעבר
לשביתת האדם ממלאכה, ובין שבת שבו רק האדם שובת, משכך, היות ולחישה אינה פוגעת בשביתת
האדם מותר ללחוש בשבת, אולם בשביעית “האיסור הוא שהארץ לא תיעבד ולכן גם ע"י סגולה הרי הארץ
נעבדה על ידו" (שם). עוד תירץ הרב קנייבסקי, על פי ההבחנה שבין דיבור ומעשה: “דבאמת אין חילוק
בין שבת לשביעית רק החילוק הוא אם עושה איזה מעשה או שאין עושה כלום רק לוחש דכשעושה מעשה
באמת גם בשבת יהיה אסור אבל בלחישה בעלמא גם בשביעית יהיה מותר".

According to his first teretz, there is a difference between the concept of the issurim of Shabbos and the issurim of the rest of the Torah.  He says that Shabbos prohibits the human act, while other dinim prohibit causing a result.  On Shabbos, we don't care that fires are set, as long as you didn't do the act of setting them.  Magical incantations are not included in the legal definition of Melacha, simply because they are supernatural.  Therefore, no melacha has been done and no issur transgressed.  During the year of Shvi'is, we care very much that the land should not be worked, irrespective of who works it, so even a supernatural method that causes land to be worked would be assur on Shvi'is.  According to this, Rashi is dealing with an entirely different issue, that of  " אין זה צידה טבעית" , and this has nothing to do with BCI. 

According to his second teretz, Shabbos and the whole Torah are the same, and l'chisha would be muttar in all cases because it does not involve a human action.  The Torah only prohibits a human action, not thoughts that result in action.  If so, a BCI ma'aseh would be muttar in kol hatorah kulah.

Let me point out that Reb Chaim Kanievsky's point that speech is neither action nor legally actionable is not contrary to the generally accepted issur on talking into a microphone or using voice recognition software to write or control a computer on Shabbos.  The difference is as follows:
In talking into a microphone, the issur is the impingement of the voice/pressure wave/air movement upon the microphone, because that impact directly causes electrical changes, and directly generating electrical changes on Shabbos is assur.  Here, by the Lechisha, there's no issur on Lechisha on Shabbos.  The issur is the trapping.  The man is not trapping, he is talking.  His voice is not doing a melacha; the effect of his voice is causing a melacha to happen.

UPDATE III

Tosfos in Gittin 31a DH B'machshava says that a melacha that is done with intent alone (Tosfos is talking about being mafrish Truma with machshava and the issur of mesakein) is assur on Shabbos.  The Chida in his Pnei David on Beshalach 16:23 brings a raya from Tosfos to the Maharsh Primo who said that since the Mahn that fell in the Midbar could be changed into whatever form you desired by intent alone- you could make it into baked, or cooked, or broiled simply by desiring that it be so- it was assur to make this change on Shabbos.  The Teshuvos Har Tzvi (OC I 174) says that this really is clear in the passuk אֵת אֲשֶׁר תֹּאפוּ אֵפוּ וְאֵת אֲשֶׁר תְּבַשְּׁלוּ בַּשֵּׁלוּ , because the Mechilta says it means that the Mahn actually cooked/baked/broiled itself according to the owner's intent, and it's clear in the passuk that this change had to be done before Shabbos began. (It's not clear to me, though, because according to Reb Akiva Eiger's pshat in the Rambam 9 Shabbos 3 onהמבשל על האור ... דבר שאינו צריך בישול כלל פטורbishul of the Mahn could not be de'oraysa.  It's a great kashe on the Rambam, but irrelevant to the halacha.)

However, the Chida, in his sefer Yosef Ometz (92:2) brings that Tosfos in Menachos 55 says the opposite, that if the hafrasha is done with thought alone, it is muttar on Shabbos.  The Chida's resolution of this stira, and a discussion on the topic as a whole, can be found in the Sefer Sdei Tzofim on Menachos, page 402 (page 408 on Hebrewbooks.org , or if that doesn't work, then go here and then go to page 408).

I know that some people are going to point out Reb Akiva Eiger's Teshuva in 159 about making a kinyan before Shabbos that will be chall on Shabbos.  I say it's irrelevant. I'm too lazy to discuss it, and just wrote this so nobody should say "Ha!  You forgot Reb Akiva Eiger's teshuva!"  I didn't.

Lastly, let me point out that the Rashi in Sanhedrin 101 is not at all clear as to why it is muttar, as indicated in Reb Chaim's two teirutzim.  Concordant with Reb Chaim's first pshat, the Levush and the Mishna Berura (328 SK 143) learn that Rashi was mattir either because it's not the normal derech or because it's supernatural.  According to both the Levush and the MB, we have no proof that Rashi would be mattir machshava.  In fact, it is very likely that if Rashi held that machshava is bichlal not a ma'aseh melacha, he (or the people who read into him) wouldn't have to come up with other hetteirim like shinui or not derech hateva.  Since he (they) did, it proves that machshava can be considered melacha.  Therefore, according to these pshatim in Rashi, our case, which is natural and will soon be common, might be assur gamur:

According to the Rambam who holds that the lachash is a meaningless superstition, the Gemara is no raya at all, since he holds it’s muttar because the lachash doesn't work.

FINAL UPDATE

What we end up having is the following:
  • A stirah in Tosfos, Gittin 31 (Assur) and Menachos 55 (Muttar).  UPDATE:  This is not correct.  Both are mattir.
  • An ambiguous Rashi (that Rav Kanievsky in his second pshat reads to mean Muttar for sure on Shabbos, and possibly in all isurim; but according to his first pshat, and according to the Levush (OC 328) that Rashi was mattir because it's not the normal derech of Tzeidah, and the Mishna Berura in 328 SK 143 that Rashi was mattir because it's not derech hateva, we have no proof that Rashi would be mattir machshava, and most likely a proof that Rashi would asser. 
  • The shittos of the Maharash Primo and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Assur). 
  • The Magen Avraham that holds that putting wheat into a mill that is already turning is called a grama, despite the intent and immediate result.  It’s possible that according to the Magen Avraham, machshava cannot make something that is not called your ma’aseh into your ma’aseh.
Bottom line:
  • Assur: Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank.
  • Muttar: Rav Kanievsky in his second pshat in Rashi. 
  • Most likely Assur in Rashi and L'halacha: Levush, Mishna Berurah, and Reb Chaim Kanievsky in his first pshat in Rashi.
  • Probably Muttar: the Magen Avraham.
So the surprising result is that for chillul Shabbos, the preponderance of shittos is that no physical act is necessary.  Chillul Shabbos can be the result of pure machshava IF the machshava causes the melacha directly and immediately and definitely, and it is commonly done in this way.  And it goes without saying that every normal posseik would agree that it would be a zilzul Shabbos to do melacha with machshava.

It could be that Shabbos is unique, that Meleches Machseves results in a chumra that makes it assur, as the Aruch Hashulchan (quoted above) says.  In fact, while not very much like the mleches hamishkan, this would be a nice match with the type of melacha involved in the creation of the world.  What the halacha would be in other issurim besides Shabbos remains unanswered, outside of the universal hetter of Reb Chaim Kanievsky's second pshat in Rashi, which, we have seen, is contrary to the Levush and the Mishna Berura.



UPDATE:
I posted on this again in 2013, in Parshas Beshalach, here.  I'm also pasting the newer post here.  I normally would just erase both and make a new one, but I hate to eliminate the comments, and I don't have the time to put them into the post.


A double portion of the Mahn came down on Friday, because people would not be allowed to carry it to their houses on Shabbos.  This way, they had their Shabbos food in their houses before Shabbos.  They were also told be sure to cook or bake the Mahn before Shabbos began.  
את אשר תאפו אפו ואת אשר תבשלו בשלו

There is a discussion in the Mechilta here about exactly how the Mahn was prepared.  Rebbi Yehoshua holds that the mere thought of baking would miraculously transform the Mahn into a baked preparation, and the thought of cooking would render the Mahn cooked.  Rebbi Elazar HaModa'i says that it would taste as if it were prepared the way you wanted, but there was no physical change.  (I suppose this is what underlies the machlokes Reb Ami and Reb Asi in Yoma 74b whether the tribulation of the Mahn was not having food in the pantry or not seeing the food you're tasting.)

יאמר אליהם הוא אשר דבר ה', אמרו לו אימתי אמר להם מחר: את אשר תאפו אפו, ר' יהושע אומר מי שהוא רוצה אפוי היה מתאפה לו והרוצה מבושל היה מתבשל לו. ר' אלעזר המודעי אומר הרוצה לאכול דבר אפוי היה טועם בו כל אפויים שבעולם והרוצה לאכול דבר מבושל היה טועם בו כל בשולים שבעולם ר' אליעזר אומר על אפוי אפו ועל מבושל בשלו הא כיצד יום טוב שחל להיות ערב שבת מנין שאין רשאין לא לאפות ולא לבשל אלא אם כן עירבו ת"ל את אשר תאפו אפו אפו על אפוי ובשלו על מבושל:


Two years ago, I posted a discussion about BCI technology, with which a person can control a computer via thought patterns.  Absolutely no movement is involved; sensors detect and analyze variations in brain wave activity and the program responds to this variation.  Once you can move and click a cursor with brain activity, you can do every single one of the thirty nine melachos of Shabbos without lifting a finger.  

BCI stands for brain–computer interface (BCI).  Other terms used are mind-machine interface (MMI), and direct neural interface, and brain–machine interface (BMI),  For the latest on BCI, go here.


Having seen this Mechilta, and some other sources, it is time for an update.  Some of this material was briefly mentioned in the original post, but most of it is new, like the Mechilta.

Harav Tzvi Pesach Frank, in his pirush on Chumash here and in a teshuva, and the Mirkeves Hamishna and the Netziv in their peirushim on the Mechilta, note that our Mechilta shows that according to Rebbi Yehoshua, this form of melacha is assur on Shabbos; that it needed to be done before Shabbos, even though the cooking and baking would be effected by thought alone.

(Please note that this Mechilta is completely incomprehensible- to me- if we're going to read it literally from a halachic standpoint.  Even if thought would make it cooked, the thought did not cook it.  I'm not talking about the Bishul b'chama/Bishul b'eish issue, I'm talking about no bishul at all happening.  It turned it into a food that was identical with something that had been cooked.  It was נתהפך to become a thing that is Mevushal, but there is no event of בישול taking place.  What we have here is like a thought that takes an object that was in a Reshus Hayachid and makes it re-appear in a Reshus Harabbim.  There was no akira, there was no ha'avara, there was no hanacha.  Before it was there, now it's here.  We have the shiur of a melacha, and we have the effect of a melacha, but the melacha wasn't done.  There's a consequence without a sequence.  Bishlema by netilas neshama, causing death is the melacha, and however you do it it's assur.  Here, it's the act of bishul that is assur and the fact that the food gets cooked is for the chiyuv on a shiur of the melacha.  It's like Zorei'ah, planting: the issur is the planting, and the fact that the seed sprouts is just a test of whether your act of planting was a melacha.  Here, it's impossible that such a thing would be bishul.  Maybe it would be makeh b'patish, but that doesn't make sense either, since it was perfectly good even without the machshava.  But I don't care that this is shver.  The Achronim see the Mechilta as a raya to this question, so I'm going with that.  I guess the problem is not bishul, but Mesaken Manna, like the next source says.)

The Moshav Zkeinim in Bamidbar (11:8) says the following:

 אמרינן בסיפרי ועשו אותו עוגות וכוי, ותימה הא כתיב (שמות ט״ז כ״ג) את אשר תאפו אפו ואת אשר תבשלו בשלו ואת כל העודף אלמא היה נאפה ומתבשל ואין לומר לאו דווקא אפו אלא תחשבו עליו, ולדבר[יו] (ה)מתבשל למה היה אסור בשבת לחשוב עליו שיש בו טעם תבשיל, וי״ל [דכיון] דלא היה מתהפך אלא על פי דבורו לתבשיל חשוב תקון דהא אפילו הפרת נדרים לצורך שבת איבעיא לן בנדרים (ע״ז אי) ובסוף שבת (קנ׳׳ז אי) אי שרי בשבת, ואע״ג דהתם שרי הכא חשיב תקון
which means that he holds it is assur, although he says דבורו.

On the other hand, Tosfos in several places indicates that it would be muttar; Fact 1.Designating Truma on Shabbos is assur under Mesaken Manna, a toldah of Makkeh Be'Patish.  Fact 2. Although lechatchila one should not designate Truma with thought alone, if one does so it is effective.  Combining Fact 1 and 2, Tosfos in Gittin 31a DH Bemachshava, and in Chulin 7a DH Vedilma and Bechoros 59a DH Bemachshava says that to do so on Shabbos with thought alone would be muttar.  Also, the Shittah in Beitza 34b says this.  (It's easy to mis-read Tosfos, but what he's saying is that even though machshava would be effective and muttar as far as hilchos Shabbos are concerned, the possibility of doing it with machshava is not sufficient to be mattir a physical hafrasha.)

The Achiezer in 2:49:4 talks about our Tosfos, and mentions that he has several problems with Tosfos' Shittah which he does not answer.  But he says that even according to Tosfos, that it's muttar to be mafrish on Shabbos with thought alone, that's only because Tevel has inherent Truma potential, so you're only designating which part is Truma.  But by Hekdesh, where you're creating an entirely new status, and this status causes a transfer of ownership, such a machshava is like a maaseh and would be assur on Shabbos.  But he says that this is only because ownership transfers generate a concern that you might write, and so are assur miderabanan.  The implication is that a real melacha, if done with Machshava, would be muttar.

Along the same lines, see Reb Akiva Eiger brought in the Shaar Tziyun in 633 sk 14, regarding a too-tall sukkah that has a pile of dirt in middle, and before yomtov you weren't mevateil the dirt, that he is not sure if if it is muttar to be mentally mevateil the dirt to the ground, because it would make the Sukka kasher and therefore be mesaken manna/makeh b'patish.  I cannot find this RAE anywhere except this Shaar Tziyun.  Anyway, from this RAE is appears that he's mesupak regarding the issue of mesaken manna with machshava.

And the best part- Reb Meir Don Plotzki (Kli Chemda) in Beshalach proposes that there is a difference between Shabbos and Yomtov.  On Shabbos, which is an eternal and immutable commemoration of Hashem's Shvisa creating the world through His Machshava, the issur includes melacha that is done with machshava.  But Yomtov, whose kedusha is created by Beis Din, by humans, the issur is only on melacha that is done with an act, the human sort of melacha.  Wouldn't that be interesting, to be mattir BCI melacha on Yomtov but not on Shabbos?

I found a nice article on this topic.  He cites most, if not all, of my references, here.  Here's his summation:

סקירת השיטות שראינו, מהן ניתן להפיק שיטה הלכתית בנוגע ל-BCI:
א.    הגרשז"א – המחשבה כמעשה (בהלכות מסוימות) לענין שבת.
ב.    הרב רוזן – בדיקת התוצאות הסופיות של תהליכים (גם פנימיים) וקישורם למקורם.
ג.    עמדת ה'חומרא' של הכלי-חמדה – כשעשיית המלאכה נעשית כרגיל על ידי המחשבה, אזי זו איננה מנגנון של כ'לאחר-יד' גרידא.
ד.    עמדת ה'קולא' של הכלי-חמדה – פעולה המתבצעת על ידי מחשבה אינה מלאכה גמורה בגידרה, אלא 'רק' איסורא.
ה.    הקהילות יעקב – מעמד של 'עדיף מכלאחר-יד' לפעולה סגולית בהלכות שבת, שלא כדרכה.
ו.     הקהילות יעקב – דרכה של פעולה כזו היא תמיד ה'לא טבעית', לא גזרו חכמים בה.
ז.     הרב זאב לב (והגרשז"א) – החילוק בין החפצא לגברא באדם ובפעולותיו בעולם. זהו היחס המפורש ביותר לנושא, ובשילוב עם חילוק החפצא/גברא זהו פיתוח של מערך מחשבתי עם השלכות הלכתיות קונקרטיות.




      Monday, February 21, 2011

      Vayakhel, Shemos 35:22. Rosh Chodesh, the Women's Holiday; and, Getting Things Done

      The passuk says that the people donated wholeheartedly toward the Mishkan to the extent that Moshe Rabbeinu eventually had to tell them to stop bringing things.
      וַיָּבֹאוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים עַל הַנָּשִׁים כֹּל נְדִיב לֵב הֵבִיאוּ חָח וָנֶזֶם וְטַבַּעַת וְכוּמָז כָּל כְּלִי זָהָב וְכָל אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר הֵנִיף תְּנוּפַת זָהָב 
      The men came with the women; every generous hearted person brought bracelets and earrings and rings and buckles, all kinds of golden objects, and every man who (donated a donation) of gold...

      The Daas Zekeinim there explains that the women refused to donate their jewelry for the creation of the Eigel.  What they did give, they gave under duress.  Now, when the call went out for donations for the Mikdash, the men wondered if the women would be willing to give anything.  As it turned out, the women dragged their husbands with them and thronged Moshe Rabbeinu, insisting that he take their golden jewelry (as the Ramban, Ibn Ezra, and Rabbeinu Bachay also say).  Whereas they had to be coerced to give for the Eigel, for the Mishkan they were more enthusiastic than the men.


      The Daas Z'keinim continues and says that if they had been unwilling to give their jewelry in both cases, it wouldn't prove anything.  Maybe they simply loved their jewelry and wouldn't give it away for any reason.  But their enthusiasm about giving to the mikdash conclusively proved that they were motivated by a spiritual refinement which led to an abhorrence of the Golden Calf and an enthusiastic nedivus for the Mishkan.  In commemoration of this spiritual greatness, they were given as an eternal holiday the day the Mishkan was erected, Rosh Chodesh Nissan.  Along with that Rosh Chodesh, they were given every Rosh Chodesh of the year as well.  The primary celebration, however, the Mother of the Yom Tov, is Rosh Chodesh Nissan.  (Much of this is not in the printed Daas Z'keinim.  It's an interpretive reading based on my expertise in his style of writing.)


      There are many references to this odd yomtov.  The most famous is the Yerushalmi in Pesachim 4:1 and Taanis 6:1 that says that for such women who have a minhag to not work on Rosh Chodesh, it is a valid minhag.  This Yerushalmi is cited by the Rashba in Teshuvos 306 and the Rosh in Megilla 3:4 and the Mordechai in Shabbos 2:278.  Rashi also mentions it there in Megilla on 22b, and Tosfos brings the idea from the Pirkei D'Rebbi Eliezer Perek 45.


      The Yerushalmi does not explain the source of the minhag, but the Pirkei D'Rebbi Eliezer does, referring to the events of the Eigel.  The part about their rushing more excitedly than the men to give away their jewelry to build the Mishkan does not appear in most editions of the Pirkei D'Rebbi Eliezer.


      Since women are mentioned several times as having spun wool and linen for the Mishkan, in many places the minhag eventually became limited to not spinning thread Rosh Chodesh.  Since nobody spins thread anymore, observing this Rosh Chodesh holiday has become rare, outside of Deformed Judaism.  Still, it is brought in OC 417, starting with the Tur.


      From the Yerushalmi, it would seem that this is a din that needs a minhag.  In other words, a woman cannot choose to do this, it only has legitimacy if it is a minhag in her family from back in ancient times.  As the Yerushalmi says, if they do it, it is a legitimate minhag, but only If they have the minhag

      But in fact, Rav Ovadia Yosef says that the minhag still exists and should be respected.  Women who choose to do this minhag should avoid heavy or tiring work.  They can turn on a laundry machine, but they should arrange heavier jobs for a different day.  This is based on a Pri Chadash, who says anyone can take this minhag upon themselves- פרי חדש' סי' תיז.  A woman can wake up one Rosh Chodesh and tell her husband, "Guess who's cooking today, honey!  I decided that I hold like the Pirkei D'Rebbi Eliezer and the Pri Chadash!"  Which, of course, means they'll be eating out once a month.

      UPDATE:  My mother shetichyeh told me that she remembers clearly that the women of the Talmud Torah community in Kelm did not sew on Rosh Chodesh.  


      There is also an interesting Or Zaruah, who presents a novel interpretation of the last words of the Pirkei D'Rebbi Eliezer. 
      תדע לך שכל חודש וחודש חאשח מתקדשת וטובלת וחוזרת לבעלה והיא חביבה עליו כיום החופה כשם שהלבנה מתחדשת בכל ראש חודש והכל מתאוין לראותח כך האשה כשהיא מתחדשת בכל חודש בעלה מתאוה עליה וחביבה עליו כאשה חדשה
       אור זרוע הלכות ראש חודש תנד


      The Shaagas Aryeh, in his Turei Even on Megilla there, doesn't like any of this.  He says that the Pirkei D'Rebbi Eliezer is, in his words, דברי אגדה בעלמא.  This means that he thinks it's a nice story, but that is was intended to be non-halachic, an aggadic statement that has no halachic weight.  So he proposes an entirely different explanation.  He says that when the Beis Hamikdas was standing, not doing melacha on Rosh Chodesh was universal, because on the day that any person brings a korban, he may not do melacha (Tosfos, Ran and Rosh in Pesachim 50a, based on a Yerushalmi there, but see Rambam 6 Klei Hamikdash 10 that it's only derabanan).  Since on Rosh Chodesh the Korban Musaf was brought on our behalf, we cannot do melacha.  He brings a Yerushalmi that says that the only reason the Korban Tamid doesn't prohibit all the Jews from working every single day of the week is because of the passuk Ve'asafta deganecha, which allows melacha.  He says that a remnant of this old minhag is the fact that there are four aliyos on Rosh Chodesh, which we don't allow on weekdays because of bittul melacha.  This was instituted back when nobody worked on Rosh Chodesh, and stayed on the books even after the Churban Habayis.



      So now: a question.  

      How can the Shaagas Aryeh just blow away a Yerushalmi and a Pirkei D'Rebbi Eliezer?  "Just agadeta:"?  It seems to be a little too dismissive, even by Shaagas Aryeh standards. 


      And this is how we come to the Kodshim part of this discussion.


      The next part is succinct, but I think it's clear enough. 
      • Machtzis Hashekel provided the money from which community Korbanos were purchased.
      • Women aren't chayav in Machtzis Hashekel. 
      • The Korban Musaf of Rosh Chodesh is a community Korban that is commemorated in Tefillas Musaf.
      • Reb Akiva Eiger (Tshuvos 9 and OC 106) says that because women are not participants in the Korban Mussaf, they are not chayav to daven musaf.  Unlike Shacharis and Mincha, Tefillas Musaf focuses exclusively on the Korban Musaf, and should only be said by a person who is chayav to participate in the Korban Mussaf.  (This is also the opinion of the Tzlach in Brachos 26a, the beginning of the fourth perek, but for a different reason- because the davening of musaf is a zman grama and is not rachami, see Brachos 20b.)
      • Additionally, some achronim (like the Steipler in Zvachim #3) say that all the Korbanos Tzibbur are zman grama and so women are doubly pattur from Korbanos Tzibbur.   
      • According to the Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvos) that the purpose of the chiyuv of building the Mishkan/Mikdash is to make it possible to do the Avodah, and if you say that their  ptur from machtzis hashekel means they're unconnected to the primary avodah, the Avodas Korbanos Tzibur, why are women chayav to participate in the building of the mishkan (Rambam 1 Beis Habechira 12 and Minchas Chinuch 95:18)?  If Mishkan= avodah, and women are pattur from avodah, then they should be pattur from Mishkan!  Does it make sense that they should be pattur from the mitzvah and be chayav in the 'machshir'?


      Answer- 
      • The question arises only because of a failure to understand an enormous and fundamental conceptual difference of Avodas Hashem between women and men.  The whole life story of women is that their greatest zechus is in supporting and enabling types of Avodas Hashem and mitzvos that they themselves are not chayav to do, like limud hatorah (hani nashi b'mai zachyan in Brachos 17a and Tshuvos Rashbash 324).  This concept is emphasized in what they did in donating their jewelry to the mishkan.  
      • So for men, the Yomtov aspect of Rosh Chodesh stems from the Korban Musaf, as I said above from the Shaagas Aryeh, based on the first Tosfos in Makom She'nahagu, that the day that your special korban is brought is a Yomtov for you.  For women, it can't stem from there, because they're pattur from the Mussaf.  So their din Yomtov stems not from the Korban, but from their love for the mitzva of building the Mishkan, from their enthusiasm for seeing to it that a mitzvah gets done even when they themselves were not chayav to do the mitzvah.  
      • So for men, with the Churban Habayis and bittul of the korban, no more issur melacha.  For the women, the yomtov was given without tna'im.  
      • Or, it is the men's nature of supporting the eigel that caused the churban.  As far as women are concerned, we would still have the Beis Hamikdash, so the ptur melacha that stems from the Korban Musaf still applies.
      ***************************  
      N.B.
      The Rogotchover in this week's parsha on this passuk does note that women ought to be pattur from binyan because of zman grama.  He also brings from Avos d"Reb Nosson that even children brought nedavos.  He explains that the 'chiyuv' to build the mikdash is not like other chiyuvim.  It is a chiyuv to see to it that they will have a place to bring korbanos, and it's that "machshir" aspect that obligates them.  So he uses the Rambam to answer the question, not to ask it.  I assumed that since they're pattur from avodas tzibur, then they should be pattur from binyan.  He says that since they will be chayav to bring personal korbanos, they have a chiyuv to see to it that a Mikdash is available for that purpose.  
      I think the Rogotchover is really just saying that zman grama is not an absolute ptur, and it depends on what the taam hamitzva is, as we see in Mezuza in Kiddushin 34a, and Tefilla in Brachos 20b.

      Wednesday, March 10, 2010

      What does נישואין (Nisu'in) mean?

      COMMENTS HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE POST, AS NOTED BELOW.

      I spoke at a Sheva Brachos yesterday, and one of the things I talked about is the word "Nisu'in."  נישואין means marriage; it is the second stage of the Eirusin and Nisu'in marriage process, and it finalizes the marriage.  I want to know the meaning of the word itself.

      I mentioned this question at the table Friday night, and Someone answered that it means "to become burdened," from רחיים בצווארו, a millstone around the neck, an idiomatic expression used in the Gemara to refer to the responsibilities of marriage.  This Person meant that נישואין/marriage is like שאת וספחת  by Metzora, two types of skin growths that symptomize Leprosy.  I asked This Person which of the parties is thus burdened, and she answered "The one who was chased."  Very funny, but I don't think that's the only answer, at least I hope not, and it's certainly not something you want to hear from one of your parents.  (Full disclosure: see Yevamos 63b:  אשה רעה צרעת לבעלה מאי תקנתיה יגרשנה ויתרפא מצרעתו)

      אירושין, which is spelled ארוסין in the literature, Eirusin, is easier.  It's pretty obvious that Eirusin comes from the same shoresh as ארשת  שפתיו, which means speech or words; so, eirusin means to give your word, to agree or to pledge to marry.  The agreement is made binding through the kinyan, and the woman becomes prohibited to all other men, but the essence is the promise.  The word is identical with the English 'Troth,' which means to promise or to pledge.  Eirusin=betrothal.  Simple.  But what does Nesuin mean?  If you'll look around on the web, you'll see hundreds of people that say it means 'elevation.'  If anything, that's a raya that it doesn't mean that.  One clown makes an assertion, puts it on a website, and every lazy ignoramus assumes it's correct.  For a drasha, it's ok-- כל אדם שאין לו אשה שרוי בלא שמחה בלא ברכה בלא טובה... במערבא אמרי בלא תורה"—“ (Yevamos 62b.)  Or maybe it means the elevation of simcha.  But for pshat, I highly doubt it.


      In any case, the question is particularly timely, because in the three parshios, Ki Sisa, Vayakhel, and Pikudei, we find the word used remarkably often, and in many different ways--
      כִּי תִשָּׂא אֶת רֹאשׁ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל
      כָּל אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר נְשָׂאוֹ לִבּוֹ וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר נָדְבָה רוּחוֹ אֹתוֹ, 
       וְאֶל כָּל אִישׁ חֲכַם לֵב אֲשֶׁר נָתַן ה'  חָכְמָה בְּלִבּוֹ כֹּל אֲשֶׁר נְשָׂאוֹ לִבּוֹ לְקָרְבָה אֶל הַמְּלָאכָה לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָהּ,
      אשר נשא לבן אותנה בחכמה, 
       נֹשֵׂא עָו‍ֹן וָפֶשַׁע וְחַטָּאָה,
       אַהֲרֹן וְכָל הַנְּשִׂאִים בָּעֵדָה
      and many, many, more.

      Please note that in musaf of Yom Tov, we also says "והשיאנו ה' אלוקינו את ברכת מועדיך." And there's  
      וַיִּשָּׂא מַשְׂאֹת מֵאֵת פָּנָיו אֲלֵהֶם וַתֵּרֶב מַשְׂאַת בִּנְיָמִן מִמַּשְׂאֹת כֻּלָּם where it means a gift,
      and ישא מדברותיו,
      and  הֲלוֹא אִם תֵּיטִיב שְׂאֵת
      and שאת וספחת
      and others.  So, please tell me what you think it means in the context of getting married.  And please, I already did the drushy thing (Marriage is a gift  (מַשְׂאַת) from the Chasan to the Kalah, and from the Kalah to the Chasan, and from Hashem to both of them; Marriage is an opportunity to elevate (כִּי תִשָּׂא) yourself by learning to love another person more than yourself; Marriage is when you take on responsibility for a family; Marriage is when you have to listen to your heart (נְשָׂאוֹ לִבּוֹ) as well as your mind;  חתן דומה למלך and the word נישואין comes from נְּשִׂאִים because the Chasan and Kallah become a king and a queen (נְּשִׂאִים), and so on).  I'm looking for something rational.

      In a salute to ingenuity, and since it's still Adar, let me point out that Devora in the comments suggested that nisuin is related to  נסיון, nisayon, a test.  Every marriage is a test. Rabbi Dr. SMS suggested in a conversation that Eirusin is related to ארס, eres, poison.  Also, see great unknown's law- "The Conservation of  Golomus" based on the Gemara in Sanhedrin.  These are people who, when I ask why we learn the dinim of kidushin from the dinim of buying a plot of land for a grave, don't understand what the kashe is.

      AFTER THE UPDATES, YOU WILL FIND AN CONCISE VERSION OF THE COMMENTS THAT CAME IN ON THIS TOPIC.  I ATTEMPTED TO EDIT THEM FOR LOGICAL FLOW.  THESE COMMENTS ARE HEREWITH MADE A PART OF THIS POST, AND WILL IMPROVE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE TWO UPDATES THAT PRECEDE THE EDITED COMMENTS.

      UPDATE:
      1.  Eli points out that the roots with the shin smalis and the shin yemanis have completely different meanings, so it's not likely that nisu'in would be pronounced with a smalis if it came from Nasha; it is more likely that the Midrash is homiletics, not etymology.

      2.  More comments that came in on the topic (though I would prefer getting them in the comment section, I am happy to hear from you through any media):
      a.  The Gemara in Sanhedrin 31b uses the root to mean "compel."
      השיאוהו ויראה פנינו בטבריא. הכריחוהו והזקיקוהו לבוא כאן

      b.  A connection to the expression "נושא בעול עם חבירו", which means to accept their burdens and duties as if they were your own.

      UPDATE:
      LKWD GUY sent me a little note, to look at Rashi Sotah top of 9b.  What do you know! Another Rashi I forgot!  (And thank you Eli, for twisting the knife by pointing out that Rashi says exactly the same thing on top of Shabbos 146a.  I wonder what life would be like if I had a good memory.)
      נחש הקדמוני נתן עיניו בחוה ובא עליה. והיינו דכתיב (בראשית ג) הנחש השיאני- לשון תשמיש ונשואין הוא

      Now that we decided that Nisuin means "taking on," here we have a Rashi that throws the entire discussion up in the air again.  I could, of course, argue that Rashi is not referring to the denotation of the word "nisu'in" but instead to its connotation, but I need a while to convince myself that this might be true.  (writing a year later, I've decided that Rashi is purely Drush, it's homiletic and not interpretive.  But it's interesting that Rashi relates the word Hishi'ani to Nisu'in, since Hishi'ani primarily means deluded me, and so I suppose Nisu'in means delusion.  But that's just drush, right?  We all go into marriage with an completely accurate knowledge of whom we're marrying, right?)

      LATER UPDATE:
      I learned of a Tiferes Yisrael in Yevamos 7th perek comment #7 who asks this question, and, in Drush mode, suggests many of the answers that appear here, including some that I made fun of, and additional explanations as well.  See there.

      AND here are the edited comments.

      Eli said...
      First it should be noticed that נישואין is not symmetric (grammatically), it's the man who is נושא and the woman נשאת, so the answer to your query to That Person is self-evident.  נשא in Tanach can mean many things, but the four common meanings are (a) to carry (b) to take (or, better translated, get hold on something) and, (probably derived from (a) and (b)), (c) to suffer (d) to forgive. As much as (c) and (d) might seem relevant, I guess the meaning here is (b). Just recall that the alternative form in Tanach to לשאת אשה is לקחת אשה.
      Barzilai said...
      You know, Eli, I thought about nisuin as 'taking', but I thought it was odd that we distinguish between the two steps of marriage by calling one eirusin and the second nisuin, while in Chumash, ki yikach refers to eirusin. It's odd that likuchin and nisuin are different forms of the same word. Unless the "taking" of nisuin is more firm or permanent that the "taking" of likuchin. But then there's the shitta of Rabbeinu Nissim Gaon (brought in Tosfos Kiddushin 10 d'h Kol) that the word kicha (which we use for a gzeirah shavah to learn ha'ara'ah from arayos) refers to NISUIN, not EIRUSIN. That would make life easier. But, as Tosfos says there, Rabbeinu Nissim is very shver, because in all of Shas Kicha kicha from Sdei Efron means Kiddushin, not Nisuin. Still, I agree with you. It's like כאשר ישא האומן את היונק. You are taking someone to yourself, not just 'taking,' but committing yourself to follow through with full dedication. 
       
      lesser unknown said...
      i would argue/comment that eli left out the common meaning of the root of the word nissuin of "to elevate or to lift". and that to lift something includes the meanings of both to carry and to take. granted this is a bit of a semantical distinction, but i feel entitled considering the whole context here. In regard to the difference between kiddushin and nissuin, i was grappling with this a few months ago, as my yeshiva is currently learning kesuvos. Where I left off, is that kiddushin is not so much taking her to you as much as removing her from others, where nissuin is the actual taking of her to you as one entity/partnership.
       
      Barzilai said...
      I think Eli's (a), to carry, is close to your elevate. As for the difference between eirusin and nisu'in, I always explain that an arusa is an eishes ish for the whole world except for the chassan. This is like buying an option on a property; you don't own it yet, but nobody else can buy it. I will be happy to hear what you have in the Rambam.   (I like lesser unknown's approach of Likuchin being taking in the sense of taking away, and Nisu'in also being taking in the sense of taking for yourself.)
      Chaim B. said...
      On the Rambam's definition of nesu'in: http://divreichaim.blogspot.com/2007/11/rambams-definition-of-marriage-yichud.html http://divreichaim.blogspot.com/2007/11/rambams-definition-of-nesuin.html "an arusa is an eishes ish for the whole world except for the chassan" Achilas terumah? Get? But of course you will just tell me any halacha I conjure up stems from the idea of having an option, not from real ishus status.
      Barzilai said...
      Chaim, I like the posts from 2007, that even the Rambam will agree that chupa lipsulos shafs a greater degree of ishus than just eirusin, but it's not mattir bi'ah. I suppose that this can be true specifically according to the Rambam that even if she's meyuchedes to one man, like a pilegesh, it's still znus and an issur de'oraysa. So, having said that, you yourself are agreeing that ishus is incremental-- even ishus of nisuin. So what's wrong with saying that she's an eishes ish to the whole world but not to the husband? As far as hetter bi'ah, she's not muttar to her husband, but as far as ishus regarding other people, that degree of ishus is there. Of course it's not just an "option to buy." The kinyan of eirusin does create some madreiga of ishus. But as far as "eishes ish," she's not his eishes ish. For other people, she's an eishes ish and chayav missas beis din for znus. By the way, you know that the Rogotchover holds that every married woman is assur midin eishes ish even to her husband, except for the din hutrah for her husband. That's whats missing in an arusa- the hutra.
      lesser unknown said...
      First a correction from my earlier post. The Rambam, in 10:1, says that nisuin is "bringing her to your home, yichud, and yafreshena lo". I remember having trouble with what exactly those last two words meant. I was remembering incorrectly that they were a part of kiddushin, which is what I was referring to before, but clearly I was wrong. Which still leaves me with a question as to what he means by this... Now to comment on other points: I don't understand exactly what you mean by your option plan. Are you implying that there is no marital connection between them, even in regard to themselves? On a d'oraysa level they are allowed to have biah before nissuin. The Rambam (in the previously mentioned halacha) mentions that it is only an issur soferim with malkos mardus. In addition in yehuda, he couldn't claim ta'anus besulim since they regularly were misyachaid in her father's house and likely had biah already. Which is hard to hear if it was an issur d'oraysa, or even a lack of any ishus d'oraysa between them. And while I wouldn't ask from trumah or get like Chaim did, since an eved can also have trumah and needs a get, alternatively, after erusin she falls under the category of kinyan kaspo for trumah and a get is needed to matir her to others even if she isn't really an eishes ish for him. But the fact that he can be matir her n'darim or become tameh to her if he is a cohen might be better examples that show a real relationship. I don't remember seeing it, but if he is pasul as a witness after kiddushin, that would also show an intrinsic connection, more than just a bought future option... I didn't click the link that chaim posted, it is after midnight here, but from the end of 10:6 in the Rambam it seems clear he holds that chuppah with a niddah is better than nothing, and creates a level higher than erusin. I apologize if I'm just repeating what is already stated in the other link. Lastly, I would point out again that I do not think there is an intrinsic issur to be with ones erusa, but rather erusin would technically permit biah, but chazal imposed an external prohibition on them. I would appreciate (and not be surprised) if you can prove me wrong on this point.
      lesser unknown said...
      I forgot to mention in my last comment that the aruch ha'shulchan has a novel understanding of the Rambam, which removes the need to say that there are multiple degrees of nissuin. It is in even ha'ezer 61:4 (and also in sif 5 he further explains it)
      Eli said...
      Thank you, LU, elevate too. I also think my "suffer" should better be translated "burden" or something similar, as in ונשא עוונו. Yet, the relevant one for the present is "get". Re: RNG, it's actually the Tosfos that is shver. It's clear that in Tanach קיחה means the whole process of marriage, if not just Nissu'in: (a) we find Kicha before Matan-Torah, so it must be just מכניסה לביתו, the first instance I believe is ויקחו להם נשים מכל אשר בחרו, and many others follow. (b) The pasuk clearly says מי האיש אשר ארש אשה ולא לקחה. As for understanding Tosfos, I guess what he means is not that the word Kicha in Tanach cannot mean Nissuin, but just that the *גזרה שוה* of Kicha does not refer to Nissuin.
      Barzilai said...
      LU, let me apologize for a possible misconception. I edited the post to say that the line so often repeated on the net about nisuin meaning elevation, and characterizing it as something a clown would say before you brought it up. Of course, you also didn't mean to say that's pshat in nisuin. Chaim B. did discuss exactly what you said, that even according to the Rambam, chupas niddah creates more ishus than eirusin. When I used the 'option' comparison, it was not meant as a perfect model. It's more like an option with a letter of intent. In the context of marriage, this creates a relationship such that she is considered to be a member of his household, a wife-in-waiting. Eli, nice that you pointed out מי האיש אשר ארש אשה ולא לקחה. I'm convinced that you're right about nisuin being another form of likuchin, a stronger form, meaning more commitment. Forgive the mashal hedyot, but there's a famous line that speaks to the distinction: “The difference between involvement and commitment is like ham and eggs. The chicken is involved; the pig is committed.”
      great unknown said...
      עי' טעם המלך ס"ק י"ד משכ' על החופת חתנים פרק י' בשער המלך דחופה אין לה מקור מן התורה. וכמובן היו אלה שלא בדיוק הסכימו - וכלשון הברוך טעם" שקר ענה in any case the gemora sanhedrin 22b says that a woman is a golem until she gets married; the marriage corrects that. however, note that there is conservation of golemkeit. guess whom marriage converts into a golem.
      Barzilai said...
      That's strange. Bishlema you say that there are many alternative definitions of chupa, that's one thing. But this is something else entirely. Unless he means the canopy thingy. That I can hear. It would be nice to see someone that says that it's chukos ha'amim.
      lesser unknown said...
      gu: 1) I am assuming that you are kidding, but unfortunately since sarcasm/witty humor does not convey well through blog comments, in case you are being serious, I would argue that the gemara in sanhedrin you quoted is not at all referring to marriage itself, but rather the biah rishona, as evident by a) the pasuk the gemara brings down as a proof b) the maharsha on this gemara and c) the tosefos in kesuvos 4a that brings down this gemara as the reason that biah rishona is called bias mitzvah. 2) I thought it was before marriage, during courtship and engagement, that a man turns into a mindless fool. After marriage (or maybe at least after shana rishona) he begins to get some of his chochma back. although, maybe I am just in denial... The simplest translation is to take, as he is taking her to him as a wife. But at the same time, why is the root word of nasah being used instead of just the root of kicha? Because there is some form of elevation, at least potentially, going on here. Similar to a nasi, that doesn't become elevated by being a leader and doesn't elevate others by becoming a leader, there is intrinsic potential in this relationship for elevation. By fulfilling the role and responsibilities entailed the nasi becomes a better person that he could have been without the yolk of the masses upon him, etc... same as with marriage. there is great potential for growth because of the marriage that was not there when both are single. Especially considering that his Toarh isn't complete, his happiness isn't complete etc. as the gemara in yevamos (I think) says.
      Barzilai said...
      You know, I kind of agree that certain words become popular because of an inherent duality of meaning. It is possible that Nisuin was chosen because of its additional connotations, though I'm pretty convinced that its fundamental meaning is "taking," as Eli illustrated.
      great unknown said...
      the meaning of the word golem is basically unformed raw material. the wife is formed by the commitment of marriage (and hence is elevated into usefulness [i.e., kli status]), whereupon she immediately (if not sooner) proceeds to re-form the suddenly raw critter she just married. although as a great neo-platonic philosopher once said: the three most important words in a marriage are not, "I love you," but rather, "he'll never change." I think her name was broomhilda.
      lesser unknown said...
      GU: How would you fit that idea of her elevation due to her commitment to marriage into the pasuk the gemara quotes "ki BOALAYICH osayich"? And to the tosefos in kesuvos 4a which uses this gemara in sanhedrin to explain why biah rishona is called b'elas mitzvah and the maharsha on this gemara in sanhedrin which (if I remember correctly) clearly explains her golem/unfinished status referring to her inability to conceive while a besulah?
      lesser unknown said...
      I quickly scanned through both the Toras Moshe and the Chasam Sofer on Chumash in the beginning of Miketz and in Vayichi, and I cant find the point you are trying to make. Can you give me a hint?
      LkwdGuy said...
      See Sotah 9b first rashi.
      Barzilai said...
      lkwdguy, I see. This needs to be in the post gufa, and that's where I put it. See the end of the post. Yasher koach for your laconic comment.
      Eli said...
      My appreciation to LkwdGuy's impressive Bekiuss notwithstanding, it should be noted that הנחש השיאני is with right-Shin while נישואין is left-Shin (i.e. sin). While pronunciation of both might be similar, depending on your family tradition, they belong to completely separate roots. נשא with a right-Shin means to seduce/incite, as in זדון לבך השיאך or השא השאת לעם הזה etc. Obviously not all occurrences of this root can be related to נישואין. Thus, it seems the midrash brought in Rashi Sotah (and Shabbos 146a too, also first in Daf(!))is a midrash based on the similarity in written form of both words, but should not be taken as an interpretation of the word נישואין itself.
      Barzilai said...
      Metzudas Tzion on Yeshaiya 9:4 explains 'sa'on' to mean the same as 'sha'on,' and again in Yeshaiya 10:13 saying that 'shoshati' means the same as shosati'. Besides Rav Hirsch's use of this tool, I believe that many rishonim use it as well. Though it could be that davka Yeshaiya was a Litvak from Shevet Efraim.
      Eli said...
      actually Yeshaiya 10:13 *says* Shosati (with Sin), but 9:4 is a case in point. Yet, as we find across Tanach more than ten places where נשא with Shin means one thing, completely different than the many meanings of נשא with Sin, I think it's unlikely to merge them together.
      Barzilai said...
      There are times, though, when you have to be careful to use the right letter. I remember thinking about the pitfalls of being a Litvak one Rosh Hashanna. ותגער בשטן לבל ישטינני

      Monday, March 08, 2010

      Vayakhel Pekudei. Reification and Incorporeality

      Previous Posts on Vayakhel/Pekudei:

      Lions and Corners


      The Latent Holiness of Human Love


      The Courage of Mussar and the Limits of Seichel.


      Knitting our Brows about Why King David Couldn't Build the Beis Hamikdash


      The Hidden Prophecy of the Destruction, and Rebuilding, of the Batei Mikdash

      In my discussion of the breaking of the Luchos, I used what Linguists call Hypostatization, or The Reification Fallacy.  Briefly, these terms refer to the human tendency to ascribe physical reality, or personality, to concepts or spiritual beliefs; viewing the abstract as if it were concrete.  This can range from the benign conceptualization, such as "Lady Liberty," or "Lady Luck," to straightforward Avoda Zara.  I applied the idea, lehavdil, to the letters of the Luchos.  When the Luchos were broken, the letters were said to be flying in the air.  There were no letters; the engraved stone surrounded and defined empty spaces in the shapes of letters, not physical letters.  Nonetheless, the letters assumed a reality such that even after the Luchos were broken, they floated in the air.  I just came across a Gemara/Rashi that mentions this point, in Sanhedrin 26b: 
      דבר אחר תושיה דברים של תוהו שהעולם משותת עליהם
       Rashi:

      דברים של תוהו. דיבור וקרייה בעלמא. וכל דיבור אין בו גשישה ממש, כתוהו הזה, ואעפ״כ עולם משותת עליהם. ונוטריקון הוא תי״ו תוהו שייה משותת:
      This week, I want to tell you about an irony involving this concept.

      We Jews, starting with Avraham Avinu, were the first to grasp that  G-d is incorporeal.  The idea that the Creator of the universe, the Source of all reality, is intangible and incorporeal, was a great leap forward in mankind's spiritual evolution.  Even now, and even among the Jews, many find such an ethereal notion challenging, and prefer an anthropomorphic visualization.  Indeed, nevi'im were often shown visions of a human form, which seems to have been necessary to enable them to experience a 'conversation.'  Still, no one (cf comments below) can dispute the assertion that we absolutely reject, we abhor, the natural mental propensity and emotional preference to attribute form to Hashem.  As the Rambam (3 Teshuva 7) says,
      חמשה הן הנקראים מינים... האומר שיש שם רבון אחד אבל שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה.... הוא מין
      and see, on this topic, the Or Zarua in Krias Shma #7. 

      It seems to me that hypostatization, which attributes physical form to the abstract, is incompatible (or, at least, incongruous) with the philosophical approach of the doctrine of incorporeality.  In that light, it is ironic to find instances of hypostatization in our Mesorah.   For example, the famous Menoras Hamaor, quoting a Medrash Tanchuma that he saw:


      בספר מנורת המאור (ה״ב סוף פ״ה נר גי כלל הי) מביא מעשה נורא בשם המדרש תנחומא, וז״ל: מעשה
      בחסיד אחד שהיה מתיחד במקום אחד והיה למד בו במסכת חגיגה, והיה מהפך בה ומהדרה כמה
      פעמים, עד שלמד אותה היטב והיתה שגורה בפיו ולא היה יודע מסכתא אחרת מן התלמוד והיה שוגה בה כל
      ימיו. כיון שנפטר מן העולם, היה בביתו לבדו ולא היה שום אדם יודע פטירתו. באה דמות אשה אחת ועמדה
      לפניו והרימה קולה בבכי ומספד ותרבה אנחתה וצעקתה, עד אשר נתקבצו ההמון ותאמר להם, ספדו לחסיד
      הזה וקברוהו וכבדו את ארונו ותזכו לחיי העולם הבא, שזה כבדני כל ימיו ולא הייתי עזובה ולא שכוחה. מיד
      נתקבצו כל הנשים וישבו עמה ועשו עליו מספד גדול ועצום והאנשים התעסקו בתכריכיו וכל צרכי קבורתו
      וקברו אותו בכבוד גדול. ואותה אשה בוכה וצועקת. אמרו לה, מה שמך, אמרה להם, חגיגה שמי. כיון שנקבר
      אותו חסיד נעלמה אותה האשה מן העין. מיד ידעו שמסכת חגיגה היתה, שנראית להם בצורת אשה ובאה
      בשעת פטירתו לספד לו ולבכותו ולקברו בכבוד, על שהיה שונה אותה תמיד ושוקד ללמד בה. והלא דברים
      קל וחומר, ומה חסיד זה שלא למד אלא מסכתא אחת בלבד, כך, הלומד תורה הרבה ומלמדה לאחרים
      ומעמיד תלמידים הרבה על אחת כמה וכמה.

      There was once a pious man who was secluded in a certain area and he studied Maseches Chagiga. He would study the Maseches over and over, until he learned it so well and he was so familiar with the Maseches. He did not know any other Maseches in the Talmud, and he would only study Maseches Chagiga. When he departed the world, he was alone and there was no one who knew of his passing. The apparition of a woman arrived and stood before him, and she raised her voice in wailing and eulogy. She moaned and cried so loud until a crowd gathered. She then told the people who had gathered, “Eulogize this pious man and bury him and show honor to his coffin and you will all merit the World to Come. The reason I ask you to do this is because he honored me his entire life and I was not forsaken and forgotten.” Immediately all the women came and sat with her and they made a great eulogy and the men took care of the deceased’s shrouds and all of his burial needs. They then buried him with great honor and the woman was wailing and crying. The people asked her, “What is your name?” She responded, “My name is Chagiga.” Subsequent to the man’s burial, the woman disappeared from view. Immediately the people understood that she was really Maseches Chagiga, who appeared in the image of a woman. She had appeared at the time of the man’s death so that he would be eulogized and cried over, and that he would receive an honorable burial. This was all due to the fact that he had constantly studied Maseches Chagiga and was diligent in studying it.

      (This Menoras Hamaor is also brought down in the Chafetz Chaim's Ma’amar Toras haBayis chapter 6 in the footnote.)

      We are giving human form to a masechta! And remember Brachos 47b, where there is a suggestion that two talmidei chachamim that vigorously discuss the halacha are counted as three for bentching- because their Torah counts as one towards the mezuman- אמר רבי אמי שנים ושבת מצטרפין אמר ליה רב נחמן ושבת גברא הוא אלא אמר רבי אמי שני תלמידי חכמים המחדדין זה את זה בהלכה מצטרפין 

      And this is not an isolated case.  Think about Shabbos: The Medrash in Breishis perek 11, echoed in Sanhedrin 58, says that Shabbos came before Hashem and said, "Every day of the week has a spouse, a pair, but I am the odd day, and I have no pair!  Hashem answered, Knesses Yisrael is your Ben Zug, as the passuk says, Zachor es Yom Hashabbos leKadsho (kiddushin)."  This idea is reflected in the Maharsha in Bava Kamma 32b, where he says that our Kiddush on Shabbos is like the Kiddushin of a Kallah (also in Nachlas Binyamin Mitzvah 31, who says that we say kiddush on a kos yayin, because it's like Birkas Eirusin.  Funny thing is that the Ritva in Kesuvos 8a that says we make Birkas Eirusin on a kos yayin because it's like kiddush on Shabbos.  You can't have it both ways, people!.)  Every week, we turn and greet Shabbos as if it were a queen, as if it were our bride.  It's not; it's a day of the week.  But we give it form and identity and personality.  We reify it, we hypostatisize it.

      Also regarding Shabbos- the Hafla'ah in his pirush on Chumash, the Panim Yafos, brings the Mechilta in Ki Sisa 31:16 that says two things.
      רבי אלעזר בן פרטא אומר כל המשמר את השבת כאלו עשה השבת שנאמר לעשות את השבת
      and "ne'esah shutaf im HKB"H be'ma'aseh Breishis."  And he brings Rashi in Breishis that after the first six days, the world was lacking menuchah, so HKB"H created Shabbos.  He says that from these places, you see that refraining from doing melacha on Shabbos is a ma'aseh asiyah, not a shlili.

      There are many more examples.  Let's see what turns up this week.

      In the first comment, Reb Micha Berger said:
      ...R' Yosef Caro's Maggid was an embodiment of the Mishnayos. Not the soul of their author, a mal'ach formed of the book itself.

      Micha's remark made me realize that the Rambam says that a malach is no more than Hashem's will given form, a condensation of the shlichus of Hashem.  That being said, it's similar to the Chazal that when we come to the final judgment, our mitzvos and aveiros will not just be listed; the mitzvos and aveiros themselves will come and testify.  Anything that has a shlichus, anything that has a tafkid, can be said to have a independent existence, an it-ness or a thing-ness. 
      If you have a better word than it-ness, I solicit your suggestions.

      Please note: the comments are more interesting than the post.  That's what I'm here for, to start fights.