Naso, Bamidbar 6:2. Narcissus and Nezirus

In the Greek myth, a young man, Narcissus, was punished by the gods for spurning someone's consuming romantic attraction (innamorato in the Greek version, innamorata in the Roman.)  He was guided to a pond and he looked into the water and saw his own reflection.  He was awed and entranced by his beauty, and because he could not possibly attain the object of his desire, he died of sorrow (or killed himself) as he gazed at his reflection.

In the Gemara (Nedarim 9b), we have the following story:

 אמר <רבי> שמעון הצדיק מימי לא אכלתי אשם נזיר טמא אלא אחד פעם אחת בא אדם אחד נזיר מן הדרום וראיתיו שהוא יפה עינים וטוב רואי וקווצותיו סדורות לו תלתלים אמרתי לו בני מה ראית להשחית את שערך זה הנאה אמר לי רועה הייתי לאבא בעירי הלכתי למלאות מים מן המעיין ונסתכלתי בבבואה שלי ופחז עלי יצרי ובקש לטורדני מן העולם אמרתי לו רשע למה אתה מתגאה בעולם שאינו שלך במי שהוא עתיד להיות רמה ותולעה העבודה שאגלחך לשמים מיד עמדתי ונשקתיו על ראשו אמרתי לו בני כמוך ירבו נוזרי נזירות בישראל עליך הכתוב אומר (במדבר ו) איש כי יפליא לנדור נדר נזיר להזיר לה' 

There was once a young man who saw his reflection in the water, and he realized how extraordinarily handsome he was.  His Yetzer Hara suddenly assaulted him and attempted to drive him away from this world.  He said "Villain!  Of what are you so proud in a world that is not yours, of a body that is fated to decompose into mold and vermin?  I swear by the Holy Worship of the Temple that I will shave you bald in service
of Heaven" and thus declared himself a Nazir.  The story of his nezirus was presented by Shimon the Kohen Gadol as the ideal, the paragon, of holy Nezirus.

Each of of these stories teaches us that vanity and excessive love of self is destructive.


If, after a little consideration, you still think the moral significance of the two stories harmonize, then, well, you need to work a little on your analytic skills.  Despite the superficial similarity, the subtexts of the two stories are diametrically opposed.

The most obvious difference is that in the Greek version, Narcissus' fate was sealed because he displeased the gods by spurning someone who loved, or lusted after, him, whereas in the story of the Nazir, he was innocently taking care of his father's sheep.  More importantly, the Greek version does not contemplate the option of aceticism in dealing with sensual urges; His selfish refusal to gratify his lovers' desire was punished by making him feel what his disconsolate lovers felt, and this sealed his doom.  In the story of the Nazir, the impulses engendered by his amazement at his beauty were countered by an awareness of the infantilism and self-destructiveness of those feelings, with the life-saving antidote of becoming a Nazir.  But most importantly, in the Greek story, the tragedy is the unwillingness to satisfy desire, and the punishment came through the creation of a desire that was impossible to satisfy.  In the Jewish story, satisfying desire would have been the tragedy, and the triumph was overcoming desire.

Naso, Bamidbar 6:23. Birkas Kohanim ברכת כהנים

Synopsis:
I
Machlokes whether a non-kohen may place both hands on the head of someone he is bentching.
This Machlokes follows from the opinions of Rashi and the Ramban in Parshas Shemini regarding the first time Aharon blessed the people, whether he used the language of Birkas Kohanim in Naso or some other nusach.

II
Whether Birkas Kohanim is De'oraysa or Derabanan in our time.
Why Birkas Kohanim is after Modim and why we say Ve'se'erav.

III
The concept of Birkas Kohanim following Avodas Korbanos and the extent to which tefilla is like a korban.

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I

There is a widespread minhag to bless children Friday night.  This minhag is brought in the siddur of Reb Yaakov Emden and in the siddur of the Gr'a.  In Rav Emden's siddur (section on ליל שבת), he says that one should place both hands on the child during the Bracha.  He says that those who believe that one should use only one hand are incorrect.  Or, as he puts it, ולא כחסירי דעת שחושבין שיש קפידא לברך דוקא ביד אחת.  (If you've ever read his Mor Uketzi'ah, you know that in matters of Halacha and Hashkafa, Rav Emden was not a model of tranquility, and "חסירי דעת" is, by his standards, mild.)  This opinion is also stated in the Pachad Yitzchak (Reb Yitzchak Lampronti, section on Brachos, page 54, who says that although some only use one hand, he uses both.  (He doesn't say that they are חסירי דעת.)

On the other hand, the Siddur Hagr'a (section on ליל שבת) says that the Gaon is quoted as having said that it is assur for anyone other than a Kohen to give a bracha with both hands.

The Torah Temima here also quotes the Gaon to this effect, and says that when the Vilner Posek Rav Landau got married, he got a bracha from the Gaon, who put one hand on him.  He asked the Gaon why one hand, and the Gaon said that we do not find a two handed bracha other than kohanim in the Mikdash.  Irrespective of your opinion on Rabbi Epstein's reliability, this particular story has been said by others with a significant difference.  There is a book of stories of gedolim called Ma'asei Ilfas by a man named Ilfas, published in Jerusalem in תש"א.  The book was published when the author was an elderly man, and he says (page 9) that he personally met the Vilner Dayan (who died in תרל"א  at 91), and he himself told him the story.  When he was a Chassan, he came in to the Gaon's house while the Gaon was eating kugel at the day meal of Shabbos, and the Gaon put out his hands to give him a bracha.  I am not making this up. The young rabbi Landau moved back, because he was afraid the Gaon would make his new Shtreimel greasy.  So the Gaon ended up putting only one hand on him and giving him the bracha.  Rabbi Landau said that his whole life he regretted the childish preference for a clean shtreimel over the Gaon's hand.

The stories in the Torah Temima and the Ma'aseh Ilfas cancel each other out.  But we do have the Siddur Hagr'a that validates the story of the Gaon's k'peida to use only one hand, and Reb Moshe once told me that the authors and editors of the Siddur Hagr'a were talmidei chachamim who took their work very seriously and can be trusted as to factual matters.

The basis for the Gaon's k'peida, one assumes, is the Gemara (Ksuvos 24b) that a non-Kohen that lifts his hands and says birkas Kohanim transgresses the mitzva of our parsha, namely, דַּבֵּר אֶל אַהֲרֹן וְאֶל בָּנָיו לֵאמֹר כֹּה תְבָרְכוּ אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל .  The passuk is telling us that only Aharon and his children can use this protocol of Bracha.

Exactly when the issur applies is well discussed: the Magen Avraham (beginning of OC 128) says it's only a problem when using the Sheim Hashem, either in a bracha of Levarech or in the words of the psukim of Birkas Kohanim (see Noda BeYehuda OC I:5).  The Ksav Sofer says the issur is only when intending to fulfill the Mitzva of Koh Sevarchu.  The Bach there says the issur is only when one raises his hands, which is consistent with the Gaon. 

I would say that the issue of whether you can use both hands when duchenning depends on Rashi/Ramban in Shmini, and the Mishneh Le'Melech.

In Parshas Shemini (Vayikra 9:22) it says that after inaugurating the Mizbei'ach, Aharon raised his hands and blessed the people-וַיִּשָּׂא אַהֲרֹן אֶת יָדָו אֶל הָעָם וַיְבָרְכֵם.  Rashi there says that (even though the parsha of Birkas Kohanim had not yet been taught) Aharon was inspired in his choice of words and he gave the blessing exactly as it was later taught in our parsha- Yevarech'echa Hashem Veyishme'recha....  The Ramban disagrees and says that Aharon's bracha was just a bracha, and we have no idea what the words of the bracha were, just as Shlomo Hamelech gave the people a bracha when the Beis Hamikdash was finished.  He says that the Bracha in our parsha was created only when Hashem taught it to Moshe.

The Mishneh Le'Melech brings this machlokes in Hilchos Tefilla (14:9).  He explains that although we learn many dinim of Birkas Kohanim from Parshas Shmini, this doesn't prove like Rashi.  The limudim are only because of a Gzeira Shava, and don't prove that the two brachos are identical.  The Ramban, therefore, learns that the bracha of Shmini was entirely different, and the Gzeira Shava only imports the circumstances of Shmini and applies them to the new parsha of Birkas Kohanim.  Rashi, on the other hand, holds that the two brachos are the same, and that we would know many dinim without a Gzeira Shava, because Shmini is also Birkas Kohanim.  According to Rashi, we only need the Gzeira Shava to teach us that you don't need to match the Bracha of Shmini exactly, that it doesn't have to be the Kohen Gadol on Rosh Chodesh. 

So: according to Rashi, Shemini's Vayisa Kapav is specifically and exclusively associated with Birkas Kohanim, and a non-kohen that uses both hands is doing something that is intended to be unique to Duchening.  According to the Ramban, on the other hand, the raised hands of Shemini are not a unique characteristic of duchenning, because Aharon wasn't duchenning when he raised his hands.  That action is appropriate to brachos in general.  When you give someone a bracha, you reach out to him, you want contact.  If so, there is no reason to think that "אֶל אַהֲרֹן וְאֶל בָּנָיו לֵאמֹר כֹּה  תְבָרְכוּ" precludes others from using both hands when they give a bracha.  Only those things that are uniquely associated with duchenning are prohibited to non-Kohanim.


II

The Gemara (Sotah 38a) uses the passuk in Shmini to tell us that Birkas Kohanim can only be done when the Kohen finishes an Avoda of Korbanos Tzibur.

Because of this, Reb Yaakov Emden (same place as above, and also in his Mor Uketziah 128) says that Birkas Kohanim in our time is Miderabanan.  Mid'oraysa, no Avodah means no Duchenning.   The Mishna Berura (Shaar Tziyun in 128) strongly disagrees and holds it is De'oraysa even now, but he does not address the question of Avoda.  Similarly, the Keren Ora there in Sota (D'H Ve'od) raises the question of avoda, and says that he would like to think that Birkas Kohanim is De'Rabanan now for lack of Avoda, but admits that it is clear that the Rambam and others hold it is De'Oraysa, as his brother, Reb Yaakov Karliner says in Teshuvos Mishkenos Yaakov OC 84.  So what do you do with Reb Yaakov Emden and the Keren Orah's question?

Although the Mishkenos Yaakov/Keren Ora brothers tie the issue of whether Birkas Kohanim is De’oraysa to the issue of whether Tefilla is De’oraysa, I don’t see that there is necessarily any correlation.  It would be more appropriate to relate this to the idea (Brachos 26b) that our tefilla is like Avodas Korbanos.  If so, then the Tefilla of the Chazan in Chazaras Hatefilla is Avodas Tzibur.  This might satisfy the prerequisite of Avodas Tzibur for Birkas Kohanim De'oraysa.  

With this we understand the nusach we use to introduce Birkas Kohanim on Yomtov- ותערב עליך עתירתינו כעולה וכקרבן.  The Gemara in Sotah says that the Kohanim must begin moving toward the platform during Re'tzei, because Re'tzei is the Bracha of Avodah, and Duchenning must follow Avodah.  (We delay the bracha until in middle of Hoda'ah, the Gemara says, because Avodah and Hoda'ah are essentially twins.)  The reason we says Ve'Seiareiv is to emphasize this connection:  We are asking that Hashem accept our tefilla as if it were a real Korban.  Now that we have brought our Korban Tzibur, we are allowed to proceed to the Duchenning.

I have to mention, though, that the Mishna Berura very strongly asserts that Duchening is d'oraysa bizman hazeh.  See the Shaar Tziun in 128, and also see Igros Moshe OC 5:20:23.


III

So the question remains, and this is where we were headed the whole time:
It seems that there is a machlokes here whether the rule of "tefilla=korbanos" satisfies Birkas Kohanim's prerequisite of avoda.  What is the basis of the machlokes?  What is the yesod of the machlokes?  I think that to answer this question we need to know WHY the prerequisite exists, and what it means, what it says about Birkas Kohanim and what it says about the Kohanim who are saying Birkas Kohanim.  And let's not forget the Mishneh Le'Melech.

TBC, maybe.  You really have everything you need to work out your own mehalach. 

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Naso, Bamidbar 5:12. Matnos Kehuna/Sota. Gifts and Family Dynamics

Brachos 63a: The Gemara asks, why is the pasuk stating that “ish es kodoshov lo yihiyeh,” ("to each man shall belong his tithes", which teaches that a farmer has the right to decide who will receive his tithes) next to the parsha of Sotah? The Gemara answers that the first pasuk has an additional homiletic meaning: If a person neglilgently retains his trumah and ma’asros in his house, if he doesn't distribute them to the kohanim with alacrity, in the end he will need to seek out a kohen to resolve his wife’s Sotah status.



Some years ago, the Rosh Yeshiva of Lomza in Petach Tikva, Rabbi Ozeir, was in my home, and he told me an excellent pshat in this smichus. It doesn’t mean that the dilatory husband is punished through his wife’s bad behavior. Such a thing is not possible--why would his wife’s behavior be influenced by his aveira? Instead, the Gemara is not introducing a new meaning into the pasuk: the Gemara is referring to the literal legal meaning of the first pasuk: that unlike tzedaka, which a person is obligated to give to the first poor man that asks for it, a person has a din of tovas hana’ah by matnos kehuna, as we learn from “lo yihiyeh”, and one may refuse to give his tithes to a kohen that requests it, and instead give all his tithes to the kohen with whom he has a special relationship. Why is this so? Why shouldn’t any kohen be able to demand that a homeowner tender whatever tithes he has in the house, just like a poor man can when asking for tzedaka? The answer is, that the Torah wants a person to establish a relationship with a talmid chochom, whom he sees as his rebbi. It is better that each person have ‘his kohen,' to whom he gives all his matanos. If, then a person is mafrish trumos and maisros, and he doesn’t give them to anyone, that shows that he doesn’t respect and love any kohanim, and that he has no such relationship to a rebbi. (The kohen was assumed to be the rebbi who is dedicated to limud and harbotzas torah--sifsei kohen yishmeru da’as.) "I should give it to him? Who is he?! When I find a Kohen that really knows how to learn, that deserves my respect, then I'll give it to him, but I don’t know anyone around here like that." If the head of the household lacks respect for talmidei chachomim, and doesn’t have a rebbi to whom he listens, his attitude will percolate through his family, and his wife and children will not have any respect for the local spiritual leaders. The madriega of yiras shomayim in his home will deteriorate to the point that his family will not have the strength to withstand the yetzer hora. Asei lecha Rav! If you don't, you'll have to find one to save you when your family life self-destructs.

This is a good time for each of us to think about whether we have a personal relationship with a Rav; whether it's a "mashpi'ah," or a Poseik, or your local Rabbi, or a Rosh Yeshiva, or anyone in in that category. When Chazal said "Asei lecha Rav" they did not mean that you should only choose someone who is like Moshe Rabbeinu. They want us to have someone to whom we feel we need to answer, someone whose opinion matters to us, someone to whom we always turn when we don't know what to do. I don't think this means that we need to abandon our free will. In life questions, sometimes, perhaps, we might ask for advice but choose a different path. But at least we need to have someone we ask, whom we respect, and to whom we bring our halacha questions. It is having the Rav, having the relationship, that is of the primary importance-- for our own good, as well as for the good of our family relationships.

Coincidentally, the Chasam Sofer says something here that dovetails with this. The Chasam Sofer says that we find that the Gemara in two places talks about things that can generate a good parnasah— aseir te’aser (Brochos 63a), giving tithes, and mechabeid ishto yoseir migufo, honoring your wife more than you honor yourself. The Gemara (Bava Metzia 59) says that you should be mechabdah yoser meigufo because the parnasah of the house comes in her zechus. So a person might say, instead of being zocheh to ashirus through tzedoka, he’ll do it through mechabda. He will buy her nice clothes and jewelry simply as a segulah to become wealthy. Buy her a platinum and diamond Hamsa! (That will not only make you rich, it will also protect you from an Ayin Hara!) The Chasam Sofer says that if he does this, he accomplishes nothing. Mechabdah only works if your motive is to be m’chabeid her. Simply draping her with jewelry as a segulah is not called m’chabdah. In fact, it might have a negative effect– people will be so attracted to her that she will be tempted to be mezaneh-- which leads to the parsha of Sotah. If, on the other hand, you actually are mechabdah because you respect and love her, the kavod she perceives in the gifts will strengthen the relationship.

Just as the level of your respect for talmidei chachamim influences your family’s attitude toward da’as Torah, and a haughty and egoistic perspective is self-destructive, and will rot your family’s middos from within, while humbly accepting the authority of Talmidei Chachamim will raise your respect from members of your family, so, too, your selfless respect for your wife– honoring her not because her status reflects upon you, but because she is an independent person worthy of your respect– ultimately reflects back upon you yourself.

These ideas share this element: One should not feel that his support of his Rebbi, or his spouse, demonstrates his largesse and benevolence. Supporting a Rebbi, and honoring one's spouse, is a lucky opportunity that you should be grateful for. The one who appears to be the patron needs to realize that he is, in truth, the beneficiary.

After posting this, someone wrote me that he disagreed with the dynamics of Rabbi Ozeir's vort. He said that he believed that a husband that lets his wife see that he follows a particular rabbi will be scorned by his wife: a wife needs to see that her husband is a manly man, a man who is capable of making his own decisions, not a unctuous nebach'el. In case his comment is marginally above being unworthy of notice, I would say that his comment is a symptom of two pathologies: self esteem and marital relationships.

Nasso, Bamidbar 6:5. Nezirus and the Path to Enlightenment

The Netziv here in his Haamek Davar explains that there are two different types of nezirus. There is a a nezirus which is intended to raise the level of kedusha; this Nezirus requires avoidance of a meis because ruach hakodesh is not shoreh in sadness, but only during simcha shel mitzvah. But there is another type of Nezirus, which is intended to help a person vanquish his Yetzer Hora. As Rashi says, a person that is exposed to wicked people should temporarily avoid worldly pleasures in order to overcome that negative influence. Why would such a Nazir have to avoid a meis? The Netziv answers that he, too, is trying to become a kodosh, and so he must also avoid things that interfere with ruach hakodesh. As Reb Yaakov Kaminecki writes in his Emes Le’Yakov in the beginning of Parshas Kedoshim, there was a time, long ago, that certain individuals accepted what was called "Chavrus," which entailed the avoidance of all types of Tumah, although there is no such requirement for a non-Cohen, and there is no evidence in the Torah that there is any benefit in doing so. He explains that for people who are on a certain level of kedusha, avoiding tumah is a part of the mitzvah of Kedoshim Tihyu.)

Evidently, the common man’s path to simple avoidance of the Yetzer Hara parallels the path to prophecy. Why is this so?

All men are capable of knowing truth, but very few consciously realize that truth. This is not merely because their yetzer hara pushes them into denial, but because their conscious mind simply cannot see it. This honest awareness is called an aspaklaria ha’me’ira. Aspaklaria is related to the Latin word Speculum, which means a mirror. This derives from Specere, which is "to see." Thus, Aspaklaria is the equivalent of a seeing glass, or a observation point. In the context of Ruach Hakodesh, the similarity between a window and a mirror is very important. A window, although transparent, can sometimes obscure the view and reflect the observer. This phenomenon is used in what we call "one way mirrors," usually very thin sheets of mylar. The person on the dark side can see the light side, while the person on the light side only sees his reflection. This is because these reflect half of the light and let half the light through. So the people on each side will see half the light from their side reflected, and half the light from the other side transmitted. Assigning numbers to the brightness, let us say that the bright light is 10 and the dim, 5. The person on the 5 side will see 2.5 reflected and 5 transmitted from the bright side. The 5 will obscure the 2.5, and he will see the transmitted image. The person on the 10 side will see 5 reflected and 2.5 transmitted, so he will only see his own reflection, the 2.5 being obscured by the 5.

An Aspaklaria is a glass and a mirror. If you see yourself, if you are a baal gaavah, if you believe that light and truth emanate from your own ideas and preconceptions, then you will not be able to see the light that is coming through. An anav, who does not focus on his own reflection, will see the image that is transmitted from the other side. This is the idea of nevua as seeing through an aspaklaria--if you are seeing yourself, you cannot benefit from the supernal light that reveals the truth. A clear view through the mirrored aspaklaria is the same as the clear vision of the nevi’im. See Rambam Hakdama to Pirkei Avos-Shemona Perakim- Perek 7, about the mechitza that iterferes with nevu’a. The effort and skill needed to attain it is the same, and the rarity of attaining that great goal is the same. Rational people, who realize that they can never see the future, delude themselves into thinking that they know what they really are. In fact, though, their preconception of what and who they are, their self-important belief that only what is empirically evident to their senses and mind is reliable, obscures the truth from them.

Sometimes, thanks to a good liberal education, a person does acquire some insight, and finds an interior so desolate and ugly, and the prospect for improvement so small, that the self-hate that arises expresses itself as hatred for others.

Thus, for a person to become a ben aliya, to change and do teshuva, he must be able to see inside himself with a true vision. This vision can only be attained through an effort that parallels that of a person who seeks ruach hakodesh. In both cases, they need to come to a point where, as Reb Meir Simcha says in Bamidbor 11:17, they have to come "ahd she’hachomer lo hoyo chotzeitz."