Kedoshim, and a Plan for a New Restaurant: FLAG Kosher

In consideration of the limits of internet attention spans, I have to make this clear from the beginning:

The Divrei Torah are valid, and the beginning and the end are serious, but the middle is written satirically, ironically.  The purpose of the post is to raise an important question, to highlight issues, and to stimulate intelligent and informed conversation.

On Pesach, our family discussed the marvelous products of food science available now- items that have no grain or kitnios but look and taste exactly like bread.  With a palette of various root starches and quinoa, and the use of chemicals and appliances that can make smoke into a brittle foam, making kosher for Pesach ersatz white bread and bagels and pizza is becoming practically quotidian.  The illusion improves every year; a friend told me that at one of the programs where kosher for Pesach beigels were offered, he saw a guest wash and say hamotzi on his shehakol bagel.

I was told that before Pesach, Rabbi Elefant was interviewed on a Jewish radio station in New York, and he said that one factor in the OU allowing quinoa was that quinoa is the only reasonable alternative to rice for making sushi, and if they couldn't make sushi, the caterers that run Pesach programs would lose a lot of money- ergo, hefsed meruba and the decision of the OU to be mattir.  It's easy to self-righteously say that such chametz replacements are inappropriate, and not in keeping with the spirit of the issur chametz.  But who among us doesn't have Shick's seven layer cake, or rainbow cookies?  They look like chametz too.  Our Mexican cleaning lady, who has gone through eighteen Pesachs with us, was shocked when she saw them.  But by now, we're all pretty used to them, and to other pseudo-foods, such as Bacos.

Instead of merely reacting instinctively, let's think about what issues may be relevant, and then decide whether the issues are problematic.

1.  Mar'is Ayin- it is assur to behave in a way where a reasonable observer might think you are doing a sin.
2.  Foods that the Torah prohibited are disgusting, and foods that mimic them ought to be equally disgusting to the Jewish sensibility.  Eating them diminishes our refinement, it makes us callous.
3.  If one eats what looks and tastes like a prohibited food, it weakens the psychological barrier and increases the likelihood he will eat real issurim.
4.  Issurei achila serve to create a vital psychological and social barrier between us and the gentiles, and without that barrier, our sense of separateness, our unique identity, will be attenuated.


Issue 1.  Mar'is Ayin.
Analysis:
The Gemara (Kerisus 21b) says that if you serve a container of fish blood, you must make it evident that it is not from an animal by floating some scales in it.  The Maharshal in Kol Habasar says that similarly, when you serve chicken in almond milk, as was the local minhag on Purim, you must have some blanched almonds in or near the milk so that nobody mistakes it for real milk.  The Rama in 87 argues with the Maharshal and says that this is only necessary by meat, not chicken, which is at worst an issur derabannan.  This is why some caterers put placards next to coffee whitener at a fleishikeh meal.

Even more lekulah, the Pri Chadash (there in YD 87 on the Rama) holds that we don't prohibit based on Maris Ayin beyond what we find explicitly prohibited in Chazal. True, many poskim disagree (such as Reb Moshe in the Igros OC 3:25 and the Maharik 115 and poskim brought in the Shaarei Teshuva OC 460:10,) but in any case, everyone agrees that all that matters is that people not make the mistake of thinking that what you're eating is treif.  The fact that it looks and tastes treif doesn't matter.  If everyone realizes that it is not really what it looks like, there is no problem of Mar'is Ayin.  This is why Pesach beigels and white bread, and soy bacon, and pepperoni and cheese pizzas, are all muttar.

Issue 2.  Foods that the Torah prohibited are disgusting, and foods that mimic them ought to be equally disgusting to the Jewish sensibility.  Eating them diminishes our refinement, it makes us callous.
Analysis:
Rashi in our Parsha brings from the Torah Kohanim the following:

 ואבדל אתכם מן העמים להיות לי

אם אתם מובדלים מהם הרי אתם שלי, ואם לאו הרי אתם של נבוכדנצר וחבריו 

רבי אלעזר בן עזריה אומר: מנין שלא יאמר אדם נפשי קצה בבשר חזיר, אי אפשי ללבוש כלאים, אבל יאמר אפשי, ומה      אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי  תלמוד לומר: ואבדיל אתכם מן העמים להיות לי, שתהא הבדלתכם מהם לשמי. פורש מן העבירה ומקבל עליו עול מלכות שמים

And I have distinguished you from the peoples, to be Mine:
If you are separated from them [through your observance of Torah], you will be Mine, but if not, you will belong to Nebuchadnezzar and his kind.
Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: How do we know that a person should not say, “I find pork disgusting,” or “It is impossible for me to wear kilayim,” but rather, one should say, “I indeed wish to, but what can I do-my Father in heaven has imposed these decrees upon me?” Because Scripture says here, “And I have distinguished you from the peoples, to be Mine”-your very distinction from the other peoples must be for My Name, separating yourself from transgression and accepting upon yourself the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven. — [Toras Kohanim 20:128]

The Toras Kohanim says that one should not say he is disgusted by pork, or kilayim.  Instead, he should say that they might be very enjoyable, but he refrains only because Hashem so commanded us.
If so, there is nothing wrong with saying you'd like to eat all these things that are assur, and if you can find a way that you can eat them without an issur, it is fine.
True, the Rambam says this only applies to chukim- מצוות שמעיות- and maybe bugs are different.  After all, we have Reb Yishmael (BM 62a) that says

דתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אמר הקב"ה אילמלא העליתי את ישראל ממצרים אלא בשביל דבר זה שאין מטמאין בשרצים דיי א"ל ומי נפיש אגרייהו טפי מרבית ומציצית וממשקלות א"ל אע"ג דלא נפיש אגרייהו טפי מאיסי למכלינהו

so maybe שרצים are inherently disgusting.  But at least Chazir is clearly in the "assur but desirable" column.
What about blood?  The Seforno puts blood in the desirable column, too.  From Devarim 12:25-

רק חזק לבלתי אכל הדם - - לא תאכלנו למען ייטב לך ולבניך אחריך כי תעשה הישר בעיני ה׳. - - וכאשר תמנע מלאכול לא יהיה זה כמואס בו, אבל כדי שתעשה הישר בעיני ה׳, כאמרם ז״ל אל יאמר אדם קצה נפשי בבשר אסור אבל יאמר איפשי ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי

Issue 3.  If one gets used to eating what looks and tastes like it's assur, it weakens the psychological barrier and increases the likelihood he will eat real issurim.
Analysis:
We have what I call the Shibuta rule.  The Gemara in Chulin 109 brings a conversation between Yalta and her husband, Rav Nachman, which teaches that everything that for everything that is assur there is an equivalent that is muttar..

אמרה ליה ילתא לרב נחמן מכדי כל דאסר לן רחמנא, שרא לן כוותיה. אסר לן דמא- שרא לן כבדא. נדה- דם טוהר. חלב בהמה- חלב חיה. חזיר- מוחא דשיבוטא. גירותא- לישנא דכוורא. אשת איש- גרושה בחיי בעלה. אשת אח- יבמה. כותית יפת תאר. בעינן למיכל בשרא בחלבא! אמר להו רב נחמן לטבחי זויקו לה כחלי

It appears that Rav Nachman wasn't worried about getting used to eating things that taste assur.  She was curious what bassar b'chalav tasted like, and he didn't reprimand her.  He simply got some K'chal for her to eat.  (Or it just wasn't smart to get into an argument with her; see Brachos 51b, and Tosfos Beitza 25b DH שאני ילתא.  Also, she was the daughter of the Reish Gelusa.)
Anyway, that is everyone's complaint about making an Eiruv.  Kids will grow up carrying on Shabbos, and they'll never learn to be careful, and they'll end up carrying without an eiruv.  This concern never stopped anyone from building an eiruv.  It's just געבורטשעט.
Also, let's remember that the Gemara in Kerisus we brought above in Issue 1 says it's muttar to consume a container of fish blood, so long as the mar'is ayin problem is removed, and nowhere does anyone say that one should avoid it for reasons of mussar.

Issue 4.  Issurei achila serve to create a vital psychological and social barrier between us and the gentiles, and without that barrier, our sense of separateness, our unique identity, will be attenuated.
Analysis:
I want to point out that precisely in the Rashi that says how important it is to be culturally separated from the Gentiles, Rashi brings the Toras Kohanim about liking Chazir and only not eating it because of Hashem's commandment.

ואבדל אתכם מן העמים להיות לי  אם אתם מובדלים מהם הרי אתם שלי, ואם לאו הרי אתם של נבוכדנצר וחבריו. 

It appears that the הבדלה is that we keep Hashem's mitzvos.  There is no spirit of the law other than being faithful to Hashem's commandments.  Kosher is kosher, and the only barrier that matters is keeping the Mitzvos.

Conclusion:
There does not seem to be any problem at all eating things that look and taste like they are assur, so long as what's going on is clear and there is no mar'is ayin issue.  The Gemara in Kerisus says there's no problem serving a container of fish blood; Rav Nachman gave Yalta udder meat to satisfy her desire to taste basar b'chalav.

Application:
What we need now is a practical and profitable application of this concept.  We need a restaurant that is dedicated to providing the Treif experience to Orthodox Jews.  Imagine a menu that offers pepperoni pizza, pork chops, cheeseburgers, shrimp or lobster salad, clam soup, bouillabaisse with all different kinds of mieseh shrotzim, bagels and white bread on Pesach... the list of chazerai is endless.

• We could add the half-raw Tartimar Tartare Burger, served with Italian wine- a nice citrusy Trebbiano Toscano.  This would be large enough to satisfy the weight requirement of the half-raw meat (a tartimar) that makes a person a Ben Sorer U'Moreh.  The din of Ben Soreir u"Moreh, of course, only applies if the person who eats it is thirteen years old, and he bought the meat with money he stole from his father.  For everyone else, being a zolel v'sovei is not a problem.  And the truth is that a Tarteimar of meat is really not that much- not more than nine or ten ounces of meat as served.

• If members of the wait staff are married women, we would have them wear Sheitlach that are indistinguishable from natural hair.

• During sefira, glatt kosher a cappella sefirah music will be played.

A good business plan needs a name.  What shall we call this restaurant?  (Dr. Nachum calls it a bistro.  Maybe he's right- It's more of a tapas thing than a formal sit down.)

Here are some thoughts.

1.  Naval, subtitled Birshus HaTorah.  If we go with Naval, the accent should be on the Val, to make it sound French.  Nah-Val'.  Maybe NaValle, in cursive script.
2.  HaKol Be'Ha'arama Nishma.
3.  Kosher Triple Treif.
4.  Mar'is Ayin.
5.  Abizraihu (אביזרייהו).
6.  Reshock.  (That's Kosher, backwards.)
7.  My favorite-  FLAG Kosher.  FLAG stands for Fress Like A Goy.

Based on his introduction to our parsha, I guess the Ramban would not eat at our restaurant.  You have to be realistic about your demographic.  But even the Ramban would agree that it's kosher.  He might even give the hashgacha.

UPDATE:
Someone told me that I'm thinking too small.  An idea like this shouldn't be limited to a restaurant- it should be a line of food that specializes in imitation maachalos assuros, festooned with hechsheirim.  (To add to the kashrus standard, it will not have a sell-by date, and it will have a little trans-fat, because what do the doctors know.)  FLAG Kosher- Coming soon to your local grocery store!

 But we can still have a restaurant.  We will call the restaurant The FLAGship.

This is a real opportunity.  As H. L. Mencken (not related to Rabbi Yaakov) is quoted as having said, "Nobody ever went broke underestimating the taste of the American public."


Because there might be someone out there there are definitely people out there that doesn't don't do well with sarcasm, I need to point out that this is not a serious suggestion.  It is a mixture of sophistry and irony, a culinary innovation in the spirit of Swift's Modest Proposal.  Despite the manner of presentation, the question of where to draw the line is truly serious and complicated, and there is no definitive right or wrong, just as קדושים תהיו has no bright line definition.  It is a question that every individual has to answer for himself and his family.

There are a few more points that ought to be added.

Nobody wants to eat imitation poisonous or rotten or malodorous food.   The fear and revulsion caused by the real thing results in a similar revulsion at an imitation.  Many people feel that treif food is repugnant.  After all, Chazal say that מאכלות אסורות cause טמטום הלב, and if they cause טמטום הלב, if eating them is so injurious to the soul, then one ought to be repelled by even looking at them or anything that looks like them.   However, as we have discussed long ago, טמטום הלב is not at all simple.  Although many say that it comes from the nature of the treif food, many others (Reb Moshe and the Briskers) say that it is a result of the issur, not the nature of the food.  If it's muttar, it's not מטמטם את הלב.  If it's just the issur and not the nature of the food, food that looks like treifus should not be repulsive.

Furthermore, one might say that the Toras Kohanim brought in Rashi above teaches a tremendous lesson: when the Torah prohibits a food, it is not that the food is horrible.  The food is fine, but we won't eat it because we listen to the Ribono shel Olam, we are disciplined, not superstitious.  So now, here's an experiment.  Two people are faced with some tremendous yeitzer hara, and the yeitzer hara is very attractive and seductive, refined, intelligent, and perfumed- think about what Yosef HaTzadik faced.  Both people are kadosh and tahor.  One person's life-long scrupulous avoidance of issurei achila reflects a visceral disgust of issurim.  The other person was equally scrupulous, but he always felt that issurim are attractive and enjoyable, but he avoided them because the Ribono shel Olam told him to stay away from them.  Now they are both faced with a dvar issur that is a supreme physical and mental pleasure.  Which one of them is more likely to overcome his yeitzer hara?

But you have to wonder.  I think that the only attraction of these ersatz issurim is the thrill of the illicit.  If a person is happy and proud to be a member of the Mamleches Kohanim, why would he have even be interested in tasting things that are assur?  If you're happy in your marriage, why are you even thinking about other women?  What is the thrill in experiencing what Gentiles experience?  Are there not enough kosher foods that we can eat that we need to duplicate things that are assur because of the thrill?  Is this another case of והאספסוף אשר בקרבו התאוו תאוה?  Wanting to eat these things may not be a problem, but it may be a symptom of a problem.

There is something to be said for לא שינו את שמם/לשונם/מלבושם, even regarding things that are muttar, simply because of the cultural barrier.   Rabbi Yissochor Frand came across a most remarkable validation of this concept, as follows:

The following is excerpted from a column by the rabbi of a Reform congregation in Miami, Florida:
"We think that intermarriage leads to assimilation, but it is the other way around. We marry people like ourselves. The average middle-class Jew is as different from the average middle class Gentile as your average Hutu is different from your average Tutsi. I know Rabbis aren't supposed to say things like this. We are supposed to fight assimilation tooth and nail. But to be honest I am about as assimilated as you can get. Put me in a lineup of the average middle class goy [sic] and the only way you could tell us apart is to play a Jackie Mason tape and see who laughs. The truth is our kids don't intermarry. They marry people just like themselves. People who eat stone crabs marry people who eat stone crabs."
The rabbi has it exactly right. People are not intermarrying. They are marrying people exactly like themselves. The reason why a strictly religious person would not contemplate marrying a non-Jew (or vice-versa) is because they are so different. Those who follow the Rabbis' safeguards live in an environment nearly as different from that of the average middle class American non-Jew, as either of those environments are different from that of the average Tutsi. The cross-cultural divide is too great. The groups are too different from each other, so they do not intermarry. It would be like marrying someone from a different planet. But if someone eats like them and talks like them and dresses like them, then it is not intermarriage at all. It is marrying within one's own kind.

As the Ramban says, there is a spectrum from Halacha to Mussar, but it is a mistake to think that Mussar is less important than halacha.  Sometimes, an act can have a  small onesh but can cause terrible spiritual damage.  And finally, even if you have a great deal of knowledge of Torah, there's no substitute for seichel hayashar.

Kedoshim, Vayikra 19:17. The Mitzva of Rebuke- הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך

Chazal (Arachin 16b, Berachos 31a) teach us that the passuk (19:17) הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך ולא תישא עליו חטא obligates each and every one of us to rebuke one who sinned or did wrong (see Rambam 6 Dei'os 6-7: כשיחטא איש לאיש לא ישטמנו וישתוק כמו שנאמר ברשעים ולא דבר אבשלום את אמנון מאומה למרע ועד טוב כי שנא אבשלום את אמנון. אלא מצוה עליו להודיעו ולומר לו למה עשית לי כך וכך ולמה חטאת לי בדבר פלוני. שנאמר הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך. ואם חזר ובקש ממנו למחול לו צריך למחול. ולא יהא המוחל אכזרי שנאמר ויתפלל אברהם אל האלהים: הרואה חבירו שחטא או שהלך בדרך לא טובה מצוה להחזירו למוטב ולהודיעו שהוא חוטא על עצמו במעשיו הרעים שנאמר הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך.)  This obligation is not limited to teachers, or spiritual leaders, or parents- it is incumbent upon every single person, man or woman.  Of course, there are limits- just as it is a mitzva to admonish a person who might take your words to heart, so, too, it is a mitzva to be silent when you know for a fact that the other will disregard what you are saying (Yevamos 65b- ואמר רבי אילעא משום ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון כשם שמצוה על אדם לומר דבר הנשמע כך מצוה על אדם שלא לומר דבר שאינו נשמע רבי אבא אומר חובה שנאמר (משלי ט) אל תוכח לץ פן ישנאך הוכח לחכם ויאהבך) , and one may not publicly shame the other person (Eirchin 16b, תוכיח מכל מקום יכול אפי' משתנים פניו ת"ל לא תשא עליו חטא).

I saw that the Tallelei Oros brings from Reb Yerucham in the דעת חכמה ומוסר that the mitzva of Hochacha is primarily one of explaining, demonstrating, showing the other that what he did was wrong.  It is not limited to preventing him from doing wrong in the future.  He proves this from the story of Yonasan's reproof of his father Shaul for his hatred of David.  I wasn't so nispa'eil from that proof, but not having seen it in the דעת חכמה ומוסר I don't know what else he says there.

But later I realized that he has to be right.  We already know that there is a din of Arvus/Areivus, that makes us liable for the sins of others that we might have prevented- the failure to prevent or to protest creates a dinei shamayim liability similar to aiding and abetting in dinei adam.  We learn this from the passuk in Devarim 29:28 that says הנסתרות לה' אלוקינו והנגלות לנו ולבנינו עד עולם.  What does our passuk of Tochacha add to the general din of Arvus?  It must be that Arvus only requires our intervention to prevent future aveiros, while the din of Tochacha adds an obligation to help our friends see that what they did in the past was wrong, even when there is no reason to think they will repeat that action.


Our Parsha also contains the passuk (19:32)  מפני שיבה תקום והדרת פני זקן ויראת מאלהיך אני יה, which is the source of our mitzva to show honor to Talmidei Chachamim.  A few days ago, two members of our community came over to me and expressed surprise about a story in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 84b) regarding Rebbi Elazar B'Rebbi Shimon:

 כי הוה קא ניחא נפשיה אמר לה לדביתהו ידענא בדרבנן דרתיחי עלי ולא מיעסקי בי שפיר אוגנין בעיליתאי ולא תידחלין מינאי א"ר שמואל בר נחמני אישתעיא לי אימיה דרבי יונתן דאישתעיא לה דביתהו דרבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון לא פחות מתמני סרי ולא טפי מעשרין ותרין שנין אוגניתיה בעיליתא כי הוה סליקנא מעיננא ליה במזייה כי הוה משתמטא ביניתא מיניה הוה אתי דמא יומא חד חזאי ריחשא דקא נפיק מאוניה חלש דעתאי איתחזי לי בחלמא אמר לי לא מידי הוא יומא חד שמעי בזילותא דצורבא מרבנן ולא מחאי כדבעי לי 

(...."Rebbi Elazar, anticipating his death, left instructions that he not be buried but rather that his body be placed in the attic of his house..  his body lay there for twenty two years... someone saw a worm leaving his ear and he became very upset, because the bodies of tzadikim are not subject to decay.  Reb Elazar appeared to him in a dream and explained that this was a specific punishment for having overheard someone denigrating a talmid chacham and not protesting as vociferously as he should have.")
The story in Bava Metzia is echoed in Rashi in Sanhedrin 44b, who says the following:

מעשה במוכס אחד ישראל רשע אחד שמת ובו ביום מת אדם גדול בעיר ובאו כל בני העיר ונתעסקו במטתו וקרובי אותו מוכס הוציאו גם את מטת המוכס אחריו וקפצו עליהם אויבים והניחו המטות וברחו והיה שם תלמיד אחד שישב לו עם מטת רבו לאחר זמן חזרו גדולי העיר לקבור את החכם ונתחלפ' להם מטתו בשל מוכס והיה אותו תלמיד צועק ולא הועיל וקרובי המוכס קברו את החכם ונצטער בה אותו תלמיד מאד מה חטא גרם ליקבר זה בבזיון ומה זכה אותו רשע ליקבר בכבוד גדול כזה. נראה לו רבו בחלום ואמר לו אל תצטער בא ואראך בכבודי בגן עדן בכבוד גדול ובא ואראך אותו האיש בגיהנם וציר של פתח גיהנם סובב באזניו אבל פעם אחת שמעתי בגנות תלמידי חכמים ולא מחיתי ולכך נענשתי וזה פעם אחת הכין סעודה לשר העיר ולא בא שר העיר וחילקה לעניים וזה היה שכרו

(A wicked man died on the same day as a righteous man.  All the townspeople involved themselves in the funeral of the righteous man, and the wicked man's relatives made a funeral for him as well.  As the two funerals proceeded, they were accosted by thieves and ran away, and by the time they returned, they confused the two coffins.  Only a student of the righteous man realized what had happened, but his cries and pleading were ignored, and the crook received great honor, while the tzadik was thrown into a hole.  His rebbi appeared to him in a dream and explained that this was his punishment for not protesting when someone derided a talmid chacham, while the rasha once gave a meal that would otherwise have gone to waste to the poor.)
They were wondering why a bystander would be obligated to mix in to someone else's conversation.  

I think it is clear that there are three dinim that obligate us to mix into other people's business and protest their disparagement of a Talmid Chacham:  

• We are obligated to honor Talmidei Chachamim.  The Gemara tells us that the honor of a Talmid Chacham is comparable to Kvod Shamayim, and the Gemara in Nedarim 7b says  אמר רב חנין אמר רב השומע הזכרת השם מפי חבירו צריך לנדותו ואם לא נידהו הוא עצמו יהא בנידוי- one who hears another say Hashem's name in vain is obligated to excommunicate the malefactor, and if he does not, he himself ought to be in Cherem; the positive requirement to honor Hashem demands that you stand up for Kvod Shamayinm.  Silence, indifference itself, is inherently disrespectful and transgresses the mitzva.  I assume the same applies to Kibbud Av V'Eim and to Mora Mikdash; 
• the din of Arvus, which creates a parallel between a failure to prevent or protest and participation, 
• and our parsha's din that we may not stand silent when we hear about or see the transgression of any issur.

Kedoshim, Vayikra 19:15. Lo Sisa P'nei Dal- Do Not Favor the Poor in Litigation

The Torah teaches that out of court, give charity, lend money to bad prospects, leave gleanings for the poor. But in court, we cannot favor the poor. If a nasty old scrooge of a rich man claims that a poor man owes him some trivial sum for having made some innocent error, we judge the case by the book and pasken just as we would if the parties were reversed. Rashi here-- You should NOT say "He is poor, and the rich man is duty bound to support him...I should find in favor of the poor man so he will receive his due with self respect."

Outside of court, we are personally and communally obligated to support the poor and downtrodden. But in the courtroom, within the parameters of legal analysis and court judgment, we may never take into consideration who the parties are. In the courtroom, the letter of the law is all that matters. So the rule is as clear as day, right? Wrong #1.

The Bach in CM 12 (4), at the end, arguing on the Beis Yosef and the Rosh, cites the Mordechai and paskens the following:
"And so all Jewish courts are noheig, to force the rich man to do what is proper and right even if the law is not so."
Please go and see the Bach inside. It's fascinating.

This seems to be directly contrary to what we assume to be pshat in our passuk. Even if you say the Bach is talking about pshara (that would be Wrong #2; he's talking about Din Torah,) what difference does that make? They came to a Beis Din for din of some sort, not to be told to give tzedakah. And if you say that the court paskens by the book, but separately forces the rich man to waive his claim, that would be Wrong #3. Look at the Bach inside and his rayah from the Gemara in Ha'umnin.

Talk to dayanim, and they'll tell you that nobody does like the Bach. Talk to people who have lost in a Din Torah, they'll tell you that the Dayanim do exactly the opposite of the Bach. Wrongs #4 and #5. But I'm really not interested in what Batei Din do or don't do. I just want to understand how the Bach understood the passuk in Parshas Kedoshim.

Asceticism

What do Chazal say about asceticism? Do they encourage or discourage prishus? The answer, as usual, is, Yes, they do. Chazal say many things on the topic of Prishus that appear contradictory, because they wanted us not to just lean back in our La-Z-Boys and read some half-baked, populist, pre-digested pamphlet about hashkafa, but instead that we spend serious time and effort investigating what underlying ideas inform our Hashkafa.

If you are hoping for a simple, satisfying, and two dimensional pshat that you can say over at a shmorg, I can't help you. Having said that, I offer some thoughts about Prishus, Asceticism in our Mesorah.

Chazal say (Brachos 7b) "gadol shimusha shel Torah yoser mi'limuda," personal association with rabbeim is greater than study." This dictum, while universally applicable, is absolutely fundamental to understanding matters of Hashkafa. Learning hashkafa only from books is certainly problematic, often futile, and occasionally dangerous. My approach is colored by my experience with the Gedolim with whom I have had a personal association sufficiently close as to give me some insight into their hashkafas hachaim. Whether I am transmitting that light faithfully, or polarizing or filtering it, is a question I certainly cannot answer.

http://havolim.blogspot.com/2007/04/kedoshim-vayikra-192-kedoshim-tihyu.html


http://havolim.blogspot.com/2008/05/kedoshim-vayikra-192-kedoshim-tihiyu.html
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Kedoshim, Vayikra 19:2. Kedoshim Tihiyu and the Blessing on Trees

The confluence of Parshas Kedoshim and Springtime, the month of Nissan, highlights an interesting idea. Rashi in the beginning of the parsha says Kedoshim Tihyu– Perushim tihyu, holiness means abstinence from illicit pleasures. According to Rashi, Kedoshim Tihyu does not introduce any new obligation or prohibition; it only reinforces our standing obligation to observe the mitzvos of the Torah. The Ramban, on the other hand, sees it as a new admonition. According to him, it is a moral directive to abstain from physical pleasures. Kadeish Atzmecha Bemuttar Lecha: Even those things that are not prohibited by the laws of the Torah should be avoided; purposeless pleasure runs contrary to Kedusha.

In the month of Aviv/Nissan, we make a bracha on blossoming fruit trees. (See video link at bottom.) In this bracha we praise Hashem for His gift of Beauty to mankind, for creating beautiful things in the world so that we will have pleasure from them. But is this not inconsistent with the Ramban? How does enjoying the trees of Spring enhance our holiness? And if it can't enhance our kedusha, are we not told to avoid it? Aren’t we instructed to aspire to an ascetic life of pure spirituality, in which worldly pleasures are no more than attractive nuisances?

And what about the Mishna in the Avos 3:9; hamafsik mimishnaso ve’omeir mah no’eh ilon zeh...ke’ilu mischayeiv benafsho. How is this consistent with the bracha on ilanos? Doesn’t this Mishna imply that indulgence in esthetic enjoyment is sinful, and inherently inconsistent with Torah? Is it a sin to have pleasure from the beauty of the trees, or is it a good thing?

And what about Shimon Hakapar's famous dictum that the Nazir is a chotei, a sinner, for inflicting suffering upon himself by voluntarily prohibiting the enjoyment of wine? That he is a sinner for rejecting the good that God has created in the world, that he is doing damage to his soul by being a Porush? How can this be? He is not a chotei! He is being mekayeim the mitzvah of Kedoshim Tihyu!

The Chasam Sofer shows us how to answer these questions.

The Chasam Sofer here says: Our idea of kedusha is not rejection of the beauty and pleasures of the world. We do not deny what the world has to offer; on the contrary. We appreciate all the world has to offer, even the things the Torah forbade. As Rashi brings from Reb Elozor ben Azariah on the passuk later (20:26) Va’avdil eschem min ha’amim lihyos li, we do not say that chazir is disgusting; it must be very tasty , but we abstain from it because of God’s command. We are prushim not because we despise gashmius, but instead because we want to be daveik to kedusha, and kedusha grows from prishus and mitzvos. But even in prishus, we must not withdraw from society; our prishus is be’hakheil, while fully involved with others, because intimate association with Klal Yisroel potentiates kedusha. And even in prishus, we do find ways to enjoy the world, as we see in the bracha of flowering trees. But we do so only in ways that enhance our pursuit of kedusha.

Prishus is not a tachlis. Prishus is a tool that reminds us of the danger of making hana’as olam hazeh into a tachlis. If you make it a tachlis, you will inevitably ruin yourself. But if you learn prishus, you will be able to train yourself to make a life of kedusha in which hana’os olam hazeh are not only not a distraction, but which can even enhance your kedusha.

Same with Nezirus. The gemara calls him a chotei for being a porush. The Gemara on 2b says, how can a Nazir be called “na’eh,” beautiful, when being a Nazir is an Aveirah! What’s that supposed to mean? What happened to Kedoshim Tihyu? The answer is that Prishus is a mitzvah, and it is an aveirah, and it is worthless, and it is priceless. The good Prishus is not intended to denigrate olam hazeh. Prishus is necessary to remind us of our priorities. Sometimes, as the Rambam says in Dei’os, a person has to become a porush gomur for a while. As Tosfos says there in Nazir 2b, yes, prishus is a sin, but the mitzvah is greater than the sin; when there is no alternative, an asei is docheh a lo sa’aseh. But the real hope is that he will then be able to return to a temperate life that will fully engage the world and its beauty and pleasure– but only to that degree that it is not mafsik his mishneh.

A perfect example of this concept is our minhag of Yom Kippur. At Maariv after Kol Nidrei, when we are full from our pre-Yom Kippur Seudos, when we have eaten more then usual because of the Mitzva of eating on erev Yom Kippur, we say Baruch Sheim out loud, like Malachim. But after Ne'ilah, having spent twenty six hours fasting and praying, we say Baruch Sheim quietly. But aren't we so much more like angels after Ne'ilah? The answer is that being angelic has nothing to do with whether we have food in our stomachs or whether we are hungry. It depends on what dominates our minds, what how we plan to comport ourselves, it has to do with what is the dominant thought in our minds. Erev Yom Kippur, we are excited and nervous about spending the next day in focused avodas hashem. That is a Malach, even if his stomach is full. Motza'ei Yom Kipppur, we're thinking about where our car keys are and whether the rov and the shliach tzibbur, those anti-semites, are going to kvetch through krias shma and shmoneh esrei. That is not a Malach, even if his stomach is empty.

As I've remarked before, the position of asceticism in Jewish hashkafa is very complex; the Lubavitcher Rebbe's doctors have said that he would pour salt over his food so that he would derive no pleasure from it; the Satmerer Rov did not sleep in a bed, but napped in a chair, for most of his life. On the other hand, other gedolim lived a life that, while thoroughly examined and disciplined, did not eschew the simple pleasures of life. Prishus is not only very complex, but it is also a very personal choice, and is certainly not a lifestyle which the average person should embrace. The Gemara teaches us the remarkable lesson that Prishus, although it is a mitzvah, that it can help a person become a kadosh, it can also be sinful and even destructive. Anytime the same act can variously be meritorious and sinful, one must tread carefully. But I think that the Chasam Sofer's careful and nuanced approach is true le'chol hadei'os and for all people.

Here is an engaging video of two gentlemen making the Bracha on Blossoming Trees. I am not responsible for the contents, not for the F16 and particularly especially not the Kabbalah.

Birkas Ha'ilanos

Juvenal Behavior: Matzah and Circuses

Excess is not foreign to modern American Jewry. The prickling sense of shame that would naturally mitigate this dissipate and vulgar profligacy has been supplanted by a brazen, even militant, attitude of entitlement: I work like a dog all year, I’m entitled to enjoy myself for a week; it’s for oneg yomtov; it’s for my daughter’s wedding; my pride in outdoing the neighbors is my greatest motivator, and so on. This is unattractive behavior, and it doesn’t contribute to spiritual growth.

Now, I know that when that old Roman satirist, Juvenal, wrote "duas tantum res anxius optat-- panem et circenses," (the people) anxiously await only two things, bread and circuses, he was referring to the decline in vigor and courage and self reliance and pride that accompanied such indulgence, and this obviously does not apply to us.  Also, he said "panem," bread, not 'matzah,' and we are makpid on gebrokst, to say nothing of panem. Still, one might profitably spend a few moments, as we look to the Ramban's lesson of temperance that begins Parshas Kedoshim, considering whether virtue is comprised exclusively of observing mandates, or perhaps also of choosing wisely.

This post will be, I think, deleted after a few days. I believe that with the onset of Nissan, there are two special dates, although they are not marked on most people's calendars. One is what I call the Chag HaHamasa. Some people call it Chag HaHafshara.  On, or about, Rosh Chodesh Nissan, the freezer magically opens its doors, and wonderful hidden treats become available. This is when the Baalas Habayis empties out the freezer because Pesach is around the corner, and starts to serve the jelly cookies, kreplach, and helzlach that she hid during the year (in case "mentchen" came and she needed to serve them something special.) This is Chag Hahamasa-- the Defrosting Holiday. The other is the Chag HaBoser, the Month of Sour Grapes, which begins right after Purim. This is the season when people start stressing about the work and expense of Pesach, and look next door and see that their neighbor is out shopping for sandals to wear at the resort they're flying off to for Pesach. Suddenly, they develop a full blown sense of Puritan glower, and decry the wastefulness and immodesty that characterizes "some people's" holiday plans.  So, maybe if I were going to Acapulco I would have an entirely different perspective.

In my case, my baruch hashem fruitful progeny require my presence, so attending an organized program is not an option. But I know how dangerous the Chag Haboser syndrome can be, and how it can makes fools of us all. I have a neighbor whose son was in shiduchim, and we asked his mother if he would be interested in a relative of ours, and she answered I can't even think about it, we have a long list, and it wouldn't be fair, etc. Two months later: not ten years, or one year, but two months later, she came moaning to us that her daughter has such trouble finding a shidduch, "every good boy has lists. Lists!" she said, "The injustice! Why should 'Lists' matter in such important things like shiduchim!" Our neighbor was not kidding. There wasn't a trace of an ironic smile on her face. She honestly couldn't associate her attitude on the 'girl' side of the fence with her attitude when she was on the 'boy' side of the fence. Apparently, an element of this syndrome is unwittingly making an

fool of yourself. I can't say that I'm immune to this problem. Envy and honest self-awareness are antagonists. So, just in case this post was influenced by the Chag Haboser, I am making this post temporary.

Addendum 4/28/08:
Out of respect for the kind comments, I am going to leave this as it is. Anyway, I don't have the heart to delete the eizel.

Kedoshim, Vayikra 19:2. Kedoshim Tihyu. Asceticism in Jewish Thought.

What is the place of Asceticism in Judaism? The reflexive answer most Jews would give is that Judaism does not approve of asceticism; we do not believe in celibacy, we celebrate holidays with feast and song, we begin Shabbos and YomTov with a toast over a glass of wine. Indeed, Rashi’s explanation of Kedoshim Tihyu is that we should stay away from arayos that the Torah prohibited, as enumerated in the end of the previous parshah, implying that Kedusha comprises avoidance of the enumerated issurim and no more. However, the Ramban seems to advocate a much broader and restrictive approach.

The Ramban here, in his famous “naval birshus hatorah” drasha, condemns the pursuit of physical pleasure. According to the Ramban, then, why does the Gemora say that a Nazir is a chotei? It would seem that according to the Ramban, a Nazir is the opposite of a chotei; he is to be commended for abandoning worldly pleasures! In fact, the Ramban answers this question. The Ramban says that the Nazir brings a korban upon finishing his nezirus NOT because he refrained from wine during the course of his nezirus. On the contrary: He brings the korban because by of the precipitous drop in his kedusha caused by ENDING his nezirus. The words of the Ramban in Bamidbar 6:14:
"the reason for the Korban Chatas brought by the Nazir upon completion of his term of Nezirus ... is for having completed his Nezirut, and this is the sin. He had reached a very high level of holiness and closeness to Hashem, and he then descended from that level. He should have remained a Nazir for the rest of his life, living out his days as a Nazir sanctified to serving Hashem... He must atone for having returned to the 'tumah' of worldly pleasures."

Indeed, the Gemora there does say that Shimon Hatzadik, while objurgating the usual motives for accepting nezirus, honored the “nazir min hadarom” whose nezirus seemed to be intended to break his physical desires and pleasures. And see Taanis 11b, machlokes Shmuel and Rebbi Elazar and Reish Lakish whether yosheiv b’taanis, one who habitually fasts, is nikra chotei or kadosh or chassid (although Rashi and Tosfos have opposite interpretations of Reish Lakish.) The conclusion of the Gemara there, certainly in Reb Elazar, and maybe the maskana l’halachah, is that if he is “matzi l’tzi’urei nafshei,” if he is “capable of standing the suffering,” he’s nikra kadosh, and if not, he’s a chotei. And it is obvious that Nezirus is a means of deveikus; after all, Shimshon and Shmuel (see Nazir 66a) were Nezirim. (Yes, Avshalom was also a Nazir. But sometimes the refusal of the option of great achievement generates horrible degradation.)

The Mesilas Yesharim Be'vei'ur Middas Haprishus apparently takes the approach of Rebbi Eliezer in Taanis, saying that good prishus is to eschew things that are excessive and unnecessary, and bad prishus is prishus from things that are necessary, so a yosheiv beta’anis is good if he can take it, and bad if he can’t. ( I believe that what he means by "able to take it and not able to take it" is that prishus is good if you can do it without anger and resentment, if you can do it with a sense of gratification.  If you obsess over the thing you are missing, that means  you are not ready.)  However, a careful reading indicates that prishus is necessary only because satisfying physical desires leads to specific aveiros.

Is there any reason other than that to avoid these pleasures? That is, is prishus from taivos good because taivos are inherently bad (ein lecho ben chorin/nemo liber est qui corpore servit), or only because they are thresholds to other things. Difference would be in case of some craving that cannot lead to issurim. No bitul torah, no arayos, no gaiva. Like smoking if it didn’t cause health problems. R’ Ruderman in his Sichos, page 345, mentions that there is a tachlis of “lehagbir haseichel al haratzon,” but he brings no sources.

Reb Moshe in the teshuvos (YD 3:35) talks about smoking marijuana, and he prohibits it. Not only does he prohibit it, he also calls it an issur de'oraysa, on the basis of the malkos in the parsha of Ben Sorer U'Moreh (Sanhedrin 72b regarding the passuk in Ki Seitzei), and Tumah, and an Issur Chamur, since it only satisfies a tayva and has no benefit to one's function. He also says that using marijuana transgresses the Ramban's Kedoshim Tihyu. However, the teshuva is based on his assumption that smoking marijuana creates a powerful addiction that will, like Chazal say about Ben Sorer U'Moreh, lead to violent antisocial behavior to satisfy this urge. One might argue that while this certainly applies to drugs such as heroin, it may not apply to marijuana. Never having smoked pot, I can't say from my own experience, but there are many who say that pot is no more addictive than alcohol.

R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz in Parshas Noso, #72, brings the Rambam that says that good nezirus is a “nodeir lashem derech kedusha, and bad nezirus is “ha’omeir harieni nazir im e’eseh kach vakach o im lo e’eseh.” R’ Shmuelevitz understands this to mean that good nezirus is one that is “ne’esis lesheim milchama im hayeitzer.” In other words, it is meritorious to use asceticism as a weapon in the battle against the evil inclination, but it is wrong to say that if I do or don’t do a certain thing, I will punish myself through self abnegation.

R’ Yakov Kaminetzki here seems to learn that the purpose of prishus is so that mevakshri hashem should be distinct from the common man– not that it is an intrinsically good thing, but that it is a means of reminding the tzadik that he what he seeks is different than what the masses of unthinking people seek. The unenlightened seek physical gratification and see it as the greatest good, while we see it as trivial and merely a means to enable us to serve Hashem.

See also below in Bechukosai, Vayikra 26:5, on “V’achaltem lachm’chem lasova.” R’ Moshe there says that it is better to eat a little and have it misboreich b’mei’av rather than eating the usual amount, because an adam hashaleim avoids involvement with physical pleasure.

I want to suggest an approach that may be consistent with the underlying idea of most of the above concepts of Prishus. It is rather simple, maybe even banal. Simplicity is underrated. It does not really address the high perishus Chazal encourage for people who want to be zocheh to Kinyan Torah-- Pas Bamelech Tochal and "ellah be'mi she'meimis atzmo ale'ha. It addresses only the most basic aspect of Prishus that is necessary for every member of Klal Yisrael.

The gemara Menachos 87 brings that Rav Yochanan says “ke'sheim she’hakol yafeh liketores, kach hakol ra le’yayin.” “Just as the sound of talk is good for the manufacture of the Ketores, so it is deleterious to the manufacture of wine.” Literally, this means that while compounding the Ketores, one should talk rhythmically, and this will improve the final product, while one should be silent when working with wine, because talk might cause it to sour. However, the Be’er Yosef from R’ Yitzchak Salanter says that the reason for the association and contrast, instead of mere recitation of difference, is that wine represents ta’anugei olam hazeh, worldly pleasures, and besamim represents hana’os ruchni’os, spiritual pleasures. One should avoid talk, i.e., preoccupation or deep interest in the former, but the more one delves into the latter, the better it is for him. The pleasures of a voluptuary become his quiddity. Even if you enjoy certain mosros, unnecessary pleasures, don’t talk about them- you can enjoy eating or drinking, but don't talk too much, or become obsessed with them.

It’s interesting to think about the way we look down upon gourmets as hedonistic pleasure seekers but we don't think less of people who love smells and music. What characterizes certain pleasures as animalistic and not others? Why don’t dignified people want to eat in public, but don't mind being seen enjoying the besamim at havdalah? Why do the Roshei Yeshiva all put their forks down when the photographer comes by? It’s not because only rational creatures enjoy smell, because dogs and cats love certain scents, and roll around in them in ecstasy. Certain animals also enjoy music. So what is it that makes eating so base?

When I first brought this question up, I said, as a joke, that the other pleasures, like smell and music, can be enjoyed with your mouth closed. Harav Reuven Feinstein made a beautiful observation. He said that eating is fundamentally selfish, and what you eat cannot be shared. But the enjoyment of music and smell can be shared with others.

I later realized that there is a more fundamental difference: eating and sex satisfy a craving, a hunger. While one may desire to hear music or to smell a fragrance, that desire doesn’t create a craving, or a hunger. As Umberto Eco says in the introductory essay to his anthology On Ugliness, there are different types of beauty: there is "beauty" that primarily arouses a desire to possess and use the object, and there is "beauty" that primarily elicits an appreciation of the object. The former is a vulgar and crude beauty; the latter is an objective aesthetic judgment. It is, one might say, dispassionate.

Having said this, we can see what prishus means in Jewish thought. Sensual pleasure itself is not intrinsically a negative thing. But the drive, the craving and pursuit of pleasure, is both unworthy and dangerous. One must aspire to eliminate that craving. When Prishus is employed for this purpose, it is laudable. This worthy Prishus comprises many levels. The initial level is to develop the discipline that enables one to resist physical cravings. The next level is to eliminate the driving urge that they often generate. Ultimately, one comes to a level where his decision to indulge or refrain is completely uninfluenced by any physical desire. Even this level, though, does not mean that one does not enjoy the food when he eats it; it only means that he choice to indulge was not driven or even influenced by desire.

The lesson is, then, that Prishus, at the most basic level, means the ability to learn to control and modify carnal desire such that one enjoys them as one would enjoy fragrance or music.

A very strong proof: Reb Elazar Hakappar, who said that a Nazir is called sinful for having deprived himself from wine, is the same Reb Elazar Hakappar who said, in Pirkei Avos, "Hakin'ah veha'ta'ava vehakavod motzi'in es ha'adam min ha'olam."

I think that this concept of prishus underlies the multitude of variations discussed by the baalei hashkafa.

This said, the question remains: does asceticism advance this goal? In other words, does self abnegation train a person to not want the thing he forcefully denies himself, or does it generate resentment and greater desire and lust? We all know that people that fall off the wagon tend to fall harder and farther, and that the final result is worse than if no attempt had been made at all. On the other hand, the Gemara does say that sexual desire is diminished by chastity and inflamed by satisfying it-- "it hungers when it is satisfied and it is sated when it is hungered." The answer is that this is exactly what Shimon Hatzadik meant, and this is what the Gemara in Taanis means, and this is what the Mesilas Yeshorim means. If a person is not ready, then his asceticism will be self-destructive, and will only serve to inflame his desire. At best, he will gain nothing from his attempts, only suffering for nothing. Only a person who is mentally and physically ready, and disciplined enough, to use asceticism to tame his baser desires, is encouraged to do so.

The Asceticism that Chazal encourage, then, is a means toward the end of learning to control and modify desire, to modify the desire for eating and for sexual relations so that they resemble the more refined sensual pleasure we derive from fragrance and music.

I suppose you could say, though it would be misleading if you hadn't read this post, that Chazal were aesthetes, not ascetics.