בין איך משוגע

My father zatzal used to tell stories about Reb Aizekel (Eizel) Charif.  One of the stories was that one night, he woke his rebbetzin up, and asked her, in profound agitation, בין איך קלאר אדער בין איך משוגע?  Am I sane, or am I crazy?

She was shocked and afraid, and she said, Reb Aizek, what do you mean?  He insisted, and repeated, בין איך קלאר אדער בין איך משוגע?  I am gozeir on you as your husband that you have to tell me what you really believe!  She answered, with worry and dismay, Reb Aizek, I promise that you are the most sane man in the world, you are 100% sane.

Reb Aizek said, Baruch Hashem!  Baruch Hashem!  Someone gave me this sefer that he just published, and I was reading it, and I came to realize that there are only two possibilities.  Either I am crazy, or he is crazy.  Baruch Hashem!  If I am not crazy, Iz ehr meshuga, then he is crazy.



I was talking to a friend recently, and we began to talk about the sugya of לקבעא קמא הדר- that sometimes, walking out and returning is called a hefsek and if you return it is a new beginning, but sometimes it is not considered an interruption, and so when you return you are continuing the same meal  He asked me the following question.

We know that if a person ate a kezayis of mezonos and left the room, he does not have to make another bracha when he returns.  Because mezonos obligates a person to return to the place where he ate, his leaving is not called a hefsek.  לקבעא קמא הדר

What if a person was eating mezonos and shehakol, and he left the room, and he returned.  Would he have to repeat the shehakol?

The natural answer is that no, he would not have to repeat the shehakol.  If he doesn't have to repeat the mezonos because his obligation to return renders his having left insignificant, then he shouldn't have to repeat any bracha.  It seems obvious to me that the din that you don't repeat mezonos is not because mezonos requires that you go back to where  you ate.  It is because mezonos creates a reality of kvius.  Because of that kevius, you have to make the bracha achrona where you ate.  If there were no brachos in the world, the concept of kevius would still apply.  The din of going back is a siman, not a siba.  If so, if there's a reality of kvius, the kvius is applicable to all your brachos.

So my friend told me that he saw a certain great posek, a man that was well known to have shas and poskim and rishonim in his pocket, said that he does have to repeat the shehakol.

I asked him, but why is this different that one who was eating a shehakol food and left the room, but he left his friends there, and he intends to return because of his friends.  He told me it's a good question, but if that posek said farkert, it's my problem to be meyasheiv the sugya.

I haven't looked at any of the mareh mekomos.  I'm afraid it will say what he says.  If it does, then the only choice I will have is to accept the unfortunate reality of the title of this post.  As the Mahari Viel said, פסקי בעלי בתים ופסקי לומדים שני הפכים הם.
(שו"ת מהר"י ווייל סוף סימן קמ"ו, הובא בסמ"ע סימן ג' ס"ק י"ג)

Marei mekomos, thank you Eli.
Badei Hashulchan here and also here
Teshuvos Maharim Padua  (Not the famous Maharam Padua, who lived three hundred years earlier, but he was the Rov of Brisk a generation before the Maharil Diskin, so read it carefully.)


Also on the issue of לקבעא קמא הדר:

What if a person heard kiddush in his Sukkah, but he didn't drink a reviis of wine.  Let's say he wasn't the one that made kiddush, or even if he made kiddush, he drank rov kos but not a revi'is.  Then he walked out to wash netilas yadayim for Hamotzi.  Is he yotzei Kiddush bimkom seuda?  Or does his walking out mean there's a hefsek and his kiddush was not bimkom seuda, since it is not related to the seuda he will eat after washing?

I would think that his obligation and intent to return to eat bread means that he never "left" the sukkah.  It's not worse than leaving friends and intending to come back- which is another example of לקבעא קמא הדר.  Indeed, that is what Reb Yosef Peimer from Slutzk, a talmid of Reb Chaim Volozhiner says in his teshuvos (here's more about him.)  Rav Chaim Volozhiner is saying a big chiddush:  he is the only one who connects the halacha of leaving a friend behind, which is usually related to the din of making new brachos, to the din of Kiddush Bimkom Seuda.  But they tell me that the Chazon Ish argues.  Can you believe it?  All of Klal Yisrael does this.  You make kiddush in the Sukkah, you go out to wash, and then you make hamotzi.  This is a hefsek, and it's not the same seuda, so it's a problem of not making kiddush bimkom seudah?

And once again, I have a very big problem understanding this.  We all know that talking between bracha and achila is a hefsek, but not where the talking is for the purpose of the Achila, like "Bring salt."  So we ought to learn a general svara that a hefsek for the needs of the seuda is not a hefsek.  If so, going out to wash in order to eat is not in the parsha of hefsek at all.  Not only is it not a hefsek, it's exactly the opposite of a hefsek- it's a "Not Hefsek," it's a chibbur.  In fact, I believe that if you sat down to eat, and you realized you hadn’t fed your animals, and you go outside to feed them so you can eat, it is not a hefsek either.  To me, this is a poshuteh svara.  So why don’t any of these gedolim say this simple, baalebatische svara?  Is there something wrong with me?  Has my brain gotten dim with age?  Has my almost exclusive focus on the Daf Yomi for twenty five years made me simplistic?  Very possible.



UPDATE
After thinking about this for a while, I've come to realize that the problem with being a baal habayis is the tendency to form an immediate opinion and to close one's mind, instead of delving into the sugya to see what other ways there are to learn it.  It's a matter of being outside the milieu of shakla vetarya, and also simple laziness and inertia.  So, yes.  Unfortunately, it's true.


By the way, Reb Yosef (Yosalleh) Peimer was like a father to Reb Elya Pruzhiner, Reb Moshe Feinstein's uncle, who was born in Slutsk.

Yiddish Expressions and their Sources in Chazal- A Yavan in Sukkah

This was originally posted in '12, but it has been updated.

Today, when my mother shetichyeh realized that she had forgotten something, she said "א קאצ'ישע קאפ."  A cat's head.  I don't recall hearing that expression before- that a person that forgets things has a cat's head.  I've since seen that some say א קאצין מוח, same idea, a cat's brain.  I don't know why we would malign the cat's memory, but it reminded me of the Gemara (Horios 13b) ת"ר חמשה דברים משכחים את הלימוד האוכל ממה שאוכל עכבר וממה שאוכל חתול והאוכל לב של בהמה והרגיל בזיתים והשותה מים של שיורי רחיצה והרוחץ רגליו זו על גבי זו ויש אומרים אף המניח כליו תחת מראשותיו, that eating a food that had been partially eaten by a cat or a rodent damages the memory.  It stands to reason that a cat and a rodent have terrible memories, because they are always eating things that a cat or a rodent had begun eating.

There are many Yiddish expressions that stem from Chazal.  Obviously, Yiddish can become ugly in the mouths of crass and vulgar people, but so much of it stems from Tanach and Chazal because of Klal Yisrael's obsessive love of the Torah.  I once enjoyed a conversation with Dr. Jean Jofen on this topic.  She was, as in so many things, an expert on the subject.  One example we discussed was that an expression for "a tiny amount," an iota, is a כי הוא זה.  A person who wanted to say that he knew absolutely nothing would say "I don't know a כי הוא זה.  This, of course, comes from the Gemara (Bava Kamma 106b) that when the Torah uses those words, it refers to a man that makes a partial admission of liability- I don't owe you הוא, I only owe you זה.  So the words כי הוא זה came to mean "a little bit."

Another one is ווי א האן אין בני אדם.  When you look at someone askance, you are looking at him ווי א האן אין בני אדם, like a chicken at a human being.  This comes from Kapparos.  We take a chicken by the legs and swing him around our heads while saying the passuk בני אדם יושבי חושך וצלמות....  One imagines that the chicken is looking down at us and wondering what on Earth is going on.  The chicken is totally confused and thinks that we are deranged.  He looks at us ווי א האן אין בני אדם.

Then, there is לא דובים ולא יער, which means "never happened, none of it is true."  This comes from the Gemara (Sota 47) that says that the story (Melachim II 2:23-25) of Elisha and the bears was only a vision or a metaphor, and there were no bears and no forest.  לא דובים ולא יער.  (Another expression that means "totally fabricated" is נישט געשטויגען נישט געפלויגען, which means "didn't rise and didn't fly," and it is our reaction to the claims of miracles about a certain Jew that lived toward the end of the second Beis Hamikdash.)

There are many such expressions.  Another is א יאהר און א מיטוואך (or א יאהר מיט א מיטוואך), translating to "a year and a Wednesday", meaning "a long, long, time."  This also comes from a Gemara (Kesuvos 2a: if after an engagement the groom delays the marriage, the dilatory groom's obligation of spousal support vests a year after the engagement, but only beginning on the first Wednesday after the year because of the din of Shakdu.  The kalla will eventually be taken care of, but she might have to wait  א יאהר מיט א מיטוואך.)  The common expression for senility- עובר בטל- comes, of course, directly from Avos 5:21, בן מאה כאילו עבר ובטל מן העולם.

The one that has forever puzzled me is ווי א יון אין סוכה, literally, something completely out of place.  Literally, it means "like a Greek in a Sukkah."  Now, I know that a Greek, a paradigmatic non-Jew, would be out of place in a Sukkah.  But the specificity of the expression makes it clear that it comes from somewhere.

Here's one approach- Rabbi David Hollander, writing in the Algemeiner, said that it reflects the passuk יפת אלוקים ליפת וישכון באהלי שם:

דער ערשטער טייל פון די געוואונשענע שיריים איז אין פאַרשטיין פאַרוואָס מיר זאָגן "ווי אַ יוון אין סוכה"? פאַרוואָס דווקא ווי אַ "יוון", נישט ווי אַ טערק, אַ רוימער, אָדער וועלכער גוי עס זאָל נישט זיין?

....why do we say "like a Greek in Sukkah?"  Why not a Turk, a Roman, or some other kind of gentile?

דער תירוץ איז, אַז יוון, די גריכן פון אַמאָל און היינט, האָבן זיך אויסגעצייכנט אין אויסערלעכער שיינקייט, אין מאָלערייען, אין סקולפּטור, אין מוזיק און אין אַרכיטעקטור, אָבער זיי האָבן דאַן, אין די ערשטע יאָרן נאָך בריאת העולם, זיך דערווייטערט פון דעם עיקר, ווי עס שטייט אין דער תורה, "יפת אלוקים ליפת וישכון באהלי שם". יפת'ס שיינקייט איז אַ ברכה, אָבער מיט אַ שטרענגן תנאי, און דאָס איז, "וישכון באהלי שם", אונטער ג-ט'ס ממשלה. אָבער יפת, די יוונים, האָבן זיך דערווייטערט פון דעם "וישכון באהלי שם" (בראשית ט', כ"ז). די חז"ל (מגילה ט') זאָגן "יפיפיתו של יפת יהא באהלי שם",יעמאָלט איז יפת שיין, בשעת עס איז באהלי שם.

The answer is that the Greek, ancient and modern,  excelled in external beauty, in painting, in sculpture, in music and architecture, but they distanced themselves, long ago, from the most important thing.  As it says in the Torah (Breishis 9:27), "Hashem , give beauty to Yefeth, and may he dwell in the tents of Shem". Yefeth's beauty is a blessing, but with a strong prerequisite- that it be under G-d's rule.  But Yefeth, the Greeks, grasped the beauty and disdained the tent of Shem.

ר' יהודה הלוי וואָרנט אַז יוון איז בלויז "פּרחים" אָבער "בלי פּירות". די מוזיקאַלישע כלים זיינען געווען אָן אהלי שם, ווי רש"י זאָגט (בראשית כ') אַז עס איז געווען "לזמר לעבודת אלילים".

Reb Yehuda Halevi warns that Greece is merely flowers without fruit.  The  musical instruments were used outside the tent of Shem, they were used to serenade the pagan idols.

מיר, אידן, לעבן אין דער קולטור פון די יוונים, פון די קינסטלער וועלכע זיינען נישט געבונדן צו דעם "וישכון באהלי שם", און ביי זיי איז כל דבר אסור מותר, מיטן תירוץ אַז די אַרטיסטן מעגן עובר זיין אויף אַלע מאָראַלישע געזעצן, ווייל זיי, די אַרטיסטן, האָבן געשאַפן אַ לעבנס-וועג, וואָס דערלויבט אַלץ ווייל עס איז נישט "באהלי שם".

צום באַדויערן זיינען פילע אידן געוואָרן די אָנפירער פון דער קולטור פון יוון, און דאָס האָט געבראַכט די השכלה-באַוועגונג, און דערנאָך דעם געפעלשטן "דזשודאַאיזם", וואָס איז געוואָרן דער "יוון אין סוכה" מיט שיינע טעמפּלען, מיט מוזיק אַלס דער עיקר, אָבער ס'איז בלויז "פּרחים בלי פּירות".

דער יוון איז ליידער אַריין אין אונדזער אידישער סוכה...

So the idea is that Yefeth, the Greek people, were given the gift of creating aesthetic beauty, which was intended to be used in service of Hashem.  They rejected "the tents of Shem," and used their gift for exactly the opposite purpose, to glorify physicality and paganism.  For a Yavan to walk into a sukkah highlights the ironic contrast- the Yavan and that which was offered but determinedly and absolutely rejected.

Nachum J suggests that the incongruity of a Yavan in a Sukkah refers to the Gemara in Avoda Zara 3a:

אמרו לפניו רבש"ע תנה לנו מראש ונעשנה אמר להן הקב"ה שוטים שבעולם מי שטרח בערב שבת יאכל בשבת מי שלא טרח בערב שבת מהיכן יאכל בשבת אלא אף על פי כן מצוה קלה יש לי וסוכה שמה לכו ועשו אותה ומי מצית אמרת הכי והא אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי מאי דכתיב (דברים ז) אשר אנכי מצוך היום היום לעשותם ולא למחר לעשותם היום לעשותם ולא היום ליטול שכר אלא שאין הקב"ה בא בטרוניא עם בריותיו ואמאי קרי ליה מצוה קלה משום דלית ביה חסרון כיס מיד כל אחד [ואחד] נוטל והולך ועושה סוכה בראש גגו והקדוש ברוך הוא מקדיר עליהם חמה בתקופת תמוז וכל אחד ואחד מבעט בסוכתו ויוצא שנאמר (תהילים ב) ננתקה את מוסרותימו ונשליכה ממנו עבותימו 

that when Mashiach comes, the nations will say they deserve a chance to do the mitzvos; Hashem will offer them Sukka, and when the sun beats down on their heads, they will say enough is enough, and kick the sukka and stomp out.  So the concept is that Sukka is specifically something that resonates with the Jewish personality, and having a Yavan in a sukka is like having your neighbor come along on your honeymoon.

S, in the comments, cites the following, from a book called יידיש- השפה הקדושה:

עם פאסט וויא א יון אין טובה
 זה מתאים כמו יוני בסוכה
 יש מפרשים שהיו אומרים ״כמו איואן(שם פרטי של גוי רוסי) בסוכה״ שאין מקומו שם. והנני מעתיק מש״ב באהל דוד ח״א
 בהערות לזכריה יד-טז ״והיה כל הנותר מכל הגוים הבאים על ירושלים ועלו מדי שנה בשנה להשתהות למלך ה׳ צב־אות
 ולחג את חג הסכת״.... עיין רש״י שפי׳ על פי הא דעבודה זרה ג, א שהקב״ה יבדוק הגוים על ידי מצות סוכה עיי״ש. ויתכן
 דמכאן בא הביטוי ביידיש ״א יון אין סוכה״ ששינו יון במקום רומי מטעם הצנזורה. דעיין שבת טו,א רש״י ד״ה המלכות
 הרשעה רומי״ דבדפוס וויען הגירסא יון מטעם הצנזורה (דבווילנא הצארית משלה דת יון האורטודוקסי [גריק
 אורטודוקס בלע״ז] ובוויען משלה דת רומי הקטוליקי. ועיין שם לעיל יא. א ד״ה ולא תחת ולקמן שם לג,ב ודף נו,א ודו״ק.
 ושמעתי שהיו קוראים לרוסים ולאלו שהיו מדת גריק ארטעדאקס בשם יונים וכ״ה בספר ביון מצולה.

This is very similar to Dr. Nachum J's suggestion as mentioned in the previous paragraph.  The interesting addition is the passuk in Zechariah that says that the gentiles will come and join us in our celebration of Sukkos.  Of course, this is what the Gemara in Avoda Zara comes from, but the expression might have come from a bemused reaction to the passuk in Zechariah.  They're going to come and celebrate Sukkos? נאר דאס פעלט אונז אויס.  That's all we're missing.  Wonderful.

In any case, I think I'm satisfied with this etymology: Based on the passuk in Zecharyah, the Gemara in Avoda Zara, and the pasuk in Breishis, the expression, which means "Something with Zero shaychus," is well grounded in Chazal and Tanach.  A Yavan in a Sukka is in a place that has absolutely no shaychus to him, where he completely does not belong.

The sefer cited, יידיש- השפה הקדושה, is very interesting, and contains some of the etymologies I mentioned in this post.  It is available at Hebrewbooks.org here.  It was written, believe it or not, by HaRav Dovid Cohen of Gevul Yavetz.  So I'm not the only person that writes about these havolim.

Rabbi Dr. GS reminds us of the Gemara (Sukka 2b-3a) that tells us how careful Queen Hellenni was to ensure that her children were in a Sukkah, even though she herself was not obligated to be there.  Good idea. Except that Hellini was queen of Adiabene, an Assyrian kingdom in Iraq, and she wasn't Greek, and she and her son Munbaz were geirim.  But it does sound like a Greek name, and she certainly wasn't obligated to be in the Sukka.  And, as RDGS pointedly notes, the Yevanim in the story of Chanuka weren't Greek either.

RDGS, never one to leave well enough alone, now directs our attention to an interesting article by Philologos in the Forwards, in which the identity of those whom we refer to as Assyrians and as Greeks and Yevanim is examined.  As it turns out, Heleni was no less Greek than Assyrian, and, if she descended from Alexander, more.

Ok, now we've cleared up this one.  Next:   עס האט א טעם ווי מען שמייסט א יון.  Literally- It (has as much flavor as /makes as much sense as- i.e., no flavor/rationale at all-) beating a Greek.

UPDATE:
My son in law, Harav Moshe Jofen, directs our attention to a Braisa in Maseches Sofrim, 1:7.

מעשה בחמשה זקנים שכתבו לתלמי המלך את התורה יונית והיה היום קשה לישראל כיום שנעשה העגל שלא היתה התורה יכולה להתרגם כל צרכה

Once, five elders wrote the Torah in Greek for King Ptolemy.  That day was as hard for Israel as the day the Golden Calf was made, because the Torah can't be translated as it requires.

How does this relate to the Sukka?

The Vilner Gaon (this is being written on his Yahrtzeit) asks, why is Sukkos in the Fall, when the events it commemorates took place in the Spring.  Chazal do offer other explanations, but the Gaon's explanation is emblematic of his unique gadlus.  The Gaon explains that when we made the Eigel, the Ananei Hakavod that indicated the presence of the Shechina left us.  The sin of the Eigel was forgiven on Yom Kippur, and on that day Moshe descended with the new Luchos from Har Sinai.  The next day, the eleventh of Tishrei, Moshe gave us the commandment to build the Mishkan.  On the twelfth and thirteenth, people brought their contributions.  On the fourteenth, an accounting was made of what was brought, and we were told to stop bringing.  On the fifteenth, the building of the Mishkan began, and the Ananei Hakavod returned.  Sukkos commemorates our regaining Hashem's love- not just the forgiveness, which occurred on Yom Kippur, but the return to the state of being loved by the Ribono shel Olam, as we were before the sin of the Eigel.

On a simple level, we can say that Ptolmey, a Greek king, instigated the translation of the Torah, which was akin to the creation of the Eigel.  Sukkos represents the perfect opposite of the Eigel.  If the Greek king equals the Eigel, and the Sukkah is the sign that the sin of the Eigel was totally erased, then the diametric opposite of the Sukka is the Greek, Yavan.

More importantly, we need to think about why Chazal chose "the day the Eigel was made" to describe the Ptolomeic translation.  We know that in Chazal, the Greeks represent a concept of the absolute limitation of knowledge to the empirical.  (see Ramban in Parshas Achrei Mos, Vayikra 16:8, והנה רמז לך ר"א שתדע סודו כשתגיע לפסוק ולא יזבחו עוד את זבחיהם לשעירים. והמלה מורכבת, וחביריה רבים. והנה העניין מבואר, זולתי אם תחקור מה עניין לשכלים הנבדלים ולרוחות בקורבן. וזה יודע ברוחות, בחכמת נגרומנסי"א, ויודע גם בשכלים, ברמזי התורה למבין סודם, ולא אוכל לפרש. כי היינו צריכים לחסום פי המתחכמים בטבע הנמשכים אחרי היוני אשר הכחיש כל דבר זולתי המורגש לו, והגיס דעתו לחשוב הוא ותלמידיו הרשעים, כי כל עניין שלא השיג אליו הוא בסברתו איננו אמת..)   For the Greek, the idea that human knowledge is imperfect and unreliable, and that we need to admit our limits and to trust the truths of the Torah, is anathema.  This is what the Braisa means when it says that לא היתה התורה יכולה להתרגם כל צרכה, that the Torah could not be translated as it needs to be- without faith in the Ribono shel Olam, the Torah is a mere book of thoughts, subject to human interpretation and criticism and the vagaries of ephemeral fashions of philosophy.  The Sukka represents the idea that human ability and thought are not enough, and we need to place our faith into the hands of the Ribono shel Olam: the only thing we can rely on is impermanence. The only absolute truth is knowledge imparted by the Ribono shel Olam.

Briefly: The sukka represents faith in Hashem, the awareness that nothing we do is permanent and nothing we know is absolute.  Yavan represents human self-reliance and the rejection of revelation in favor of empiricism.  A Yavan and a Sukka are fundamentally incompatible.

I think this pshat is the best of all.

*

Schach That is only Kosher on One Axis, and Eiruv Tavshilin a Few Days Before Yomtov.

I
DIRECTIONAL S'CHACH

The Chicago Rabbinical Counsel, pursuant to the psak of Rabbi Gedaliah Schwartz and Rabbi Shmuel Fuerst, has made it known that a certain commercially available fencing product is kosher to be used as Schach.  The original psak can be seen here.  However, they include a link to a caveat: it is only kosher when it is supported by some other schach other than this fencing- on bamboo, for example- and also that it lies perpendicular to the other schach.   The warning can be seen here.  If you remember your High School math, the Cartesian terms would be that this Schach is only kosher on the X axis.  If you place it on the Y axis, it will be passul.

Let's call it "X Axis Schach."

Here is a picture of the schach in use in a sukkah.

In the picture you can see a black line.  This is one of the wires that are woven through the reeds to hold them together.   A moment's thought should make it clear why this schach is only kosher perpendicular to the support bamboo.  If a moment's thought does not do it, I note the explanation below.

Unfortunately, from my examination of this product, I believe it to be mostly open, חמתו מרובה מצלתו.  It might be that since its use is limited to cases where it is perpendicular to other kosher schach, it can be assumed that between itself and the support schach there will be a total of צלתו מרובה מחמתו.  This, however, is a risky assumption, but well within the purview of reliance on one's poseik.  For skeptics, the only way to make a final determination would be to use a light meter and a flashlight in a darkened room. Rabbi Reuven Drucker, the Marah D'Asra of the Agudah of Highland Park New Jersey and Menahel of Yeshiva Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch in Washington Heights, is an expert in such determinations.

UPDATE
I was just informed that Rabbi Fishbane, head of the CRC, says that they did measure it and they found it to be tzilsa merubah.  Rabbi Fishbane is universally respected in the Kashrus World, has well established his credentials as a man to be relied upon, and I cede to his opinion.
SECOND UPDATE
Oddly, in the printed CRC information sheet, this schach is discussed, and the paragraph ends by saying that as in all cases, one should ensure that the schach is Tzilso Merubah.  Evidently, someone at the office was not convinced that it is mostly reed.

EXPLANATION
If the schach is placed parallel (Y Axis) to the support schach, then removing the wire would result in all the reeds falling down between the supports.  If it is placed perpendicularly (X Axis,) then even if the wire were to be removed, the reeds would stay in place.  Thus, when the fencing is parallel, the wire is the only reason the schach stays where it belongs, and under the rule of Maamid Bedavar Hamekabel Tumah the reeds are no more kasher than the wire itself.  It is like having a metal lattice holding up the schach.  (Many poskim are not concerned about maamid..)


II
ON EIRUV TAVSHILIN

On another topic:  Some people, not chalilah in reference to anyone who will be eating in my house this Yomtov, are obsessive about the Eiruv Tavshilin.  They are afraid someone (me) will forget to make the eiruv.    Others might themselves be worried that they will get busy and forget erev yomtov.  For those unfortunate compulsives, I have some advice.  Make the eiruv two or three days before yomtov.  As the Tur points out, his father, the Rosh, says that according to Rav Ashi, such an eiruv is kasher, and we pasken like Rav Ashi (as the basra.)  True, the Mechaber (OC 527, see, for example, here, in Seif 4 and 25 ) holds that lechatchila one should be choshesh for the shitta of Ravva (and the Maharshal that says that the Rosh's analysis is incorrect) and only rely on an erev yomtov Eiruv, but bedieved it is certainly kasher.  So for anyone taking this to heart, remember: if you make the eiruv a few days before Yomtov, or erev yomtov for the last days as well, it's kosher.  But don't make a bracha, neither now nor later on erev Yomtov.  And make sure the Eiruv food remains edible and available until Shabbos begins.

Sukkos in the Fall

The Tur (OC 625) asks, if on Sukkos we re-enact our sojourn in the eponymous Sukkos in the desert, why does it occur in the Fall, when the event took place when we left Egypt, in the Spring.  He answers that after a wet and cold Winter, many people find it pleasurable to eat outdoors as the weather improves.  If we made the holiday in the Spring, it would not have the symbolic force that it does now.  We make it in the Fall, when nobody else eats or sleeps outdoors, so that we should be emphatically reminded of our reason for doing so.  As the Bach says, the mitzva of Sukkos requires a specific awareness of the reason for the commandment.  (I apologize to my friends in the Southern Hemisphere for the Hemispheric chauvinism.)

The Rambam (Moreh 3:43) says exactly the opposite of the Tur: that this season was picked because it's neither too hot nor too cold for a Succah (in Eretz Yisrael's climate, of course).

These are unsatisfying answers.  We are taught that our holidays are not mere tableaux vivants re-enactments, but instead a re-experience of the mazal and segula of the moment, a wellspring from which we draw spiritual strength.  It is hard to accept the Rambam's and the Tur's assertions that Sukkos has no inherent temporal/spiritual relation to its place in the calendar.


Addressing this issue, the Vilner Gaon (born 1720) and the Chasam Sofer (born 1762) say identical answers.  The Vilner Gaon is in Shir Hashirim 1:4, here.  The Chasam Sofer is in his Drashos, page 29a, in the Drasha for Shabbos Shuva of תקצ"ד, D'H B'Yalkut, here.

Thank you, Heather H., for pointing out that today, October 17, is the Gaon's Yahrtzeit, 19 Tishrei Tof Kuf Nun Ches/1797.  The Chasam Sofer's Yahrtzeit, 25 Tishrei Tof Reish/1839, is next Sunday, October 23.  May they be meilitzei yosher for us and all Klal Yisrael.

They answer that the Clouds which (according to Rebbi Eliezer) the Sukkos represent, departed upon the sin of the Eigel.  The Clouds only returned after we did teshuva and began building the Mishkan.  When was that?  Our teshuva was accepted on Yom Kippur, the tenth.  On the eleventh, Moshe Rabbeinu gave us the commandment to build the Mishkan; on the twelfth and thirteenth, we collected the material and money we needed; on the fourteenth, the calculations, assignments and disbursements were made, and on the fifteenth of Tishrei, the work began.  It is not just the Ananim we are celebrating- we're celebrating Hashem's return of the Ananei Hakavod as a sign of His love after we did teshuva.  The Teshuva did not merely erase our sins, it reinstated Hashem's love.  It is the great joy of the return of the ananei hakavod that we are celebrating.

The problem with this teretz is the pessukim in Nechemiah 9:19-20, which say
 יח אף כי עשו להם עגל מסכה ויאמרו זה אלהיך אשר העלך ממצרים ויעשו נאצות גדלות.  יט ואתה ברחמיך הרבים לא עזבתם במדבר את עמוד הענן לא סר מעליהם ביומם להנחתם בהדרך ואת-עמוד האש בלילה להאיר להם ואת-הדרך אשר ילכו בה


Even when they made the Eigel and said "This is your god that took you out of Egypt", and they did great blasphemies, You, in Your great mercy, did not leave them in the Desert.  The Pillar of Cloud did not move away from them in the day to lead them on the path, nor the Pillar of Fire to illuminate the road they walked upon.


It appears that these pesukim, which clearly state that the sin of the Eigel did not cause the Cloud to go away, contradict the assertion of the Gaon and the Chasam Sofer.


The answer is, of course, that there is a difference between the Amud Ha'anan and the Ananei Hakavod.  The Pillar of Cloud remained with them, but the Clouds of Glory, which covered and protected them, did disappear, and only came back when they began building the Mishkan.




You might disagree with this distinction.  After all, the Aruch Hashulchan seems to commingle the two Ananim:

ותניא (סוכה יא ב): "כי בסוכות הושבתי את בני ישראל" – ענני כבוד היו, דברי רבי אליעזר. רבי עקיבא אומר: סוכות ממש עשו להם.

והנה לדברי רבי אליעזר – וודאי דשייך לעשות זכרון לדבר הגדול הזה, שהקיפן בענני כבוד. וכמו שהתוודו בעלותם מן הגולה בנחמיה (ט), שאמרו: "אף כי עשו להם עגל מסכה... ואתה ברחמיך הרבים לא עזבתם במדבר, את עמוד הענן לא סר מעליהם..., ואת עמוד האש בלילה...". דבענני כבוד היתה התגלות אלקות ממש, כמו שאמר משה רבינו בעניינא דמרגלים: "אשר עין בעין נראה אתה ד', ועננך עומד עליהם, ובעמוד ענן אתה הולך לפניהם יומם, ובעמוד אש לילה"

Also, we find that Chazal equate the Amud Ha'anan and the Ananei Hakavod, in Medrash Bamidbar Rabbah II:

וכמה ענני כבוד היו מקיפין את ישראל במדבר 

ר' הושעיה ור' יאשיה, ר' יאשיה אמר: חמישה. ארבע לארבע רוחות, וא' מהלך לפניהם. ר' הושעיה אמר: שבעה. ארבעה לארבע רוחות השמים, וא' מלמעלן, וא' מלמטן, ואחד שהיה מהלך לפניהם רחוק ג' ימים, והיה מכה לפניהם את הנחשים, ואת העקרבים, ואת השרפים, ואת הסלעים, ואם היה מקום נמוך היה מגביהו, ואם היה מקום גבוה היה משפילו, ועושה אותם מישור, שנאמר (ישעיה מ): כל גיא ינשא וכל הר וגבעה ישפלו. 


Also, see (sorry about the transcription errors: my secretary stepped out for a moment...)  Mechilta D'Rebbi Yishmael in Beshalach, 13:20, where it says very clearly

 וה׳ הולך לפניהם יומם בעמוד ענן מלמד ששבעה ענני כבוד היו עם ישראל  

י ו מ ם  בע מ ו ד  ענ ן  הרי אחד .  וע נ נ ך  עו מ ד  על י ה ם  (ב מ ׳  יד  יד )  הר י  שנ י ם .  וב ע מ ו ד  ענ ן  את ה  הו ל ך  לפ נ י ה ם  י ו מ ם  (שס )  הר י שלש>ה<. וב ה א ר י ך  הע נ ן  (ב פ ׳  ס יס )  הר י  ארבע>ה<. וב ה ע ל ו ת  הע נ ן  (שמ׳  פ לו )  הר י  המש>ה<. וא ם  לא  יע ל ה  הע נ ן  (שם לז )  הר י  שש>ה<. כי  ענ ן  ה׳ על  המ ש כ ן  י ו מ ם  (ש ם  לה )  הר י  שב ע ה .  אר ב ע ה 15 מא ר ב ע  רו ת ו ת  ו א ח ו  מל מ ע ל ה  וא ח ד  םל מ ס ד .  וא ח ד  שמ ק ד י ם  לפ נ י ה ם  פ ת ק ן  לה ם  את  הד ר כ י ם  מג ב י ר . לה ם  את  הש פ ל  ומ ש פ י ל  לה ם  את  הג ב ו ה  וע ו ש ה  לה ס  דר ך  ס ר ס  ומ י ש ו ר  כע נ י ן  שנ א י  כל  ני א  י נ ש א וכ ל  הר  וג ב ע ה  יש פ ל ו  וה י ה  הע ק ב  לפ י ש ו ר  וה ר כ ס י ם  לב ק ע ה  (ישע׳ פ ד) וא ו ם ׳  והיתד. פס ל ה  לש א ר עפ ו  אש ר  יש א ר  מא ש ו ר  כא ש ר  הי ת ה  לי ש ר א ל  כי ו ם  על ו ת ו  מא ר ץ  פצ ר י ם  (ישע׳  י א  שז). הד י  זה  נ א כפ ל מ ד  ו נ מ צ א  למ ד  מה  לע ת י ד  לב ו א  כל  גיא יג ש א  וכ ל  ה ר  וג ב ע ה  יש פ ל ו  כך  היד, לה ן  בע ל י י ת ן 20 פא ר ץ  מצ ר י ם .  די א  והי  הל ך  לפ נ י ה ם  י ו מ ם  ר׳  יו ס י  הנ ל י ל י  או מ ר  אל מ ל א  פק ר א  כ ת ו ב  אי אפ ש ר ל א פ ר ו  כא ב  שנ ו ס ל  סו נ ס  לפ נ י  בנ ו  וכ ר ב  שנ ו ס ל  פו נ ס  לפ נ י  עב ד ו .  לל כ ת  י ו מ ם  ול י ל ה  פק י ש  נס י ע ת ן כי פ י ם  לנ ס י ע ת ן  בל י ל ו ת  פ ה  נס י ע ת ן  בי פ י ם  לא  הי ו  טח ו ס ר י ן  או ר ה  אף  נס י ע ת ן  בל י ל ו ת  לא  הי ו פח ו ס ר י ן  או ר ה .  מה  נס י ע ת ן  בל י ל ו ת  לא  יר ע ב ו  ול א  י נ פ א ו  ול א  יכ ם  שר ב  וש מ ש  (י ש ע ׳  מם  י) אף נס י ע ת ן  בי מ י ם  לא  יר ע ב ו  ול א  יצ מ א ו  ול א  יכ ם  שר ב  וש מ ש .

It's possible that some ananim went away and some didn't.  But the pashtus of the Passuk in Nechemiah is that all of the Ananim remained after the sin of the Eigel, even before Yom Kippur.  So what's pshat in the teretz of Gaon and the Chasam Sofer?  We can find the answer to this question in the Chasam Sofer, here, (Drashos, page 53b, D'H Sha'alah).


The Chasam Sofer asks, why does the Gemara in Sukkos 26b not suggest that women ought to be Chayav in Sukka because they were involved in the miracle no less than the men?   He answers, as he said earlier, that Sukkos commemorates not the Clouds, but the return of the Clouds after Teshuva.  He says that the Clouds did not actually disappear, but they ejected any sinner that attempted to enter into them.  The men, who were excommunicated for their sin of the Eigel, remained outside of the cloud until they began building the Mishkan.  The women, on the other hand, had never participated in the Eigel, and were never driven away from the Anan.  While any man entering the Anan were spit out, the women were able to enter the Anan at will.  Since for the women nothing changed, the redemptive experience of Sukkos did not apply to them at all, and we certainly could not say they're chayav on the basis of אף הן היו באותו הנס.  They weren't באותו הנס at all.


According to the Chasam Sofer, we can understand the pesukim in Nechemiah to mean that the Anan never went away, and still guided them.  But it did not allow the men to enter into it, it was poleit them.  Only when they began building the Mishkan were the men allowed to enter into the cloud, and it is this redemptive experience that took place on the fifteenth of Tishrei that we celebrate.


I want to point out an irony.  According to the Chasam Sofer, the reason that we wouldn't apply אף הן היו באותו הנס to obligate women to do the Mitzva of Sukka is because they never sinned, they never were kicked out, and they never earned redemption.  Sukkos is the holiday that commemorates a fall and a return to Hashem's love.  They never fell, and Hashem loved them all the time, so they have no reconciliation to celebrate.  Although it sounds strange, it makes perfect sense.  The descendants of an alternative Avraham Avinu who never said "Bamah Eida" would never have been redeemed from Mitzrayim.  I recently read that a physician lamented how he spends half an hour teaching a patient about lifestyle changes that will ensure that his heart remains healthy, and a cardiac surgeon that repairs a heart damaged by by a bad lifestyle is paid thirty to forty times as much for his half hour.  Somehow, that reminded me of the Chasam Sofer's teretz.

Sukkos: Shehakol Tomatoes, Greenhouse Esrogim and Moonroof Schach

Shehakol Tomatoes and Greenhouse Esrogim

The bracha on a tomato or a cucumber is Borei P'ri Ha'adama- Who created the fruit of the Earth- except when it is not a fruit of the Earth.  If a vegetable is grown in a container that is not open to the ground, and has no branches that overhang the ground, it is not halachically attached to the Earth, and you cannot make the regular bracha "borei pri ha'adama" on it.  In that case, the correct bracha is She'hakol.  Some, but not all, greenhouse produce falls into this category.  Although some greenhouses have benches that are perforated and stand above open ground, some grow produce that is completely separated from and unexposed to the earth.  During the winter, you should check your produce, because it is common for winter tomatoes and cucumbers to have been grown in greenhouses, often hydroponically, and therefore require the bracha she'hakol. When in doubt, one should make the bracha She'hakol.

While the issue of correct brachos is important, it is a din derabanan, and this question has relevance to dinim de'oraysa as well.  For example, can you use an esrog that was grown in an atzitz she'eino nakuv, a closed pot that separates the plant from the earth?  We can understand that the words "Pri Ha'adama" exclude something grown without contact with the Earth.  But the bracha "borei pri ha'etz"- Who created the fruit of the tree- doesn't mention the ground or the earth, so the bracha for greenhouse grown tree fruit should still be "ha'etz," and it should therefore satisfy the requirement in the Torah to use "Pri Eitz Hadar."  Similarly in the case of Hadasim, it says Anaf Eitz Avos, but nothing about the ground.  Certainly, the Aravos and Lulav should be fine, since it doesn't even say Pri or Eitz.  On the other hand, perhaps the word "eitz" connotes a tree that grows from the Earth, in which case a greenhouse esrog or hadas would not be kosher.

This is not a remote case.  As it happens, I have both an esrog and a hadas in pots which spend the summer outdoors and (because I live in Zone 5a/b) the winter in the house.  They are over twenty two years old, and have produced a great number of kosher esrogim and hadasim, though the esrog is long past its bearing years, and I trim the Hadas more as Bonsai than as a source of Hadasim.  I just realized that the esrog, the hadas, and I, are all superannuated.

Reb Moshe (OC 4:#124) indicates that they are kosher.   (Reb Reuven Feinstein argued that  his father was only mattir bedi'eved.  That may be true, but the cited teshuva shows that he was mattir lehalacha, and in the teshuva he does not say it is only bedieved.)  Reb Yaakov Kaminetsky is also mattir lechatchila.  His son in law used to raise esrogim in a greenhouse in Monsey.  However, the Chayei Adam in his Hilchos Sukka 152:3 (discussed extensively in his Nishmas Adam there) is not sure of the halacha in the case of all the four minim.  Although he believes they ought to be kosher, he has a problem with a Rambam in Hilchos Trumos (second perek) that indicates the opposite.  Reb Aharon Kotler was the biggest machmir on this issue.  He held that not only is such a fruit not kosher for Sukkos, but if the tree the fruit grew on was ever detached from the ground, that tree is forever passul for growing arba minim.  The Yam shel Shlomo and the Chazon Ish also discuss this, but I don't have access to my notes at the moment.

As far as Brachos, the Chayei Adam in his Hilchos Brachos (I don't remember the klal number but its easy to find) says that you make a she'hakol on this kind of vegetable, and mezonos on bread that is made from this kind of wheat (astronauts, pay attention.)  However, in line with his safek in Hilchos Sukka, he leaves unresolved the halacha regarding borei pri ha'etz.

(I think it's odd to say that and explicit element- Arvei Nachal, a brook willow- is not read as requiring that it actually grow near a brook, and you can use a willow that grew far from any brook, and to then say that an implicit requirement, that the eitz be grown in the ground, is integral.)

Moonroof Schach

As for Moonroof Schach, someone pointed out that if you want to go on a trip, you can throw a schach mat over your sun or moonroof, and have a kosher sukka.  Here's a picture of the car I drive, a Subaru Forester:

The sides of the car would have a halacha of Dofen Akuma, and you can't sit under the dofen akuma, so you would have to eat under the open part, not the closed roof.  There's also an issue of having the table in a non-kosher part of the Sukka (OC 634:4).  So make sure to eat off of your lap, or to use a lap table, not the dashboard.

This arrangement is better than the idea of opening two doors on one side of the car and putting the schach on between the tops of the doors, thus creating a three-sided sukka- the car and the two doors.  The car door sukka can involve a problem of having the walls of the sukka more than three tefachim above the floor of the sukka, which is passul (no gud asik because gediim bokim bo).  The Moonroof option, on the other hand, has the walls going down to the floor.

For the first commenter, who mentioned that his daughter wants a picture of a sukka on an elephant, here.

Sukkos and Chanuka

I like to think that the end of one Yomtov is the time to start looking forward to the next one. Now that Sukkos is over, and MarCheshvan is about to begin, there's a long, empty time until the next Yomtov. But at the Ne'ilas Hachag of Simchas Torah, I heard a very nice dvar Torah from a young man, Joey Nussbaum, and it bears repeating both because of the connection between Sukkos and Chanuka and because of the explanation it provides to a perplexing Gemara in Shabbos.

We all know the Beis Yosef's question about why we celebrate eight days, when the miraculous long-burning oil only lasted seven days more than it normally would. The Aruch Hashulchan addresses this question in OC 670:5. He brings from the Sefer Chashmona'i that in the year before Matisyahu's rebellion, Antiochus had prevented the korban celebration of Sukkos and Shemini Atzeres. Therefore, when the Jews were able to re-inaugurate the Beis Hamikdash, they intentionally celebrated for eight days, in order to show that they were making up for the lost days of Sukkos and Shemini Atzeres. The eight days of burning, then, were simply a heavenly ratification of their decision to establish this eight day holiday. (This is actually made clear in the Megillas Chashmona'im.)

With this we can finally understand what Shammai means by saying that we should start with eight candles and go down one every day just as was done with the bulls that are brought on Sukkos. Everyone reading the Gemara is puzzled by this association, because this reverse progression is unique to Sukkos, and why would Chanuka davka reflect the singular rules of Sukkos? But now we understand that Chanuka was viewed as a stand-in, as a commemoration, of the Sukkos holiday and korbanos that they had been prevented from bringing.

This also explains why we find dinim of hiddur on Chanuka that we generally don't find in other dinim. The reason is, again, because Chanuka is, to some extent, a quasi-Sukkos, and Sukkos is a holiday when hiddur on the esrog and all the minim is stressed to an unusual extent.

Micha Berger of http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2006/11/chayei-sarah-kibbush-and-chizuq.shtml commented that he heard this association from Rav Aharon Soloveichik in 1993, and expanded on it with something else he heard from him. What follows is from Micha's website, Aspaqlaria, at the above link.

R. Chaim Soloveitchik holds that there is a distinct difference between the sanctity of Eretz Yisroel that came with the first commonwealth and that of the second.

The first Temple did not create a permanent qedushah (holiness). The reason given is “that which was acquired through conquering is lost through conquering. The First Commonwealth built on land acquired in the wars of the days of Yehoshua and the Shoftim (Judges), was itself conquered.

The Second Commonwealth was “merely” an immigration of a group of Jews who decided to live in the land as Jews. It is predicated on the mitzvos done there, the education of children raised there. That kind of sanctity can not be undone. “Qidshah lisha’atah viqidshah le’asid lavo – it was sanctified for its time and sanctified for all time to come”. Even today, Har Habayis (the Temple Mount) has the sanctity of the Temple.

R. Aharon understands his grandfather’s words in the light of this distinction. The first commonwealth was founded on kibbush. It therefore had an inherently inferior qedushah. The second commonwealth was built by chazaqah. When Hashem tells Zecharia, “Not by force and not by might but by My spirit”, He is saying that the second Temple should be build on chazaqah, not kibbush, to lead to a permanent sanctification. “Neqeivah tesoveiv gever.”

Rav Aharon Soloveitchik notes Chanukah’s connection to Sukkos. According to Seifer haMakabiim, on the first Chanukah people who had just missed being oleh regel, going up to the beis hamiqdash, with their esrog and lulav, did so then at their first opportunity. Beis Shammai taught that one should light 8 lights the first night of Chanukah, 7 the second, learning from the 70 bulls offered for the mussaf on Sukkos, which also declined in number each day: 14 the first day, 13 the second, etc… Rav Yosi bar Avin or R’ Yosi bar Zevida explains that Beis Shammai are emphasizing the link between Chanukah and Sukkos. (We follow Beis Hillel, and teach that the ideal is to increase as the holiday progresses. They do not deny the connection; but rather Beis Hillel asserts an overriding halachic principle — that we increase in holiness over time.)

The concept of being a geir vetoshav is at the center of the similarity between the two holidays. Sukkos is a time when the toshav leaves his home to experience geirus in the Sukkah. Chanukah is also about the ger’s Chazaqah, the rededication of the second Beis haMiqdash. Not about winning the war – the war wouldn’t be over for years – but about being able to live in Israel as Jews, with access to the beis hamiqdash.

Yalkut Shimoni at the End of Iyov and Sukkos

התמלא בשכות עורו. אמר רבה בר בר חנה עתיד הקב"ה לעשות סוכה לצדיקים לע"ל (כתוב בישעיה רמז תק"ג). אמר ר' לוי כל מי שמקיים מצות סוכה בעולם הזה אף הקב"ה מושיבו בסוכתו של לויתן לעתיד לבא שנאמר התמלא בשכות עורו וגו', את מוצא בשעה שבאו יסורין על איוב היה עומד וקורא תגר אחר מדת הדין שנאמר מי יתן ידעתי ואמצאהו אדעה מלים יענני, אמר לו הקב"ה איוב מה אתה עומד ואומר מי יתן ידעתי ואמצאהו הרי עורו של לויתן שאני עתיד לעשות לצדיקים לעתיד לבא אם חסר אני מטלית אחת ממנו יש לך למלאת שנאמר התמלא בשכות עורו, וא"ת עורו של לויתן אינו דבר משובח, א"ר פנחס הכהן בר חייא ור' ירמיה בש"ר שמואל בר רב יצחק פספסי הרוחות שלו מכהות גלגל חמה שנאמר האומר לחרס ולא יזרח. ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט, אין לך מזוהם של דג אלא מקום רפידתו, ומקום רפידתו של לויתן יפה של זהב לכך נאמר ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט. ד"א האומר לחרס ולא יזרח מקום רפידתו חרוץ הוא זהב שנאמר ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט.

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This is from the Yalkut Shimoni toward the end of Iyov. The reason I posted it is this: The fortieth perek of Iyov, where Hashem responds to Iyov's bewildered complaint, has a surprising number of (40:21-22, and 40:31) apparent references to Sukkos. Some mefarshim have translated these words to mean very different things, (e.g., 'Tzalzel' either meaning 'shade' or 'a fish-processing knife'). Thus, התמלא בשכות עורו can mean "Can you riddle his skin with barbs," meaning "Would you, Iyov, dare to lay a hand on the Leviathan?". But others read it as meaning "Will you complete the Sukkah with (the Leviathan's) hide?"

The Yalkut (40:31) takes the latter approach, and says that the pesukim allude to the following dialogue between Hashem and Iyov.

I'll try to translate.

"Will you finish the Sukkah with the Leviathan's hide?" Rabbah bar bar Channa said: in the future, Hashem will make Sukkos for the Tzadikim. Rav Levi said, whoever fulfills the mitzva of Sukka in this world, Hashem will settle him in a Sukka made of the hide of the Leviathan in the coming future, as it says "Will you finish the Sukkah with the Leviathan's hide."
You find that when suffering came upon Iyov, he complained about his strict punishment and said "If only I could know, if only I could find Him, I would like to know what words He could use to explain what is happening to me!" Hashem answered, "You say you want to know? Look: I will one day make a Sukka from the hide of the Leviathan; if it will be missing one side, will you complete it? If you say 'with the skin of the Leviathan,' is that not praiseworthy?
Rav Pinchas... and Rav Yirmiah... say, the corners of his sides dim the orbit of the Sun... there is no more foul part of a fish than its bottom; the bottom of the Levyasan is as beautiful as gold."

(end of Yalkut)

I can't tell you what this mysterious Yalkut means. But I do know the following:
1. It has something to do with Sukkos.
2. Hashem comforted the tragedy-beset Iyov by showing a connection between the suffering of the righteous in this world and the fact that a Sukka is kosher even when missing one entire wall.
3. It says that only Hashem can complete the fourth side of a sukka made from the hide of the Leviathan.

This may be one of the many medrashim that is so hopelessly obscure as to remain hefker to whatever pshat people want to impute to it. But I am hoping to get a clear and convincing pshat before yomtov is over. I know that Reb Aharon Soloveichik has a pshat in the Yalkut. I have to think about it before posting it.

Chaim B of DivreiChaim.blogspot.com referred me to Reb Tzadok, who says (see comments; it's on page 244 of the hebrewbooks.org volume I) that the idea of Sukkas Oro Shel Liviyasan means that tzadikim, having overcome the Yetzer Hara in this world, will be seated in a sukka made from an animal that represents untrammeled physicality and driving desire, (the Liviyasan being a combination of the Nachash and Dagim, which profligately engage in pirya verivya,) and that this animal was the source of Adam and Chava's "kosnos ohr." Thank you, Chaim. But Reb Tzadok's pshat does not address the connection to Iyov.

See further in the comments for a pshat from the Yismach Moshe that does specifically talk about this Medrash. I'm still hoping for more kipshuto.

Thanks to the wonders of the internet, I received a pshat from the author of the earlier post (on Meva'eit), who said the following:

Sukka is known to represent Hashem's protection and Hashgacha (e.g. Erchin 32b ואגין זכותא עלייהו כי סוכה, and the interchange of Shomer Amo Yisrael Laad <-> Hapores Sukkat Shalom).

Sukka tells us that it is just so that one could be in a place where the 4th wall is missing, the 3rd is only tephach, and the other two are some combination of God, Lavud & Dophen Akumma. Yet, it is a kosher Sukka.
(Note: The writer is referring to the halacha that a sukka does not need four walls. A Sukka is halachically adequate if it has two 'whole' walls, a third wall that is a few inches long, and no fourth wall at all. Even the two 'whole' walls don't have to be whole: they can be perforated and short and afford no privacy or protection.)

We often look around and see holes in this protection shield. Iyyov feels he was left out there, no Mechitzos, no protection around. But, when he would see the full picture, the full Sukka, it should become clear that what looked like nothing around was in fact part of the bigger Sukkat Livyatan. Would he then dare to "fix" it?

And now I understand what I had heard in the name of Reb Aharon Soloveichik. I was missing some minor elements of what Reb Aharon said, but having seen this pshat, it is clear to me that this is precisely what Reb Aharon meant.

The Sukka represents Hashem's protection, the Hashgacha Pratis of Klal Yisrael. But the Sukka, ironically, is the merest scrap of a house-- not only is the roof barely functional, but the walls are merely ideas or symbols of walls, more absent than present. The mussar haskeil is that davka this Sukka teaches us that Hashem's inexorable hashgacha, the hashgacha that makes us indestructible, seems to be so fragile, it's barely there, but is no less real for that. As Reb Aharon said, the Mechitza that is there ahl pi din (tzuras hapesach, pi tikra, omeid meruba ahl haparutz, lavud, dofen akuma, Gud Asik, Pasei Bira'os, and all the dinim we use to create mechitzos, as Reb Eli mentioned) can be more real than a physical mechitza. Similarly, the deficiencies and deprivations we perceive in our life experience are often only epiphenomena; the deeper reality of the richness of a Torah life is truer than that which our limited perception can comprehend.

Yasher Kochachem to Rabbanim and Doctoirim Gary S, Chaim B, and Eli E!

I later saw that the Aruch Laner mentions this medrash too: 

Aruch Laner explains that by showing Iyov the halacha that a sukkah is composed of only three walls, of which the third may be only a tefach, Hashem demonstrated that this world's existence is temporary, as it serves as a portal of passage to the eternal world of the souls in the World-to-Come.  If a person 's lot is one of suffering, he need  not feel that he has been deprived of his deserved comfort and tranquility.  In fact, this state of difficulty should provide hope that his true reward will be eternal.   

Lulov before Shachris-- A Todir Kodem Problem

Moved to Beis Vaad.

A Remarkable Brisker Chumra on S'chach

I saw the strangest thing in the Brisker sefer (anonymous, printed taf shin nun gimmel) on the moadim. He brings that R Chaim was choshesh for the shitta of the Magen Avraham in OC 14 and 649 that l’chatchila only a bar chiyuva can make tzitzis or put s'chach on or even tie the lulav together.  Not only was Reb Chaim machmir like the Magen Avraham, but he was machmir more than the Magen Avraham:  The Magen Avraham says that the whole thing is just Lechatchila; and also, if the child is thirteen we are not chosheish that he is not a gadol.  Apparently, Reb Chaim was chosheish to such an extent that when he found out that a thirteen year old had put the s'chach on a sukkah, he refused to eat there, because he didn't want to rely on Chazaka d'Rabba for De'oraysas.  (Obviously, Reb Chaim wasn't machmir because the Magen Avraham says so, he was machmir because held like the Magen Avraham, but not just as a chashash lechatchila, but mei'ikar hadin.)

R Moshe talks about this chumrah in Igros OC 5 page 133. He disagrees with the Magen Avraham on two points.

First, he (and the Mishneh Brura) says that the Rema that says that yeish omrim that a woman should not tie tzitzis is not because of Rabbeinu Tam’s limud that the same way women cannot write tefillin because “uchsavtam/uk’shartam” which teaches that “kol she’yeshno b’kshira yeshno b’ksiva,” applies to all mitzvos, but rather the Maharam’s “dabeir el b’nei Yisrael v’assu lahem tzitzis,” which teaches “v’lo akum,” and which the Maharam says also excludes women.  The Maharam is specific to the mitzvoh of tzitzis and unrelated to other mitzvos.

Second, he says that even Rabbeinu Tam, whose shitta excluding a non-bar-chiyuva the Magen Avraham says would apply to tzitzis, agudas lulav, and putting up the s'chach, does not really hold like that. Rabbeinu Tam’s limud only applies to objects which have no meaning outside of the mitzva, like lulav agud and tzitzis. But where the object exists independent of the mitzva, like schach l’sheim tzeil, even Rabbeinu Tam would agree a woman can make the sukka.

Reb Moshe notes that Tosfos in Gittin 45a DH Kol says that RT said his din on tzitzis and igud lulav and asks that Rabbeinu Tam’s din should also apply to passel a women from putting on the s'chach, and this is shver from ganba’ch and Tosfos bleibs shver. R Moshe says that the answer to Tosfos’ kashe is that Rabbeinu Tam never meant to apply his din to Sukka.

Then R Moshe has an interesting discussion about the idea of Hiddur Mitzva. He says that the Machzor Vitri’s pshat in hiddur mitzvoh is that you should be machmir to do the mitzva fully with all chumros and things that contribute to the kiyum hamitzva, and has nothing to do with esthetic beauty. For example, putting on a gartel is a noi mitzva because it adds to Hikone. So it could be that Rabbeinu Tam holds like the Machzor Vitri, and holds that the din hiddur we find by igud lulav is because it contributes to holding the minim together, which is a to’eles in the kiyum hamitzva. If so, this explains Rabbeinu Tam’s reason for not having a women do the igud, because igud is not just hiddur, it is a part of the tzuras hamitzva. (See Parshas Lech Lecha, Breishis 12:1, where I bring from the Brisker Rov that the ambiguity of the identity of the land to which Avram was told to go was intended so that the halicha should be mitzva atzma and not just hachanoa.)

I am told that the Briskers hold that the Rambam holds like the Machzor Vitri.

This was originally posted in '06, and has been edited for stylistic consistency and clarity.  Mostly the former. 



However, you can’t go too far with this shittoh, because the Rambam in 7 Issurei Mizbei’ach says that from the possuk by Hevel, which says that Hevel brought beautiful korbonos and “vayisha Hashem el Hevel v’ehl minchoso” shows that whatever mitzvoh you do should be done in a beautiful way. The Rambam there says clearly that he is referring to esthetic beauty. But it is also interesting that he doesn’t prove it from the regular din of hiddur mitzvoh or from v’anveihu. Also, the Brisker Rov somewhere in his pirush on the gemora says that there is a special din by korbonos of ‘meichelveihem,’ which is not connected to ‘v’anveihu.’

So the bottom line is that R Moshe holds that even if you are machmir like Rabbeinu Tam, it would only apply to tzitzis and lulov, but not other mitzvos. But b’etzem he holds like the Maharam, which is limited to tzitzis, and would be mattir even lulov. He says he is surprised that the Bikkurei Yaakov paskened like RT, and he paskens instead like the Maharam. Imagine how surprised he would be at the story of R Chaim not sitting in the Sukkoh because a boy of thirteen put on the schach, and maybe he didn’t have shtei sa’aros.