NOTE: BETWEEN DECEMBER 2013 AND JANUARY 2019 NEW POSTS OF SERIOUS DIVREI TORAH WERE POSTED ONLY AT Beis Vaad L'Chachamim, beisvaad.blogspot.com AS OF JANUARY 2019 I PLAN TO POST IN BOTH PLACES


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Showing posts with label Shlach. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shlach. Show all posts

Monday, July 01, 2019

Shlach. Word Choice Exposes Secret Thoughts

Reading the Parshas HaMeraglim reveals very little about what the problem was, about the root of the tragic episode.  Only in Arvos Mo'av, when Moshe Rabbeinu reviews the history of Klal Yisrael during his time as their leader, do we get an idea of where we went wrong.

Devarim 1:22
ותקרבון אלי כלכם ותאמרו נשלחה אנשים לפנינו ויחפרו־לנו את־הארץ וישבו אתנו דבר את־הדרך אשר נעלה־בה ואת הערים אשר נבא אליהן

Rashi
ותקרבון אלי כלכם. בְּעִרְבּוּבְיָא; וּלְהַלָּן הוּא אוֹמֵר (דברים ה') "וַתִּקְרְבוּן אֵלַי כָּל רָאשֵׁי שִׁבְטֵיכֶם וְזִקְנֵיכֶם וַתֹּאמְרוּ הֵן הֶרְאָנוּ וְגוֹ'", אוֹתָהּ קְרִיבָה הָיְתָה הוֹגֶנֶת – יְלָדִים מְכַבְּדִים אֶת הַזְּקֵנִים וּשְׁלָחוּם לִפְנֵיהֶם, וּזְקֵנִים מְכַבְּדִים אֶת הָרָאשִׁים לָלֶכֶת לִפְנֵיהֶם, אֲבָל כָּאן "וַתִּקְרְבוּן אֵלַי כֻּלְּכֶם" בְּעִרְבּוּבְיָא – יְלָדִים דּוֹחֲפִין אֶת הַזְּקֵנִים, וּזְקֵנִים דּוֹחֲפִין אֶת הָרָאשִׁים (ספרי):

Also, both the Kli Yakar and the Shach al HaTorah.

Shach al HaTorah
Not Shabsai Kohen (Vilna 1622-1663.) Mordechai Kohen (Tzfas  slightly earlier.)
ויתורו את ארץ כנען לא כמו שאמרו הם ויחפרו לנו את הארץ שפיהם הכשילם שאמרו ויחפרו שעל ידי זה השליחות נגזר עליהם שימותו במדבר והיו בכל לילה חופרים קבריהם ושוכבים בתוכם ולמחר מכריזים הבדלו חיים מתוך מתים אלא ויתרו כתיב היתרון שיש לארץ כנען על שאר ארצות 

Kli Yakar (Prague 1550-1619)
ויתורו את ארץ כנען מצינו ג' לשונות בענין זה ויתורו ויחפרו וירגלו כי ישראל אמרו (דברים א כב) נשלחה אנשים לפנינו ויחפרו לנו את הארץ והקב"ה אמר ויתורו את ארץ כנען ובמרגלים כתיב (שם א כד) וירגלו אותה לפי שג' דעות היו באותה עצה כי הקב"ה אמר ויתורו שיש במשמעתו גם לשון יתרון כי רצה הקב"ה להראות להם יתרון הארץ על כל הארצות כמ"ש (שמות ג ח) ולהעלותו מן הארץ ההיא אל ארץ טובה ורחבה וטובה זו היא הטובה הרוחנית מצד היותה אוירא דמחכים (ב"ב קנח) כי זה הכנה אל האדם לבא על ידו לכלל הטובה האמיתית כי אין לאדם יתרון תחת השמש זולתו ויתרון ארץ זה בכל היא (קהלת ה ח) אבל ישראל רוח אחרת היתה עמהם כי תמיד היו מבקשים תואנה לשוב מצרימה וע"כ אמרו ויחפרו שיש במשמעתו לשון חרפה כי ערות הארץ רצו לראות כדי שיהיה להם מקום ללון ולומר נתנה ראש ונשובה מצרימה אבל מ"מ לא בקשו שיוציאו מלבם דבה שקרית והמרגלים השחיתו התעיבו יותר ממה שבקשו מהם והוציאו מלבם מלין שקרים כדרך כל הולך רכיל המפליג כל דבר להגיד יותר ממה שראה לכך נאמר וירגלו אותה כי רגל לשון רכיל כמו שפירש"י על פסוק לא תלך רכיל  (ויקרא יט טז)  

So, what do we have?
1. That they did not have Yishuv HaDaas. They were Pochazim. Every Baal Mussar knows that Pezizus, haste, panic, impetuousness, leads to self destructive behavior.

2.  That while the Ribono shel Olam, or Moshe, used the word ויתורו, Klal Yisrael said ויחפרו. As both the Kli Yakar and Rav Mordechai HaKohen say, although the two words are technically synonymous, choosing one over the other reveals a tremendous difference in what motivates you. ויתורו connotes "looking for the benefit." ויחפרו , the way I like to say this vort, means "dig up dirt." The Kli Yakar says it relates to חרפה. Even though that requires transposition of two letters, that doesn't matter. We're talking about the secrets of the soul, and in our mouths, the two words are very similar. The Shach says it relates to the graves they dug on Tisha B'Av.

I used this vort by an Aufruf for my great nephew, Binyomin Ray, and my son Mordechai used it at a nephew's Bar Mitzva. The point is the same. Nothing in life is perfect. The Ribono shel Olam always challenges us. The attitude towards challenges, the lenses through which we view the world, makes the difference between a life that poisons itself and everyone around it, and a blessed and fruitful life.  Do you look for opportunities that the Ribono shel Olam is giving you, or do you kvetch and cry and run away?   Will you live with an עין טובה or an עון רעה?  Will you live with  ויתורו or ויחפרו. 

Friday, June 17, 2011

Shlach, Bamidbar 15:35. Kashering Chillul Shabbos

This was originally posted in 2011.  I am re-posting because of an important addition, number VI below.

Synopsis:
Doing Melacha on Shabbos is a capital aveira.  But doing melacha to save a life is not only allowed, it is a mitzva.  Two questions arise.  Why doesn't the rule of Ho'il allow all melacha on Shabbos since the fruit of the melacha might be used for a sick person?  Also, even assuming that Ho'il does not allow melacha on Shabbos, what if a person was intentionally mechallel Shabbos, but in fact the fruit of his melacha was needed for and used by a sick person?  Would this retroactively kasher/excuse his chillul Shabbos?

If you're looking for chizuk in hashkafa or mussar, this is not it, but you could go to here or here.

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Our parsha tells us of the M'kosheish, a man that openly and rebelliously was mechallel Shabbos, and that he was found guilty of this crime and executed.


Chillul Shabbos is a capital aveira. The punishment is not merely theoretical, it can actually be carried out where there was hasra'a and zadon. There are two fundamental questions about what might excuse a mechallel Shabbos be'meizid.


I

Question one: 
While it is permitted to cook on Yomtov for a Yomtov meal, it is prohibited to cook on Yomtov in preparation for a weekday meal.  The rule called "Ho'il" relaxes this prohibition, because even though he intends to use the food for the weekday meal, if unexpected guests were to come on Yomtov, he would serve what he cooked to his guests on Yomtov, so the cooking is viewed as if it were for Yomtov use..  Ho'il allows us to say that as long as guests could possibly come, the issur of Yomtov is removed.  We don't care if guests actually come or not: as long as they could come, and there is a potential that the cooking you are doing on Yomtov will be needed for Yomtov, you're off the hook.  The issur of cooking on Yomtov for a weekday only applies, then, if you cook right before the end of yomtov, when it is impossible for guests to come and eat.

Pikuach Nefesh is Docheh Shabbos.  If there were a sick person who needed whatever the Mekosheish was being mekosheish, it would be muttar- indeed a mitzvah- to do it.  So why don't we apply the rule of Ho'il?  As long as what the mechallel Shabbos is doing might possibly be necessary to save a choleh, he should be pattur.

Tosfos asks this question in two places.  
First, it's important to see the Gemara in Menachos 64a
דאיתמר שמע שטבע תינוק בים ופרש מצודה להעלות דגים והעלה דגים חייב להעלות דגים והעלה דגים ותינוק רבא אמר חייב ורבה אמר פטור ועד כאן רבה לא קא פטר אלא כיון דשמע אמרי'  נמי דעתיה אתינוק אבל לא שמע לא ואיכא דאמרי א"ל היינו פלוגתייהו דרבה ורבא דאיתמר (לא) שמע שטבע תינוק בים ופרש מצודה להעלות דגים והעלה דגים חייב להעלות דגים והעלה תינוק ודגים רבה אמר פטור ורבא אמר חייב רבה אמר פטור זיל בתר מעשיו ורבא אמר חייב זיל בתר מחשבתו 

A.  In Menachos 64a Tosfos DH Le'haalos he says
להעלות  דגים והעלה דגים ותינוק:  לא דמי לאופה מיו״ט לחול דבפרק אלו  עוברין דפטרינן מטעם הואיל ומקלעי ליה אורחין ונימא  הכא נמי הואיל ופטר ליה אתינוק פטור נמי אדגים דהתם הוא דאפייתו חזיא לצורך יו״ט אבל הכא צידת דגים לא חזיא בשבת
He seems to mean that ho'il only helps when there is one act and one result, but if the one act had two results, and one of the results is not excused by the ho'il, then he is chayav.

B.  In Pesachim 46b Tosfos says 
א"כ ביטלת כל מלאכת שבת הואיל וראוי לחולה שיש בו סכנה וי"ל  כיון דלא שכיח כלל לא אמרינן הואיל
Here, Tosfos simply says that ho'il won't work where the excuse-event is extremely unlikely.  This is similar to the Tosfos' (Gittin 33a) teretz on hasra'as safek because you might be sho'eil.

The two teirtuzim are completely different and have different ramifications le'halacha.


II
Question two:
Let's assume that Ho'il does not apply to Melacha on Shabbos.  Even so, there ought to be a way to kasher chillul Shabbos.
If a person was willfully mechallel Shabbos, and as it turned out, the fruit of his chillul Shabbos was actually needed to save someone's life, such that if he hadn't done the melacha, it would have been a mitzva to do it, is he pattur?  Does this circumstance, which the malefactor was not aware of but which did exist at the time of the chillul kasher his chillul Shabbos, or does pikuach nefesh require awareness of the hetter to be invoked?  Is unwitting pikuach nefesh docheh Shabbos?



PLEASE note that Questions one and two are different.  Question one is why doesn't ho'il patter chillul Shabbos: in other words, regardless of whether the fruit of the melacha was needed, the possibility that it might be needed is enough to allow bishul on Yomtov, and so why doesn't the possibility it might be needed for pikuach nefesh allow most melachos on Shabbos.  Question two is, assuming there's no din of Ho'il on Shabbos, what if in fact someone ran into the house of the mechallel Shabbos and said "Baruch Hashem you cooked soup, because Shmerel the Choleh is dying for chicken soup!"  Would this excuse the sheigitz that cooked the soup?

The discussion among the Achronim regarding Question two is as follows.

A.  Rav Yosef Dovid Zintsheim (in his Yad Dovid on Menachos, available from Machon Yerushalayim,) writes that this hangs on the Machlokes Rabba and Rava in Menachos 64a (that we brought down in Section I,) and that according to Rabba, if you end up using the cooked food for the sick person, the chillul Shabbos will be kashered.  In other words, it will lemafrei'a not be called chillul.

B.  Reb Meir Simcha (Ohr Sameiach 2 Shabbos 16) modifies this slightly, and says that Rabba in the Gemara in Menachos is only saying he's pattur from Skila, that there won't be missas beis din, but certainly the person needs kapara no less than the woman in "va'hashem yislach lah," in Nazir 23a, where the Gemara says that a person who thought the food was treif and ate it anyway, and it turned out it was kosher, this person needs kapara and even is chayav Makkas Mardus.

C.  Reb Meir Don Plotzki (Kli Chemda in Vayechi) says that Rabba in the Gemara in Menachos is only saying he does not/can not bring a Korban for a Shogeig, but even Rabba agrees that the malefactor is chayav Missas Beis Din, or at least Kareis. 

What a difference between Reb Meir Simcha and RMDP!

D.  Reb Elchonon in Kovetz Shiurim Pesachim 193, to Daf 46b, says that the machlokes whether you say Ho'il is whether you go after the act, which might be justified, or the kavana, which is to use it after yomtov. He says that according to Rav Chisda that you don't say ho'il, even if guests come you'll remain chayv. BUT he brings the Meiri there, who says that even according to Rav Chisda, who doesn't hold of Ho'il, if guests do show up he's pattur; the same would apply to Shabbos and Pikuach Nefesh.  (Don't tell me that there's a difference between cooking on Yomtov and pikuach nefesh on Shabbos.  The Gemara in Pesachim 47b makes it clear that the rationale of Ho'il applies to cases of Dechiya.)  In any case, Reb Elchonon disagrees with the Meiri.

III
Question two has an interesting permutation.  Borer, separating good from bad, is muttar only if you are going to eat/use the good now.  If you are putting it away for another time, e.g., you are being borer Friday night for use at Seuda Shlishis, that is pure Borer and is Chillul Shabbos.  Reb Yosef Chaim of Baghdad (Rav P'alim OC 1:12) discusses a case where the person was borer good from bad to eat later, but then he changed his  mind and ate it right away.  Pattur or Chayav?  Also, what if he was borer to eat right away, but then didn't.  Pattur or Chayav?  You can see that the issue is similar.

A.  Rav Yosef Chaim says that all that matters is what he was intending when he did the breira.  Unlike Yomtov, there is a din of M'leches Machsheves on Shabbos.  This rule can apply to say that if he did the melacha with the intent that is part of the definition of the melacha, then it is a melacha, and nothing that happens later will change that.  Furthermore, this case is not exactly like the Gemara in Menachos.  In Menachos, what he did was an act that was muttar, although he did not know it.  Here, the act is assur.  What he does later does not change the nature of the act retroactively.

B.  He says that if not for this answer, we would have a conundrum.  How can any borer be chayav when the rule of Ho'il would say that since he might eat it right away, it should be muttar whether he does or doesn't eat it now.  Tosfos in Pesachim will not help us, because this is obviously not uncommon.  We must say, therefore, that Ho'il is totally inapplicable to Shabbos, because the rule of M'leches Machsheves defines the melacha on the basis of intent, irrespective of what he could have planned and what might happen.

C.  I have a little trouble understanding what he is saying.  As I understand it, the cases where Boreir is muttar are based on Derech Achila.  Derech Achila requires intent at that moment.  If the intent was not as Derech Achila, nothing you do later will matter.  Conversely, if the intent was Derech Achila, it doesn't matter whether you ate or did not eat.  

IV
There was a Rov in Chicago many years ago by the name of Rabbi Yosef Kagan.   He was a grandson of the Chafetz Chaim, whose daughter married a man named Kagan, just like her own name.  He was a great talmid chacham, but was not the type to seek out people to talk to.  In 1961 he printed a little sefer called עיוני הלכה והגיונות, and one of the divrei Torah is on our sugya.  He also talks about how Meleches Machsheves plays out in the Gemara in Menachos.  He reads the following into the Binyan Shlomo: that even Rava who holds that one who caught fish and saved a drowning child is chayav, that is only when he intended to catch fish and he caught fish, and the child was not what he had in mind.  Only then does Rava hold that Meleches Machsheves makes him chayav.  But if he cooked something to eat on Shabbos, and it turned out to be needed by a choleh, everyone would agree that he is pattur.  To the omniscient view, his entire act was muttar.  Only where he also caught fish, or by korbanos, where the din of Hiddur requires awareness of Hiddur, does Rava argue.  He then uses Meleches Machsheves just like Rav Yosef Chaim, to eliminate Ho'il from Shabbos calculations.  He  reads this pshat into the Tosfos there DH L'haalos.

V
The Gemara in Pesachim 47b asks, if we use Ho'il, then why is a person who plows on Yomtov chayav?  Plowing would be muttar if he were doing it to turn over soil to use for Kisui HaDam, so even if he's doing it for a different reason, ho'il should be mattir- Ho'il if he were to shecht a bird he would need it for kisui, under which circumstances charisha would be muttar.

Tosfos brings that the Rashbam understands the Gemara to mean that Charisha for Kisui is a Melacha She'eina Tzricha LeGufa.  If he would use the dirt for Kisui, it would turn out that the Charisha was muttar because it was a Melacha She'eina Tzricha LeGufa.  The R'i argues on the Rashbam.  He says that if you say "Ho'il that I could have done it as an eina tzricha legufa it would be muttar, so it's muttar now too," then "ביטלת כל מלאכת שבת" once again.  So Tosfos says a different pshat.  But this leaves us to wonder, why indeed don't you say a hetter of Ho'il on all melachos Shabbos, Ho'il I could end up using the fruit of the melacha in a way that makes the melacha eina tzricha le'gufa?

Reb Meir Simcha in the Ohr Sameach (1 Yomtov 7, last paragraph) says an amazing yesod:
Ho'il works only when in either case it is a melacha, but in the ho'il case, it is a melacha that is muttar.  But kavana of eina tzricha le'gufa is not a melacha at all; what you did was a melacha, and ho'il cannot reclassify what you did as a non-melacha.

Perhaps we can say the same thing to explain why ho'il won't work to be mattir on the basis of using it for a choleh.  It could be that just like hana'a from a mitzva is not called hana'a, so too, melacha for a choleh is not in the hagdara of melacha at all.  Ho'il cannot take a melacha and make it into a non-melacha.  I know this is highly debatable, but if Rav Shach's Avi Ezri can be full of svaros like this, why can't I say them once in a while?

VI
Reb Akiva Eiger in Tshuvos 5, Chasam Sofer in Tshuvos 79.  If you've gotten this far, look them up yourself.


Addition June 2015
VII
I just realized that this question is directly related to something we had once written about- Reb Shlomo Zalman's warning about which doctor should do pikuach nefesh on Shabbos.  The tzushtell is good, but it causes so many problems that I think we have no choice but to accept the svara from Reb Meir Simcha above in V and II B.

This is what I had in the other piece, which is relevant to this discussion.Regarding פקוח נפש on Shabbos, Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach  zt”l's psak is quoted by HaRav Yehoshua Yeshaya Neuwirth zt”l as follows:  (SSK 32:130)


ושמעתי מהגרש"ז אוירבעך זצ"ל , דנראה דעדיף טפי לעשות המלאכה ע"י שומר מצוות שכוונתו למצווה, כי ע"י עבריין אשר כוונתו רק עבור בצע כסף, אע"ג דקעביד מצוה, מ"מ הו"ל כנתכוין לבשר חזיר ועלה בידו בשר טלה, דמבואר בקידושין לב. תוד"ה דמחיל, דגם ע"ז יש משום "ולפני עור" וגם אפשר דבני"ד גרע טפי, כיון שבאמת יש כאן חילול שבת, ויתכן שהרופא נחשב כאינו מחלל שבת רק אם כוונתו להצלה ולא אם מכוון  לתשלום, וראה גם בספר בית הלוי עה"ת פרשת שמות. על הפסוק ״וירא אלוקים את בני ישראל״ל

Here is the Beis Halevi:
ומזה יצא למי שהיא פרוץ באחת ממצות ה׳ , אע״נ דלפעמים נתרחש לו אונס שלא יכול לקיימה מ״מ לא מקרי אונס  וכמו בשמירת שבת ונדומה דלפעמים אנוס הוא לעשות מלאכה או עבור חולה ר״ל וכדומה מ״מ לא מקרי אונס רק לאותם שהיו שומרים אותו אם לא היה האונס, אבל המחלל שבת כשאינו אנוס, גם במלאכה שהוא אנוס מקרי מחלל, וכן הוא בכל האיסורים
As we (not the royal we; I refer to the numerous contributors to that particular piece,) discussed, it is clear that RSZ is saying that the hetter of Pikuach Nefesh requires that the motivating intent is to save a life.  Where the motive is self-interest, it appears that there is no hetter of pikuach nefesh even where a life is saved.  Obviously, this is a shocking chiddush, which we discussed there at length.  But as far as the question of the day, according to RSZ, you couldn't kasher chillul Shabbos.  The hetter of dechiyah only applies where the melacha was done with the intent of saving a life.  Why?  We have to say like Reb Meir Simcha, despite all the problems it causes.

Monday, June 13, 2011

Shlach: Three Easy Pieces


All three pieces in this post are associated to some extent with the Kli Yakar.  

As the musical works listed in my profile indicate, I have a prejudicial preference for 'thirds', and what's the point of a semi-anonymous blog without an occasional eccentricity, so I'm calling this post "Three Easy Pieces."

I
Synopsis:
Human humility and honest self awareness are congruous.
Godly Humility: How we can describe Hashem as having the apparent trait of humility.

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Bamidbar Shlach 12:3, Moshe was more humble than any man on the face of the earth.


1.  It has been noted that  if you were to ask Moshe Rabbeinu "Who is the most humble man on earth?"  He would respond "I am."  He wrote it in the Torah because Hashem told him to, and he knew it was true, and that it was a praiseworthy and unprecedented achievement to have reached that madreiga of humility.  Bishlema his yedi'as hatorah, of course he knew was far beyond any other man.  But to be aware that you are the most humble of men seems to be self-contradictory.  In fact, however, this awareness did not diminish his humility at all:


Similarly, the Gemara (end of Sotah, 49b), Reb Yosef's ve'ha  ika ana, where the Mishnah says that with the death of Rebbi, humility died.  Reb Yosef protested, but what of me?  (Of course, some interpret the "Ana" in Rav Yosef's statement as referring not to himself but to some other Tanna who was famously humble.  This is not pashut pshat in the Gemara.)


Here is a famous example:
Reb Chatzkel Abramsky, the Av Beis Din in London from 1934 to 1951, a talmid of Reb Chaim Brisker, and author of the great Chazon Yechezkel on Tosefta, was was once sued by a shochet who claimed he had been fired unfairly.  As his testimony began, his attorney asked him to state his name and his position. The attorney then asked, "Is it true that you are the greatest halachic authority in the United Kingdom?  Rav Abramsky said, "Yes. That is true."

At that point the judge interjected and said, "Rabbi Abramsky, do your laws and ethics not teach you to be humble?  
Would you not say that this is somewhat haughty on your part?  Rav Abramsky responded, "Yes, we are taught to be humble. But I am under oath."

So it is an inescapable fact a man can know he is humble, and remain humble.

But if humility means knowing that you are no better than anyone else, how do we explain this?  He knew he was a tzadik in anivus, and that anivus is the key to a relationship with the Ribono shel Olam!


  • Life is not a sports event.  In a race, you are judged by comparing your position to that of others, irrespective of the competitors disparate natural talents.  Perhaps life is similar, and we are judged by comparison with others: see, e.g., the machlokes Rav and Shmuel by Noach Tzadik Tamim Hayah Bedorosav.  But the score is based on how close you have gotten to your tafkid, to your personal potential.  Your primary competition is your perfect self.  Moshe, knowing his flaws and failures, was humble.  He knew that he was not where he ought to be.  This awareness of his flaws and his regret for his failures meant that he was humble.  His humility was simply a matter of honest self awareness.  Nobody can be proud of an unflinching awareness of his failings.  
  • Kesef Mishna: Awareness of the greatness of other creations of Hashem makes you realize the vast chasm that separates you from perfection makes renders utterly trivial any superiority you may have over others human beings.  (Kesef Mishna in 4 Yesodei Hatorah 12.)




2.  Rav Yosef, earlier in Sotah, says that you always find that Hashem appears with anivus.  Although Hashem is "clothed with Gei'us," that is only His 'garb,' but within that garb, Hashem chooses the middah of Anivus.  Hashem, says Rav Yosef, chose Har Sinai and the Sneh to demonstrate that anivus.  How is anivus shayach by Hashem?  


That is the other part of anivus: appreciating the good qualities of others, irrespective of what you are, or of what others are.  A small mountain, a thornbush, have qualities of their own.  Respecting those qualities and loving the thing or person who has them is a form of anivus as well.  See, for example, how the Ruach Chaim explains this in Avos 4:1.


The Kli Yakar (first piece in Mikeitz, Breishis 41:1) begins with another Gemara (Megilla 31a) that associates the Ribono shel Olam with the Middah of Anivus, and explains it as follows:
 אמר רבי יוחנן, כל מקום שאתה מוצא גבורתו של הקדוש ברוך הוא, אתה מוצא ענוותנותו, דבר זה כתוב בתורה ושנוי בנביאים ומשולש בכתובים, כתוב בתורה, כי ה' אלהיכם הוא אלהי האלהים ואדוני האדונים, וכתיב בתריה, עושה משפט יתום ואלמנה, שנוי בנביאים כה אמר רם ונשא שוכן עד וקדוש וגו', וכתיב בתריה, ואת דכא ושפל רוח, משולש בכתובים, דכתיב סולו לרוכב בערבות ביה שמו, וכתיב בתריה אבי יתומים ודיין אלמנות   בנוהג שבעולם, שאדם שיש לו איזו מעלה יתר שאת על חבירו, אינו זוכר את חבירו הקטן מערכו, ובל ישא את שמו על שפתיו, מצד רום לבבו, וזו היא טענת הפילוסופים על השי"ת לאמר שלגודל רוממותו ית' אינו משגיח בשפלים בכל מה שתחת גלגל הירח, ולבטל דיעה נפסדה זו נאמר (ש"א ב ג) אל תרבו תדברו גבוה גבוה יצא עתק מפיכם כי אל דיעות ה' ולו נתכנו עלילות, ר"ל אל תדברו שמצד שהקב"ה גבוה מעל כל גבוהים אין לו ידיעה בפרטי מעשינו, כי אל דעות ה' שיש לו ידיעה בכולם ולו נתכנו כל עלילות מעשה איש. וכדי לאמת דבר זה שהקב"ה שוכן את דכא ושפל רוח, צירף הקב"ה בשמו הגדול ית' ארבע אותיות של מספר מועט יותר מכל האותיות שבאלפ"א ביתא, כשתכתוב יו"ד ה"א וי"ו ה"א הסתכל בכל האותיות כשתכתבם במלואם לא תמצא שום אות שיעלה למספר מועט כמו אלו. וכן אמרו רז"ל (מגילה יא.) א"ר יוחנן כל מקום שאתה מוצא גדולתו של הקב"ה שם אתה מוצא ענותנותו כו' מן הכתובים שנאמר (תהלים סח ה) סולו לרוכב בערבות ביה שמו, ר"ל שבחוהו ביה שמו כי עם היותו רוכב בערבות גבוה מכל אע"פ כן יה שמו, שהם האותיות הקטנים במספר והתיבה רק בעלת שני אותיות דהיינו המועט בצירוף האותיות וכל זה מופת על ענותנותו ית.

So, there are two aspects of anivus:
Awareness and hyper-criticism of one's own flaws, irrespective of whether you are ahead or behind others.
Appreciation and respect for others, irrespective of their flaws and humble state.


The idea of appreciation and respect for others is how the Netziv in our parsha explains Anivus by the Ribono shel Olam as well.  


I'm putting in a piece from the Gemara in Sotah 5a, for several reasons.  It talks about the repugnance of Ga'ava and the beauty of humility, and because it reiterates the idea of Hashem's middah of Anivus, but mostly because of the wonderful line about B'shamta if you do and B'shamta if you don't, which the Rambam brings in his pirush to Avos (4:4), and which we discuss more fully vis a vis the Ma'apilim, here.

א"ר אלעזר כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח ראוי לגדעו כאשירה כתיב הכא (ישעיהו י) ורמי הקומה גדועים וכתיב התם (דברים ז) ואשיריהם תגדעון וא"ר אלעזר כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח אין עפרו ננער שנא' (ישעיהו כו) הקיצו ורננו שכני עפר שכבי בעפר לא נאמר אלא שכני עפר מי שנעשה שכן לעפר בחייו ואמר ר' אלעזר כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח שכינה מיללת עליו שנאמר (תהילים קלח) וגבוה ממרחק יידע דרש רב עוירא ואיתימא רבי אלעזר בא וראה שלא כמדת הקב"ה מדת בשר ודם מדת בשר ודם גבוה רואה את הגבוה ואין גבוה רואה את השפל אבל מדת הקב"ה אינו כן הוא גבוה ורואה את השפל שנא' (תהילים קלח) כי רם ה' ושפל יראה אמר רב חסדא ואיתימא מר עוקבא כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח אמר הקב"ה אין אני והוא יכולין לדור בעולם שנא' (תהילים קא) מלשני בסתר רעהו אותו אצמית גבה עינים ורחב לבב אותו לא אוכל אל תקרי אותו אלא אתו לא אוכל איכא דמתני לה אמספרי לשון הרע שנא' מלשני בסתר רעהו אותו אצמית א"ר אלכסנדרי כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח אפילו רוח קימעא עוכרתו שנאמר (ישעיהו נז) והרשעים כים נגרש ומה ים שיש בו כמה רביעיות רוח קימעא עוכרתו אדם שאין בו אלא רביעית אחת עאכ"ו א"ר חייא בר אשי אמר רב ת"ח צריך שיהא בו אחד משמונה בשמינית א"ר הונא בריה דרב יהושע ומעטרא ליה כי סאסא לשבולתא אמר רבא בשמתא דאית ביה ובשמתא דלית ביה א"ר נחמן בר יצחק לא מינה ולא מקצתה מי זוטר דכתיב ביה (משלי טז) תועבת ה' כל גבה לב

II
Kli Yakar: Tzitzis- tcheiles like sea, like sky, like kisei hakavod- from Yalkut Shimoni in Haazinu:  The turbulent, restless sea always tries to break the rules and inundate the earth, but Hashem stops it.  The placid sky goes about its work with calm determination.  Same idea here- yiras onesh and ahava.  First, like Sea, which stays in bounds because of fear of Hashem's judgment.  Then like Sky, which does its work because it is the right thing to do.  Then you can come to the kisei hakavod.


III
Kli Yakar: Yom LeShana, a day for each year; in that this refers to the punishment for the Meraglim, it should be written the opposite way, Shana le'yom.  He explains that the term has a dual meaning.  Of course it means they were sentenced to wander in the desert for forty years (minus fifteen days, as explained here), one year for each day of the willful blindness of the Meraglim.  But “yom” also refers to Tisha Ba’av.  There will be one day every year that you re-experience the tzaros that resulted from what you have done here.


Postscript.
There was a man named William Temple, a Bishop of the Church of England, who happened to be a Judeophile and friend of Chief Rabbi Hertz.  He once said an interesting thing:
Humility does not mean thinking less of yourself than of other people, nor does it mean having a low opinion of your own gifts.  It means freedom from thinking about yourself at all.  

Since I wrote about humility, and that many people misunderstand it, I have to write the famous mussar joke about anivus.  A new bachur comes into Navoradok and sits down to learn mussar with hispa'alus, and begins to cry and moan "oy, I am nobody, I am nothing...."  An older bachur nudges his friend, and says "Look who thinks he's nobody."

And let us remember Winston Churchill's instructive observation, if only to eschew it.  Churchill once said "Yes, Man is but a worm, but I think that perhaps I am a glow-worm."



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Tuesday, June 01, 2010

Shlach, Bamidbar 14:34. Yom Le'Shana- A Year of Exile for each Day.

great unknown once told me a vort, which he heard in Ner Israel when it was still on Garrison Boulevard, which means many, many years ago.  I have since seen it attributed to Reb Eizikel Charif.

It says here that the punishment was “yom leshana,” a year of wandering in the desert for each day that the spies were in the Land of Israel  (14:34).  The Meraglim were in Israel forty days, so they were doomed to wander in the desert for forty years.  Now, Klal Yisrael left Mitzrayim on the 15th of Nissan, and went into Eretz Yisroel on the 10th of Nissan, which means that they weren’t in the desert a whole 40 years, but were given 4 days off. Also, even if they had gone straight from Mitzrayim to Eretz Yisroel, it would have taken them 11 days, so those eleven days have to be subtracted.  The net result is that they got 15 days off of the forty year sentence.  Why?

The passuk in 13:3, talking about the Meraglim as they began their mission, describes them as "Anashim."  Rashi says that Anashim in Tanach expresses chashivus, social prominence and spiritual eminence.  Considering what soon transpired, this is a surprising way to describe the Meraglim.  Rashi, therefore, explains that Be'osa Sha'a, kesheirim hayu- at that hour, the first hour of their mission, they were kasher, they were upstanding and good. 

And with this, he said, we can answer the question:  If the punishment was “yom lashana”, 24 hours equals 12 months, two hours equals one month, and one hour equals half a month.  Since “be’osah sha’ah kesheirim hayu,” that one hour’s worth, fifteen days, was subtracted.

Who, you wonder, was Reb Eizikel, or Isaac'l, Charif?  My father Zatzal, who spent the majority of the waking hours of his life either learning or helping Talmidei Chachamim, loved to say things he heard in Reb Aizikel's name.  (Charif is pronounced with a patach, not a kametz, and it's mi'le'eil, not like the hot pepper sauce.  Cha' rif.)  The problem is that there were two people that were called that.
  • There was the Rav of Pietrekov.  His name was Yitzchak Charif.  You can see a little sefer of his ksavim here, printed by his grandson in 1940, and, according to the grandson's introduction, having been written around one hundred years before he printed it.  The copy linked to was photographed from the Lubavitcher library; also see the haskama from Rav Sonnenfeld, (in which he refers to the author as Reb Yitzchak'l Charif) next to Rav Kook's haskama.  It reminded me that Rav Kook's kever on Har Hamenuchos is right next to or one away from that of Amram Bloi, not that chas veshalom I'm comparing any two people in this paragraph to each other.
  • And there was this Reb Izele Charif, whose family name wasn't Charif, but the adjective was so appropriate that it became his name anyway:  (From Shlomo Katz's Hamaayan on Torah.org)
    R' Yehoshua Isaac Shapiro z"l
    ("Reb Eizel Charif")
    R' Eizel was born in 1801 in Glubki, near Vilna, and his first teacher was his father, R' Yechiel. R' Eizel was a child prodigy whose genius was recognized by the age of seven, and he was soon nicknamed, "The Iron Head" (presumably because he never forgot what he learned). He later earned the nickname "Charif" / "The Sharp One," although he claimed, in his humility, that it was only an acronym of "Chatan Reb Yitzchak Fein" / "son-in-law of R' Yitzchak Fein."

    At one point, R' Eizel was a disciple of the chassidic rebbe, R' Aharon of Staroselya (a leading disciple of Chabad's founder, R' Shneur Zalman), but he later became a critic of chassidut. He also studied in the famed Blumke's kloiz in Minsk, where, it is said, he used to review the entire Talmud every month. In 1832, R' Eizel was appointed rosh yeshiva and darshan / preacher in Minsk's Kloiz Chevra Kadisha.
    R' Eizel received semichah / ordination from R' Abale, the av bet din / chief rabbinical judge of Vilna, and through the latter's recommendation was appointed a dayan / rabbinical judge in Kalvaria, Lithuania. After 1839, he held rabbinic positions in Kutna and Tiktin.
    In 1853, R' Eizel was appointed rabbi of Slonim, the town with which he his associated for posterity. In every town where he served, R' Eizel somehow found time, despite his superhuman schedule of learning and writing, to engage in numerous communal and charitable activities. In addition, many dinei Torah / legal disputes were brought to R' Eizel for resolution, and he was one of the three judges appointed to rule on the dispute involving the leadership of the Volozhin Yeshiva.
    R' Eizel's nickname, "Charif," alludes in part to his sharp sense of humor, which he readily used to humble those who he felt needed humbling and to criticize those whose scholarship was not up to par with the standard that he expected of Torah leaders. (Chassidic rebbes were frequent subjects of his witticisms.) In particular, R' Eizel was adept at making puns or plays on the words of verses and Talmudic statements.
    R' Eizel died in 1873, leaving 11 works including Emek Yehoshua, Nachalat Yehoshua and a commentary on the Jerusalem Talmud, Noam Yerushalmi. Many of his derashot are in the style of the 18th century Parashat Derachim, explaining midrashic stories and actions of biblical figures in halachic terms. All exhibit a wide-ranging knowledge of halachah, midrash and Tanach. 


     I once had the pleasure of hosting the Gadol Batorah Rabbi Yankel Drillman.  He told me another thing from Reb Aizikel.  Someone brought Reb Aizekel a sefer for a haskama, and he refused.  The shliach kept insisting, and said, "But this Rebbe and that Rebbe gave me haskamos, why won’t you?"  Reb Aizikel answered, as a Litvak would, that “Onu maskimim, ve’heim maskimim.  Onu maskimim ledivrei torah, ve’heim maskimim lidvorim be'teilim."

If  you have something from Reb Aizikel, I would love to hear it.

Another story about a haskama.  Late one night, Reb Eizekel's rebbetzin heard him pacing back and forth, muttering under his breath.  She went into the room, and heard that he was saying "Besser unter der barg! Besser unter der barg!"  "Reb Eizekel," she said, "what do you mean by that?"  He answered "Reb Ploni left me a sefer because he wanted a haskama from me.  I went through his sefer, and I remembered that when Hashem picked up the mountain and told Bnei Yisrael that if they accept the Torah, then fine, but if they don't, He will drop the mountain on them and they would be buried there.  And I say, if this is the Torah, then Besser unter der barg!"
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Thursday, June 18, 2009

Shlach and Kavod Hatorah

In scholarly journals, the first citation of an individual's name is complete: Mr./Dr./Professor/Rabbi/Cantor Ploni Baumvulshpinner. Thereafter, the citation is only to the surname-- Baumvulshpinner. Some Modern Orthodox scholarly journals adhere to this protocol as well, which is why we often see citations to Karelitz, Soloveitchik, Kotler, Kamenetsky, and Feinstein.

I have always found this unpleasant, certainly not kevod hatorah, perhaps even bizayon hatorah. Yes, it is the standard form of citation in scholarly papers and journals, but I felt that because in our tradition one always refers to an Adam Gadol by his given name and with an honorific (Sanhedrin 82a and 100a and the Margalios Hayam on Sanhedrin 102a; Bamidbar Rabba 18:7; Shemos Rabba 52:2; Shmuel I:20; Sotah 35a* ), to not do so was just another example of a mah yafiskideh aping (aping: shameless mimicry, often with absurd result; Yiddish- Nochmachen vi a malpeh) of foreign manners and mores. Like saying imitatio dei instead of ve'halachta bidrachav.

BUT, eventually I realized how unfair and provincial a criticism this is. In this week's parsha we actually find that Moshe Rabbeinu's own brother in law, one of his greatest disciples, does exactly this: see Rashi in Bamidbar 13:30. From here we see that this form of referring to Gedolei Yisrael has an ancient provenance among the Jews.

*Mar'ei me'komos credit to Beis Aharon from R. Aharon Maggid, NY tof shin choph zayin, vol 4 p. 265.

Here is another example: The leader of the Shevet of Shimon, also refers to Moshe Rabbeinu by his last name: The Gemara in Sanhedrin 82a says that Zimri ben Salu, the Nasi of the tribe of Shimon. and no doubt an honorable man, called Moshe Rabbeinu "Ben Amram."
~

Coincidentally, Rabbi Yitchok Adlerstein just posted an article on a similar topic: the monstrous and, ultimately, sterile Chimera created by the application the methodology and attitudes of modern scholarly analysis to issues of Hashkafa and halacha.
http://www.cross-currents.com/archives/2009/06/19/conversion-standards-hockey-bats-and-the-academic-approach-to-halacha/
~
And for you horror buffs-- for a skin-crawling experience, here's a download of a recent article that illustrates the problem of iconoclasts masking as preservationists- ironically, Kalev's strategy employed in pursuit of exactly the opposite result.
http://www.bmj.org.il/pdf/books/Sperber_ln.pdf
The basic idea is that Rashi, nebach neither a historian nor a scholar of Greek or Latin, didn't understand the Gemara, the Amora'im didn't understand the Tana'im, and the Tana'im didn't have clue as to the sociological mileu of the Dor Hamidbar and therefore misunderstood Moshe Rabbeinu, and really, Hashem also probably didn't really mean a lot of what He said literally, so in the name of intellectual honesty we, the enlightened, really ought to toss 90% of the mesora in favor of scientific analysis of what happened on Har Sinai, and the fact that we don't is only out of bemused loyalty to Klal Yisrael's quaint habits. I, on the other hand, think that the idea that interpretation and application of a religion is best left to its most loyal practitioners is so elementary that even a sheigitz like Augustine understood it-- "Securus judicat orbis terrarum". Or, as GB Shaw once said, there is such a thing as a fundamental rectitude that can bear any quantity of superficial aberrations.
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Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Shlach: The Sins of Humility, Faith, and Scrupulosity

Brought in the name of Rav Kook in Chaim Sabato's Ahavat Torah:

Only with humility is Eretz Yisroel conquered: it says “tovah ha’aretz me’ohd me’ohd,” and in Pirkei Avos it says “me’ohd me’ohd hevei shefal ru’ach.” This unusual expression, "me'od me'od", shows a relationship between humility and our ability to acquire the land of Israel.

Rav Kook adds that this is what it means in Tehillim 37:11 “ve’anavim yirshu eretz,” the meek shall inherit the earth; Aretz, in this passuk, means Eretz Yisrael. (Also quoted by the Nesivos Shalom from the Rebbe of Lechowitz. Also, see Reb Isaac Sher's similar approach to the mistake of the Meraglim.)

So it was known to the Meraglim that humility was a central ingredient in Yerushas Eretz Yisrael, and no doubt they prepared themselves accordingly; they learned mussar with hispa'alus, they did a cheshbon hanefesh, a spiritual audit. They went on their mission well prepared, with the requisite shiflus haru'ach. But it seems that this good thought was misapplied, and was ultimately counterproductive. They felt that the hanhaga of lema'ala miderech hateva, the supernatural protection of the Jewish people, would stop upon entering Eretz Yisrael, and Hashem would leave them to their own zechusim and abilities: they said they felt like chagavim, that bederech hateva they had no hope of conquering the land, even if Hashem would help in a derech hateva way. Their sin was misapplied humility.

Scrupulosity is the conviction of spiritual uncleanliness, of unworthiness, the inflation of trivial failings into major catastrophes. Scrupulosity, and its brother, unctuousness, perhaps are, perhaps are not, sinful. I've known several people who were classically unctuous as young men, but who ended up becoming successful and influential Mashgichim. (By the way; the etymology of unctuous is the Latin word for oily, or greasy, because these people often walk around rubbing their hands around each other as if the are rubbing oil into their hands. Thus, the epithet 'greaseball' in the Yeshiveshe jargon. This phenomenon, evidently, is not exclusive to our yeshivos.) But these traits, unless carefully controlled, certainly can become counter-productive.  Think about Reb Zecharia ben Avkilus!

After the disaster of the Meraglim, a group of contrite men decided that they would take their lives into their hands and march into Eretz Yisrael- the Ma'apilim.  They were all killed.  The sin of the ma’apilim was misapplied bitachon. They believed that if they bravely put themselves into danger, if they did like Nachshon ben Aminadav at the Yam Suf, Hashem would step in in recognition of their faith in Him. (The Netziv there says that they hoped their bravery and trust would elicit Hashem's help; and if it didn't, it was better to die ahl kiddush Hashem in the attempt than to live through the forty years of the Midbar.) They, and the Meraglim, made the mistake of applying middos tovos without constant appraisal of whether the middos were serving Hashem’s will.

You can’t let a midda tova run away with you; you need to constantly reassess whether the middah is being used correctly.  This is what Rava (Sotah 5a) means when he says, regarding humility,  בשמתא דאית ביה ובשמתא דלית ביה.  Excommunicated in whom it is, excommunicated in whom not.

How, you wonder, can a person be liable for well-intentioned mistakes? Beyond the issue of punishing intellectually sincere non-believers, here the question is more serious: here, the sins stemmed from anivus and bitachon; shouldn't they have been rewarded for good faith? Even if they didn't deserve reward, did they deserve such serious punishment for what must have been well-motivated errors? And similarly, why did Hashem punish the generation of the Midbar for what Hashem said was a sin of "Lo he'eminu." If you don't believe, you don't believe. Belief is, after all, an inevitable outgrowth of experience: you trust those who earn your trust, and nobody else. If you don't trust someone, whose fault is it? If Klal Yisrael didn't believe, whose fault was it?

The answer seems to be that much of what we consider well-reasoned decisions are post-facto rationalizations of base motivations that we are unwilling to explicitly consider. These true motives, which embarrass us because they are hedonistic, or solipsistic, or infantile, are hidden in the closet, and we self-servingly create rationalizations that not only hide the dark truth, but even make our decisions appear, superficially, honorable and self-sacrificing. The thing is, you can lie to your friends, and you can lie to yourself, but you can't get away with it when you're dealing with the Bochen Levavos.

Just as Chazal say we can love Hashem "bi'shnei yetzirecha," that we can use the Yetzer Hara- Ga'ava, Azus, Kin'ah, Nekama- in the service of Hashem, it turns out that we can rebel against Hashem with our Yetzer Hatov- Anivus, Bitachon, and Yir'ah.


Mei'inyan le'inyan be'oso inyan:
The Tefillah of Moshe on the sin of the Meraglim: the Gemora in Shabbos 89a. “Reb Yehoshua ben Levi: when Moshe came up to Hashem, he found Him tying crowns on the letters. Hashem told him, “Don’t they say “Shalom” where you come from? Moshe answered, “Is it right for a slave to greet his Master?” Hashem said, “You should help Me.” Moshe said, “Ve’atah, yigdal nah Koach Hashem....” What does “ve’atah yigdal no Ko’ach Hashem” mean? And what was it that Moshe realized when Hashem told him to say Shalom?

Rav Freidlander in his Sifsei Chaim on Mo’adim, vol 1 page 276 or something, brings the Maharal in the Ohr Hagolah, and explains the dialogue. 'Crowns on letters' means perfection of the Torah, the absolute power and inherent sufficiency of the Torah and the Middos of Hashem. Hashem asked Moshe, don’t you say hello where you come from? That is, don’t you say Shalom, which is a brachah that Hashem’s power be increased in your world of Gashmius? Moshe answered, what good is my brachah on the Middos of Hashem? Hashem answered, (just as we have in Brochos 6a with Yishmaeil ben Elisha in the Kodesh Kadashim– barcheini be'ni– http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SPDski6IBfM ), that this is the secret of tefillah. The middos are a reality. But, just as was the case with the rain that gave life to Gan Eden, to actuate them, to bring them to fruition in our world, they need to be unlocked, and Hashem wants mankind to hold that key. The key is tefillah. As I have said from the Alshich on the Middos, the 13 Middos are infinitely potent; but in order for the middos to be given effectiveness, man has to become a proper conduit for the power of the middos, and this is only through tefillah AND through BECOMING the middos. A water pipe can carry water, a gas pipe carries gas, a copper wire carries electricity. A person who is ra’ui to carry the middos of Hashem can invoke them through his tefillah.

So: this parsha teaches us about the sin of humility, the sin of faith, and the power of Tefillah. How on earth can a mortal man know that he is fooling himself through his ostensible application of middos tovos and pursuit of good? There is only one answer. What distinguished Yehosuha and Kalev? They were not greater than the others. Why didn't they fall into the trap that destroyed the other meraglim? What distinguished them was tefilla. The other meraglim were the greatest of the great; they were paragons of Mussar and self-sacrifice and middos tovos, and after careful meditation and thought, they made their fateful decisions. But-- Yehoshua and Kalev had one advantage- and that made the difference between life and death. The difference was tefilla. Moshe prayed for Yeshoshua, and Kalev went to Chevron to lie prostrate on the kevarim of Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov. No matter how great one is, no matter what he has achieved in life, it is only through tefilla for siyata dishmaya can we hope to accurately discern when our middos tovos are being used letov or ch'v the opposite. Pick up that Tehilllim and pay attention to what you are saying in davening, or you might, Ch'V, follow the path of the meraglim.

~

Sunday, June 15, 2008

Shlach, Bamidbar 15:37. Tzitzis– Equal to All Other Mitzvos

Let’s start with something Reb Moshe Feinstein said. First, I will say what he writes in his Darash Moshe, and the then I will say it the way I heard it from him.

From the Darash:
Tzitzis is a uniquely important mitzvah. So why isn't it mandatory?
Rashi brings that Reb Moshe Hadarshan says that Tzitzis is shkulah keneged kol hamitzvos. If so, if tzitzis is such an important mitzvah, that it equals all the other mitzvos, and in that it is a constant reminder of all the mitzvos of the Torah, why is it not obligatory at all times? It is so easy to avoid this mitzvah by not wearing four kanfos, or by rounding them off, or by wearing garments made of synthetic fiber. Why shouldn’t we be chayav to wear daled kanfos so that we should have the mitzvah of tzitzis at all times?
Because only one who seeks instruction will be sensitive to its lesson.
Answer: the fact is that many people look at tzitzis and remember nothing. The reason for this is that a person is apt to misinterpret the things that he knows, people tend to re-interpret what they know to comport with their desires and yeitzer hora, as demonstrated by all the old and current sects that claim loyalty to the Torah but turn it upside down. For them, Torah becomes a sahm hamoves (Yoma 72b) because they are lack the humility to seek to instruction. They think they know enough to be able to interpret according to their understanding and perspective, but they don’t realize that wisdom does not automatically follow knowledge. Only a person who who seeks to be instructed will look at these strings and see the tcheiles and the gematrios and the mitzvah itself and be reminded to keep the taryag mitzvos.

The way I heard it from Reb Moshe (with a slant toward ahavah instead of humility):
Because only one who does it with loving devotion, not as an imposition, will be sensitive to its lesson.
Why shouldn’t it be chiyuvis to wear a daled kanfos in order to be mekayeim this mitzvah? Also, why is the word "ve’amarta" used, since it is a lashon rafah, a softer form of speech, not "dabeir" which is a stronger form? The answer is that tzitzis is only mazkir the mitzvos when it is done mei’ahava. When a person does a mitzvoh that he is chayav to do, it does not express ahavah. Only a person who can avoid the mitzvoh, but seeks out the opportunity to have the mitzvoh, is doing it mei’ahavah.

This seems to contradict the rule that fulfilling a mandatory mitzvah is greater than fulfilling a voluntary mitvah.
The problem with this pshat is that it seems to contradict the rule of "gadol ham’tzuvah v’oseh," that one who does a mitzvah because he is obligated is greater than one who does a mitzvah by choice. How can he say that making it into a kiyumis makes the reward greater, when the rule is that the schar for a chiyuvis is greater? Although R’ Yosef (Kiddushin 31, BK 38, 87) has a havah amina that there is a greater mailah in eino metzuvah v’oseh, the final decision of the Gemara is that metzuvah is greater.

A side discussion as to whether a Mitvah Kiyumis is called a Eino Metzuvah Ve'oseh.
I told this to Harav Moshe Faskowitz, Rosh Yeshiva of Madreigas Ha’adam and Rav of Torah center of Queens, and he said that even assuming that Tzitzis is a Mitzvah Kiyumis, Mitzvos Kiyumis are included in ‘mafkidna v’avidno," a kiyumis is called metzuvah ve’oseh. I said that this would not be like Tosfos’ pshat based on a yeitzer hora not to do it when commanded to do it. He said that even a kiyumis there is a yeitzer hora to not do it, because it is being done because Hashem said one should do it, and it’s called ‘mifkidno’ and ‘m’tzuveh’ even if it is not mandatory. He said that the real eino m’tzuvah is a woman in a zman grama, and a blind man if you hold they are pattur. And maybe a kattan.

(I had Harav Yakov Drillman at my house, and mentioned this question to him. He said that there is a question among the achronim whether a mitzvah kiyumis is docheh a lahv; the Shagas Aryeh, for example, holds that a kiyumis is not docheh. Obviously, then, Tzitzis is not called a kiyumis, because Tzitzis is the source of Asei Docheh Lo Sa'aseh. In any case, though, he said, Tzitzis is not a good example of kiyumis, because as soon as you have the beged on it certainly becomes a chiyuvis. It is only a kiyumis in the broadest sense, that you don't have to wear a beged in the first place. See Reb Akiva Eiger in Shulchan Aruch OC 11 on Magen Avraham 13, where he asks, why is Tzitzis docheh Shatnez, since you can avoid putting on the beged and not have the conflict. He answers based on the Mordechai that the chiyuv begins only after you have the garment on-- it is not assur to put on a four cornered garment without tzitzis, only that after you have it on, you are obligated to put in the tzitzis. So if Asei were not dochel Lo Sa'aseh, so Tzitzis was not docheh shatnez, you would be still be allowed to put on the garment, and then not put in the Shatnez tzitzis, just as the Mordechai says that you may wear a non-tztizissed garment on Shabbos-- since you cannot put the knots in on Shabbos, you can put on the beged, and then, when the obligation to put in tzitzis arises, you can ignore the mitzvah because of the issur of kosheir. His point is that tztizis is called a chiyuvis, not a kiyumis, in the context of efsher lekayeim shneihem.

But allthis does not diminish the question, though. I don't care if Tzitzis is a kiyumis or not, or whether a kiyumis is called metzuvah or eino metzuvah. The fact remains that one can easily avoid the obligation to ever wear Tzitzis.)

Here is the "require some thought" part.
Open-ended Mitzvos are engineered to attract only those who do them with love.
Reb Moshe has another vort in the Darash. Near the beginning of Trumoh he says a remarkable vort. He says that in any mitzvah which is "ein lahem shiur," a mitzvah which has a minimum mandatory requirement but has no maximum limitation, a person who does beyond the mandatory minimum without nedivus leiv is only rewarded as a "eino m’tzuvah ve’oseh." Only if he does it with ahavah and simchah and n’divus haleiv is he rewarded as a ‘m’tzuvah v’oseh.’ This is true by all mitzvos that are "ein lohem shiur", including limud hatorah.

For those that do them with love, they are called mandatory-- the mandate of love.
Reb Moshe’s vort in Trumoh explains his vort here and addresses the argument about whether a kiyumis is called ‘m’tzuvoh’ or not. R Moshe is saying not like me and not like Harav Faskowitz. He says that by any mitzvah that has a mandatory component but also has a ‘ein lohem shiur’ component, when a person does the ein lahem shiur component, (which I think is a perfect model for every ‘eino m’tzuveh,’) then if he does it with nedivus, he gets the schar of a metzuveh, and if he does it without nedivus haleiv, then he only gets the schar of a eino metzuveh.

Tzitzis is a classic example of a Mitzvah that begins as a voluntary mitzvah but becomes a mandatory mitzvah.
So, in the case of tzitzis, which a person can avoid doing forever, if he chooses to be m’chayeiv himself, then his motivation matters very much. If he does it mei’ahavah, then he is rewarded as a m’tzuveh. If not, he is rewarded as an eino m’tzuveh. So Harav Faskowitz is right, to a degree. A kiyumis is included in the rubric of ‘mifkidnah’ or ‘m’tzuveh.’ But if he does it with ahavah, with ‘nediv leiv,’ then he is the person that Hashem wanted to be doing the mitzvah, and he is rewarded as a m’tzuveh. If he does it out of habit or to for his ego or for show, then he is not the person Hashem wanted to be doing the mitzvah, and he is rewarded only as an eino m’tzuveh.

We can even say that any ‘ein lahem shiur’ mitzvoh which is directed at nedivei leiv is intended to be done only when your heart makes you do it. This is what R Moshe means in Trumah. For the nedivei leiv, it was a chiyuv. For everyone else, it was a ‘eino m’tzuveh.’ Hashem is not mandating it unless your heart is driving you to do it. When that is the case, then Hashem is mandating that you do it. If so, tzitzis is a perfect model for this kind of mitzvoh, as follows:

We see from R’ Yosef (Kiddushin 31, BK 38, 87) that there is a advantage in eino metzuvah, although the maskonoh is that metzuvah is greater. The superiority of eino metzuvah is that he does it mei’ahavah, as R’ Moshe says. The superiority of metzuveh is that he is overcoming his yetzer horah to do what Hashem commands. Tzitzis has both advantages! You don’t have to wear a beged daled kanfos, but once you put on the daled kanfos, you are chayav to put in tzitzis. So you have the advantage of eino metzuveh and the advantage of metzuveh. So tzitzis is like the Trumas Hamishkan: for the nedivei leiv, there was no chiyuv. But for a person who was a n’div leiv, it was chiyuvis.

In short: Tzitzis is a unique Mitzvah, that comprises all the Mitzvos of the Torah. One would think that such a mitzvah would be mandatory, while in fact Tzitzis is a mitzvah one could legitimately avoid his entire life. The reason this is so is because the Mitzvah of Tzitzis contains the advantage of both an obligatory mitzvah and a voluntary mitzvah; one may avoid wearing a four-cornered garment. But when one chooses, because he seeks the opportunity to do the mitzvah, to wear such a garment, as soon as he puts on the garment he becomes obligated to put in tzitzis. Thus, Tzitzis falls under the rubric of both Metzuveh and Eino Metzuveh, and it carries the reward of both types of Mitzvos as well. It is only for such a person who seeks out the opportunity to become obligated in the mitzvah, for a person who is driven by his devotion to Hashem’s will even when he is under no obligation, that Tzitzis equals all the mitzvos of the Torah.

A side discussion about whether a Mitzvah Kiyumis is called Metzuveh Ve'oseh.
Regarding the issue of whether a Mitzvah Kiyumis is called Metzuveh or Eino Metzuveh:
Rabbi Drillman pointed out the Gemara in Bava Kama 38a. The Gemara says "Amad Vayteir Goyim," Hashem saw that the nations did not fulfil the seven mitzvos and He freed them from their obligation to fulfill them. The Gemara asks, does this mean they benefitted from their negligence? The Gemara answers that as a punishment for their indifference to the seven mitzvos, Hashem changed their status from Metzuva ve'oseh to Eino Metzuveh ve'oseh, which gets less reward. The Gemara asks, but Rav Meir said that anyone who fulfills a Mitzvah, even a non-Jew who does Mitzvos, is rewarded as if he were a Kohen Gadol! The Gemara answers that they do get a reward, but not as a Metzuveh, only like an eino metzuveh. Rashi there says a remarkable thing: he says that even though "va'yateir," they are called eino metzuveh, but if they transgress these mitzvos, they are punished. Rashi in Avodah Zarah says the same thing: the Gemara there says that there is an issur of lifnei iveir for a Jew to enable a Gentile to transgress one of the seven mitzvos. Rashi asks, but the Gemara in Bava Kama says "vayateir!" Rashi answers that even after vayateir, they are punished for transgression. So what do we see from this Rashi? Obviously, there remains a mitzvah kiyumis for the Gentiles to fulfil the seven mitzvos. The Gemara says there is a schar of a kiyumis. And even so, the Gemara calls it Eino Metzuveh. So we see that Mitzvos Kiyumis-- even where transgression results in punishment!-- are called Eino Metzuveh.

Sunday, June 03, 2007

Shlach: Drasha for Sheva Brachos (#2)

This is very, very succinct. You can use one part of it, adjust it to your needs, and have a perfectly useful Drasha.

The specific connection with this week's parsha is the fact that the din of Tzitzis is here, but it can be used any time. With a little effort on your part, it can be developed into an excellent Dvar Torah for a Sheva Brachot. Or Vort for a Sheva Brochos. As I've said before, the traffic on this site is pretty light, so if you use it without attribution, you probably can get away with it. Who would you attribute it to, anyway? Barzilai? That's just a pseudonym I took out of Tanach for reasons that are none of your business. Just don't use it before tonight, June 3 '07, because that's when it is going to debut in Lakewood.

First of all, we must remember that even after Hashem told the Jewish people how wonderful the land of Israel is, they insisted on checking it out themselves. Similarly, as soon as the chassan heard about how marvelous the kallah is, and what a yichus she has, and how brilliant and kind she is, it was clear that this was a great opportunity. Still, there was only one thing he had to verify for himself-- "Hashemeinah hee im Razah." (For the humorless among you, I need to identify that as a joke.)

Second, and more seriously: Building a Bayis Ne'eman requires three elements: A foundation, walls, and a roof.

The foundation is the history the couple brings to the marriage: their families, what they have learned, and their achievements in Middos and Chessed.

The walls are the contribution of the Kallah. Under the Chupah, the Kallah walks around the Chassan seven times, as we did with the Aravah on Sukkos around the Mizbei'ach, to symbolize that it is the Akeres Habayis that creates the circumstances of kedushah that separate the home life from the influences of the secular world. As the Gemora (Yevamos 62b) says, "Hasharui be'lo ishah, sharui... be'lo Chomah." One who is without a wife, lacks a wall. The wife creates the walls that define and surround the Jewish home.

The roof is the contribution of the Chassan. In Megilas Rus (3:9), Boaz was asked "Ufarasta kenafecha ahl amasecha,"  ופרשת כנפיך על-אמתך-  spread the corner of your garment over your maidservant. The husband brings the Kallah to the chuppah that he creates, and that chuppah is the roof of the bayis ne'eman. What does the roof signify? The Gemora in Menachos says that Tzitzis, which are discussed at the end of this week's parsha, are a segula for two things: for Tznius and for a kosher Parnassah. It is when a person gets married that these two things acquire the greatest importance, when he becomes responsible for the wellfare of his wife and family. It is with the middah of Tznius, and the siyata dishmaya to ensure that the home is sustained with only koshereh parnassah, that the husband creates a roof of the bayis ne'eman.

It is with these three elements that a Bayis Ne'eman is created. With the foundation of experience and history and influence and family that the Chassan and Kallah bring with themselves; with the walls of kedusha that exclude the outside world and create within them an environment of kedusha; and the roof of tznius and ehrlichkeit that is symbolized in the Chuppah, the Tallis Gadol that the Chassan wears on his body and with which he provides shelter and safety for his Bayis Ne'eman.

A more effective way to arrange the vort is this:

Minhag among Eastern Europeans to not wear Tallis Gadol till married.

Maharil says because parsha of marriage is next to Parsha of Tzitzis, also we find in Megillas Rus (see Rashi on 3:9) the expression for marriage being uforasto kenofecha ahl amasecha.

But what’s the real underlying reason?

We find two segulos associated with wearing tzitzis; Tznius and Ehrlichkeit in Parnassah (Menachos 43 and 44).

Tznius is a way of life, and not at all limited to physical modesty. Modesty means that you don't show off your money, your holiness, or your shittos. Ehrlichkeit in parnassah means that you want every element that contributes to your lifestyle to be kosher in all ways.

The most important time to ask for siyata dishmaya in these two elements is when one gets married.

The Tallis, the Chupah, that represents these two elements, is only the ceiling.

You can't just float a roof on nothing. There have to be walls that hold it up. In fact, to build a Bayis Ne’emon you need three things: Foundation, Walls, and Roof.

Roof– Tallis. Husband’s. (INSERT NICE THINGS ABOUT THE STERLING CHARACTER OF THE CHASSAN.)

Walls– kedushoh created by the Akkeres Habyis, as it says, hashorui belo isho shorui belo chomoh. (INSERT NICE THINGS ABOUT THE KALLAH, and her good sense of knowing what to allow and what to exclude from a good Jewish home, about what to encourage and what to discourage, about inculcating in herself and in others everything the Mesilas Yeshorim, or her favorite sefer, discusses.)

Foundation– parents, chinuch, middos. (INSERT NICE THINGS ABOUT THE FAMILIES {don't forget Elter Bobbeh SHPRINTZEH FLOSHEH GRENDEL} AND YESHIVOS AND RABBEIM AND RABBONIM that guided the Chassan and Kallah to this point.)