Beha'aloscha. Yearning To Do Avodas Hashem

Our parsha illustrates the vast gulf between two groups of people who can be said to have acted in the same way. One was the the מתאוננים, the ones that demanded the food they were used to in Mitzrayim, and the other was the טמאים לנפש אדם, the individuals that were tamei and couldn't bring the Korban Pesach. Both knew that what they already had was sufficient, but both said that they suffered terribly because they knew that there was more that they might have. The Misonenim had the miraculous Mahn, which was a perfect food and fully sufficient for all their bodily needs, but they suffered because they knew there was tastier and more pleasurable food available. The Te'meyim knew that they were pattur from Korban Pesach. Pattur means that under the circumstances, they had no mitzva to bring the Korban. But they were anguished at the thought that they would miss the incomparable joy of participating in the Mitzvah. of participating in the Mitzvah. 

We're written about this in the past.

We're writing about this now because of Reb Moshe's insight as to how a person should feel and how he should behave when he is not being able to fulfill a mitzvah. Instead of saying he's pattur and that's all there is to it, he should do something that has to do with the mitzva, no matter how small it may be, and no matter that he is not fulfilling any commandment by doing to. Especially interesting is that Reb Shlomo Zalman disagreed (I assume because he felt it came too close to bal tosif or shchutei chutz.)  Reb Shlomo Zalman said that Reb Moshe only meant it as a mussar haskeil, but not in practice. But you will see that Reb Moshe really meant it in practice as well.

Reb Moshe in the Darash in this week's Parsha:

למה נגרע לבלתי הקריב את קרבן ה' במועדו (ט' י') תמוה מאוד מה כתב רש"י שהטמאים אמרו שיקריבו עליהם בכהנים טהורים ויאכלו טהורים הא א"א זה דנקרב לטמאין פסול (פסחים מא א) ואף אם נימא שהיתה כוונתם לצרף עם טהורין ויהי' לטהורים ולטמאים שכשר הקרבן לא ירויחו כלום כי לא יוצאין הטמאים בזה. וצ"ל דבר חדש דאף שאין יוצאין מ"מ מיד אהבת המצוות הוא שצריך להשתתף עכ"פ אף שלא יצא אם א"א לו לקיים ממש וכעין הא שעשה משה שהפריש שלש ערים אף שלא קיים המצוה. אך ראיה משום ליכא משום דהתם עכ"פ נשאר מעשיו קיים. ואף שאפשר שהיו רשאין ישראל לשנות ולהפריש ערים אחרים מאחר שלא קלטו עדיין מ"מ ידע שלא ישנו. אבל הכא חזינן שאף שלא יצאו כלום ידי חובתן אף למקצת מ"מ יש לו להשתדל להיות קשור עם המצוה במה שאפשר וכן בזכות האהבה דיהושע לתורה הבטיח לו השי"ת לא ימוש סה"ת הזה מפיך (יהושע א ח) היינו שנתברך שיוכל לעשות כאהבתו בלא מניעות ועיכובים מצד ענינים גשמיים כהברכות דאם בחקותי שהוא לדברים גשמיים שפי' הרמב"ם בהקדמתו למשניות שהוא שלא יהיה לו מניעות לעבודת השי"ת וללמוד התורה 

ומזה יש למילף לאחד שקשה לו לקיים איזה מצוה שמצד האהבה למצוה יראה לעסוק בה לכה"פ במה שאפשר כגון שאסור לו לאכול כזית מרור יטעום מעט וכן בכל מצוה כגון מי שאסור לו לישב בסוכה יראה עכ"פ לעשות סוכה וחזינן כמה היתה גדולה אהבת חמצוות לישראל שהשי"ת נתן מצות תרומות ומעשרות באופן שיוכלו שלא להפריש לעולם בלא איסור כגון להכניס דרך גגות כברכות לה ב ומ"מ סמך הקב"ה על כלל ישראל שיקיימו תו"מ עד שלקח הנחלה משבט לוי ואין זה רק על יחידים חסידים שבדור אלא על כל ישראל ממש והוא משום שאהבת המצוות הי' גדול מאוד לדורות הראשונים והשתדלו בכל עת ובכל ממונם להתחייב במצוות
 וזהו נראה בטעם שתקנו לברך שיכנס לתורה ולמע"ט שלכאורה בלתורה כלול גם מע"ט דעל מנת שלא לקיים נוח לו שנהפכה שלייתו על פניו ובלא תורה אין ע"ה חסיד ולמה אמר תרווייהו אלא שהוא ברכה לאהבת המצוות שיעשה מע"ט אף אלו שיכול ליפטר בדין כגון בתרומות ומעשרות ובציצית ללבוש רק בגדים שפטורים מציצית וכדומ' וע"ז צריך ברכה מיוחדת שיכנס למע"ט מצד אהבת מצוות 

Reb Shlomo Zalman is brought in Halichos Shlomo Tefilla page 87

The first paragraph is the main text. The second (י"ד) is the note. The third 926) is the annotations under the notes.

י מי שציוהו הרופא שלא יוציא מפיו אפילו תיבה אחת במשך זמן מסוים, כגון שבוע, שאם לא כן יאבד קולו או יפגמנו לעולם. אם ברור לו לחולה שאבחנת הרופא אמתית ורוצה לשמוע לו ולנהוג בזהירות יתירה ולא לדבד כלל, רשאי שהרי אין אדם חייב לבזבז כל ממונו כדי לקיים מצות קריאת שמע, וכל שכן שאין עליו לאבד את קולו לעולם כדי לקיים מצות קריאת שמע. ולכן יהרהר בלבו כל התפלה והברכות וקריאת שמע (י"ד)  

(י"ד) דאע"ג דקיי"ל (סי' ס"ב ס"ג ובמ"ב סק'ו) הרהור לאו כדיבור דמי בכה"ג הו"ל כאלם שצריך להרהר וזהו תפלתו, ואף דלכשנתרפא בתוך זמן התפלה ודאי צרין לחזור אין זה משום דההרהור לאו כלום הוא דהרי עיקר חיוב תפלה וברכות הוא ההודאה לד' והרי הודה וקיים המצוה (26)  אלא משום דעכ"פ לא קיימה כתקון תכמים  ולכן צריך לחזור, 

(26)  והיינו דוקא בנד"ד דאף שאינו עושה כתקון חכמים מקום כיון שאינו יכול להוציא בשפתיו יש כאן קיום מצוה בהרהורו כמי שנתבאר. אבל אין זה משום זכר למצות תפלה, דאין לנו לחדש דברים כעין אלו לעשות זכר למצוות במקום שאי אפשר לקיימם. וכעין זה נראה בהא דמבואר בסי' תרע"א במ'"ב סק"ו לענין נרות חנוכה דבשיש לו מעט שמן יתן בנר אהד בשיעור והשאר יחלק לנותרים, הגם שלא יהי' בהם שמן בשיעור כלל, דהתם נמי אין זה משום זכר למצוה אלא משום דסו"ס יש באן קצת פרסומי ניסא, שזהו עיקר תוכן המצוה. ולכן נראה דאף המל"מ דס"ל בפ"א מהל' חמץ ומצה ה"ז דחצי שיעור במצוות עשה לאו כלום הוא מ"מ בהא מודה, ורק במקום שהזכירו כן הפוסקים כגון בסי" תרמט ס"ו בקהל שאין להם לולב וכדו' עבדינן זכר למצוה (כתבי תלמידים) וכשהראו לפני רב מש"כ הגר"מ פנשטיין ז"ל בס' דרש משה פ בהעלתך אמר שזהו רק ע"ד הרעיןן אבל לא בגדרי ההלכה. 

On the other hand, Rav Zilberstein brings it down lehalacha in his Chashukei Chemed Beitza 15b, where he introduces the piece from Reb Moshe by saying the following:

שאלה יהודי אשר אינו יכול לאכול ולקיים מצות שמחת יו"ט מה בכל זאת אפשר לו לעשות 

תשובה כתב השו"ע או"ח סימן ש' לעולם יסדר אדם שלחנו במוצאי שבת כדי ללוות את השבת אפילו אינו צריך אלא לכזית וכתב השערי תשובה עיין בא"ר בשם של"ה מי שמפסיק מבעוד יום יטריח להכין סעודה זו לאחרים עכ"ד ולפי זה הוא הדין בעניננו אם לא יכול לאכול בעצמו לפחות יכין סעודה לאחרים כדי שאחרים ישמחו ובזה יקיים קצת מצוות שמחת יו"ט. 

Beha'aloscha, Bamidbar 11:6. Tired of Mahn: Orienting, Habituation, Sensory-Specific Satiety, Ruchnius and Gashmius.

Most people will find this post boring.  I find the question fascinating, possibly a key to the nature of human motivation, but that's just my opinion.


How would you like to eat the same food for forty years?  Let's say that the food could have different flavors, even different textures, but it always looked the same, and only changed when thought about some other specific food while you were eating it.  But when you ate it without the hineni muchan, without imagination, it would always taste and feel the same, kind of like shortbread cookies.  Would you enjoy it much?  


The fact is that we experience a decline in appetite when that appetite is satisfied repeatedly in the same manner.  We're all familiar with this phenomenon.  Although some people, particularly children with food obsessions, can eat and will only eat one or two foods for years- with one of my children, it was Cheerios and macaroni and cheese, and by the end of Pesach he lost lost ten percent of his body weight- for most people, repeatedly eating one food results in not only diminished enjoyment, but even disgust.


This is not specific to eating.  It applies just as well to sexual relations and to music.  Passionate affairs inevitably cool, and listening to the same music over and over has been used by the military as a form of torture.  There are so many words to describe it- bored, jaded, world-weary, ennui.....


Why is this so?  The food tastes the same as it did before, you're the same person, so why don't you enjoy it as much as you did in the beginning?  The pate de foie gras is still exactly the same as when you tasted it and swooned from pleasure.  Your taste buds are the same.  The ambiance is the same.  What's the problem?  The spouse is the same, why are you bored, why are you looking at another person whose only distinction is that she is not the one to whom you've been married for seven years?  What does boredom have to do with physical enjoyment?  


And given that this is a reality, we need to kler a Chkira: 
However it works, what is the underlying logic?  Is novelty a necessary component of enjoyment?  Or does repetitiveness work against pleasure?  


There are two mechanisms that psychologists have studied that bear upon this question.  (I) is Orienting/Habituation and the other (II) is Sensory-Specific Satiety.  Following brief discussions, we will talk about (III) why the Ribono shel Olam was angered by the complaints about the Mahn.


I
Orienting responses are heightened sensitivity experienced by an organism when exposed to a new or changing stimulus. Orienting responses can result in overt, observable behaviors as well as psychophysiological responses such as EEG activity and undergo habituation with repeated presentation of the eliciting stimulus.

The importance of mind over stomach was demonstrated in 1998 in a striking experiment with two men whose mental functions were normal except for a severe form of amnesia. They were unable to remember an event for more than a minute. Their eating habits were studied on several days by researchers, led by Paul Rozin at the University of Pennsylvania, who created a rather extended lunch period.

After each man ate his lunch, the food was cleared. In a few minutes, a researcher appeared with an identical meal and announced, “Here’s lunch.” The men always ate up without any complaint about feeling full. Then, after the food was cleared and another few minutes passed, a third lunch was served, and the men always dug into it, too.In fact, one of them stood up after his third lunch of the day and announced that he would “go for a walk and get a good meal.” Asked what he planned to eat, he replied, “Veal parmigiana” — the same food he had just had for lunch. When the researchers tried the same experiment on a control group with normal memories, the people all refused a second lunch. They, unlike the men with amnesia, consistently felt less hungry after eating, but the sensation apparently wasn’t just coming from their stomachs, as the researchers concluded.
“Nonphysiological factors seem to be of major importance in the onset and cessation of normal eating,” Dr. Rozin and his colleagues wrote in  Psychological Science. “The results suggest that one of the principal nonphysiological factors is memory for what has recently been eaten.”


I would put it this way.  It seems that after eating a particular food, the memory of satiety is imprinted more strongly than the memory of the appetite.  With repeated experiences of the satiety brought about by eating this food, the sense of not being hungry becomes a conditioned reflex.  A nafka minah would be that according to this model, habituation would not occur unless the person ate to full satisfaction.  A person who every day eats a particular food but not to satisfaction will never tire of eating it.



II
The other is Sensory-Specific Satiety- that eating will decrease appetite selectively- a person will be satiated for one food but not for others: For item A, I have no appetite.  For item B, I'm hungry.  There is an aphorism for this in many languages, such as (Eiruvin 82b)  רווחא לבסימא שכיח.  In English, the expression is, as Dr. Rolls says,  New meat begets a new appetite.

The following is an excerpt from a paper by Dr. Barbara Rolls, "Sensory-specific Satiety" NUTRITION REVIEWS VOL. 44, NO. 3/MARCH 1986, in which she discusses a concept in which her peers (e.g., Dr. Paul Rozin, who was kind enough to send me the information) consider her pre-eminent.  Dr. Rolls is the author of a series of popular weight management books titled "Volumetrics."

Monotony in the Diet 
Up to this point we  have been considering hedonic responses to foods during a meal and for  several  hours  after  a  meal.  Let  us look beyond  daily consumption and consider changes in food preference that can develop over longer periods. People tire  of  particular foods and this, of course, means that they stop eating them. There is  little understanding of why  the  preference for particular foods  declines over time, but one obvious possibility is that eating a food too often can affect acceptance. 


Studies of the effects of consumption of monotonous army rations indicate that  repeated presentation of some foods can lead to a very persistent decrease in the pleasantness of  these foods.  For  example,  with  repeated consumption canned meats became very un- palatable and continued to be disliked for 3 to 6 months after the study. Canned meats were not rated as very palatable at the start of the study, and the effects of repeated consumption appear  to be  different  for  staple foods and foods of initial high palatability. For example, in the army studies repeated consumption did not change  the  palatability  of  desserts, sweets, canned fruits, cereal, or staples such as dairy products, bread, or coffee.  We also found no decline in the rating of pleasantness of the taste, appearance, texture, or smell or either a confectionery or a savory corn snack after they had been eaten every day for 3 weeks. 


Moskowitz has described time preference curves for different food types. These indicate that foods not consumed for about 3 months are highly desired,  but those eaten the  day before may not be desired at all. Foods such as meat and shellfish, foods with a heavy fat content, or foods that carry the meal such as the entree have steep curves and are greatly desired if  not eaten for  a very long period, but recent consumption eliminates the desire for such foods. Items that do not carry the meal and do not have a high fat or  protein content such as bread, salad, potatoes, and some desserts have a much flatter function and can be eaten every day with no loss of preference. (emphasis mine.)


A recent study of food preference of Ethiopian refugees illustrates the importance of understanding the effects of  monotony on food intake. The refugees reported that the taste of the three foods that they had been eating for approximately  6 months  was  less pleasant than  that  of  three new foods. Refugees who had been eating the usual diet for only 2 days found its taste as pleasant as that of the new foods. The monotonous diet affected the refugees in that they would often trade the staple diet for small quantities of less nutritious foods, and they  would stop preparing the  monotonous foods adequately. This effect could possibly have been overcome by the simple expedient of adding spices to vary the flavor, as is the practice when people subsist on diets consisting primarily of one food such as rice. It appears that decreases in palatability can extend beyond a meal to affect general acceptability of  some foods. It seems unlikely, however, that  this  is the same phenomenon as sensory-specific satiety. Sensory-specific satiety occurs rapidly after eating, and tends to be fairly short-term. 


The food industry refers to decreases in acceptance of  foods in the long term as “wear-out.’’ It seems likely that wear- out is partly due to cognitive satiety. That is, a person knows a lot of a particular food has been  consumed and  desires a change.  It is possible that eating too much  of  a food  or being forced to  eat  a food  can contribute to cognitive satiety. Supporting this cognitive hypothesis is the finding that, in a study of factors affecting food monotony, self-selection of  the items to be included in a repetitive diet reduced dissatisfaction with the diet. Thus overall satisfaction with a 3-day, self-planned menu cycle was the same as with a 6-day cycle chosen by someone else. Making people eat foods that they  have  not selected themselves can decrease the preference for those foods. (emphasis mine)  This is supported  by  studies  of  young children,  in which foods they were  forced to  eat to  gain rewards  decreased  in  preference. Clearly, much more work is needed to understand what makes foods change in desirability. Variety, Monotony, and Body Weight Body  weight maintenance may  depend to some extent on the availability of a varied and palatable diet. 


In studies of the effects of consumption of  a monotonous liquid diet, it was found that both obese and normal-weight individuals voluntarily  restricted intake and  lost  weight. There is also some evidence that if freely available diets are varied and palatable there may be excessive weight gain. In studies of  caloric regulation  in  obese  and  normal- weight subjects confined  to  the hospital, a plentiful and varied supply of food led to over- eating and weight gain over 3- to 6-day period . It is difficult to conduct long-term controlled studies of the effects of variety and palatability on human body weight.  It  is therefore worth considering the literature on animals. 


In recent years there have been several reports of obesity in rats given free access to  a variety of  palatable, high-energy  food.  In most  of  these studies the obesity could have been due to the high palatability and high energy content of the foods as well as their varied sensory properties. However, in one study the effect of  variety per se was examined by using foods of similar energy  density which were eaten  in  similar amounts in pilot studies (ie, they appeared to be of similar palatabilities). Rats were offered either laboratory chow alone, chow plus one palatable food, or chow plus three palatable foods (cookies, crackers, chocolate)  in  succession (changed every  12 hours), or  simultaneously, for 7 weeks. All rats offered the palatable foods ate more than the chow-fed controls. Rats given the simultaneous but not the successive variety ate more than the other palatable food groups and had significantly greater body weight gains and more body fat at the end of  the 7 weeks. Thus the effect of  variety on food intake can extend beyond a single meal and can contribute to the development of  obesity. 


It seems likely that, in affluent societies where there is continual appetite stimulation by both successive and simultaneous variety within and between meals, there will be little opportunity to compensate for overeating due to variety without conscious limitation of intake. Mechanisms of Sensory-specific Satiety Is the  decrease in the palatability of  foods that accompanies consumption simply  because of sensory adaptation or habituation? In other words,  does the perceived intensity of foods decrease with consumption? In a study conducted by Mower et al on the effect of  a meal  on  olfactory stimuli, decreases  were found in the pleasantness of  the  odors, but there were no changes in the perceived intensity  of  the stimuli. In another study  it was found that the decrease in the pleasantness of the taste  of  particular foods  was  associated with only minor changes in the intensity of the taste of those  It would not be adaptive to have food consumption lead to a decreased ability to taste foods. Indeed, we all know that we  can still taste and smell foods after they have  been consumed.  It  is  more  likely that sensory-specific satiety involves a change in a mechanism concerned particularly with the reward or hedonic value of food. 


Electrophysiological studies of brain cells in monkeys are  clarifying  the mechanisms  of sensory-specific satiety. The electrical activity of  single cells has been recorded while mon- keys ate particular foods  to  satiety.  When recordings were  made  in  areas of  the  brain concerned with the sensory analysis off  taste stimuli (the nucleus tractus solitarius and the opercular cortex) or visual stimuli (the inferior visual temporal cortex and the amygdala), satiety  had no  effect  on  the responses of  the This finding is in marked contrast to the effects of  consumption on cells in the lateral hypothalamus, an  area  of  the  brain involved in the control of  motivational state and reward. It  was  found that  when  a  monkey was hungry, cells in the lateral hypothalamus responded to the sight or taste of food, but as it consumed a food the neurons became less responsive to it and acceptance for that food gradually decreased. However, if the monkey was then offered another food, the neuron responded and the monkey then accepted this food. Thus, sensory-specific satiety does not appear to be  related to  changes in  sensory processing of  responses to foods, but it is related to brain areas controlling motivation and the reward value of foods. 


To further define the neuronal basis of   sensory-specific satiety, Rolls and colleagues followed taste processing from the primary (opercular) taste cortex into a secondary gustatory area in the caudolateral orbitofrontal cortex, which  in turn  has  connections to  the  lateral hypothalamus.  Sensory-specific satiety  is paralleled by the responses of single neurons in this caudolateral orbitofrontal cortex taste area. A neurophysiological basis for  this,  in terms of altering responsiveness of specifically tuned neurons in this area of gustatory cortex as a food is eaten, has been proposed.  It is likely that cognitions contribute to sensory-specific satiety. People seem to learn how much of  a  particular food they  can eat  in a meal.  It  may  be that when this  limit is exceeded, food  becomes unpleasant. Learning about the  caloric value  of  foods and appropriate amounts for  consumption depends on the sensory properties of the foods. Since cognitions about foods depend on sensory properties  of  foods,  it will  be difficult to  determine whether sensory-specific satiety and cognitive satiety are distinct phenomena. 


Conclusion 
During consumption of  a food the pleasantness of  its taste, appearance, smell, and texture  decrease.  The  pleasantness  of  other foods not consumed decreases much less or remains unchanged. Such responses to foods occur  very  rapidly, within  2  minutes after a meal, and appear to depend more on the sensory properties of  foods than the caloric content, hence the term “sensory-specific satiety.” Sensory-specific satiety helps to  ensure the consumption of  a varied, and therefore  balanced, diet. Thus, when a variety of  foods is available, there will  be a tendency to switch from one food to another because of  the decrease in palatability in any one food after consumption. Sensory-specific satiety can also affect the amount of  food consumed in a meal, so that the more varied a meal, the greater the intake will be. Since sensory-specific satiety is one of many factors controlling food intake and selection, its influence depends on the  context in which eating takes place. An understanding of factors  that affect the hedonic response to foods is important, for this response potentially influences both appetite and the acceptability of foods.


III
Considering these realities, it is not surprising that we found the Mahn unappetizing after a while.  The reaction was natural and expectable, perhaps inevitable.  In fact, in Devarim (8:16) it says   המאכלך מן במדבר אשר לא ידעון אבתיך למען ענתך ולמען נסתך להיטבך באחריתך  , He fed you the Mahn in the desert...so that you would suffer and to test you so that you would benefit in the end.     The Gemara (Yoma 74b) says 
המאכילך מן במדבר למען ענותך רבי אמי ורבי אסי חד אמר אינו דומה מי שיש לו פת בסלו למי שאין לו פת בסלו וחד אמר אינו דומה מי שרואה ואוכל למי שאינו רואה ואוכל אמר רב יוסף מכאן רמז לסומין שאוכלין ואין שבעין אמר אביי הלכך מאן דאית ליה סעודתא לא ליכלה אלא ביממא that the people did not enjoy the Mahn as they would regular food, either because it didn't look like food, and appearance is an important part of gustatory satisfaction, or because they never had tomorrow's food in the pantry.  I would say that equally problematic was the sameness of the Mahn, the constant repetition.  Even if it did taste different, it was the same old thing every day.  It was missing the sizzle, the excitement of newness.  Just like a blind person is not as satisfied as a sighted person, because he is missing the visual aspect, so too the sameness of appearance caused boredom and ultimately disgust.  So what was the Ribono shel Olam's kpeida?  Why was He angered? 


I'd like to think about the fact of our abhorrence of sameness, how boredom subverts pleasure and drives us to seek new experiences, even if they are absolutely not better than what we've had before.  Irrespective of Darwinian necessities (ensuring a varied diet, fathering children with many women,) or physiological mechanisms (altering responsiveness of specifically tuned neurons), let's assume there's an intentional spiritual component in this phenomenon.  In the section I emphasized above, Moskowitz's observation, we note that the problem only occurs in foods "with a heavy fat content or foods that carry the meal".  But there does not seem to be any such phenomenon in foods that "do not carry the meal or do not have a heavy fat or protein content."  Similarly, see Rolls' reference to the difference between self-planned repetitive menus and menus planned by someone else.  These strongly imply a predominant mental component in this phenomenon.  Let's further assume that the disgust with the Mahn bespoke an extreme spiritual flaw on the part of Klal Yisrael.  The question then becomes, what, exactly, was that flaw?


to be continued


I don't have time to finish this, so here's what I'm thinking.
This problem is intensified where the foods have a high fat content, or carry the meal, or are imposed externally.  The common denominator is the attitude of eating to satisfy the nefesh ha'be'hamis- self-indulgence.  Hashem created us with a hatred for stagnation, and this emotion should serve a desire to grow in ruchnius, to never be satisfied, to feel impatience and disdain for what we've already achieved, because of a burning desire to accomplish more.  For the Dor Hamidbar to allow infantile impulse for self-indulgence to redirect this spiritual drive toward a desire for new food meant that they didn't appreciate what it meant to eat the Mahn, which was the food of Malachim and enabled them to grow in havanas hatorah.  It was, basically, Me'ilah.

Be'ha'aloscha, Bamidbar 11:7. The Color of the Mahn

Rav Yehoshua ibn Shu'ib, (Spain 1280-1340, a talmid of the Rashba,) in his drashos on this week's parsha, writes that one should cover the Challa with white covers.  Similarly, the Eliah Rabba (OC 271 SK 16) brings from the Tzeida Laderech that the cover should be white.  (Actually, the Tzeida Laderech says that whole tablecloth should be white.   Considering that ibn Shu'ib was the rebbi of Rav Menachem ben Zerach, author of the Tzeida LaDerech, it is very likely that the Tzeida Laderech is just quoting his rebbi.  On the one hand, that means that the ibn Shu'ib really did mean 'white', but on the other hand, it makes it likely that ibn Shu'ib also meant the whole tablecloth, not the covers of the challos.  But this doesn't matter.  The Achronim take it to refer to the challah cover, so we will, too.) Achronim ask why the cover should be white, and some suggest that Levanos simply means Clean, as we find in the issur of Libun on Shabbos, where Libun means removal of dirt.  In Shulchan Aruch, it just says that the cover should be clean.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is quoted as saying that the cover of the Challos can be transparent, because the main purpose is to physically cover the Challah, as a remembrance of the Mahn which was also covered, and not to hide it from exposure to the wine.  So, what to do? White or transparent?  This is not a momentous question.  I guarantee that nobody is going to give a din v'cheshbon on having the wrong color challa cover.  But..... read on.

It so happens that the Malbim in Parshas Beshalach (Shemos 16:31) asks that there, the Torah describes the Mahn as being והוא כזרע גד לבן, while in our parsha, in 11:7, it is described as והמן כזרע גד הוא ועינו כעין הבדולח.  In Beshalach it is called Zera Gad Lavan, while in Behaaloscha it is just called Zera Gad.  He answers that the whole week, the Mahn was transparent, but on Shabbos it was white, and Parshas Beshalach is talking its appearance specifically on Shabbos.


(I've always thought that Lavan sometimes is used to mean transparent; although the words בהיר צלול and  שקוף are more clear, so to speak, I think that when the Gemara talks about זכוכית לבנה, the most valuable and extravagant kind of glass, they mean colorless.  As evidence, see Pliny's Natural History book 37, where he says "Still, however, the highest value is set upon glass that is entirely colourless and transparent, as nearly as possible resembling crystal, in fact. "  Transparent and translucent are to some extent on a continuum.)


If so, we might say that this would explain why on Shabbos, the covers of the Challos should be white, but on Yamim Tovim, you can use whatever color you want, including transparent.  In fact, maybe transparent would be especially appropriate for Yomtov.  To be yotzei le'chol hadei'os, use a white cover inside transparent vinyl.


(See also here, which, if it matters, I saw after I got ready to write this.  The only thing new that I saw there was the Ibn Shu'ib, and as I pointed out above, that's just the Tzeida Laderech in an earlier iteration.  On the other hand, the mar'ei mekomos that I did have were basically from Rav Shimon Kalman Goldstein.  Yasher Koach.)

Be'ha'aloscha, Bamidbar 19:35. Bris Milah and Learning Torah

A discussion of the Bris Milah as an essential prerequisite for proper understanding of Torah.

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Reb Akiva Eiger, in his Tshuvos (42) discusses the right of a grandfather to make the Bracha over a bris when the father is not there.  He says the following:

הלבוש (סימן רס"ה)כתב דיש מתמיהים למה יברך האב להכניסו, הא המוהל הוא שלוחו, ושלוחו של אדם כמותו, וכיון שהמוהל מברך על המילה מה צורך לאב לברך להכניסו, הרי המילה היא בריתו של אברהם אבינו, ויש מפרשים דברכת להכניסו אינה על המילה רק האב משבח ומברך לד' שמיום ההוא והלאה מוטל עליו עוד מצות אחרות הנגררות אחר המילה, והם שמצוה לפדותו אם הוא בכור וללמדו תורה ולהשיאו אשה, עין שם... מצינו במתניתין סוף פרק ג' דנדרים גדולה מילה שאלמלא היא לא ברא הקב"ה עולמו, שנאמר אם לא בריתי יומם ולילה חוקות שמים וארץ לא שמתי. ואמרינן שם (דף ל"ב) גדולה תורה שאלמלא תורה לא נתקיימו שמים וארץ שנאמר אם לא בריתי, משמע דאם לא בריתי קאי אתרוויהו על מילה ועל התורה... ויותר נראה דבאמת מילה ותורה שייכים להדדי, וכמ"ש בעוללות אפרים (מאמר שצ"ב) שמילה חיצונית היא סיבה למילה פנימית מערלת לב, כשימול ערלת לבבו אז יהיו חדרי לבו פתוחים להבין ולהשכיל 

The Bracha of "Le'hachniso" is not only on the Mitzva of Milah itself, but an expression of gratitude for the other mitzvos that follw the Bris, such as...to teach him Torah and to find him a spouse. The Gemara in Nedarim says that the words "אם לא בריתי יומם ולילה חוקות שמים וארץ לא שמתי", if not for my Bris, I would not have emplaced the laws of Heaven and Earth, seem to refer equally to Torah and to Bris Milah. We find in the עוללות אפרים (written by the author of the Kli Yakar, but not very popular because it's not written with the clarity he developed for the Kli Yakar) that the external Milah is the cause for the spiritual Milah of the heart, which opens the heart and enables it to absorb and understand the wisdom of the Torah. 

So I always wondered, are there any other proofs of the association of Bris Milah and Limud Hatorah?  Of course, there's Birkas Hamazon, where it says "על בריתך שחתמת בבשרנו ועל תורתך שלמדתנו", but that does not prove any causal relationship. But I do have several good, strong ra'ayos, as follows.

 1.  The Tanchuma in Mishpatim (5), which goes like this. 

ואלה המשפטים. זה שאמר הכתוב, מגיד דבריו ליעקב וגו', לא עשה כן וגו'. אונקלוס) הגר בן אחותו של אדריאנוס, היה מבקש להתגייר והיה מתירא מן אדריאנוס דודו. אמר לו, אני מבקש לעשות סחורה. אמר לו, שמא אתה חסר כסף וזהב, הרי אוצרותי לפניך. אמר לו, אני מבקש לעשות סחורה לצאת לחוץ לידע דעת הבריות, ואני מבקש לימלך בך היאך לעשות. אמר לו, כל פרקמטיא שאתה רואה שפלה ונתונה בארץ, לך עסוק בה, שסופה להתעלות ואת משתכר. בא לו לארץ ישראל ולמד תורה. לאחר זמן מצאוהו רבי אליעזר ורבי יהושע, ראוהו פניו משתנות. אמרו זה לזה, עקילס לומד תורה. כיון שבא אצלם, התחיל לשאול להם שאלות הרבה, והן משיבין אותו. עלה אצל אדריאנוס דודו. אמר לו, ולמה פניך משתנות. סבור אני שהפסידה פרקמטיא שלך או שמא הצר לך אדם. אמר לו, לאו. אמר לו, אתה קרוב לי ואדם מצר לי. אמר לו, ולמה פניך משתנות. אמר לו, שלמדתי תורה, ולא עוד אלא שמלתי את עצמי. אמר לו, ומי אמר לך כך. אמר לו, בך נמלכתי. אמר לו, אימתי. אמר לו, בשעה שאמרתי לך מבקש אני לעשות סחורה, ואמרת לי, כל פרקמטיא שאתה רואה שפלה ונתונה בארץ, לך ועסוק בה, שסופה להתעלות. חזרתי על כל האומות ולא ראיתי אומה שפלה נתונה בארץ כישראל, וסופה להתעלות. שכן אמר ישעיה, כה אמר ה' גואל ישראל קדושו, לבזה נפש למתעב גוי לעבד מושלים מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו למען ה' אשר נאמן קדוש ישראל ויבחרך. אמר ליה סקנדרוס שלו, עתידין אלו שאמרת, שיהו מלכים עומדים מפניהם, שנאמר, מלכים יראו וקמו. הכהו אנדריאנוס על לחיו, אמר ליה, יש נותנין רטיה אלא על גב המכה. עכשיו אם רואין גילורר אחד אין עומדין מלפניו, שהיית אומר שהמלכים רואין אותם ועומדין בפניהם. אמר ליה סקנדרוס, אם כן מה תעשה, טמנהו, הואיל ונתגייר הרגהו. אמר ליה, עקילס בן אחותי עד שהוא במעי אמו היה ראוי להתגייר. מה עשה סקנדרוס שלו. עלה לגג ונפל ומת, ורוח הקודש צווחת, כן יאבדו כל אויביך ה'. אמר ליה אנדריאנוס, הרי מת סקנדרוס, אין אתה אומר לי על מה עשית הדבר הזה. אמר ליה, שבקשתי ללמוד תורה. אמר לו, היה לך ללמוד תורה ולא לימול. אמר לו עקילס, נתת לאסטרטלירוס אנונה אלא אם כן נטל זינו שלו. כך, לעולם אם אין אדם נימול, אינו יכול ללמוד תורה, שנאמר, מגיד דבריו ליעקב (תהל' קמז יט), למי שהוא מל כיעקב. לא עשה כן לכל גוי, משום שהם ערלים. חקיו, זו תורה. 

Akilas' uncle, Hadrian, was shocked that he had been circumcised.  Akilas told him that he did so because he wanted to learn Torah.  His uncle said, you could have learned without making a bris. Akilas answered that it is impossible to learn Torah without having a Bris Milah.  (I believe the Gaon says that Akilas=Onkelos.)

2.  The connection to this week's parsha is that our parsha contains וַיְהִי בִּנְסֹעַ הָאָרֹן .  The Gemara in Shabbos 116 says that this little piece, separated as it is with the two upside-down nunns, is viewed as a separate book of the Torah.  We derive from this (OC 334:12 and Mishna Berura SK 36) that in certain cases of fire on Shabbos, one may save a sefer Torah if it has 85 letters that are intact, even if they are scattered in many words.  The source for the number 85 is that the smallest "book" of Torah, Vayhi Binso'ah, is 85 letters.  The gematria of the word Milah is, of course, 85.  This is another excellent flag that highlights the association of Bris Milah and Limud Hatorah.  The kedusha of Bris Milah is a Machshir that enables a child to become a Sefer Torah.   I'm sure I am not the first to note this association, but I am not aware of who else has said this, because I'm not a gematria man.  Minor point:  if you are a gematria man, then run with the idea of Metzitza b'peh.  Peh, פה, the locus of limud hatorah, connected with the bris milah.  Not my department, but for those of you that like this sort of thing, here it is.  

3.  The Yerushalmi in Sotah about Elisha ben Avuya.  The Yerushalmi says that the great Talmidei Chachamim of Yerushalayim had gathered for Avuya's son's bris, and as they talked in learning, it appeared that a great fire burned around them.  Avuya was frightened and asked, have you come to burn down my house? They answered no, we were just talking Divrei Torah, and the words were happy as at the time they were given at Har Sinai, and so the fire of Mattan Torah appeared.  Nothing to be afraid of, it's just limud hatorah the way it should be.  Avuya was so amazed that he determined to dedicate his son to Torah scholarship.  This was, apparently, an inappropriate reason to learn Torah, and  this self interest expressed itself as a flaw in the child's learning, and since he was such a great and powerful intellect, what might otherwise have been a minor blemish became monstrous and resulted in Elisha ben Avuya becoming an Apikorus.  

The point of the Yerushalmi is that the time of the Bris Milah is the moment that the parameters of the child's potential growth in Torah are set, when the range of trajectories is enabled.  In the case of Acheir's great potential, this self-interest at the so very important moment of the Bris Milah הבאיש הביע את שמן הרוקח, and he became an apikorus. 

4.  The Targum Yonasan, as explained by Rav Schwab in his Sefer on Chumash.  The Targum Yonasan says that they used to say ישימך אלוקים כאפרים וכמנשה, Yesimcha, at a bris.  Rav Schwab explained that the word Milah is related to mahul, blended.  So Bris Milah alludes to the idea that Ruchnius and Gashmiyus are not immutably opposed.  On the contrary, kedusha and chulin can work together in a synergistic, mutually beneficial relationship.  We mention Efraim and Menashe  because Efraim learned while receiving monetary support from Menashe; the work that Menashe did with the kavana of supporting Efraim was as spiritual as Efraim's Torah.  One might associate this idea with something the Lubavitcher Rebbe constantly says from the Baal Hatnya: that the great chiddush of Mattan Torah was that previously, kedusha and gashsmiyus were incompatible and antagonistic.  With Mattan Torah, gashmiyus itself could become infused with kedusha through limud hatorah and kiyum mitzvos.  If so, we might say that the Bris Milah, the Bris that allows Mehila/mixing, is what enables our limud hatorah to affect our physical being

Be'ha'aloscha, Bamidbar 11:10, Shavuos, and Rus: Geirus

Synopsis:
The Jewish People underwent Geirus at Har Sinai.
There is a rule that גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי , conversion erases all previous familial relationships and renders relatives unrelated and able to marry each other.
It appears that this rule did not apply to the Jews at Har Sinai.
Why?
Answer: Because at Sinai, two things happened, but the Geirus only had one step.
One: the actual Geirus- we were granted a quantitative (613) and qualitative (servants of Hashem) increase of mitzvos and kedusha, and
Two: this endowment was declared to be exclusive to members of Klal Yisrael.
At every Geirus after Sinai, two things happen, but they are different, because they are both parts of the Geirus. (Neither of these two elements can exist independently, but they are conceptually and effectively distinct.)   
One: the person erases his past and joins Am Yisrael, and
Two: he accepts the kedusha of Avdus to Hashem and Taryag Mitzvos.
It is element One, the negation of his prior identity, that results in the annulment of familial relationships.
Element One was not present at Mattan Torah, nor was there any need for it, nor would it make any sense at all.
Therefore, at Sinai there was no negation of their prior relationships.

However, there is an contrary opinion that holds that the rule of K'katan did apply at Sinai.
I explain the basis of the two opinions.
I discuss problems with this minority opinion.

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Now the long form.
Our passuk says וַיִּשְׁמַע מֹשֶׁה אֶת הָעָם בֹּכֶה לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתָיו אִישׁ לְפֶתַח אָהֳלוֹ.  Chazal (Shabbos 130a) explain that the people were upset about the Arayos restrictions they were taught at Mattan Torah.  As the Gemara says, כל מצוה שקבלו עליהם בקטטה כגון עריות דכתיב וישמע משה את העם בוכה למשפחותיו על עסקי משפחותיו עדיין עושין אותה בקטטה דליכא כתובה דלא רמו בה תיגרא.    Mitzvos they accepted with contentiousness, they are still fussing about.  (I don't know if this is a siman or a sibba.  Both make perfect sense.)  For example, it says they cried about marital relations, and this initial resentment still echoes among us, as we see that wedding negotiations always involve some argument. 

What so upset us that we came to tears?  Rashi there in Shabbos says שנאסר להם קרובות, that certain relatives that are allowed to a Ben Noach are prohibited to Jews, and they were crying for the loss of those relatives.  But there is an important disagreement between the Maharal and Reb Meir Simcha as to exactly what the problem was.

The Maharal (and Rabboseinu Ba'alei Hatosfos on our passuk) understands the Gemara to mean that many married couples realized that they would have to separate, because under the new rules their marriage was illegal. 

Reb Meir Simcha (Devarim 5:26) understands that the marriages of the people that received the Torah at Sinai were not affected: with the giving of the Torah, we all became Geirim (Yevamos 46a), and converts are viewed as newly born.  גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי.  (Yevamos 97b)  The familial history of all the people living then, who were all geirim, was erased.  All their relatives from their past life were no longer legally related to them.  Therefore, there could be no problem with marriages among those people, and so Hashem told them to go home, no matter to whom they were married, שׁוּבוּ לָכֶם לְאָהֳלֵיכֶם, which means to their marital relations (Moed Kattan 7b).  The reason they cried here in Be'ha'aloscha was because they were thinking about the future, when the children they would have in the future would not be allowed to marry the childrens' relatives.

The Maharal (Breishis 46:10 and in Yisro) says that the rule of גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי did not apply to that generation, because it was a forced conversion; Hashem had them over a barrel, so to speak.  They couldn't refuse the conversion.  A forced conversion does not yield the result of גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי.  So, many married couples were forced to separate.  (Side note- The Shmaitsa in the Hakdama says that it wasn't a literal case of duress.  Instead, the fact that the world could not exist without Torah was so obvious to the Jews at that point, that in a manner of speaking, they had no choice.)

Ironically, the Chasam Sofer in his pirush to Avodah Zara 63b says that he never could find a convincing source for Chazal's rule of Geir Shenisgayer K'Katan Shenolad Dami.  Reb Meir Simcha says that the passuk in Devarim 5 שׁוּבוּ לָכֶם לְאָהֳלֵיכֶם that allowed them to go home to their spouses is the source for the rule- that they could go back to their spouse even if the spouse was a relative, because any potential problem was solved by the chidush of גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי.   The Maharal looks at the same event and says that on the contrary, the couples that were related to each other were  prohibited to go home, and that's why they cried.  According to Reb Meir Simcha, it is the source for the rule.  According to the Maharal, it is the one and only exception to the rule.

Most Achronim assume the Maharal's pshat, that they were crying for the spouses they lost.  However, they offer several alternatives to the Maharal's explanation for this anomalous absence of the general rule that a Ger is no longer related to his erstwhile relatives.  As we said, the Maharal's explanation is that Mattan Torah was to some extent a forced conversion, and a forced conversion is not called a rebirth.  The explanations offered by other Achronim are as follows:

Many achronim (including Rav Shternbuch in his Moadim Uzmanim on Shvuos #238) say that Geir Shnisgayer is only Ke'Kattan when he is coming from a different nation.  But we already were descendants of the Avos, we already were Klal Yisrael.  For example, the Ramban at the end of Emor says that after Avraham's Bris Milah, his children acquired the yichus of "Zera Avraham," and the Brisker Rov in Parshas Bo says that the din of Kol ben neichar by Korban Pesach proves that there was already a legal distinction between Zera Avraham and a Ben Neichar in Mitzrayim.  So the Geirus at Mattan Torah was simply geirus to add kedusha.  Such a Geirus is not ke'katan she'nolad.

Reb Yosef Ber (YU) as brought by Rabbi Shurkin in his Harrerei Kedem brings the Rambam that Geirus requires three things, Milah, Tevilah, and Ritzui of the Dahm of a Korban.  From the words the Rambam uses (13 Issurei Bi'ah 1 and 3, and see similar in 1 Teshuva 2), it appears that he sees the Korban at Mattan Torah as essentially distinct from the normal korban of a geir: it was a korban tzibbur.  Therefore, he says, the geirus too was a geirus of a tzibbur.  We only say Ke'kattan when an individual becomes a geir, because he leaves behind all his relatives.  But where a group all becomes geirim together, their relationships survive the geirus.  I'm sure Reb YB said it slightly differently, because the way it's written it's very speculative.  What I think he said was that there is a difference between the geirus of a yachid and the geirus of a tzibbur.  Even if a bunch of geirim are misgayeir at once, they are still not related, because the nature of their geirus was Geirus Yachid.  But here, it wasn't geirus of a yachid.  It was Geirus of a Tzibbur.  A Geirus tzibbur brings along its members' relationships.


I am not a Googelamden, who just digs up a bunch of pshatim and adds nothing.  I don't write unless I can offer something new.


What I have to offer is this: 
When Rus insisted on becoming a Giyores, she told Na'ami  עמך עמי, ואלקיך אלקי.  Your nation is my nation, and your G-d is my G-d.  Geirus involves two elements, two dinim: joining Klal Yisrael and kabbalas Mitzvos Hashem.  What is this Ameich Ami business?  Why does the Ger need to join Klal Yisrael?  Apparently, it's only shayach to be chayav in Mitzvos when you're a member of Klal Yisrael: that special yachas to the Ribono shel Olam requires being a member of Am Yisrael.  Now, these two elements have different characteristics.  Establishing the special relationship through the mitzvos is a a matter of acquiring something totally new.  Before, you weren't chayav in mitzvos, and now you are.  Joining Klal Yisrael is more than a matter of entering, it requires leaving as well.  One can be a Amoni, or a Ashuri, or whatever, and that's fine, but in order to become a Yisrael, you have to abandon your earlier national identity.  Kedusha- a positive act, be'poeil.  Klal Yisrael- both a negative and a positive, shlilis and be'poeil. You have to erase your past in order to enter your future.  (Maybe this is a part of the Geirus, maybe it's only a machshir for kabbalas mitzvos.  That's a question for another day.)  This is the basis of Geir Shenisgayer: not the addition of kedusha, but rather the abandonment of the previous identity that was necessary in order to become a Yisrael.

So nowהסכת ושמע :

What is the source of this dual requirement, of joining Klal Yisrael plus kabalas mitzvos?  Why isn't Kabalas Mitzvos alone good enough?  Because at Mattan Torah, at the the bris of Chorev, two events occurred:

• One, that we were endowed with and we accepted the Chiyuv mitzvos, the special relationship with the Ribono shel Olam.  
• Two, that the Ribono shel Olam was meyacheid this chalos davka to Klal Yisrael.  

This was a geirus, certainly, but at that time the actual Geirus only had one element- chalos mitzvos and avdus to Hashem.  It so happens that there was also a special yichud of this chalos to members of Klal Yisrael.  Why was this higher kedusha made exclusive to Klal Yisrael?  I don't know.  Maybe because of Avraham's being the first to recognize with tifkeit what the Ribono shel Olam wants and to fulfill it, maybe because of the perfection of Yaakov, maybe because of the gevura of Yitzchak.  I don't know, and it doesn't matter to me.  The fact remains that this special yachas through an endowment of kedusha is specific and exclusive to members of Klal Yisrael, and this exclusivity was established at the time of Mattan Torah.  And while we were the kallah, we were also the Chosen.

After Mattan Torah, only after the limitation of chiyuv mitzvos to Klal Yisrael, the process of Geirus itself required two steps. The two steps now are:

• First that the Geir becomes a member of Klal Yisrael and 
• Second that he accepts the kedusha of mitzvos and avdus to Hashem.  

So the kashe of the Maharal disappears, poof.  Geirus is only ke'katan shenolad when the process involves two elements, identity change and kedusha.  This is true after the Bris with Klal Yisrael at Sinai, when the Ribono shel Olam was meyacheid His name and kedusha upon us.  But at Sinai, no identity change was necessary.

I think this pshat is gold, and makes everything else unnecessary.  True, Reb Meir Simcha holds that Geir shenisgayeir is ke'katan because of a Gzeiras Hakasuv and it applied to the Geirus of Sinai.  But for all the rishonim and achronim that say not like Reb Meir Simcha, what I'm saying could be, as my father zatza'l used to say, karov l'emes. 

I ask, too, that you realize that this goes FAR, FAR, BEYOND the teretz from the achronim that Rav Shternbuch brings.  What they say is dry as dust, with no explanation, no lomdus, a take it or leave it teretz.  What I'm saying brings a completely different perspective that breathes life into the teretz.

One more thing:
Let's talk for a moment about the basic machlokes whether Geirus Sinai had a din of K'katan she'nolad or not.  What's the yesod of the machlokes?

We already explained that the shita that Sinai did not cause כקטן שנולד holds that nolad comes from the change of identity, from Nochri to Yisrael.  What does the other shitta, Reb Meir Simcha, hold?  Reb Meir Simcha holds that כקטן שנולד comes from the Chalos din of becoming an Eved Hashem.  This applied 100% at Har Sinai, so there was a din of כקטן שנולד there too.

In fact, if  you want to say this with a little smile, you might say pshat in the machlokes about what causes the din of katan she'nolad - is it the שינוי השם  from Nochri to Yisrael or the שינוי רשות from owning himself (or, perhaps,  הפקרות,) to being a kinyan of the Ribono shel Olam, an Eved Hashem.



Please note that even if you don't accept the essential difference between Mattan Torah and later Geirus, the idea that Geirus involves two elements still is very useful, as follows:


Would this din apply where they were already members of Klal Yisrael?  Of course not.  They weren't abandoning their past. 
Would this din apply where it was the geirus of a tzibbur?  No it would not.  Since Hashem allowed the tzibur to convert as a whole, it appears that their din tzibbur was allowed to remain.  If not, then they couldn't have a GEIRUS TZIBUR.  If they remained a tzibur, then there was not din of katan shenolad.
And finally; would this din apply if the geirus was forced?  No, it would not. A chalos can be chall ba'al korcho.  But a bittul chalos cannot be chall ba'al korchos.  You can be mechayeiv someone in more mitzvos against his will, you can impose kedusha on him, but a person's identity is inherently personal- you can't make a person not be what he is.  That can only happen if the person changes himself.


UPDATE:
Tal Benschar wrote a comment noting that it is clear in Chazal that the generation of Sinai did inherit from their parents.  The Gemara in Bava Kamma 109a says that under certain circumstances, repayment of theft may be made to the heir of the victim.  That person is called the Go'eil.  The Torah says there may be a victim who has no heir.  The Gemara asks, but every Jew is related to every other Jew!  The Gemara says that the only person without an heir is a Ger who had no children after the conversion.  According to Reb Meir Simcha, the entire generation of Sinai were considered reborn without relatives, so why would every Jew be related to every other Jew?  There were 600,000 unrelated individuals created on that day.
I attempted to defend Reb Meir Simcha by saying that the din of Go'eil may survive the Geirus of Sinai, though the din of yerusha did not, just as Amoni or Mitzri does.  I supported this with the opinion of Reb Yochanan, that a convert (whose children later convert, according to the Rambam's reading of Reb Yochanan) is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of Piryah ve'Rivya.  I deflected the fact that rishonim seem to equate Go'eil with Yoresh by arguing that the laws of yerusha might be a siman of who is the go'eil, not the sibah, and would therefore apply even through geirus.

I later admitted that this argument was untenable, because there is not a shred of support for this concept in the Braisos or Gemaros or Rishonim.  

It was also noted that it is impossible to contend that there was no din yerusha in the midbar, because the way the Gemara in Bava Basra understands the story of the Bnos Tzlafchad assumes all the dinim of yerusha were in full force.

The only defense of Reb Meir Simcha I could think of is that although they were K'katan regarding Arayos, they were not K'katan  regarding Yerusha.  The problem with this is that Reb Meir Simcha says that the entire source for the rule of K'katan  is Sinai, and if it didn't apply to yerusha, on what basis does it apply in cases of later geirus?

One might respond that it is obvious to Chazal that if kurva regarding Arayos is annulled, then  kurva regarding yerusha must be annulled as well.  If so, one must deal with the contradiction evident between Tzlafchad and Shuvu L'ahaleichem.  One can say that the retention of yerusha was a singular exception to the rule which was necessitated by the overriding need to bequeath Israel to the descendants of Avraham, either to fulfill the vow to Avraham, or because we, as individuals, were not worthy of Eretz Yisrael.  Our only claim was through Avraham Avinu.  This is why Geirus did not annul kurva regarding Geirus Sinai.   But for all subsequent Geirus, just as kurva regarding Arayos is annulled, kurva regarding yerusha is annulled too.

In any case, I noted that with or without a defense of Reb Meir Simcha, we can assume that he had a way to resolve the questions, and so his opinion that K'Katan applied to Sinai remains on the roster of Shittos.

Beha’alos’cha, Bamidbar 9:7. Lamah nigara, לָמָּה נִגָּרַע לְבִלְתִּי הַקְרִיב אֶת-קָרְבַּן ה' בְּמֹעֲדוֹ בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. Pesach Sheini.

This is a little complicated, but I think it's worth the effort.

The Torah records the complaint of the men who were prevented from bringing the Korban Pesach with the rest of the nation due to their Tum'ah. What kind of question is this? How on earth did they have the right to confront Moshe Rabbeinu with a complaint about the Torah? They knew the halachah of tumah, they knew that a tomei couldn’t bring a Pesach, they knew that according to the dinim that Moshe had taught them, they were not allowed to bring the korbon. This is all evident in their question: we know that the Torah says we are not allowed to bring the korbon. And still they stood up and said it was not fair? This is how the question was phrased by Reb Aryeh Leib W הרוצה בעילום שמו in shiur in June 2006.
UPDATE:  Since I wrote this, the person who asked me this question passed away.  His name was Larry Wilk, and he was a dear, dear friend.

There are a lot of possible answers, none of which I like. For example:
Lamah=please explain, that it was more in the way of a plaint than a complaint; or,
We were tamei because we were oseik with the Aron of Yosef, so we’re anusim because we did a mitzvah; or,
We were oseik with a meis mitzvah; or,
This korban is central to our identity as Jews.
And so on. None of these pshatim hits the spot. None of these pshatim satisfactorily explain the tone or content of what seems to be a confrontational argument, a complaint, not a plaint.
Thank you to an anonymous writer, who directs us to the Ritva:  

"Ritva in Megilla 25 says that erev Pesach was their 7th day of haza'ah so they could have gone to the mikva and eaten that night. They held that since they were merely mechusar tevila it's muttar to shecht and be zorek on their behalf and eat that night."

I think the answer is this:
They knew that the Korban Pesach, although technically a Korban Yachid, a korban which each individual is personally obligated to bring, has certain dinim of a Korban Tzibbur. For example, as the Gemara and Rashi in Psachim (also Tosfos Sanhedrin 12b d’h shetum’oh) bring from the Gemara in Yoma 51a many times, it’s like a korban tzibur because it is brought "b’kenufiah", en masse. Second, there are many rishonim in Yoma around daf 8, discussing the status of the Pahr Kohen Godol on Yom Kippur, and see the Shagas Aryeh 38 and Rambam III Tmidim Umusofim 18, (and see Mishneh Menachos 96 about the Chavitin of the Kohen Godol, and the Gemara there on 51b with three explanations for why it’s docheh Shabbos,) that say that any korban, not only a korban tzibbur, that has a zman kavu’ah, can apply the din of tum’ah hutrah b’tzibbur. Now, obviously, these Rishonim do not apply this semi-Tzibbur status to a yachid who is tamei erev Pesach. But the point is that the tmei’im asked Moshe, we know there is a din of tum’ah hutrah be’tzibbur. Since korban Pesach comes be’knufiah, it is like a korban tzibbur even though it is brought by yechidim. So, they said, the din of tum’ah hutrah b’tzibbur should apply to every yachid that wants to bring a korban. And certainly according to those rishonim that hold that the Pahr Kohen Godol had a din korban tzibbur, the same should apply here. This explains why they used the expression "lamah nigara mitoch hakahal" and "b’mo’ado:" these are the words that are used to identify the Korbanos that are docheh Shabbas and Tumah.

So Moshe told them they were right. Their kashe was so good, that they were m’chavein to a din that they hadn’t heard from him– like those tana’im that said that if the Torah was forgotten, they could recreate it misvara, and as Asni’el ben Knaz later did. Their taineh was correct, but only on the basis of what they knew. If there were only one time to bring the korbon, they would be allowed to bring it b’tum’ah. But, he told them, there was also an option of Pesach Sheini. Now that there is that alternative date, it no longer is called a korban that is kovu’ah lo zman.

If the tzibbur was tamei, then it is kavu’ah lo zman, because a tzibbur cannot bring on Pesach Sheini. But since a yachid has the alternative, for yechidim it’s not kavu’ah lo zman.

In other words, it is not the inability to be makriv b’tum’oh that results in the alternative; it is the alternative that results in the inability to be makriv.

It’s immodest, but I like my teretz better than any of the other teirutzim I’ve seen.

Anyway, it’s nice that among all the complaints about not having enough good food to eat, people complained once about not being able to do a mitzvah. The same Ribbono Shel Olam that didn’t give them the food they wanted is the One Who limited their options on how and when to do mitzvos.

Be'haaloscha, Bamidbar 11:16. Espah li shiv'im ish. How Many Members in Sanhedrin?

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 2a says that we learn from these pesukim that Sanhedrin has to have 71 people, the seventy stated plus Moshe. Ovi Mori HK'M asked, but Moshe was “shakul keneged Sanhedrin,” Moshe’s judicial status was such that he was considered equal to the entire remainder of the Sanhedrin; so how do you learn from here that Sanhedrin must have seventy one members? There is one opinion that Sanhedrin requires 70 people, another that it requires 71. If Moshe was equal to a separate Sanhedrin, then the Sanhedrin that included Moshe was the equivalent of 140 people, and a Sanhedrin without Moshe should indeed need 140 people! Also, he asked, how is it possible for Moshe to pasken alone? Only God Himself is called a “dan yechidi.” Furthermore, there is a din that kulo chayov, pattur-- that in capital cases, if all the members of the court find the defendant guilty, he is automatically found innocent, because unanimity in a capital case is evidence of prejudice, a failure of serious legal dialogue, and because there will be no masa umatan, they will be incapable of seriously considering exculpatory factors. So how could Moshe be dan by himself? There could not have been any give and take, any discussion, and so whatever decision he made would have been procedurally flawed!

The answer to both questions, Ovi Mori HK'M said, can be seen in the parsha of the Slov right before this passuk.When the people complained that they had nothing to satisfy their desire to eat meat, Moshe said to Hashem, it is impossible to satisfy these people, "mei'ayin li bossor?" As Moshe said later, there isn’t enough meat in the world, if I gave them all the fish in the sea, it wouldn’t be enough, where will I get it from, “he’anochi horisi es ho’om hazeh, he’anochi yeliditihu?” Did I conceive this nation? Did I give birth to them? What did he mean to add with this last phrase? Even if he had “horisi” and “yeliditihu," what's impossible is impossible!

From Moshe’s words we see that "impossible" presenting an insurmountable barrier depends on your relationship with the person in need. When a child needs something, a father's reaction is that he will do whatever he can, no matter how difficult, no matter if what they need is "impossible", he will try to do the "impossible." As my father hk'm put it, "Fahr ah Tatteh iz dos nit kein teretz." He used Bisya bas Pharaoh as an example: when she saw the child in the water, she stretched out her hand, although her hand could not possibly have reached him. No matter! You do what you can, and you don't even weigh the possibility of success. So first, Moshe Rabbeinu said "what they want simply does not exist." The whole world is not enough to satisfy their desires and needs. Then he said, if they are asking for the impossible, how do they expect me to do it? Am I their father? So Hashem told him, "Until now, you were like a father to the people. When you judged them, you didn’t judge as a dayan, you judged as a father judges his children. A father doesn’t need hagadas eidus, he doesn’t need shakla vetarya. But if you say that you are not their father, from now on you are only the gadol hador, and you can judge them as a dayan, as one of the seventy one.

With this we understand another thing. The instruction to Moshe to convene a Sanhedrin is placed in middle of the story of the People's complaint about not having meat to eat. There seems to be no reason for this apparently irrelevant interruption. Why does the Torah place the parsha of Sanhedrin here? The answer is that the way Moshe reacted and expressed himself in his response to the people's complaint was the reason he was told to gather a Sanhedrin and to join the Sanhedrin as one judge among the others. Until that point, he was dan not as a dayan but as a father. Moshe had gathered the Bnai Yisroel in Mitzrayim, he gave them courage and hope and identity, he brought them out, he split the Red Sea, he gave them the Torah. In National identity terms, we would call him the father of the nation. And more than that– he was a charismatic leader– the people see themselves as part of him, and he sees himself as part of them. Their individual existence is meaningless, as they exist only as reflections of each other; the state is a reflection of the personality of the leader. But when he said "they are asking for the impossible! Am I their father? Am I their mother?" he lost that status, and could only be dan as a dayan.

After I said this in a drasha, someone showed me that the Brisker Rov does ask the kashe on the Gemora in Sanhedrin (if Moshe was equal to the other 70, then we should say that a Sanhedrin without Moshe should comprise 140 members, not only 71.) The Brisker Rov answers that we see that Moshe Rabbeinu's din changed from being a shakul as soon as Hashem told him to gather the 70 people. But– and this is very important– the Brisker Rov does not even hint at any explanation for this change. Ovi Mori’s pshat improves the vort tremendously. The fact that people told him it is a Brisker vort is just because people have a yetzer hora to say “yeah, I saw that someone else says that already,” when in fact the other person just says a little nothing from the vort.

When I told this to HaRav Yitzchok Grodzinsky, a Rosh Kollel in Bnei Brak, the son of the last Mashgiach of Slabodkeh in Lithuania, I remarked that it is very much not a pshat that a Brisker would say, and Harav Grodzinsky added that it was, in fact, davkeh a Slabodker mehalach, emblematic of the oeuvre- the fundamental mussar spirit- of the Slabodkeh Yeshiva.