Nitzavim, Devarim 29:10. Achievement Through Empowerment

I

There's a Chasam Sofer in this week's parsha that says two fascinating things.  I'm going to do an interpretive translation of what he says and we'll see where it leads.

1.  If a woman sends her husband out to learn, if she encourages him to be kovei'a ittim, and he goes out to a seder, and he wastes his time, then the woman has the complete schar of talmud Torah, and the man has nothing but the punishment for bittul Torah.  It's not her fault that he didn't learn:  she did what she was obligated to do.  In Olam Haba, she will shine with the brilliance of Torah, and he will be....what?  An empty cup of coffee?  A list of fantasy football stats?  Nothing, nothing, nothing.

2.  Michal bas Shaul held like Reb Yosef's hava amina, that eino metzuva v'osseh is greater than metzuva v'oseh.  She wore tefillin, as everyone knows from the Gemara in Eiruvin, and that was emblematic of her attitude about women and Zman Grama mitzvos.  She didn't want to be bothered to encourage or enable her husband to grow in Torah, because she was busy learning and doing and growing on her own.  This is why she had no children till the day she died: her tafkid was to enable others to learn, and by declining to engage in her specific function; the siyata dishmaya for her consonant ability to bear children was impaired.

One thing the Chasam Sofer says is that אין נחת לפניו באינו מצוויים ועושים.  I found that to resonate with the Baal Ha'Itur and the Yereim brought by the Rosh in RH 4:7, which is surprising since we in Ashkenaz pasken like the Rav'yah (brought in the Rosh) and the Ra'avad (in the beginning of Toras Kohanim by Semicha), who hold that whatever a man does has full mitzva significance by a woman.  (For an basic outline of some of these opinions, see here.)  I have to admit, though, that the Shaagas Aryeh in 106 also goes with that mehalach where he assers carrying a shofar through reshus harabim for a woman that needs to hear tekiyos.  Still, I think the Chasam Sofer is going even farther than characterizing it as mere כדי לעשות נחת רוח לנשים (Chagiga 16b).

The Chasam Sofer ends by saying that

והנה עד"ז יזדרזו הנשים לגדל בניהם לתורה כי לא יזכו ע״י אינו מצוה ועושה כטעותה של מיכל בת שאול

 אלא ע״׳ גידול בניהם

II

In the comments, it was pointed out that this restrictive role assignment can be difficult to bear.  Many women resent what seems to be an assumption of unfitness for intellectual tasks and an inferior role in public prayer.  It is clear, however, that role assignment is common in the Torah, and we are very serious about working within those roles.

For example:  Some families of the Leviim were assigned to guard the gates, an Honor Guard in the Beis Hamikdash.  Other families of the Leviim were given the responsibility of singing and playing instruments in the Beis Hamikdash.  These familial guilds were absolute and unchangeable, to the extent that if a Levi of the latter were to perform the former, he would be guilty of a capital crime- Erchin 11b,

 אמר אביי נקיטינן משורר ששיער בשל חבירו במיתה שנאמר (במדבר ג) והחונים לפני המשכן קדמה לפני אהל מועד וגו' והזר הקרב יומת מאי זר אילימא זר ממש הכתיב חדא זימנא אלא לאו זר דאותה עבודה:

It goes without saying that if a non-kohen were to perform certain avodos that require Kehunah, he would also incur a commensurate punishment.  

Why is this true?  Is the offense against the Korbanos?  Is it because he was pogeim the avodah?  No.  I believe it is because of his transgression of the division and assignment of Kohanim and Yisraelim, just as the previous case must be because he had no right to cross the line out of his particular role.  It is a din of  Poretz Geder, of bittul Mechitzos, of Basadeh Triefa. 

Nitzavim, Devarim וְשַׁבְתָּ עַד ה ... בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל-נַפְשֶׁךָ... וְשָׁב ה אֶת שְׁבוּתְךָ וְרִחֲמֶךָ Teshuva on Aveiros & Teshuva on Mitzvos.

earlier posts:
The Enemies of Teshuva: Doubting and Dawdling          Trying to Buy a Clean Conscience     Teshuva is Easy     The Communal Obligation of Mitzvos



Our parsha mentions the concept of Teshuva.  Teshuva might be one of the Taryag Mitzvos (Ramban here), or it might be too fundamental to be called a mitzva (Minchas Chinuch 364 explaining the Rambam in the Yad).  In any case, our pesukim are talking about Teshuva, and they tell us that teshuva can be doubly effective, that it not only ends punishment, but that it can also bring us to a state of grace and love and blessing.


The Mesilas Yesharim (perek 4) says that Middas Hadin, the Divine Attribute of Strict Justice, would not allow for Teshuva.  Under Middas Hadin, the punishment for a sin would be immediate and devastating, and the sin would be irreparable.  It is only through Middas Harachamim that these consequences are ameliorated.  The sinner is given time to repent, the punishment is diminished, and Teshuva  uproots and erases the sin entirely.  This modification of Middas Hadin is only possible through the Chesed, the charity, of Middas Harachamim.  (I've included the Hebrew and English text of the Mesillas Yesharim at the end of the post.  It's Elul, it's time to look at the Mesillas Yesharim.)


Reb Elchanan Vasserman asks the following question from the Gemara in Kiddushin 40b (which is also brought in the Rambam 3 Teshuva 3).

ר"ש בן יוחי אומר אפילו צדיק גמור כל ימיו ומרד באחרונה איבד את הראשונות שנאמר (יחזקאל לג) צדקת הצדיק לא תצילנו ביום פשעו ואפילו רשע גמור כל ימיו ועשה תשובה באחרונה אין מזכירים לו שוב רשעו שנאמר (יחזקאל לג) ורשעת הרשע לא יכשל בה ביום שובו מרשעו וניהוי כמחצה עונות ומחצה זכיות אמר ריש לקיש בתוהא על הראשונות

Briefly:  A life-long perfect tzadik that rebels at the end of his life loses all that he has done in the past.  Reish Lakish explains that this is not true if he sins out of some momentary desire or weakness.  It is true only when he recants and regrets his good deeds-- he is toheh ahl harishonos.  

From this Gemara we see that natural law mandates that regretfulness for past mitzvos erases all the mitzvos.    Reb Elchanan (Kovetz Maamarim, Ahl Hateshuva, p 21) asked the Chafetz Chaim, How then can the Mesillas Yesharim say that the power of Teshuva to erase past sins is a gift arising from Middas Harachamim?  According to the Gemara, regret is a natural and universal solvent: if you regret good acts, the good is erased.  If that's the case where the result is suffering and punishment, then kal vachomer (Meruba middas tova mimidas puranus) the same would naturally be true in the opposite regard- that regret for sin will erase the sins and prevent punishment.  Why does the Mesillas Yesharim say that the ability of Teshuva to erase sin is a singular and unparalleled gift from Hashem?


(Some people answer that only after the gzeiras hakasuv that Teshuva erases sin did it follow that Toheh ahl Harishonos erases mitzvos.  With all due respect, I think that's just infantile, a reflexive ‘lomdus’ that doesn’t make any sense.  The latter does not follow the former at all.  The protocol of Din does not have to echo that of rachamim.  That's the whole point of saying that midda tova is meruba.)


The Chafetz Chaim  answered that while it is true that all regret erases past behavior, Teshuva is unparalleled in two ways.  1. Teshuva brought about by fear of punishment does not mean that the baal teshuva regrets his aveiros like the Toheh, the sinner in Kiddushin, regrets his mitzvos.  A man who is doing Teshuva out of fear only regrets the deadly consequence of his sins.  Despite his lack of true regret, Teshuva meiYira erases his sins.  2. And if the Teshuva was from love of Hashem, Teshuva meiAhava, it doesn't erase the sin- it reconstitutes the sin into a meritorious act, as if it were a mitzva.  This is  unparalleled in the case of one who regrets having done a mitzva, and is the unique result of Middas Harachamim.

Reb Elchanan points out that the Ramchal's words do not seem to accord with the Chafetz Chaim's pshat.  The Ramchal said that even the erasure of sin is only possible because of Middas Harachamim, while the Chafetz Chaim said that erasure of any past mitzva or aveira is the natural result of charata, of regret.

I'd like to point out that my reading of the pesukim in Yechezkel, both the pasuk brought in Kiddushim from perek 33 and also the passuk in Yechezkel perek 18 brought in Yoma 86, indicates to me that just as Teshuva can change aveiros to mitzvos, exactly so can Toheh ahl Harishonos, regret for past mitzvos, change them into Aveiros.  And it's not only my reading.    The Arvei Nachal (by the author of the Levushei Srad and the Tiv Gittin) on Parshas Va'eschanan Drush II, says exactly that.  This, too, does not seem to accord with the words of the Chafetz Chaim.

Also, I wonder, what kind of Toheh is the Gemara in Kiddushin talking about?  Is it talking about a Toheh that matches the Teshuva we are told to do?  Is a man called a Toheh only if he deliberately and thoughtfully reexamines the mitzvos he did, is deeply ashamed of them, mournfully regrets doing them, and makes a firm conscious decision to never do mitzvos again?  Does he have to re-create himself, as the Rambam says of the Baal Teshuva?  I doubt it.  It means just what it says:   that he regrets having done the mitzvos.  If that's enough to erase mitzvos, why wouldn't similar regret be enough to completely erase aveiros?  Why does teshuva require the wrenching effort of בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשֶׁךָ?

Unfortunately, this all seems to point toward something I've often quoted from a well known and highly respected Mashgiach that I've had business with.

 "Good Comes and Goes, but Bad is Forever."

He didn't put it in those exact words, but pretty close, and I think the aphorism sums up his philosophy, that a spiritual fall generates an indelible change that forever increases the risk of relapse. Spiritual advances, on the other hand, are fragile, easily lost, and effortlessly extirpated. They disappear easily, and when they do, they don't leave a trace.

Reb Yitzchak Hutner in his Pachad Yitzchok answered Reb Elchonon's question along the same lines (minus the cynicism.)  He said that going from life to death is part of the teva, the natural order of Hashem's universe.  Going from death to life is not.  Order requires constant energy, while disorder is the default state.  Anyone can be meimis a chai.  Not everyone can be mechayeh a meis.

Another way to put this: Middos Ra'os take root much more easily than middos tovos.  Uprooting them is much harder than uprooting good middos.  What is true for Middos is also true for the effect of mitzvos and aveiros.  That alone would serve to explain why Toheh is derech hateva, while Teshuva is lema'ala miderech hateva.  Besides being painfully obvious, the Beis Yosef in the beginning of Orach Chaim says this about Azus Panim. Bad behavior is dyo, an indelible dye, while good behavior is sikra, faint and superficial.  One would think that observing disgusting behavior is not likely to influence you to emulate that behavior.  But in our parsha, in 29:16, it says that if you observe the disgusting pagan rites, beware of the effect on you, and know that you might be influenced by it.  Similarly, the Gemara (beginning of Sotah, brought by Rashi in Ki Sisa) says "haro'eh sotah b'kilkula, yazir atzmo min hayayin."  If you see a Sotah ugly disheveled and publicly disgraced, be on guard!  You are in danger of following her example.  Avoid wine!  Thus, we see that the result of Toheh is natural, while Teshuva is practically a miracle.

But one can say another mehalach.  And do me a favor: after reading it, the teretz is obvious.  But it wasn't obvious before you read it, so don't give me a hard time.  Hakol b'chezkas sumin....


Toheh works like Kavana misnagedes in mitzvos (Rosh Hashanna 28).  Even if you hold Mitzvos einan tzrichos kavana, that is because (as Reb Moshe says in the Darash on Ushmartem es hamatzos, Shmos 12:17) stama lishma , or because if the person realized that he had done the mitzva he would be pleased, or because of the Rambam in the second perek of Hilchos Geirushin.  But certainly, the desire to do Hashem's will is fundamental to all mitzvos, and if you do the mitzva intending that it not be a mitzva, you have done nothing at all.  For aveiros, on the other hand, even if you do an aveira with kavana misnagedes, for example, you do the aveira because you enjoy it but have kavana davka not to transgress Hashem's will, it doesn't make a bit of a difference, you're still punished for the aveira.  And worse than that: when one does a mitzva and davka doesn't want to be mekayeim Hashem's will, the act of doing the mitzva is the biggest moreid bemalchus.  Of course his mitzvos turn into aveiros.

With these teirutzim we can answer a kashe on a Tosfos in Sanhedrin 37b.  The Gemara says that even though our courts are no longer empowered to administer capital punishment, Hashem makes sure that the appropriate punishment occurs.  Tosfos asks, but we see many people who deny the entire Torah who live and prosper?  Tosfos answers that perhaps their Bris Milah suspends their punishment and they are given the reward for that mitzva before they die.  The problem is that obviously these people are Toheh.  If so, then according to the Gemara in Kiddushin they should get nothing at all for their mitzvos!  But according to our teirutzim, there is no kashe.  Tosfos chose the mitzva of Millah very carefully, because Millah is different than all other mitzvos.  The din of Toheh only applies to mitzvos that a person does and whose effect derive from the intention to do Hashem's will, or whose effect is the positive result of the act.  But Millah is neither.  It is done on one person by another person, and its effects are absolute, no matter what the mahul wants or thinks, as David Hamelech pointed out.  That's why Avraham Avinu saves mehulim from Gehinom, but Moshe Rabbeinu doesn't do so for people who've done the other Taryab.  So while all other mitzvos can be erased through Toheh, davka Millah can not.  And now you see why Tosfos mentioned Millah davka.

I suppose I should write Reb Elchanan's teretz, but that will have to wait.  Anyway, I like these teirutzim more, and they also answer the other kashes I mentioned above, about changing the mitzvos to aveiros and the ease of toheh compared to the difficulty of teshuva, and Tosfos in Chulin.

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Cited text of Mesillas Yesharim

, וזה, כי לפי שורת הדין ממש, היה ראוי שהחוטא יענש מיד תיכף לחטאו בלי המתנה כלל, וגם שהעונש עצמו יהיה בחרון אף, כראוי למי שממרה פי הבורא יתברך שמו, ושלא יהיה תיקון לחטא כלל, כי הנה באמת, איך יתקן האדם את אשר עיות והחטא כבר נעשה? הרי שרצח האדם את חברו, הרי שנאף, איך יוכל לתקן הדבר הזה? היוכל להסיר המעשה העשוי מן המציאות.

אמנם, מדת הרחמים היא הנותנת הפך השלשה דברים שזכרנו: דהינו, שיתן זמן לחוטא ולא יכחד מן הארץ מיד כשחטא, ושהעונש עצמו לא יהיה עד לכלה, ושהתשובה תנתן לחוטאים בחסד גמור, שתחשב עקירת הרצון כעקירת המעשה, דהיינו, שבהיות השב מכיר את חטאו ומודה בו ומתבונן על רעתו ושב ומתחרט עליו חרטה גמורה דמעיקרא כחרטת הנדר ממש שהוא מתנחם לגמרי והיה חפץ ומשתוקק שמעולם לא היה נעשה הדבר ההוא ומצטער בלבו צער חזק על שכבר נעשה הדבר ועוזב אותו להבא ובורח ממנו, הנה עקירת הדבר מרצונו, יחשב לו כעקירת הנדר ומתכפר לו. והוא מה שאמר הכתוב (ישעיה ו): וסר עונך וחטאתך תכפר, שהעון סר ממש מהמציאות ונעקר במה שעכשיו מצטער ומתנחם על מה שהיה למפרע.

וזה חסד ודאי שאינה משורת הדין, אך על כל פנים הנה הוא חסד שאינו מכחיש הדין לגמרי, שהרי יש צד לתלות בו, שתחת הרצון שנתרצה בחטא וההנאה שנהנה ממנו בא עתה הנחמה והצער. וכן אריכות הזמן איננו ויתרון על החטא, אלא סבלנות קצת לפתוח לו פתח תקון. וכן כל שאר דרכי חסד: כענין ברא מזכה אבא (סנהדרין קד), או מקצת נפש ככל הנפש (קהלת רבה ז כז), המוזכרים בדברי החכמים, דרכי חסד הם לקבל את המעט כמרובה, אך לא מתנגדים ומכחישים ממש מדת הדין, כי כבר יש בהם טעם הגון להחשיב אותם. אך שיותרו עבירות בלא כלום או שלא ישגיח עליהם, זה היה נגד הדין לגמרי, כי כבר לא היה משפט ודין אמיתי בדברים, על כן זה אי אפשר להמצא כלל. ואם אחד מן הדרכים שזכרנו לא ימצא לחוטא להמלט, ודאי שמדת הדין לא תשוב ריקם.

For on the basis of justice alone it would be dictated that the sinner be punished immediately upon sinning, without the least delay; that the punishment itself be a wrathful one, as befits one who rebels against the word of the Creator, blessed be His Name; and that there be no correction whatsoever for the sin. For in truth, how can a man straighten what has been made crooked after the commission of the sin? If a man killed his neighbor; if he committed adultery-how can he correct this? Can he remove the accomplished fact from actuality?


It is the attribute of mercy which causes the reverse of the three things we have mentioned. That is, it provides that the sinner be given time, and not be wiped out as soon as he sins; that the punishment itself not involve utter destruction; and that the gift of repentance be given to sinners with absolute lovingkindness, so that the rooting out of the will which prompted the deed be considered a rooting out of the deed itself. That is, when he who is repenting recognizes his sin, and admits it, and reflects upon his evil, and repents, and wishes that the sin had never been committed, as he would wish that a certain vow had never been made, in which case there is complete regret, and he desires and yearns that the deed had never been done, and suffers great anguish in his heart because of its already having been done, and departs from it for the future, and flees from it then the uprooting of the act from his will is accredited to him as the uprooting of a vow, and he gains atonement. As Scripture states (Isaiah 6:7), "Your wrong will depart, and your sin will be forgiven." The wrong actually departs from existence and is uprooted because of his suffering for and regretting now what had taken place in the past. 


This is certainly a function of lovingkindness and not of justice. In any event, however, it is a type of lovingkindness which does not entirely negate the attribute of justice. It can be seen as according with justice in that in place of the act of will from which the sin arose and the pleasure that it afforded, there is now regret and suffering. So, too, the time extension constitutes not a pardoning of the sin, but rather God's bearing with the sinner for a while to open the door of repentance to him. 

Nitzavim, Devarim 29:28. Communal Obligation of Mitzvos

Arvus, or more correctly Areivus, means that all Jews have an obligation to see to it that their fellow Jews live Torah lives. Areivus is often translated as meaning the same as Areiv, which is a loan guarantor. In other words, each of us is obligated to fulfill our duty to Hashem, and as guarantors, we also are responsible for our neighbors' duty.

Mishulchan Gavo’ah brings from Reb Baruch Ber (with some changes): we find that if c'v Klal Yisrael is punished for aveiros, because of the din of arvus the tzadikim can be punished. He brings that tzadikim and tashba”r suffer for the resha’im of the generation. Additionally, we find that when pur’anus chas veshalom occurs, it starts from the tzadikim. Reb Baruch Ber asks, the din of arvus as found by a guarantor on a loan is that ein nifra’im min ha’areiv until you make the claim from the actual debtor and he can’t pay the debt. You certainly cannot go to the areiv before going to the primary debtor! He answers that there are two types of arvus. The halacha mentioned is by an areiv stam. But an areiv kablan is a co-signer, not merely a guarantor, and he is equally chayov, he is a primary debtor even though he didn’t borrow the money.  (Technically, there are four kinds of arvus: stam, ahl me'nas she'ipara, kablan, and shlof dotz or nasa ve'nasan be'yad, or according to Rabbeinu Tam toward the end of BB around 174b, five.  However, the distinctions among the last three have no relevance here, since the last group are direct obligations on the areiv, while the first group is primarily on the borrower.  What he means is that there are two categories of arvus.)


He explains that the lomdus of the difference is that an areiv stam accepts responsibility for the result of the debtor’s behavior, that is, if the debtor’s behavior results in default, the areiv must pay. But an areiv kablon accepts the original obligation of the debtor. The latter is also true in the din of arvus of Klal Yisrael. The din of arvus is not just that we are liable for the result of, and therefore punished for, the behavior of others; instead, it is that our chiyuv mitzvos includes seeing to it that others do their mitzvos.

In both monetary Arvus and Mitzva Arvus, you suffer the consequences of the other person's failure to do his duty. But there is a difference: by a monetary debt, if you pay the deadbeat's outstanding loan, you're off the hook. But by mitzvos, it’s not enough for you to do the mitzvah. You can't even do the mitzva twice, once for yourself and once for him. You have to see to it that the other person does it.

I believe that according to this idea of Reb Baruch Ber, the din arvus is not a side-halacha that obligates us to bring Jews to the Torah. It is an additional dimension of every mitzva we are chayav to fulfil. As an areiv kablan, the chiyuv of others to hear the shofar is your chiyuv of Teki'as Shofar. That means that even if you have heard teki'as shofar with the greatest hiddur, if someone has not heard teki'as shofar, and you could have helped him, you were not mekayeim this aspect of the mitzva of tekias shofar.

(By the way, I think this pshat is implicit in the Yerushalmi that you can be motzi a person even on the bracha of a mitzva, even if you have already done the mitzva yourself. The Yerushalmi asks, but how can you say "ve'tzivanu to do this mitzva"? You are no longer chayav to do the mitzva! The Yerushalmi answers that the din of Arvus means that if the other person has not been mekayeim the mitzva, then the chiyuv to do this Mitzva still remains upon you. And the nusach habracha is not "vetzivanu to see to it that others do mitzvos", the nusach of the bracha is "vetzivanu to do this mitzva.")

Notes:
1. For a similar discussion, see Birkas Shmuel, Kiddushin #27, the chkira he brings from his son in law, R' Reuven Grozovsky, although they're talking about chinuch of limud hatorah and we're talking about mitzvos in general. Others have confused the two sugyos, and assumed that what is true by one is true by the other, but that putative correlation is purely speculative.
2. See comments, below, from Harav Dr. Eli, Tosfos Sotah 37b.

Parshas Nitzavim and the Mitzvah of Teshuva

Reb Meir Simchah in this week’s parsha, Parshas Netzavim, says an interesting thing. He says that now that there is an option of doing teshuva, to not do tshuvoh is not just a bitul asei, but rather it is an aggravating factor in the punishment of the underlying aveira. In other words, the punishment for not doing teshuva is worse than the punishment for the aveira you should have done teshuva for. (Devarim 30:11.)

So, why is it so hard for us to seriously focus on the Mitzvah of Teshuva? Here are some of the usual suspects. I don't want you to think that they are self-evident, dreary platitudes. Simple is not the same as simplistic. As the Mesilas Yesharim illustrates, simplicity sometimes hides profound truth. And, as the Mesilas Yesharim definitely doesn't say, it's taken a long and dissolute life to come up with this list.

A. Lust. I am not ready to give up my pleasures. Self-denial is both out of style and not good for your mental health.

B. Pride. I’m as good as anyone else, I’m at least as good as those rabbis, those professional Jews, and I don’t need to apologize for my lifestyle. And I’m certainly not going to admit they are any better than me by changing to be more like them.

C. Sloth. I know I ought to do tshuvoh, but it’s just too much effort, both mentally and physically, for me.

D. Fear of Peer Group Reaction, fear of what other people will think of you. Your friends will think you've gone frum, or your family will be angry at you for not going with the flow of their comfortable lives and assumptions. In some circles, doing teshuva is very anti-social. I know a young couple that was ostracized by their erstwhile friends, and suffered a great deal of emotional pain, and eventually moved out of the neighborhood, because the young woman decided to wear a sheitel. Way to go, friends!!!

E. Despair. I’m no good, I'm beyond redemption. Or, I’ve tried it before, and it didn’t work, and I would just be lying to myself to think it’s going to work now. This is usually just a rationalization for A, "Lust" and C, "Sloth."

F. Denial. You believe that changing your lifestyle would be so terribly traumatic, (see A, "Lust" and D, Fear of Peer Reaction,) that you create a delusional reality that supports your refusal to undertake it. Sometimes the tool of denial is convincing yourself that you are not capable of doing tshuvoh (see E, "Despair,") and sometimes B, "Pride," that you don't need to.

You might recognize some of these factors from the last time you thought about going on a diet, because it's really the same issue of will power and admitting failure and the need to change. This is what keeps the people in the women's magazine business prosperous. When you fast on Tzom Gedaliah, though, keep in mind that the same conscious decisiveness that keeps us from eating on that day demonstrates that we can indeed do teshuva and eliminate other bad behavior.

A few years ago, I read a story in the paper about the arrest of a suspect in a crime (I think it was by Stefan Esposito). The article said that the suspect "allegedly" shot someone several times in a parking lot, but the victim survived and was able to identify him. Also, a security camera in the lot filmed the crime, and every time the suspect fired the gun the flash very clearly illuminated his face. Also, an off duty policeman witnessed the crime, pursued the suspect, chased him and arrested him two blocks away, at which time he was found to be in possession of the weapon used in the crime.

The article ended by stating that

"the suspect faces an uphill legal battle."

In the beis din shel maaloh, they can build a good case against ovrei aveirah as well. Our lives are recorded and played over during our trial, and malachim who witnessed the events testify about what occurred, and worse yet, the suspect has signed a document stating exactly what aveiros he did. We face an uphill legal battle.

But despite what might seem to be pretty bad odds, there is a great deal we can do to ameliorate the consequences of our aveiros.

Remember the Minchas Chinuch. He says if not for the passuk that passels a Sukkah Gezulah, the fact that you’re not mekayeim the mitzvah because of Mitzva Haba’ah be’aveira wouldn’t be that much of a problem, because even if you haven’t been mekayeim the mitzvah by eating there, at least you weren’t mevateil the assei by eating outside of a Sukkah: you did eat in a Sukkah, just you weren’t mekayeim the mitzvah. Same thing with teshuva: even if you can’t be mekayeim the mitzvah of teshuva, at least don’t be mevateil the assei.

Many people don’t realize how broad the concept of tshuvah is. It runs from the Gemara in Kiddushin where "shema hirheir tshuvah b’libo" makes him a safeik tzadik gamur, to extremes like tshuvas hamishkal and galus. Simply accepting that what you have done is wrong, and being ashamed of what you have done, is a great mitzvah. You may not be ready for the extreme end of the scale, but anyone can be m’kayeim the great mitzvah of tshuvah by recognizing the need to do it, and knowing how easily accessible the beginning of the range of options is.

We see this in the Mishna in Yoma. Reb Akiva says Ashreichem Yisrael, how lucky you are, Yisrael, that you have the option of Teshuva, and he brings two pesukim: Vezarakti aleichem Mayim Tehorim, and Mikvei Yisrael Hashem; teshuva is like the sprinkling of the ashes of the Parah Adumah, and it is like immersing in a Mikva. Rav Pam Zatzal explained that Reb Akiva is illustrating the broad range of the Mitzva of Teshuva: If one immerses himself in a mikva, as does a geir who re-creates himself, this is the greatest mitzva. But being sprinkled with the ashes of the Para Aduma, which seems to be a far lesser personal investment in tahara--it is a mere sprinkling on a person that does not even remove his clothes, his begadim tzo'im, also brings tahara and purification. Reb Akiva is telling us Ashreichem Yisrael-- Teshuva at any level is a magnificent, wonderful gift to Klal Yisrael.

In Parshas Vayeilech, the Ramban on 31:17-18 says that "Ki ein Elokai bekirbi" is not a real vidui, and it is certainly not a teshuva shleima. But it is recognition of the sin, it is some degree of regret. And in the next passuk, 31:18, the Ramban explains that this tiny little incomplete teshuva results in a tremendous lessening of the tochecha; it ends the Tzaros Ra'os ve'Rabbos, but it doesn't end the galus entirely. Klal Yisrael has to do a better teshuva to end the galus. But it is a powerful and effective step which bears fruit immediately.

Similarly, the Ramban on Devarim 30:14, Mah Hashem sho'eil mei'imach, and Ki karov eilecha hadavar me'od, says that the Davar is Teshuva. The minimum requirements are few and within reach. See, also, Kiddushin 49b: if a wicked man proposes to a woman, and the woman's acceptance is conditional on his being a holy man, a tzadik gamur, and the man is known to be a lowlife scoundrel, we still have to consider her possibly married, because "shema hirheir teshuva be'libo," maybe he had thoughts of repentance in the moments prior to his proposal. Evidently, this would classify him as a tzadik gamur!

I wish you, in this Eish Shechora ahl gabei Eish Levana, a Kesiva Vechasima Tova Le'alter le'chayim tovim. Thank you for your valuable insights, mar'ei mekomos, and mussar.

Nitzavim, Devarim 29:18. Ve’hisbareich bilvavo leimor Shalom yihyeh li.

Parshas Nitzvaim continues the theme of Parshas Ki Savo, that being chosen by Hashem is a high-risk job that comes with tremendous responsibilities. As Hashem’s people and His emissaries, we are held to a very high standard, and just as we are given the potential to achieve stellar greatness, we are warned that our indifference to our obligations can bring the most horrible debasement and tragedy. Having been warned, we blanched; who can live a life balanced on the edge of a razor, where the slightest inattention brings such terrible punishment? So Moshe told us, Attem nitzavim, you stand here today; you know you are not perfect, but even so Hashem has brought you to the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and just as you will soon enter the promised land, so, too, I promise you that ultimately you will experience the ultimate redemption and love of Hashem.

Having said this, it is surprising that in 29:18 Moshe warns that there might be among us those who ignore this warning, saying everything will be fine, I will do what I want and nothing will happen to me. After all, Moshe had already frightened them with one hundred and forty eight curses, each more horrible than the other. What is he adding here? To whom is he speaking, who is it that heard the earlier warnings, and accepted them, but thinks he has a loophole, an angle, that will enable him to coast along, doing what he wants?

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank answers that Moshe Rabbeinu was addressing a phenomenon that we all have witnessed. As he puts it, a person was found in his store on Shabbas, openly doing business. He was asked, how can you do this? You believe in Hashem, you come to shul, how can you be mechaleil Shabbas so blatantly? The man answered, wait, you will see, I will make it all better. After Shabbas, he came to the Rav and handed him a generous donation, and said, here, this will do a tremendous amount of good, all the projects that need funding, all the poor that need assistance, this donation is the answer to your prayers.

This is the person Moshe Rabbeinu was addressing; the one who decided on his own that he can decide when the ends justify the means. Asei docheh lo sa'aseh! Lo efshar velo komichavein! Vechai bahem!  He is performing a vital role in the community, he is one of the good guys, he builds mikvaos, he supports the needy, he is doing God’s work! This is not mere rationalization. He actually pats himself on the back, he is "misbareich bilvavo! What a fine person I am!

Moshe Rabbeinu says to this person, Lo yoveh Hashem selo’ach lo. Not only will Hashem be angry at him, Hashem will be jealous of him, so to speak. You think you know better than Me? You think that I can’t take care of my people without your aveiros? Who are you to think you can get away with this, that the mitzvos are only for the common man, that you are the prince who can decide what he will or won’t do? For that kind of azus, gaavah, and chutzpah, Hashem reserves a special anger.

Similarly, the Pardes Yosef (the Poilisher one) says that there is a reason for the nexting (my word; I hate the word juxtaposition), the smichus of Parshas Teruma to Parshas Mishpatim. The Torah wants us to know that when there is a Mitzvah to donate one's money to a Beis HaMikdash, the gabbaim need to be sure where that money is coming from.
The Torah wants us to know that in dinei momonus there are Mishpatim: There is a section dealing with theft and there is a section dealing with the prohibition of taking interest on a loan, and on returning collateral and on not pressing the borrower and on not causing injury and on paying for damage that you caused. The Torah wants us to make sure that the money we are donating comes from sources which are Kasher v'Yashar. The Torah is not interested in a person donating money that is not kasher.

This, says Pardes Yosef, is the reason that Parshas Mishpatim comes before Parshas Teruma. We need to know about gzeilah and ribbis and shomrim and nezikin. Only then can we talk about making a pledge to the Beis HaMikdash.

Just as Binyan Beis Hamikdas is not docheh Shabbas, so, too, Binyan Beis Hamikdash is not docheh dinei mamonos.

Along the same lines, the Maharsha (written around 400 years ago) in Kesuvos 67 criticizes those who steal and then give that money to charity: "Many in this generation gather their wealth through measures which are without faith in G-d and which involve Chillul HaShem like by stealing from ovdei kochavim. Afterwards, they donate this money to get annual honors for themselves so that they will be blessed by the community. This is nothing other than a mitzvah ha'ba’ah b'aveirah. Such money will not last."

In real life, this is an unworkable requirement; it’s not true in halachah or in practice. (See Tosfos Avoda Zara 17a DH Mahu, but Tosfos is not really a proof, because that's talking about a psul in the object even if it went through several hands; and anyway, the only mitzvah a mumar is pattur from is Korban Pesach, if that, and he is certainly not pattur from the mitzva of Tzedaka.) A mossad does not have to examine the kashrus of the money it’s taking, other than in exceptional circumstances that involve chillul or kiddush Hashem. But there is one thing we should remember; “One should not assist a person who is buying a clean conscience.” Davar beshem omro: credit to Dr. Jordan Hillman, retired professor of law at Northwestern University, with whom I used to share a weekly lunch and discussion of the differences and commonalities of Orthodox (mine) and Reform (his) philosophy. My beloved cousin is a prince of a man, an ehrliche and warm person. And he gets points in my book for having been a navigator on bombing flights over Germany in WWII. But as far as dogma and faith are concerned, there isn't very much common ground.

Nitzavim , Devarim 29:17. Pen yeish bachem ish o ishah, pen yesh bachem Shoresh.

All yamim tovim have two days because of safek, but the days of Rosh Hashanna are not misafek, they’re called vadai and yomah arichta. Why is this so? There are, as always, two answers: a technically correct one, which is well known, and a deeper, perhaps truer, answer.

I believe that answer is as follows. (The sefer Menachem Tzion says something on the parsha here that I found very unclear; if this is what he means, then it’s his. If not, it’s mine.)

Ba’alei mussar say that the reason ‘pen’ is repeated is that the yetzer hara has two strategies of attack.
One is to find a crack in one’s faith; if a person just takes his emuna for granted, and does not reflect on how Hashem runs the world, and hashgacha pratis, there may be a weakness in his emunah that he is not even aware of. This is the ‘Pen yesh bachem...asher levovo poneh,”--the ‘pen’, the doubt and weakness in bitachon that is within the person himself. The Gematria of Amalek and of Sofeik is 240.
The other strategy is if the person’s emunah is good, the Yetzer Hara looks for a chance to convince the person that what is actually an aveira is not so bad, not even assur, maybe even a big mitzvah to do--this is the pen of a person who does not stay aware of what is muttar and what is assur, he has a “pen” about what the halacha is. While he may start out doing things that are arguably only safek, it is a shoresh poreh rosh ve’la’ana of maizid gamur. The first time, he says to himself, “eh, it’s probably muttar.” Eventually he will convince himself that not only is it muttar, it’s probably a mitzvah. This is the ‘Pen’ of “shoresh poreh rosh vela’ana.”

As an instrument of destruction, the ‘pen’ is mightier than the sword.

We see now that this series of psukim lists the five most dangerous factors that lead to a life of aveiros. They are:
1. Vatir’u es shikutzeihem,
2. Pen #1,
3. Pen #2,
4. Vehisbareich bil’vavo, and
5. leimor shalom yi’hiyeh li.

Vatir’u is exposure to anti-Torah immorality, what I call “ha’ro’eh sotah be’hiddurah. Pen #1 is weakness in faith. Pen #2 is not knowing what the halacha is. Vehisbareich is intellectual arrogance, the attitude that whatever I do is fine, and nobody can tell me that I am wrong. Shalom yiheyeh li means that I don’t care how my behavior influences orther people because I don’t care what happens to other people, as long as sholom yiheyeh li, as long as I’m going to be alright.
1. Exposure to immoral behavior.
2. Uncertainty of faith.
3. Ignorance of halochoh.
4. Intellectual arrogance.
5. Indifference to the well-being of the community.
If a person sees any of these characteristics or attributes in himself, it’s a good sign that needs to re-examine his lifestyle.


We cannot come into Rosh Hashanna with a ‘pen', with sfeikos. When you come to Rosh Hashanna , you have to be ready. You have to deal with your doubts before the day comes, because if you walk into shul unprepared on Rosh Hashanna , you have lost a tremendous opportunity. You have to prepare for the Yomim Noraim by examining where you stand, who you are, what you are proud of, what you are ashamed of, and then you can benefit from Rosh Hashanna . Chazal absolutely did not want a person to come and say, well, it’s a sfeika diyoma, maybe it’s not today, I still have tomorrow....chazal want us to know that this is not the case. It’s today--there is no tomorrow. The time to prepare for Rosh Hashanna is not when you walk into shul on Rosh Hashanna , it’s when we begin the slichos.

And here's a mashal about the great enemy of teshuva- procrastination.
In Europe, the chimney sweeps, the Koimen Kerrers, were looked down upon. Their work left them filthy and covered with tar and soot, and besides the dirty layer of ash, their skin was stained and they smelled like wet ash and the residue of all the food that had been cooked in the fireplace. There was a man who needed to marry off his daughter, but he was a koimen kerrer, and nobody would look at his daughter. The Shadchan decided that he would try his luck in a neighboring town, where the father's trade was not known, and he was successful. As soon as the daughter became engaged, the father decided that he would do no chimney sweeping for a month before the wedding. A month would be enough time to scrape all the ash and tar off, and it would be enough time for the stains in his skin to go away, and he could come to the wedding as clean as anyone else, and cause no embarrasment to his daughter and to his family.

Sure enough, a few days into the month, he realized that he had to pay for the wedding, and money was tight, so he decided that two weeks of enforced vacation would be enough, and he could try to do a couple of jobs in order to get some money together. After the two weeks went by, of course, a friend came over and said, please, my chimney is blocked and really needs to be cleaned, could you please just do this one job? Well, for a friend...and anyway, two weeks is plenty of time. One week before the wedding, a long time customer came over and said, look, you've been doing my work for years, and I don't want to give the work to someone else, but I need the job done, and if you can't do it, I'll have to go to the competition. Sure enough, he decided that under the circumstances, he had to do the work, which took almost the entire week. But, he thought, I'll really scrub myself on the day of the wedding. The stains won't come off, and I might still smell a little, but a little scented soap will do the job, and I'll still look decent. Comes the morning of the wedding, and he is absolutely determined that the morning will be spent in the shvitz with a bar of fels naptha, and he'll be fine. On the way to the bath, there's an emergency. Someone comes over and says that if his chimney is not swept, his wife will leave him, he will be made to look like a fool, he'll die of shame, and he is willing to pay ten times the going rate for the job, but please, please, it's just two hours of work. Well, ten times the rate! And I'll be finished by noon, plenty of time to clean up enough for the wedding. So it's off to work. But this is a difficult job, and it's an old chimney, and as he's finishing up, ma'aseh sattan! He gets stuck in the chimney. It takes three men and two ropes, but after two hours, he is dragged out of the chimney, he's never been so filthy and smelly and tarred, and if he doesn't leave RIGHT NOW he'll miss the chupah, so he runs off to the wedding covered from head to foot in tar and wet ash and rancid grease, his clothing ripped, you can barely tell he's human. (From the sefer Kerem Tzvi, from Reb Tzvi Hirsh Farber of London in the 1930s.)

The story is only funny until you realize that it's really about how you've spent the entire month of Ellul and what you're likely to look like on Rosh Hashannah.