Daven as if You Are the Last Fifteen Thousand

 Reb Chaim Brown's son, Eliezer, has a blog, and he posted the following from R Mordechai Malka, the Rav of Elad in Israel.

He found it on Bechadrei, https://www.bhol.co.il/news/766685

 ..  מבואר במסכת תענית דף ל ע"ב, וכן במסכת בבא בתרא דף קכא ע"א: אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל לא היו ימים טובים לישראל כחמשה עשר באב וכיום הכפורים. בשלמא יום הכפורים משום דאית ביה סליחה ומחילה, יום שניתנו בו לוחות האחרונות. אלא חמשה עשר באב מאי היא? וכו' (אמר) רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן: יום שכלו בו מתי מדבר. דאמר מר עד שלא כלו מתי מדבר לא היה דבור עם משה, שנאמר ויהי כאשר תמו כל אנשי המלחמה למות וידבר ה' אלי, אלי היה הדבור ע"כ. ומבואר במדרש איכה רבה (וילנא) פתיחתות א"ר לוי כל ערב תשעה באב היה משה מוציא כרוז בכל המחנה ואומר צאו לחפור והיו יוצאין וחופרין קברות וישנין בהן, לשחרית היה מוציא כרוז ואומר קומו והפרישו המתים מן החיים והיו עומדים ומוצאין עצמן חמשה עשר אלף בפרוטרוט חסרו שש מאות אלף, ובשנת הארבעים האחרון עשו כן ומצאו עצמן שלמים אמרו דומה שטעינו בחשבון וכן בעשור ובאחד עשר ובשנים עשר ושלשה עשר וארבע עשר, כיון דאיתמלא סיהרא אמרו דומה שהקב"ה ביטל אותה גזירה מעלינו וחזרו ועשאוהו יום טוב.

א} צריך להבין מדוע עשו אותו יו"ט ומה הדמיון ליו"כ?

ב} ושמעתי דבר נפלא בשם המשגיח מפונביז' הרה"ג לוינשטיין זצ"ל שהנה לכאורה יש להבין מדוע רק החמש עשרה אלף האחרונים זכו שהגזרה תתבטל מעליהן וכי אחרים לא התפללו להינצל?

ותירץ שההבדל בין הקודמים לאחרונים כיון שבכל שנה היו מתים ט"ו אלף מתוך עשרות אלפים ששכבו בקברם והרוב היו קמים ורק ט"ו מתוכן לא היו קמים, א"כ בכל פעם ששכבו בקברם עדיין לא היית תפילתם שלמה לתלות עיניהם רק בחסדי השי"ת, כיון שהיית מתגנבת מחשבה בתוך ליבם שהוא מקוה שלא יהיה בין הט"ו אלף שנפטרים אלא יהיה מן הנשארים, אולם הט"ו אלף האחרונים של דור המדבר היה ברור להם שהם לא יקומו ואין שום סיכוי שהן ישארו ואין להם להישען אלא על אביהם שבשמים, רק אז שפכו ליבם באמת ותלו ביטחונם רק בקב"ה לכן התקבלה תפילתם והתבטלה מעליהם הגזירה, ללמדנו את אשר אמר דוד המלך שאמנם קרוב השי"ת לכל קוראיו, אך אינו נענה אלא לכל אשר יקראוהו באמת, והיינו בלב שלם מבלי להישען על חכמתו או גבורתו או דבר אחר, ורק שאין שיתוף ופונה אך ורק לקב"ה זוכה ומתקבלת תפילתו. ולכן אמר מדוע ישיבת מיר שרדה במשך שנות השואה למרות כל גלותה ומעברה ממקום למקום בסכנות גדולות ובתנאים קשים ביותר, ואילו כאשר הגיעו לארה"ב נחרבה, כיון שכאשר היו בגלות תלו כל ביטחונם בהשי"ת והיה להם סייעתא דשמייא, ואילו כאשר הגיעו למקום מבטחים כבר בטחו גם בבני אדם ובעושר ולכן לא נענו וחרבה הישיבה. ובזה מובן מדוע עשו אותו יו"ט כי בו התחולל הנס והתקבלו התפילות וממילא הופך ליום שמסוגל לתפילות כעין יו"כ, ורוב הטעמים בגמרא הן שנתקבלו התפילות של ישראל ולכן זכו להאיר עיניהם להתיר השבטים ושבט בנימין ולהביא לקבורה הרוגי ביתר ולבטל השומרים שמנעו לעלות לרגל.

I had two problems with the vort. First, I did not like R' Levenstein's expression that the Mirrer Yeshiva in America was "כאשר הגיעו לארה"ב נחרבה." Nechreva??? Yes, we all know that the greatest Mirrer talmidim, especially R Leib Malin, felt that R Avraham Kalmanowitz's creation was too Americanized, and they went and founded Beis HaTalmud. But Chorva?  Somehow, it didn't sound right.

Second, I disagreed on the idea that the last fifteen thousand davened at all. The same way that the mishna in Brachos says that prayer to change an existing fact is a תפילת שוא, and R Akiva Eiger brings from the Sefer Chasidim that it is not just futile, but actually assur, it seems to me that once the RBSO made a 'neder' or 'Shuva,' prayer to change anything is a waste of time, no less than asking for a neis. My proof is from Moshe Rabbeinu himself. It was only after he thought that the RBSO was mattir neder did the 515 tefillos begin. Evidently, before that he didn't even try to change the Gzeira. the same is true for the Dor Hamidbar. Bishlema before the last year, fine, maybe they davened that they should live and let others be among the fifteen thousand that had to die; or that they should all live until the last year in the Midbar. But in the  last year? There was no way out. אשר נשבעתי באפי!  They were definitely going to die, so instead of davening, they would have spent their time better saying vidui. Or chazering mishnayos. What's the point of tefilla at that point!

So I sent my first question, on R Levenstein's expression, to R Malka. Here is my letter.

  כבוד הרב שליט"א

ראיתי בעלון כבודו 

(I inserted the relevant paragraph)

ואני מאוד תמה על המילים

.. ואילו כאשר הגיעו לארה"ב נחרבה..

.. כאשר הגיעו למקום מבטחים כבר בטחו גם בבני אדם ובעושר ולכן לא נענו וחרבה הישיבה..

בבקשה, יואיל נא כבוד רבנו להסביר למה התכוין במילים כדרבנות האלו

תודה רבה

אליעזר נחום איזנברג

שיקאגא

ארצות הברית

R Malka was kind enough to answer, as follows:

בס"ד 

לכבוד מעלת רבי אליעזר נחום איזנברג

שלום וברכה וכט"ס.

ראשית. שמחתי שכבודו עיין ולמד את המאמר. 

שנית. אלו הן דברי המשגיח של פונביז' ולא שלי.

שלישית. הדבר ברור ומאוד מובן שהרי כתוב בתהילים קרוב השם לכל קוראיו "אשר יקראוהו באמת". ללמדנו פעמים רבות האדם קורא ומתפלל להשם אך לא באמת, מאחר וטבעו של אדם לצרף במחשבתו את כל האופוציות הקיימות ביכולתו לפעול בכדי לקדם את בקשתו, כך שיש צירוף של כוח אנוש שהאדם תולה בו את תקוותו ואינה קריאה מכל הלב, ורק כאשר האדם מבין ומפנים שאין עוד מלבדו וגם כל ההשתדלות שלו אינה יכולה להועיל ולפעול כלום לולי רצון השם רק אז תפילתו נענית. וזה המבדיל בין כלל מתי המדבר לשיירי מתי מדבר האחרונים שהקודמים עדיין לא התפללו מעומק הלב מאחר ועדיין תלו אולי הם לא בחשבון אולם האחרונים ידעו בצורה הכי ברורה שאין שום סיכוי להימלט ורק תפילה מעומק הלב אולי תציל ולכן ניצלו. ובדומא לכך מה שהתחולל בישיבת מיר.

He's right, it's a fantastic vort and a wonderful thought about how we ought to be davening. So I told him that I had an interesting story for him: 

כבוד הרב שליט"א

תודה רבה!

מעניין מאוד מה שקרה איתי בדבר תורה זאת,

הייתי אצל רופא ירא שמים, היה לי בעיא עם הרגל שלי, בדיוק כאב לי העקב, לכבוד פרשת השבוע.

הוא ביקש שאגיד לו "ווארט," ואמרתי מה שכתבת מהר' לעווענשטין.

הוא הגיב ברגש ואמר שזה מאוד מתאים לחייו.

קודם שהמשיך לדבר, אמרתי  שזה צריך לי עיון. הקב"ה נשבע שלא יבוא דור המדבר אל הארץ, ולהתפלל במקום שבוע זה כמו צועק על העבר או מתפלל לשנות את הטבע שזה תפילת שוא, ולא רק שוא אלא לרע"א בשם ספר חסידים ממש אסור.  והא ראיה, שמשה לא התפלל על עצמו עד שחשב שהקב"ה התיר נדרו. א"כ מוכח שלהתפלל על "אשר נשבעתי באפי" זה ממש יגיעה לריק, ובמיוחד אחרי מ"ט שנים.

השיב לי הרופא שהוא בן 51, וכשהיה בן 45 אמרו לו כל הרופאים המומחים בעולם שהגיע הזמן לייאש על בנים, שלא אפשר בשום אופן שיוליד בנים, ושממש לא כדאי להמשיך לנסות. והוא החליט בלבו ש"היפלא מה' דבר??" ושדוקא במצב של יאוש הגיע הזמן להתפלל בכל לבו.

סוף דבר, יש לו בן בן חמש.  בדיוק מה שאמרת בשם הרב לעוונשטין.

ממעשה זה למדתי שהכאב שכאב לי העקב, בפרשת עקב, היה מפני שאני הייתי צריך לפגוש בדוקא ברופא זה, ושאגיד לו מה שכתבת, ועי"ז ירפא אותי רפואת הנפש.

יישר כוחך 

יתן ה' לכבודו כח ובריאות להמשיך להפיץ מעיינותיו חוצה

True story. My heel had been hurting me since Shavuos, and I finally made an appointment with an orthopedist, whom I had never met. He heard of me, and asked me to tell him a vort. I told him the vort, since it was not long after the fifteenth of Av, and he said that it really meant a lot to him. I assumed he just said that as a way of saying "Nice vort, yasher koyach," so I just kept talking, and said that I disagreed with the vort, because there was no point in davening. He then told me why the vort meant so much to him. After decades of fertility intervention, when he was 45 years old, the experts finally told him the time had come to give up. There was no way that he could ever have children, and instead of this interminable difficult and expensive and utterly futile intervention, he needs to come to terms with his reality. He then, and davka then, decided that "אין עוד מלבדו," he needed to go up the ladder to the RBSO, because there was no hope other than an answer outside of mazal and teva and "reality." 

He then said that he, now 51 years old, he has a five year old son that was born one year after he was told there was absolutely no hope.

Apparently, R Levenstein was right, and I was wrong. I'm not surprised.

I also told R Malka that I figured out why R Levenstein said חרבה הישיבה. This is because he said what he said in Yiddish. Only a born Yiddish speaker knows that there is a big difference between 

די ישיבה איז חרב געווארען and 

זיי האבען א חורבע געמאכט פון די ישיבה.

The first means they destroyed it. The second, which I'm sure is what R Levenstein said, means that they missed a great opportunity, they could have created something magnificent but they used it to create something inferior.  

Whoever was saying this over in Hebrew missed that nuance.  It was just lost in translation.

He wrote back, and said that he can see that my explanation may be true. But one thing for sure:  He is going to say over the story.

בס"ד

שלום וברכה.

יתכן. 

אבל ישר כוח על הסיפורים הנפלאים ממש מחזק ובעזרת השם אשתמש בהם לשיעורים. ברוכים תהיו.

‎*********************************************************************************************************

בכבוד רב,

לשכת הרב הראשי לאלעד

הרה"ג מרדכי מלכא שליט"א

 

www.orhamelech.org

 

טלפון בית: 03-9096874

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Va'eschanan, Devarim 4:9-10 and 6:7 The Jewish Home is Har Sinai

The home and the family is the Har Sinai of Klal Yisrael.

The passuk in 6:7 says

ושננתם לבניך ודברת בם בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך בדרך

ארחות חיים לרבינו הרא"ש

ליום שלישי, 44.

קבע עתים לתורה קודם אכילה ושכיבה, ודברת בם על שלחנך,והזהרת בם אנשי ביתך להדריכם על פי התורה בכל הדברים הצריכים אזהרה

Establish times to learn, before you eat or sleep.  "And you shall speak of them" at your table, and instruct the members of your household, to lead them to follow the way of the Torah in all matters that need instuction.

ר' דניאל מובשוביץ זצוק"ל in a letter to someone that had learned in the Beis HaTalmud in Kelm, quoted in הערות ועיונים על אורחות חיים להרא"ש מר' שמואל שכטר:

וכן ראיתי מהגדולים שדיברו תמיד בביתם על שולחנם באמונה ובבטחון ובזריזות ובמנוחה ובאהבת תורה ומצוות ולהסיר השטף והדיבור מהבלי העולם הזה ולנטוע אהבת העולם הבא.  וכן אודות חסד והטבא ואמת ונושא בעול עם חבירו וכו'מעלת בר סמכא ובעל שכל חזק ולהיות איש חיל ושם לב על דרכיו, הכל דברים הנודעים, אם מפרשת השבוע, מהפטרה, מחובות הלבבות ומשערי תשובה לרבינו יונה.

So I saw among great men, that they spoke all the time in their houses at their tables of belief, faith, alacrity and tranquility, love of Torah and the Mitzvos, and to avoid the onrushing and the talk of worldly foolishness and to implant love for the world to come.  Also, about kindness and charity and truth and carrying other's burden with them, and the great value of being a man that can be relied upon, a man with a strong mind, a brave man who thinks carefully of what he will do, all these things are well known; whether from the weekly Parsha, or the Haftorah, or the Chovos Halevavos, or Shaarei Teshuva of Rabbeinu Yona.

Rabbeinu Bachay in Parshas Teruma:

מנהג חסידים שבצרפת שעושים משלחנם ארון לקבורה, להורות כי האדם לא ישא מאומה בידו ולא ילונו בעמלו כי אם הצדקה שעשה בחייו והטובה שהוא מיטיב על שלחנו.

Rabbeinu Bachay says that the minhag of the holy men of France was that they would have their dining room tables used to fabricate their coffins, to show that a man takes nothing in his hands from this world, and nothing will accompany him from all his efforts other than the tzedaka he does and the good he does at his table.

Rabbeinu Bachay is talking about Tzedaka.  His words are equally true regarding the Divrei Torah and Mussar that are said at the table.

In my cousin's house, Harav Mordechai Tendler, whose Rebbitzen is the daughter of Harav Yaakov Jofen, they have had a minhag from the time their children were babies that at every Shabbos seuda the family reads  and discusses a chapter from the Alter of Navardok's Madreigas Ha'adam.  I am not necessarily recommending this for everyone.  Some people can make it an interesting and stimulating experience that the children look forward to.  Others would do it as a religious obligation and the children might see it as an boring and tedious imposition.  It has to be right for you:  the Seuda on Shabbos has to be a pleasure and something everyone looks forward to.  If the only way to ensure the pleasure of the Shabbos meal in your house is by talking about the Mets, so be it.  But if you can manage to get the Madreigas Ha'adam in, in a way that adds to the pleasure of the Seuda, then that would be wonderful.


This bonding of family and Torah is not limited to parents.  It applies equally to grandparents.  Regarding the passuk in our parsha 4:9-10,

 רק השמר לך ושמר נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך ופן יסורו מלבבך כל ימי חייך והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך. יום אשר עמדת לפני ה׳ אלקיך בחרב

Be very careful to...teach it to your children and grandchildren, about the day you stood before God at Chorev (Sinai)

the Gemara in Kiddushin (30a) says 

אמר ריב״ל: כל המלמד את בן בנו תורה, מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קבלה מהר סיני, שנאמר: והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך, וסמיך ליה: יום אשר עמדת לפני ה׳ אלקיך בחורב

Anyone who teaches his grandchild Torah is viewed as if he had received it from Har Sinai.

and the Sefer Hamikneh there says a wonderful thing.

. ונראה לפרש מפני שאמרו חז״ל אינו דומה לשומע מפי הרב [לשומע] מפי התלמיד, וכן מצינו שבכל דור ודור מימות משה רבינו ע״ה שנתמעט ההשגה כפי ריחוק המקבלים זה מזה, וכר, וזה הטעם שאמרה תורה שילמד את בן בנו אף על גב מחוייב בנו ללמדו שהוא אביו, אלא שאינו דומה ממה שיקבל מבנו למה שיקבל ממנו לכך חייב התורה לאבי אביו שהוא עדיף טפי, וכיון שמצינו ששכר הגמול המלמד את חברו תורה הש״י משפיע לו חכמה, כמו שאמרו מתלמידי יותר מכולם, וכו', כן הגמול הזה שהוא מכוין ללמד את בן בנו כדי לקרב קבלתו, כן הקב״ה מקרב קבלתו כאילו קיבלו מהר חורב וק״ל

Chazal have said that you can't compare one that learns from the teacher to one that learns from the student.  And indeed we find that in every generation from the time of Moshe Rabbeinu comprehension has diminished in proportion to the distance of those who receive it.  This is why the Torah says that one should teach his grandson, even though one's son is obligated to teach his own child; because what the child receives from his own father is not comparable to what he receives from his grandfather.  The reward for one who teaches another Torah is a heightened understanding, and here, too, since his intention is to teach his grandson in order that he will receive the Torah from an earlier generation, so too Hashem will endow the grandfather with an understanding of one who stood at Har Sinai.

The Jewish home, the Jewish family, is the Har Sinai of every generation.

~

Va'eschanan, Eikev, and Re'eh. Why a Chassan Speaks; Fat is Fate; and Resentful Meshulachim

I haven't posted recently.  Here are a few things I found interesting.  I hope you find them interesting as well.

I
In Parshas Va'Eschanan, Devarim 6:7 - ודברת בם, בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך בדרך, ובשכבך ובקומך, and in Parshas Eikev, Devarim 11:19 -  ושננתם לבניך, ודברת בם, בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך בדרך, ובשכבך ובקומך , the passuk tells us that we need to learn and teach Torah.  Targum Yonasan adds, in both cases, ותהויין הגיין בהון במותביכון בבתיכון בזמן מיעסקכון בחיתונכון, which means, most probably, that you should learn Torah when you are busy with your wedding.  This is very strange, in light of the classic Chazal that the people involved in making a wedding, and certainly the Chassan, are granted a dispensation on the obligation of Limud HaTorah.  In any case, if you want an interesting source for our minhag that Chasanim say Divrei Torah at Aufrufs and Sheva Brachos, here you have it.

Truth is, I believe the reason our minhag is for a Chassan to speak at the Aufruf and Sheva Brachos because they are so distracted and busy that if they didn't have to speak, days would go by and they would not learn a word.  Now that they have to speak in public, to a critical crowd, in front of a new wife and in laws and strangers, they have no choice but to learn more diligently than usual.  This is also why a father is expected to say a Dvar Torah at a Bris.  In fact, I remember being in the delivery room when my bechor was born, and immediately thinking about what I would say at the bris.  But the Targum is interesting.

After citing the Targum and my pshat, here are the usual reasons offered to explain why chassanim speak at the Sheva Brachos.

a.  The Gemara (Sanhedrin 101) says that at every festive gathering, we should say divrei Torah:

התורה חוגרת שק ועומדת לפני הקב"ה ואומרת לפניו רבונו של עולם עשאוני בניך ככנור שמנגנין בו לצים אמר לה בתי בשעה שאוכלין ושותין במה יתעסקו אמרה לפניו רבונו של עולם אם בעלי מקרא הן יעסקו בתורה ובנביאים ובכתובים אם בעלי משנה הן יעסקו במשנה בהלכות ובהגדות ואם בעלי תלמוד הן יעסקו בהלכות פסח בפסח בהלכות עצרת בעצרת בהלכות חג בחג 

so it's not specific to a Sheva Brachos, but an application of the Gemara's general instruction to say divrei torah at festive gatherings.

b.  Many people have said that because the Gemara (Pesachim 49a) says that the marriage of the daughter of a talmid chacham to an am ha'aretz is ill fated and not a seudas mitzva:

תניא רבי שמעון אומר כל סעודה שאינה של מצוה אין תלמיד חכם רשאי להנות ממנה כגון מאי א"ר יוחנן כגון בת כהן לישראל ובת תלמיד חכם לעם הארץ דא"ר יוחנן בת כהן לישראל אין זווגן עולה יפה

so the Chassan endeavors to demonstrate that he is a talmid chacham and so it is a auspicious marriage and a seudas mitzva.  By the way, many have said that this explains why we "hak up" the Chassan, why we often interrupt him during the speech and don't let him finish his prepared divrei Torah- because we are saying that he doesn't need to prove that he's a talmid chacham, we know that he's a talmid chacham without his having to prove it to us with his speech.

II
If you're fat, it's not because you're a slovenly and undisciplined bum.  It's fate.  Regarding the passuk in Devarim 30:15 that says ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב ואת המוות ואת הרע, the Medrash Tanchuma in Pekudei says : הקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על הטיפה מה יהא בסופה, אם זכר אם נקבה, אם חלש גיבור, אם עני אם עשיר, אם קצר או ארוך, אם מכוער או נאה, אם עבה או דק, אם בזוי או גס. וכן גוזר על כל קורותיו. אבל אם צדיק אם רשע, לא, אלא הדבר ההוא נותנו בידו של אדם בלבד, שנאמר: ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב, ואת המות ואת הרע (דב' ל טו).   Basically, fat is fate.  Relax and enjoy it.



III
In parshas Re'eh, the Torah objurgates a person that refuses to lend money to a fellow Jew out of fear that the borrower will take advantage of the law of Shemita and not pay back the loan.  The Torah refers to such a person as a Beli'al, the equivalent of an idolater.  The Chafetz Chaim in the intro to Ahavas Chesed discusses this, and brings the Chinuch that says it's talking about a borrower who, under the terms of the loan, should pay back before the debt-annulment of Shevi'is takes place (so we're not dealing with out-and-out Tzedaka,) but you're worried that he won't pay back on time and he'll push you off until Shevi'is comes.

משרשי המצוה כדי לחזק ולקבוע בנפשינו מדת הנדיבות ולהרחיק בתכלית ריחוק מדת הכילות, ואין נדיב יותר בעולם כמלוה מעותיו בלי משכון עם היותו יודע שהזמן קרוב להשמיט מעותיו ולהפסידו ממנו באם לא יוכל לגבותם קודם השמטה. והוציא הכתוב בלשון השמר לך לומר שאל יעלה על רוחך כי על נזק הדל אני מזהירך פן יחסר לו אשר לא תתן לו, כי לא כן הוא ועל הנוגע לך מזהירך כי יקרך עון. וזהו שאמר השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל לאמר קרבה שנת השבע שנת השמיטה של שמיטת קרקעות וכרמים וזיתים, ובהם כמונו כעניים שוים בהם, ואיך עוד אפתח ידי לתת עוד לו מממוני צדקה, נמצא העניים אוכלים אותנו בשלש פיות. דע כי לב בליעל הוא, קשה המעשה כע"ז כמ"ש ז"ל כל המעלים עינו מן הצדקה כאלו עובד ע"ז, נאמר כאן בליעל ונאמר יצאו אנשים בני בליעל.

Declining to lend such a person doesn't sound like idolatry to me, and I'm not sure what the problem is.  It's possible that the problem is that you don't believe that Hashem will pay you back for the borrower's non-payment.  But it seems to me that to lend him money, when you have a legitimate concern about his unfairly delaying until Shevi'is, is no worse than building a fence around your land to keep out vandals.

In any case, what I want to know is this:  Does Usha's rule of Chomesh apply to loans.  Of, better, the Gaon holds that Chomesh is De'oraysa when the poor man is in front of you.  Does that rule of Chomesh apply to loans?  When are you obligated to lend money, and to what extent does this obligation extend?  And you can't say that it's a wishy washy rule, that you ought to do it but if you don't it's no big deal, because it is a very very big deal: the Torah warns you that if you don't lend the money, you are in serious trouble.  What triggers the obligation, and under what circumstances of the borrower and under what financial condition of the lender does it apply.  As we will see in a moment, it is not limited to destitute borrowers.  But it certainly doesn't apply to a profligate wastrel or a speculator that wants to invest in commodity futures.  I don't know the answer to this question, and I would be very happy to hear from someone who has something good to say about this.

4.  Again on the passuk (15:9) השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל לאמר קרבה שנת השבע שנת השמטה ורעה עינך באחיך האביון ולא תתן לו וקרא עליך אל ה' והיה בך חטא., that it is akin to idolatry to refuse a loan to a person that is in need.  From a cursory reading of the passuk, one would understand it to refer to a man who needs a loan because he is hungry or desperate for sustenance of some sort.  However, the Chinuch here in Mitzvah 488 says that it is broader, and it includes a businessman who needs a loan. 
Additionally, the Rambam applies it as a general mitzva, not limited to loans.  The Rambam brings this passuk in three places:

9 Shmitah V'Yovel 30

מי שנמנע מלהלוות את חבירו קודם השמיטה שמא יתאחר החוב שלו וישמט עבר בלא תעשה שנאמר השמר לך וגו'. וחטא גדול הוא שהרי הזהירה עליו תורה בשני לאוין שנאמר השמר לך פן וגו'. וכל מקום שנאמר השמר או פן או אל הרי זה מצות לא תעשה. והתורה הקפידה על מחשבה רעה זו וקראתו בליעל. והרי הוסיף הכתוב להזהיר ולצוות שלא ימנע אלא יתן שנאמר נתן תתן לו ולא ירע לבבך בתתך לו וגו'. והבטיח הקב"ה בשכר מצוה זו בעולם הזה שנאמר כי בגלל הדבר הזה יברכך וגו':

10 Matnas Aniyim 3
כל המעלים עיניו מן הצדקה הרי זה נקרא בליעל כמו שנקרא עובד עכו"ם בליעל. ובעכו"ם הוא אומר יצאו אנשים בני בליעל ובמעלים עיניו מן הצדקה הוא אומר השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל. ונקרא רשע שנאמר ורחמי רשעים אכזרי. ונקרא חוטא שנאמר וקרא עליך אל ה' והיה בך חטא. והקב"ה קרוב לשועת עניים שנאמר שועת עניים אתה תשמע. לפיכך צריך להזהר בצעקתם שהרי ברית כרותה להם שנאמר והיה כי יצעק אלי ושמעתי כי חנון אני:
1 Malveh V'Loveh 1
מצות עשה להלוות לעניי ישראל שנאמר אם כסף תלוה את עמי את העני עמך. יכול רשות תלמוד לומר העבט תעביטנו וגו' ומצוה זו גדולה מן הצדקה אל העני השואל שזה כבר נצרך לשאול וזה עדיין לא הגיע למדה זו. והתורה הקפידה על מי שימנע מלהלוות לעני שנאמר ורעה עינך באחיך האביון וגו':

Although our passuk refers to "your desperate brother," it is clear, again, from the Rambam in Shmita V'Yovel it is clear that he applies it to anyone who needs a loan, even if he is not an Evyon.  As I mentioned above, I don't know the extent of this obligation.

5.  The passuk says that if one refuses to give the loan, he has sinned.  The Rambam quoted above emphasizes this as well. Rashi in our passuk also says a remarkable thing about this:  The passuk says that if the poor man cries to Hashem, Hashem will listen to his cries and punish the one who refused to lend him money.  

and he will cry out [to the Lord] against you: One might think this is a requirement [namely, that this poor man is obliged to “cry out… against you”]. Therefore, Scripture says, “[On his day you shall give him his payment…] so that he will not cry against you [to the Lord]” (Deut. 24:15). - [Sifrei 15:138]		וקרא עליך: יכול מצוה, תלמוד לומר (דברים כד, טו) ולא יקרא:
and it will be a sin to you: in any case, even if he does not cry [against you]. If so, why does it say,“and he will cry out… against you?” [It means that God says:] I hasten to punish in response to the one who cries out more than to the one who does not cry out. — [Sifrei]		והיה בך חטא: מכל מקום, אפילו לא יקרא. אם כן למה נאמר וקרא עליך, ממהר אני ליפרע על ידי הקורא יותר ממי שאינו קורא:

Regarding the first Rashi:  Why on Earth would I have thought that the rejected applicant is obliged to cry out against the one who refused?  Regarding the second Rashi, and the passuk in general: What obligates a man to lend to another?  If a person refuses to take a lulav and esrog, if a person refuses to wear Tefillin, is the punishment so severe?  Why is this so serious here?  What right does the supplicant have to the lender's money?  So let's assume that if a person is in a position to lend money, he is a Gizbar, he is a steward of the money, not its owner, and a steward who is entrusted with assets to be used for another's benefit, and he refuses to do so, is a thief.  But this is a complaint the Hashem has against the wealthy man.  What right does the supplicant have to complain?  It's not his money, he was asking for a favor, what kind of chutzpah is it that he asks Hashem to punish the man who refused to do him a favor?  I would think that such a person is imbalanced, or a potential thief himself, because he views the money as his entitlement, when it actually belongs to the other person.  Bishlema by an item given in collateral, the lender's refusal to let the borrower use it in a time of need is unfair, because until the court takes it from the borrower and gives it finally to the lender, it is to some extent the property of the borrower.  But here, what right does the supplicant have to complain to Hashem- to the extent that you need a passuk to tell you that although he MAY complain to Hashem, he has no OBLIGATION to do so!

I am well aware that meshulachim and aniyim curse the people who don't give them as much as they think they're entitled to.  I've seen this many times.  But it's an ugly trait, and unfit for any normal member of Klal Yisrael.  I assume it stems from the fact that they have taken tzedaka for so long that they perceive the money in your pocket as belonging to them.  They no longer see the demarcation between what's yours and what's theirs, at least insofar as taking is concerned.  But it's not a good middah.  It is a very very bad middah.  The reason it's called "my money" is because it is my money.  What is the hava amina that the poor person is obligated to complain to Hashem????

Va'eschanan, Devarim 6:13. Honoring Hashem and Talmidei Chachamim

"את ה' אלוקיך תירא"  tells us that we must fear Hashem, and that our behavior must reflect that fear.  For example, the Mishna Berura in 215:20 says that because of this passuk, one who casually enunciates Hashem's name, one who says Hashem's name in a manner that evinces a lack of fear and awe of Hashem, transgresses an issur De'Oraysa.   (I mention this to anticipate the argument that the passuk only discusses the emotion, and that an act is merely a symptom of a lack of fear.  From here we see that the passuk (as a whole) addresses equally heart, mind, and action.)

This passuk is the subject of a famous difference of opinion between Shimon (or Nechemiah) Ha'Amsoni and Rebbi Akiva.  This is in several places in Shas, and the first in Kiddushin 57a.

שמעון העמסוני ואמרי לה נחמיה העמסוני היה דורש כל אתין שבתורה כיון שהגיע (דברים ו) לאת ה' אלהיך תירא פירש אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי כל אתין שדרשת מה תהא עליהם אמר להם כשם שקבלתי שכר על הדרישה כך קבלתי על הפרישה עד שבא רבי עקיבא ולימד את ה' אלהיך תירא לרבות תלמידי חכמים

Shimon the Amsoni made a career of interpreting the word "Es" as a term that expands the explicit terms of the passuk.  For example:  We are all familiar with the rule that Tevilla requires that our hair be in the mikva as well as our body.  This is not explicit anywhere in the Torah.  However, the Gemara (Eiruvin 4a) says 

שערו נמי דאורייתא הוא דתניא ורחץ את כל בשרו את הטפל לבשרו וזהו שער

that from the words "Es b'saro" we learn that not only does his body, his Basar, require tevilla, but even that which is secondary to his body, namely his hair, requires Tevilla as well.

 But when he came to Parshas Va'eschanan, and he saw our passuk, he abandoned his thesis that "Es" expands the passuk.  Rashi explains that Reb Yishmael thought, מה ארבה לירא עמו?  What can I possibly include in fear of G-d?   There is nothing that can possibly be compared to the fear of Hashem!    His talmidim asked him, Rebbi, what of all the drashos you've taught us?  He answered, just as I was rewarded for interpreting, so too shall I be rewarded for relinquishing.  But then (in the next generation) came Reb Akiva and interpreted that our passuk teaches us to fear talmidei chachamim.

Reading the Gemara immediately elicits some obvious and important questions.  What did Reb Akiva know that Reb Yishmael did not?  Or, alternatively, what is the machlokes between Reb Yishmael and Reb Akiva?  And more interesting, what did Reb Yishmael do with the many, many instances prior to this passuk that use the word "Es" with Hashem's name?  In fact, right in our parsha, eleven psukim before, the passuk says לְמַעַן תִּירָא אֶת ה' אֱלֹקיךָ.  What did he do with that "Es" that he couldn't do with this one?

Rabbi Shain, a Rebbi in Yeshiva of Staten Island, in his excellent sefer "Birkas Ish" (in Parshas Miketz), shows us a clear answer to this question that ironically answers nothing at all.

We find, he says, that Onkelos translates אֶת in several ways.  In Breishis 37:2 by הָיָה רֹעֶה אֶת אֶחָיו בַּצֹּאן, וְהוּא נַעַר אֶת בְּנֵי בִלְהָה וְאֶת בְּנֵי זִלְפָּה he translates both Eses to mean עם, with.  In Shemos 9:29, he translates ויאמר אליו משה כצאתי את העיר as from/מן.  Of course, most of the time Onkelos translates את as ית.    It is clear that when את  has a function in the passuk, Reb Yishmael doesn't darshen it as a ribui at all.  It is only the את that means ית that Reb Yishmael darshens as a ribui.

In the context of Hashem's name, he notes that in Breishis 44:18, Yosef said to his brothers .אֶת הָאֱלֹקים אֲנִי יָרֵא; In Shemos 1:17 it says וַתִּירֶאןָ הַמְיַלְּדֹת אֶת הָאֱלֹקים; and in Shemos 14:31 it says וַיִּירְאוּ הָעָם אֶת .  Examining these cases, we find that in every iteration of   "את השם", Onkelos translates it either as מן קדם השם or קדם השם.  The first and last time that Onkelos translates it differently is "את השם", where he translates it to mean ית השם.

So this definitely answers the question.  It is only את that means ית that Reb Yishmael darshens as a ribui.  Even the  קדם and מן קדם have a function in pshat in the passuk.  The one and only time that את means ית in the context of Hashem's name is our passuk, which Reb Yishmael would have had to darshen as a ribui.

The question remains, what is the difference in this passuk from every other similar passuk that made Onkelos translate it to mean ית and not מן קדם or קדם.

Now:
Reb Yonah Valler, in his Kanfei Yona in this week's parsha, says that he understands the Machlokes between Reb Akiva and שמעון העמסוני as similar to the machlokes between the Rambam and the Geonim on chatzitza of hair.  We mentioned above that from the words ורחץ את כל בשרו we learn that when you go to the mikva, you are required to be tovel your hair as well as the rest of your body.  Thus, dirt or knots in the hair that prevent contact with the water raise a  Chatzitza issue.

Generally, the rule of Chatzitza is that רובו ומקפיד, something that covers a majority of the object, and the person doesn't want it there, it is a chatzitza mid'oraysa.  How do we define majority of the surface of a person?  The Rambam holds that we add the surface area of the hair to that of the body, and a majority of that sum is called a majority.  The Geonim hold that the hair is viewed separately, and if a majority of the hair is covered, even though it's a tiny minority of hair plus body, it is a chatzitza de'oraysa.  (We pasken like the Geonim.)

The Ran in the Rif's hilchos Niddah explains the machlokes like this:
The Geonim hold that since we darshen Es to mean hair, it's like two pesukim:  an explicit passuk for "body" and an implicit one for "hair".  Therefore they hold that if the majority of the hair is covered, it's a chatzitza.  The Rambam holds that even after the drasha, all we know is that the hair is counted as appurtenant to the body, so we add the surface of both to determine if the chatzitza covers a majority.

Thus, he says, if you say like the Rambam that the Ribui of Es to add another implicit but coequal and equivalent element, there's no way that we can include talmidei chachamim in our passuk.  Talmidei Chachamim are not coequal with the Ribono shel Olam.  This is the shitta of שמעון העמסוני.  If, however, you say like the Geonim, that the ribui of Es only says that along with A you have to also consider B, then there's nothing wrong with saying that Es by Hashem includes Talmidei Chachamim.  This is the shitta of Reb Akiva.

He adds that this explains why the Rambam in Shoresh II in Mitzvos brings that the Bahag holds that the fear of Talmidei Chachamim is counted as a mitzva separate from fear of Hashem.  The Rambam argues and says that it is appurtenant, not coequal.  This, of course, is the Rambam leshitaso by tevilla of hair.  Es is only appurtenant, not coequal.

So now, let's get back to our question.  שמעון העמסוני knew of our passuk when he started darshening the word Es back in Breishis, and it apparently never bothered him.  What changed?  There can only be two explanations:  That he used to think it meant מן קדם, so you don't have to darshen it as a ribui at all, or that he always knew it meant ית and that it was a ribui, but he used to hold like Reb Akiva that it means appurtenant, not coequal.

TBC

(just to get this Yetzer Hara out of the way, I need to mention that in Yeshivos, they say pshat in Reb Akiva's  chiddush of לרבות תלמידי חכמים is that even a Talmid Chacham needs to be a Yarei Shamayim.)

Va'eschanan, Devarim 6:7. Ve'shinantam Le'vanecha.

The mitzva of Limud Hatorah is derived from here and from Vehaya Im Shamo’a’s ‘Velimadetem’ below in Devarim 11:19.

Reb Akiva Eiger in the teshuvos (starting at #29) discusses whether kesiva is ke'dibbur, whether writing has the same halachic status as speech, regarding Oaths, Counting the Omer, and other things. Reb Akiva Eiger holds that it is not ke’dibbur, and that you do not fulfill the mitzva of Talmud Torah by thinking the words of Torah.

He brings a contrary opinion from Teshuvos Shev Yakov, who holds that it is ke’dibbur. The Shev Yaakov brings proof to his opinion from the halacha that one who thinks in learning does not have to make a Birchas Hatorah, but one who writes Torah does have to make a bracha. The difference must be that thinking is not the same as speech, but writing is, and therefore requires birkas hatorah. But Reb Akiva Eiger shlogs op the raya. He explains that we learn the Mitzva of Talmud Torah from the words veshinantam and velimadetem; both of these words mean both to study and to teach. This is why we exclude thinking, hirhur, because you can’t teach anyone Torah by being meharher in learning. On the other hand, when you write, you certainly can teach others through your writing, and therefore it is included in the mitzvah of talmud Torah. Thus, the Shev Yakov’s raya is not good; The Shev Yaakov held that the Mitzva is dibbur, and the difference between thinking and writing is that thinking is not like dibbur, while writing is like dibbur. Reb Akiva Eiger explains that by Torah, there is no din of dibbur at all. The only din is that it has to be a limud which could be used to teach others. This is the only reason that we are mema’eit hirhur. But in the case of other dinim, like sefira or sh'vua, which do require dibbur, ke'siva would not be enough.

We see from here a very interesting thought; that limud hatorah has to have in it the ability to teach others. Limud which is not spread, or a lomeid who does not make an effort to teach others, is missing the ikkar of talmud Torah. If a person learns Torah, and has no influence on the people around him, there is something wrong with his Torah. If your children are not at least as great as you- relative to their capacity and the circumstances-- then it’s a raya that your own limud hatorah was flawed

☞Note, also, that R’ Akiva Eiger wrote the tshuva on the day he got married, as he says in the beginning of the tshuva

Rabbi Moshe Kletenick of Seattle once spoke at his nephew's bris, and said that he heard once that the Rambam in the Yad somewhere says that one brings his child to Hakhel “leiro’os bo,” to be seen with his child. He said over that this means that the parent brings the child to demonstrate that he is a shomer Torah, and he shows that by bringing a child that is being properly raised to do mitzvos.

Sanhedrin 99a: “kol halomeid Torah ve’eino melamda harei zeh bichlal ki dvar Hashem bazah.” One who learns Torah, and does not teach it to others, he is included in the phrase "the word of God he has disgraced."

So whenever we learn, we need to remember that we can't pat ourselves on the back and say that we're good boys, we've been mekayeim the mitzva of Talmud Torah. The Mitzva of Talmud Torah is far deeper and broader than learning alone. It includes learning, incorporating the mitzva so that it is a part of our mind and our emotions, bringing what we've learned to our real life, and teaching others what we've learned. We say this every day in Birchos Kri'as Shma: Lilmod, le'lameid, lishmor ve'la'asos.

In a guest post, Rabbi Doctor Psychrolutes marcidus brought an Reb Yosef Ber Soloveitchik's amazing diyuk that the Rambam is meramez exactly this thought in 1 Talmud Torah:1-4. See http://havolim.blogspot.com/2009/07/land-of-free-part-ii.html


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Va'eschanan, Devorim 4:39. Ve'yadata hayom Ve'hasheivosa el Levavecha: The Mind and the Heart.

This pasuk tells us that we should know- ve'yadata- that Hashem is the One and Only Master of the Universe. Then, the pasuk tells us, 've'hasheivosa el levavecha,' set it firmly into your heart. Clearly, the second step goes beyond the first, and one might know Hashem's kingship and still not achieve what this pasuk requires of him. What is the difference between 'knowing' and 'setting firmly into the heart'?

In fact, though, there is a very important qualitative difference between the two points of knowledge. Reb Yitzchok Blazer, a student of Reb Yisroel Salanter, once said that the distance between Ve'yadata and V’hasheivosa is far greater that the distance between Lo Yadata and Yadata. From Lo Yadata to Yadata, from 'not knowing' to 'knowing' is a relatively small step. From Yadata to Ve'hasheivosa, from 'knowing' to 'knowledge of the heart' is an Odyssey.

Just knowing something is not at all the same as a full emotional understanding. We have all experienced the difference: This is like when a person tells his best friend, or a father tells a son, close your eyes, lean back, and fall into my arms. Even if you absolutely trust the person behind you, it will be very hard to actually fall and depend on the person to catch you. Only after a few false starts can you convince your body to let go and fall into the other’s arms. It’s not enough that you know— your body has to be convinced.

Reb Eliyahu Dessler (Michtav Mei’Eliahu Vol. 5, on the avoda of Rosh Hashanna.) stresses this difference, which he categorizes as the difference between rational awareness and ‘dveikus’. He says that this journey is the avoda of Rosh Hashanna: if you properly say Malchios, Zichronos, and Shofros, you will come to devykus, which will make teshuva a foregone conclusion. If the dveykus does not lead to remorse and full teshuva for past sins, then your enthusiasm and kavana is just an ephemeral experience, a caprice, a delusion.


This applies just as well to negative or destructive beliefs or behaviors. In the Haftorah of Devorim the Navi talks about sins that are Kashanim and sins that are Katola. Both shanim and tola refer to red-dyed wool Despite their similar appearance to an observer, there is an very important difference between them. R’ Meir Simcha says that Shanim is wool that is only dyed on the surface, so teshuva can result in brilliant white like snow, whereas Tola is red through and through, and teshuva can only result in the less pristine white of Tzemer. This illustrates the difference between an act or behavior that is superficial and one that saturates the personality.

The Darash Moshe and the Ramban observe that the Meraglim in Shemos Shlach 13:3, were listed lefi gedulosom, in the order of their spiritual achievements. But strangely, we find that Yehoshua and Kaleiv are in middle of the pack. Despite the apparent superior tzidkus of the others over Yehoshua and Kalev, what mattered in the end, when faced with nisayon, was the depth of conviction, the emotional saturation, the dveikus— the hasheivoso el levavecha.

What really is the difference between yedi’ah of the mind and yedi’ah of the heart? One example: a woman may know absolutely that married women cannot go outdoors with her hair uncovered. But she might sit in mixed company and talk about private matters that concern only her and her husband. Or, strangely enough (and I’m not making this up), swim at a mixed pool– with a snood to preserve her standards of modesty. People who never miss davenning in shul can let years go by without one Shmoneh Esrei in which they pour their hearts out to Hashem. What the heck are they doing there? The only possible explanation is that simply knowing something means that you know the thing and nothing more. Knowing it in your heart means that you understand and feel the underlying concept and you have made it a part of your emotional and intellectual essence. When a person has reached that level, then everything he does will subconsciously be checked for consistency with his essential belief.

A friend of mine has a talent often associated with "savants." He can tell you immediately what day of the week any date, past or future, will fall on. He doesn’t hesitate for a moment– he knows immediately. There is a certain complex formula that anyone can laboriously work out that will yield the same result. I am told that if a person works through the formula hundreds, or maybe thousands, of times, he eventually develops the intuitive, subconscious skill to know the answer without any apparent thought at all, just as my friend does. That is the difference between ve’yadata and ve’hasheivosa ehl le’vovecha.

And how can you tell who is a tzadik misafa v’lachutz and who is a tzadik in his pnimiyus? You can’t. Not only can’t you tell in other people, you can’t even tell in yourself. It’s like courage— you never know what you are until you are tested, as is well illustrated in Stephan Crane's The Red Badge of Courage. Not only can’t you tell, it is almost unknowable; the Torah (and Sefer Iyov) is full of stories of people who were tested, after which Hashem says “Atta yadati” that you are a real ba’al bitochon. Appearances mean little. Only after being put to the test can one know who he is.

When we put on our tefillin, let us remember this important idea, perfectly symbolized by the Shel Rosh on our head, the straps of the shel rosh that go down to our heart, the Shel Yad next to the heart, with the straps that go down to our hands: it is not enough to 'know'. Torah has has to go from your Head to your Heart to your Hands.